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Abstract
Amid a long period of deskilling in art school curricula, craft has been denigrated as inferior to
art and confining for artists, but can craft liberate imagination? The purpose of this study was to
understand the relationship between an adult learner’s self-perceived capacity for imaginative
expression in representational drawing and the development of her artisanal judgment during a
self-directed program of classical study, online and in-person, over a period of 22 months
(mostly during the coronavirus pandemic). The researcher created, coded, and analyzed
drawings, photographs, field notes, diaries, and video recordings to track cognitive events and
situative factors encountered in the process of learning to draw. Rooted in Kantian philosophy
and guided by Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, an analytic interpretation of findings revealed
the role of knowledge (empirical, axiomatic, tacit) and epistemically felicitous falsehoods in
achieving constructive perception, a capability suited to imaginative expression in drawing and
the predominant challenge of navigating complex attentional dynamics. Findings also described
the role of embodied modalities, which constituted a somatic activity system, in grounding
cognition and supporting learning transfer. Exploration of communities of practice served as a
rite of passage, bringing to light artistic apparatus and valuable opportunities for peer learning.
The inquiry exposed the author’s unhelpful assumptions about imagination and identified
methods for developing it that could be earned, not merely gifted: elaborative sketching,
engaging with art, visual research, perceptual and recollective drawing, constructive drawing,
and problem finding. This firsthand processual account of adult learning recommends a holistic
approach to constructivist pedagogy over naïve, or trivial conceptualizations of constructivism in
drawing curricula. In addition to helping novice artists heal the breach between skill-building and
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imagination, the study contributes to literature, in educational psychology and social sciences
generally, on adult learning and cognition in the arts.
Keywords: adult development, cognitive autoethnography, communities of practice,
constructivism, drawing study and teaching, imagination in art, self-directed learning, tacit
knowing
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“Drawing Mother”
This is a task beyond magic.
How am I to draw this woman
so young she was not yet mother?
In her eyes I see dreams flower
before tomorrow slammed the door.
Draw that. I may as well
compose clouds or fish for stars.
I do not attempt art here,
but resurrection.
I lay down stroke on stroke
to see the truth dissolve in colors.
The heart’s eye and the inept hand
quarrel over line and shade—
but to draw is to touch
and so though the cool gods
watch but do not help,
I will draw—and draw again
—Joanne Speidel, Crow Songs
Copyright 2002 by Joanne Speidel. Reprinted with permission.
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“I went to art school when you weren’t supposed to know anything,” said the artist Cheri
Wheat to me when I introduced myself at the end of her drawing workshop on October 5, 2019.
Cheri is an accomplished artist who, determined to learn classical methods, found a way to do so
outside her college curriculum. She said it matter-of-factly, without affectation, not behind a
smug veneer. In that simple moment, I felt seen, as if I had been invisible for years.
My experience of art school in my teens and early 20s matched Cheri’s description.
Almost nothing was taught in the way of skills. Professors in charge of my first-year foundations
class extolled the virtues of breaking down what little knowledge was in our heads. They
assumed we had received technical training in high school or through private classes. For many,
that was true, but not for all; not for me. At the beginning of a new assignment, they would read
us a list of art supplies we needed to buy. I remember once a couple of the professors snickered
sarcastically, telling us what a pity it was that our parents would need to purchase yet another
item for us. Maybe that was their own recollection of spending in college. Maybe they did not
spend their summers waitressing, cleaning houses, or paving roads. As a first-generation student
who understood the realities of blue-collar drudgery, I was too intimidated to ask.
I grew up in a small town to working class parents before the dawn of the World Wide
Web. When it came to clothing for school, or money for family vacations, we went through some
lean times. That reality was etched into my father’s hands, which bore the cracks and callouses
of his livelihood; it was audible in my mother’s voice when she worried. My parents worked
hard. Thanks to them, there was always food on the table. On balance, things were good. We
were surrounded by family and friends. We had a home in a neighborhood where I could walk in
the woods. I had plenty of good books to read, many from the public library. Those books set my
imagination on fire.
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In light of my rural upbringing, it probably is not surprising that art school did not match
the expectations I had in mind for it. With no experience of the contemporary art world and a
bare minimum of art education in public school, I embarked on a curriculum that was, in many
ways, too advanced. Nevertheless, it challenged me intellectually. It opened my mind. It built
character and grit. Those are gifts I do not regret. I loved color theory and watercolor classes
with Mary Lum. I loved delving into negative space with cardboard and paint. I got to learn
glassblowing and lampworking. But overall, I felt cast to the wind. There was no center of
gravity—no repertoire of skills I could beckon to bring my visual ideas into being as I imagined
them.
One of my biggest disappointments happened in the context of my honors thesis, during
my final year of college. I had been granted permission by the director of the college library to
donate three stained glass panels and install them inside the windows of the special collections
reading room. This was a repository of modern British literature bequeathed by alumna Evelyn
Tennyson Openhym, who was inspired by Tennyson’s (1809–1892) poem, “Idylls of the King”
to build the collection. The prior summer, I had found a stained glass instructor near my
hometown to teach me the basics of cutting and arranging glass. Likely due to the toxicity of
lead, she used copper foil and solder; but an important aspect of my project was to understand
the methods of medieval glaziers, so I brought coils of lead came back to campus with me.
There, with the generous assistance of Fred Tschida, I learned to fire glass sheets in a kiln after
teaching myself the basics of tracery, which involved black powdered paint and gum arabic.
In contrast to my methodology, my design (see Figure 1) did not attempt historical
accuracy. I aimed to create a post-medieval illustration that was my own, just as Tennyson had
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written his own poem based on the original Arthurian tales. The following passage inspired the
design of my window:
Down from the casement over Arthur, smote
Flame-color, vert and azure, in three rays,
One falling upon each of three fair queens,
Who stood in silence near his throne, the friends
Of Arthur, gazing on him, tall, with bright
Sweet faces, who will help him at his need. (Tennyson, 1892, p. 19)

Figure 1
Design for Stained Glass Panels (Rough Sketch), 1994, by the author

4
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To construct the window, I had secured a workspace in a shared studio in Harder Hall.
All seemed to be going well but took longer than anticipated. A week before graduation, when I
was halfway through leading the middle pane, I came to realize that my junctures were not tight
enough (see Figure 2). Because the books I had been consulting were unclear on the topic and I
did not know anyone with the requisite expertise, it became clear I would have to start over.
Unfortunately, there was not enough time to do so.

Figure 2
The Abandoned Project, 1994, by the author

5
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The moment I realized this I was crushed. I felt deeply ashamed. My friend Kathy
captured my chagrin in a snapshot, which I pasted into the last page of the written portion of my
thesis (see Figure 3). Looking back, it is plain to me now that I needed more than one semester to
construct the panels and should have attempted the project only after more rigorous study. Such
is the wisdom conferred by failure.
After graduating college, I embarked on a career in academic librarianship that has
sustained me for more than two decades and kept me curious. Working in the Widener Library at
Harvard University made me want to understand what scholars go through and need from
librarians. As I plunged into doctoral study part time through Lesley’s individually designed
program in educational studies, four themes kept resurfacing, no matter which classes I took:
imagination, judgment, intuition, and the marriage of art and craft. After I finished my
coursework, I gave myself permission to follow those ideas back to their origin. In so doing, I
had to face my fear. I had to return to the wound of artmaking.

Figure 3
Me in the Studio, 1994
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This time, however, there would be no pressure to create a finished product. This would
be about learning the ropes, starting from the ground up. Even great artists had to learn the
technical aspects of artmaking, which Albrecht Dürer called “ars” in conjunction with “gwalt,”
the more ingenious, or creative side (Riley, 2008). Dürer himself is documented to have written
of his own learning quest. In a letter dated October 13, 1506, which was translated by M. Kemp
(1990), Dürer said to his friend Willibald Pirckheimer, “I shall be finished here [in Venice] in ten
more days; then I shall ride to Bologna where someone is willing to teach me the secrets of
perspective” (pp. 54–55). It is phenomenal to imagine Dürer in a state of ignorance about his
craft. In some way, he becomes a “regular person,” not too different from me, despite his artistic
genius.
My own learning quest would begin with a firsthand study of drawing. This would be
different from the approach to drawing I had experienced in art school; the kind Petherbridge
(2008) referenced when she said, “Few students in the twenty-first century develop sophisticated
hand-eye skills, and most drawing tends to be slight, spontaneous, expressive, gestural, and often
deliberately unskilled” (p. 31). Such drawing is not without merit. In classes, I found it joyful,
vigorous, and experimental. However, it generally lacked technique. By the time I enrolled at
Alfred University in the early 1990s, most art schools already had stopped incorporating
technical skills into their curricula for decades. The following quotation by the artist N.
Houghton synopsizes, in general terms, my overall experience in art school:
The art curriculum over the centuries has been a steady process of deskilling. … In terms
of drawing—and observational drawing in particular—this is undoubtedly the case. …
[Students are encouraged] to learn how to market themselves, but with the risk that their

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

8

quality of promotion will exceed the quality of the work they promote. (2016, pp. 117–
118)
To learn to draw in a systematic fashion, I would need to embark on a journey. I would
need to find a community of practice (see Lave & Wenger, 1991) that kept such knowledge
alive. This dissertation is a record of that journey and what I learned along the way.
Statement of the Problem
Recent literature in the fields of psychology and neuroscience reveals that adults who
engage in creative hobbies enjoy increased wellbeing (Adams-Price et al., 2018; Conner et al.,
2018; Fisher & Specht, 1999; Fraser et al., 2015; Noice et al., 2014; Price & Tinker, 2014) and
the benefits of creative activities are visible in the brain scans of older adults (Takeuchi et al.,
2017; Zhao et al., 2018). Meanwhile, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that learning
traditional drawing skills may augment the capacity for imaginative expression among visual
artists (Chamberlain, 2018; Kozbelt & Kantrowitz, 2019; Suwa & Tversky, 2003). Taken
together, these lines of research suggest that most adults in midlife and beyond who pursue a
new or renewed visual arts practice may benefit not only from the creative act of making art, but
also may derive dividends if they integrate systematic drawing techniques into their learning
curricula.
Drawing skill acquisition may be particularly helpful to adults who attended postsecondary art schools decades ago, for it is widely acknowledged that deskilling dominated most
college art programs in the West after the 1970s, when academic drawing traditions passed down
since the 16th century gave way to pedagogies centered on conceptual art (Aristides, 2016;
Houghton, 2016; Jarvin, 2019; Petherbridge, 2008; Singerman, 1999; C. Wheat, personal
communication, October 6, 2019). The alienation of would-be representational artists from the
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tools of their trade mirrors the dichotomy so often wedged between art and craft, mind and body
(Berman, 1989; Bordo, 1987; Suthor, 2008). In the 21st century, this unease is compounded by a
growing frustration, recently observed among Americans in the “maker movement,” with
globalized neoliberal capitalism and incorporeal corporate work (Marotta, 2020).
Many of the complexities of life in the digital age emanate from these power structures
and are reflected back to us in a staggering array of images transmitted through visual culture
every day. Because this landscape places an unprecedented interpretive demand on visual artists,
it behooves them to develop and hone their artisanal judgment. Drawing instruction offers an
important means of doing so, for drawing connects the hand and intellect (Rosand, 2002). For
example, artists in training who transcribe (i.e., copy) master drawings learn to see through
experts’ eyes and analyze their visual decisions (Aristides, 2016; Pardo, 2008). Drawing
exercises like this contribute, in turn, to a growing mental library of visual schemata available to
each artist for imaginative recombination in future projects (Fish & Scrivener, 1990).
At its best, systematic drawing instruction promises to develop artisanal judgment and
imagination, while honoring the body of the artisan, by providing a repertoire of useful skills.
Because of this, it offers a holistic approach for cultivating the inner artist within any adult
learner who is interested in creating representational art. Many individuals in this cohort feel
frustrated when their abilities fail to match their vision and, due to said gap, are at risk for giving
up on their lifelong dreams (Arment & Skott, 2020; Izykowski, 2021). For those with full time
jobs and careers outside the art world, scarcity of available drawing time and isolation from
communities of practice centered on art and drawing aggravates the problem.
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Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
As an adult who identifies with these challenges, I asked the following question, which
served as the primary focus of my study: What is the relationship between an adult learner’s selfperceived capacity for imaginative expression in representational drawing and the development
of her artisanal judgment during a self-directed (Knowles et al., 2005) program of classical
study? I intended to probe the potential answers to that question through firsthand learning
experiences 1 and discover, along the way, drawing strategies and supports for adult novice
artists. It is my hope that this autoethnographic study reveals useful situative and cognitive
factors relevant for adult learning in the visual arts and may prepare aspiring representational
artists like myself for a fruitful avocation in drawing and the teaching of drawing throughout the
adult lifespan. In order to address my primary research question, the following sub-questions
guided the study:
1. How do cognitive factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the
development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment?
2. How do situative factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the
development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment?
3. What does the process of developing artisanal judgment through systematic drawing
practice mean to an adult learner in terms of her self-perceived capacity for imaginative
expression?
Research Design Overview
To conduct this qualitative investigation, I chose cognitive autoethnography because it
enabled me to capture and analyze data documenting my own social and reflexive experiences of

1

For selected learning resources, see: Appendix A.
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learning to draw in a naturalistic setting. A case study approach afforded in-depth examination of
drawing instruction from a firsthand perspective, that of a learner, over a period of 22 months. A
suitable methodology for novice researchers and experienced scholars alike (Saldaña, 2011),
autoethnography is “unique from a research perspective in that the researcher is the subject of
study” (Hughes, 2017, p. 5). It is the qualitative study of oneself, as a research participant, by
oneself, as a researcher. I served as the sole participant in the study. The relatively unfettered
access I had to my own learning experiences and my own mind allowed me to recursively
investigate ascribed meanings, as well as cognitive and situative factors, at a level of depth that
would be difficult to achieve with other participants, particularly during a pandemic.
The study largely took place in the apartment that I share with my husband, in a spare
bedroom outfitted for drawing, with the exception of one in-person conference that I attended in
October of 2019 and a couple of museum visits and lectures prior to the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic. The home setting was amenable to my project because I owned a computer through
which I could access online drawing instruction. Conducting research from home also meant that
I could adapt the spaces around me, including walls, doors, floors, and other flat surfaces, to my
learning needs.
The contents of my learning served as data, which I elicited through self-directed study,
manual practice of drawing, and the graphical products thereof. In order to track cognitive and
situative factors encountered in the process of learning to draw, I kept field notes and diaries, and
photographed the drawings I produced. Field notes allowed me to document notable drawing
techniques and best practices that I learned in classes, from books, and through occasional
attendance at conferences and museum lectures. Diaries provided introspective and reflective
data regarding my drawing processes and my interactions with learning materials, as well as self-
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evaluations of my learning progress. My drawings (or photographs thereof), served as visual data
against which to compare the verbal evidence gathered. Due to the difficulty of accessing and
articulating real-time data in the form of introspective and perceptual-motor acts (R. R. Hoffman
& Militello, 2009; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Omerod & Ball, 2017;
Wilson, 2002), I relied on an additional source of data besides still images and verbal selfreports: self-observation. Self-observation was possible through video recordings of myself
during specific drawing activities. Using Panopto, I recorded the videos with my laptop and iPad
cameras, which output videos of both my drawing surface and me, as well as transcripts of my
recorded narration during the drawing process.
Data were analyzed using cognitive event analysis (CEA) (Steffensen, 2013) and
reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; J. C. Richards, 2022) to examine processual
features of my learning experiences (e.g., dynamic bodily movements, gestures, and narrative
prosody) and identify patterns of meaning in the data, respectively. I used CEA in conjunction
with drawing activities recorded on video, and reflexive thematic analysis for everything else,
including the video transcripts. Through CEA, I was able to diagram out stages of event
trajectories containing cognitive events (i.e., moments of insight or the shifting of attention).
Meanwhile, engaging in reflexive thematic analysis allowed me to generate, group, regroup,
categorize, review, refine, and theme codes extracted from the data to construct findings.
Throughout the processes of data analysis and interpretation, I was guided by three intellectually
compatible frameworks: Polanyi’s (1961, 1966, 1967; 1975) theory of tacit knowing, the theory
of grounded cognition (see Ariely, 2008; Barsalou, 2008, 2010, 2020; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010;
Freedberg & Gallese, 2007; Kantrowitz, 2012; Lakoff, 1999; Tversky, 2001), and Suwa and
Tversky’s (2003) theory of constructive perception.
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Rationale and Significance
As increasing numbers of students turn away from university art programs in favor of
atelier-style academies that teach foundational drawing and painting skills (Hextrum, 2017;
Pearce, 2019), the time is ripe for renewed scholarly inquiry into the role of technical training in
art education. My interpretation of findings suggests that the root of the problem may lie in a
trivial understanding of constructivist pedagogy among many arts educators, such that discovery
learning is frequently embraced without sufficient learning supports and guidance (see B. Davis
& Sumara, 2010). Osborne (2015) identified a gap within the literature on constructivist theory
that could have exacerbated such misinterpretations. In his words, “What is missing from
constructivist writing … is an account of the processes that would support learning and a
rationale for their justification” (p. 228). In the absence of processual accounts that examine
constructivist teaching methodologies on a granular scale, there is room to interpret
constructivist theory too loosely. This dissertation study is one attempt to provide a processual
account and rationale. Hopefully, it succeeds in bridging a small region of the existing lacunae.
Through firsthand experience with systematic approaches to drawing, my research aimed
to surface and critically examine cognitive and situative factors that could help adult art students
express themselves imaginatively without losing sight of skill development. The documentation
of my learning journey should be of interest to university educators who wish to integrate craft
meaningfully into studio arts curricula, or those who wonder about the value of physical, penciland-paper drawing instruction (skeptics and enthusiasts alike). My findings also may serve
atelier students who would like to reflect more deeply on their drawing practice as it relates to
artisanal judgment and cognition, as well as drawing hobbyists and independent art teachers who
care about the role of craftsmanship, artisanal judgment, and imagination in drawing. More
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generally, this study may inform the work of education researchers and cognitive psychologists
who focus on adult learning and cognition in the arts.
Researcher Standpoint
As an autoethnography, the study is situated in my everyday life, that of a middle class,
white, married, American woman in midlife who was interested in learning to draw while
conducting doctoral research, maintaining a full-time career as an academic librarian, and
helping to care for her mother out of state. In my 50s and finally free of the student loans I had
paid off over the years, I could begin to pursue my lifelong dream of learning classical drawing.
Even though I could return to that dream, I could not return to the naiveté of my youth, when I
imagined the arts inhabited a higher plane of existence, invulnerable to human failings.
The artistic traditions that I so admire, passed down since before the Renaissance, are
laden with the baggage of Western civilization. Through the power of patronage, white, wealthy
Western elites have shaped aesthetic production to suit their rarified tastes, diminishing the
viability of alternative perspectives. Women artists and artists of color have struggled, not only
for the opportunity to create their work, but to have it shown and appreciated. Although I am
thankful that classic treatises by Alberti and Leonardo have been preserved for their merits, it
does not escape me that they are, regrettably, riddled with exclusionary language and ideas. For
centuries, Indigenous cultures have been desecrated in the name of art, whether through
appropriation or exploitation, and some of the worst propagandists have bent art to their cause.
The list of injustices is long.
None of this means that artists should cease creating. Rather, it suggests a reckoning—an
invocation to consciousness. How can a learner adopt academic drawing traditions without
promulgating the same injustices amid which they were developed? There is no easy answer,
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particularly in light of Audre Lorde’s warning that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house” (2007, p. 110). As I embarked on a fraught journey, I took solace in the wisdom
of some of today’s leading intellectuals. For example, I attended a virtual lecture given by artist
and scholar Nell Irvin Painter on racial and gender identity in America. It was sponsored by the
Minneapolis Institute of Art. During the question-and-answer segment, Painter said she believed
conscientious artists need not shy away from Western classical drawing traditions if that is their
preferred style (personal communication, March 11, 2021). Citing Lorde’s (2007) famous
aphorism, Painter advised that it is possible to transform the master’s tools. I felt relieved to hear
her perspective.
An artist’s tools are inanimate without the head, heart, and hands of an artist to guide
them. Intentions matter. On a parallel note, Cornel West and Jeremy Tate (2021) recently decried
the decision of Howard University to dissolve its classics department, ostensibly in protest of
Western crimes. In their words,
We must be vigilant and draw the distinction between Western civilization and
philosophy on the one hand, and Western crimes on the other. The crimes spring from
certain philosophies and certain aspects of the civilization, not all of them. … [The]
classical approach is united to the Black experience. It recognizes that the end and aim of
education is really the anthem of Black people, which is to lift every voice. That means to
find your voice, not an echo or an imitation of others. But you can’t find your voice
without being grounded in tradition, grounded in legacies, grounded in heritages. (n.p.)
West and Tate’s (2021) exhortation is as germane for artists as it is for educators. If we
hide from our history, we lose its lessons. Through my dissertation research, I have stared
Western art traditions straight in the eye and chased after the knowledge practices that matter the
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most to me as a novice artist and teacher who is living through trying and transitional times. In
the process, I have documented my learning journey, tracking the steps taken toward building a
more representational, and representative, repertoire.
Researcher Assumptions and Biases
The questions asked, investigated, and answered in this study arose in the context of the
society in which I live and the value systems within which I have been acculturated (Hughes,
2017). Throughout the research process, I continually asked myself the following questions:
•

How might the value that I attach to systematic drawing instruction, inherited through the
Western tradition, be challenged by my membership in a systemically racist, sexist,
ageist, ableist and classist society wherein many people also face discrimination based on
their sexual orientation, gender expression, ethnicity, and religion?

•

How might this challenge influence my approach to drawing, not only as a learner, but as
a teacher?
In terms of moral decision-making and human flourishing, consideration of these

questions is crucial for developing one’s judgment as an artist in the 21 st century. Although the
dissertation focuses on artisanal aspects of judgment, which bear specifically on how things are
made (see Aristotle, 340 B.C.E./1909), it is worth acknowledging that judgments related to
making—i.e., artisanal judgments or craft judgments—do not occur in a vacuum. Downstream,
they may impact how we live our lives.
Pushing this perspective further, fiction writer Matthew Salesses (2021) contended that
craft is underpinned by culture; according to his argument, there is no “pure” craft. The rules of
thumb passed down through patrimony to practitioners of any art form reflect a set of cultural
understandings particular to the society that produced them; a certain type of reader, able to
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decode the meanings behind the craft, is assumed. When marginalized authors are expected to
conform to the craft rules of a dominant culture, Salesses confided that “the spread of craft starts
to feel and work like colonization” (p. 10). There is no reason to believe that the dynamic
between visual artists and the beholders of their works somehow escapes this pitfall. In Salesses’
(2021) words, “Craft is never neutral. Craft is the cure or injury that can be done in our shared
world when it isn’t acknowledged that there are different ways that the world is felt” (p. 22).
As I embarked on my own journey to learn a craft tradition passed down through Western
civilization, I was heedful of Salesses’(2021) caution. My citizenship in the United States, a
country whose prevailing folklore descended from Ancient Rome and Athens, as well as my
membership within the dominant U.S. culture, has conferred upon me privileges not to be taken
for granted. It also has imposed blinders that are difficult, if not impossible, to recognize without
broadening my view of the world beyond the familiar pathways. But I needed to begin my
sojourn at my own front door. This dissertation documents my earliest expeditions, immediately
beyond that threshold. In time, I will wander afield of these pages, propelled by T.S. Eliot’s
poetic lines: “We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to
arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time” (1942/1974, pp. 214–215).
Organization of the Study
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I (chapters 2–4) is a multi-chapter
literature review that presents scholarship in philosophy, psychology, education, and the arts in
three areas related to the learning and practice of realist drawing: imagination, judgment, and
embodiment. The first of these chapters (chapter 2) explores how philosophical ideas about
imagination across the centuries have informed our conceptualizations of imagination in the
present day. It also synthesizes psychological research on the intersections between drawing
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practice and imagination. Chapter 3 examines literature on the role of judgment in drawing, from
its philosophical underpinnings through its psychological applications in research laboratories
and classrooms. Chapter 4 summarizes literature on the role of drawing as an embodied activity
and the role of the body in cultivating artisanal judgment. It reviews art historical precedents,
philosophical frameworks, psychological findings, and educational practices related to drawing
and embodiment.
Part II of the dissertation comprises the primary research study undertaken by this author,
presented in chapters 5–7. Chapter 5 details the cognitive autoethnographic methodology
employed and the rationale behind it. Chapter 6 reveals findings culled through my analysis of
data generated during the research. Chapter 7 includes my interpretation of those findings in the
context of relevant literature. It also provides conclusions, recommendations, and hypotheses
bearing on my research questions.
Definitions of Key Terms
The following definitions of key terminology will be helpful for understanding this
research study:
•

analytic autoethnography: a first-person, qualitative case study of an individual’s
experiences with social phenomena, analyzed in relationship to generic social and
cultural processes, with a commitment to theorization

•

art: a strenuously contested term signifying the status assigned to objects and phenomena
when they exhibit features that engender aesthetic appreciation within a given culture;
used interchangeably in this dissertation with artwork(s)
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artists: people who create works of art or, as novices in the process of becoming artists,
practice artistic exercises; used interchangeably in this dissertation with the less culturally
loaded terms, artisan, or draftsperson

•

artmaking: the activity of creating art

•

artisanal judgment: considered deliberation and intuitive decision-making by artists that
pertains to skilled, manual, craft aspects of artmaking in theory and practice

•

artisanship: the technical aspect of creating a drawing, entailing judgment, dexterity,
technique, and care; similar to the term craft, Aristotle’s (340 B.C.E./1909) concept of
technē, and Pye’s (1978) workmanship of risk, but applied to artworks

•

associative fluency: a conceptual ability that entails drawing plausible semantic
resemblances among syntactically different stimuli in a restricted area of meaning

•

axiomatic knowledge: meaningful, orienting, communicative, and often self-evident
social symbols in the form of first principles, axioms, or precepts that can be justified
rationally and are generated through logic or abstracted from recurring patterns originally
accumulated through observation and experience

•

Bargue method: an approach to perceptual drawing that involves training in the late 19th
century practice of transcribing, as accurately as possible, precise drawings printed by
lithographer and painter Charles Bargue (1826/27–1883 [2003])

•

bottom-up processing: attending to perceptual experiences while filtering out
preconceptions about those experiences; called the innocent eye approach when applied
to artmaking (see also: top-down processing)
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cognitive ethnography: the qualitative study of cognitive phenomena within a social
context, sometimes described as the study of cognition “in the wild,” as opposed to a
laboratory

•

cognitive event: a change (miniscule, grand, or in-between), usually initiated by a
learner, in the layout of a learning environment, a project, or tools, or within a learner’s
body, attention, or cognitive state (Steffensen, 2013)

•

cognitive event analysis: abbreviated as CEA, a psycho-anthropological qualitative
research method applied in both naturalistic and experimental settings, which is used to
investigate embodied and situated cognition and involves the examination of situative
contexts of cognition “via a microscopic focus on dynamic bodily and inter-bodily
movements, gestures and prosody” (Omerod & Ball, 2017, n.p.)

•

cognitive factors: mental structures and processes, such as thinking, memory,
perception, inference, and decision-making, that occur at the level of individual agents

•

community of practice: a group of individuals engaged in a shared cultural practice
characterized by intergenerational learning within a rubric of social norms and
expectations that is sensitive to improvisation among participants over time (Lave &
Wenger, 1991)

•

constructive drawing: the act of drawing wherein depictions emerge through
imaginative expression, most typically effectuated through an artist’s visual memory
abilities

•

constructive perception: “the deliberate adoption of perceptual strategies in the service
of cognition. … [which involves] coordinating perceptual discoveries and conceptual

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

21

generation in a domain” (Suwa & Tversky, 2003, pp. 1140–1141), likely a key factor in
imaginative expression in drawing
•

deskilling: the devaluation and diminishment of systematic rendering techniques in
curricula designed to educate visual artists

•

drawing: a polysemous concept, defined narrowly for purposes of this research as a form
of mark making that, when properly learned, is “the best way of developing [visual]
intelligence and forming judgement, for one learns to see, and seeing is knowledge”
(Viollet-le-Duc, 1879, as cited in Petherbridge, 2008, pp. 30–31)

•

dynamic evaluation: the weighing of the aesthetic merits of budding artworks against
one’s goals or a set standard, which involves gauging progress toward completion and
assessing the amount of time and effort warranted at each stage (Serafin et al., 2011)

•

elicitation: the act of verbalizing experiences

•

embodied cognition: undergirding the situated cognition hypothesis, the scientific theory
that brain, body, and environment together participate in a causally dependent
relationship, each one affecting the others as components in a holistic cognitive system
(see also: grounded cognition)

•

empirical knowledge: social symbols affording meaningful communication and
orientation, accumulated through trial and error, and justified through observation and
experimentation

•

epistemically felicitous falsehoods: representations, usually models or idealizations [or
subjective representations for purposes of this study], that are valuable for couching and
conveying understanding, despite being untrue (Elgin, 2017)

•

explicitation: the process causing something to be explicit
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first marks: initial lines, often very generalized, demarcating the beginnings of a
drawing; sometimes called “blocking in”

•

grounded cognition: the interaction of extending (e.g., social), embedding (e.g.,
environmental), embodying (e.g., embodied), and enacting (e.g., perceptual,
introspective, affective) domains of experience with cognitive processes like attention,
memory, knowledge, language, and thought (Barsalou, 2020) (see also: embodied
cognition)

•

imaginal: related to imagination, but not necessarily imaginative or imaginary

•

imagination: the ground of all cognition, which knits together experience, memory, and
judgment and affords categorization, counterfactual thinking, and fancy (see Coleridge,
1847; Kant, 1781–1787/1998)

•

imagination, productive: an active and playful or inventive force of mind wherein
recollected mental images and experiences are recombined to produce new images and
ideas and influence perception (see Avicenna [980–1037], as cited in D’Ancona, 2016;
Kant, 1781–1787/1998)

•

imagination, reproductive: a passive and representative facility of mind that helps make
sense of experience through classification and allows one to recall and reproduce images
stored in memory (see Avicenna [980–1037] as cited in D’Ancona, 2016; Kant, 1781–
1787/1998)
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imaginative expression in drawing: the visual representation of ideas and images
originating in the mind (i.e., mental images) or emerging spontaneously during mark
making2

•

inference: a logical conclusion, derived from a supposition about unobserved data, which
may explain or anticipate an observation in light of existing knowledge; may occur post
hoc or a priori (e.g., via deduction, induction, abduction, analogy)

•

judgment: a mental faculty, often involving inference-making, that mediates the
connection between one’s understanding of natural laws (or general rules) and one’s
ability to reason logically and decide what to believe and how to act; includes judgments
of coherence, which may be determinative or reflective in nature (see Kant, 1781–
1787/1998; Martin, 2006; Polanyi, 1966)

•

mental images: internal representations of the external environment

•

off-line cognition: also referred to as off-line processing, this mode of thinking occurs
through introspection, aside from external inputs or motor output

•

on-line cognition: also referred to as on-line processing, this mode of thinking involves
active sensory and motor engagement of body, mind, and brain with the environment

•

perceptual reorganization: acting upon a configuration to reorganize it through
regrouping, altering frames of reference, or changing perspective (although
conceptualized as a mental occurrence, it may be exhibited physically by artists in the
process of drawing)

2

Notably, this definition differs from the sense of the term described by the aesthetic philosopher R.G.
Collingwood, which is synonymous with art proper, distinct from craft, and must always emerge spontaneously and
without forethought (see G. Kemp, 2020).
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realist or representational art: mimetic art that possess a high degree of naturalism, or
verisimilitude, relative to subject matter that is plausibly depicted (used interchangeably
in this dissertation with the terms classical drawing, figurative art, perspective drawing,
volumetric drawing, systematic drawing, and illustration)

•

schemata: conceptual representations that function as preconceptions through which
perception is filtered and are necessary for the formation of mental images (singular:
schema)

•

self-elicitation: drawing out or bringing forth one’s own emotions, opinions, facts, etc.

•

self-explicitation: verbalizing one’s lived experiences that would otherwise remain tacit,
below the threshold of consciousness

•

situated cognition: the hypothesis that learning is the byproduct of an interaction
between knowledge and action, and that cognition is situated within the body and
embedded in, as well as structured by the world in terms of a given situation or context
(Brown et al., 1989)

•

situative factors: interactions, pertaining to learning, that occur among and between
individuals, materials, situations, and representations

•

systematic drawing practices: reliable and mimetic mark making techniques passed
down through generations of teachers and practitioners

•

top-down processing: knowledge-motivated perception, wherein preconceptions inform,
deform, enrich, or impoverish perceptual experiences. See also bottom-up processing

•

tacit knowing: applying one’s automatic or ingrained knowledge, which was originally
accumulated by attending to a given subject (the focal target) through and from one or
more relevant vehicles (subsidiaries) (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975)
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transcription: copying a work of art, not with the intention of creating a replica, but with
the purpose of learning how another artist worked and developing fundamental drawing
skills related to perception, imagination, the handling of drawing media, and hand-eye
coordination (see also: Bargue method)

•

visual delusions: images that cause conceptual errors, e.g., when visual illusions are
mistaken for reality (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016)

•

visual illusions: images that cause perceptual errors, but not necessarily conceptual errors
(more likely to occur when focusing on local details of subject matter as opposed to taking a
big-picture perspective)
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CHAPTER 2
Imagination in Realist Drawing
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
—Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream

When many people think of representational volumetric drawings that follow the rules of
linear perspective, words like “precise” and “realistic” often tend to come up in conversation,
whereas descriptors like “creative” and “imaginative” arise less frequently. This chapter
challenges that perception, reviewing literature from the fields of philosophy, psychology,
education, and art history pertaining to the role of imagination in the creation of realist 1
drawings, as well as realist drawing practices in the development of artistic imagination. Readers
will contemplate the role of imagination in apprehending and creating artworks and be guided
through philosophical theories exploring what imagination is and how it functions cognitively, as

1

See Janson (2007) for a more detailed, academic definition of Realism in Western art. In this chapter and
throughout the dissertation, I have not capitalized “realism,” because I am interested in a broader conceptualization
of the term than strict adherence to a specific art historical period or style allows. Embracing a less determinate
definition accommodates a greater degree of artistic license in creating drawings inspired by the Realist tradition
proper, as well as its antecedents and consequents in representational drawing. Therefore, the term “realist,” in
lowercase form, should be understood as a quasicolloquialism, and purposely so. In essence, I use it to describe
plausible, volumetric rendering in representational drawing.
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well as the mediating role that art and drawing can play in imaginative cognition. In light of
these philosophical arguments, the chapter reviews psychological findings that bear on realist
drawing education, particularly in regard to constructive perception and exercises that may
fortify a draftsperson’s imaginative capacity, such as sketching, memory drawing, and technical
skills development.
A Space for Imagination in Realist Drawing
What role should imagination play in realist drawing, and what challenges does it present
to the novice artist? These questions may seem strange; realist drawing is, after all, concerned
with verisimilitude, with presenting a convincing portrayal of the world—a portrayal that seems
to cohere with veridical perception. It strives to construct a world that is believable—so
believable that it rivals three-dimensional reality, inviting beholders to step through the page and
breathe inside of it. It can be argued that all artworks, realist or not, open new realms to explore;
they offer potential to ignite the imagination and fire the emotions. Yet, I am partial to realist
art’s ability to create a close juxtaposition of illusionistic space with my own subjective,
embodied visual experience. By mimicking possible worlds that I might see from a first-person
perspective, realist drawings offer an unparalleled sense of immediacy. Their subtle
idiosyncrasies, their almost imperceptible inaccuracies, can stop me in my tracks, as if, like a
horse on a well-worn trail, I must rear up at a strange fallen branch. Rather than fear, however, it
is fascination I feel.
Artistic Reality
Every realist drawing will not provoke this kind of wonder, of course, for even with
exquisite workmanship, many lack imagination. Polymath M. Polanyi and philosopher H. Prosch
(1975) contemplated this vexation. They noted that, despite the long tradition among artists to
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create convincing images through faithful observation and skillful transcription, artworks that
merely imitate factual reality fail to rise above mundane experience. Such artworks seem
unremarkable, even trivial—mere manifestations of the dross of daily life. On the other hand,
works that eschew the everyday, that possess some artificial qualities and present experience
through an interpretive lens, tend to strike us as more meaningful. They offer an alternative
reality to our own, a separate, artistic reality against which we can measure and reflect upon the
significance of things we might otherwise miss. Were unvarnished realism a hallmark of
aesthetic achievement, Polanyi mused that we could expect no more of sculptures than we do of
wax replicas in Madame Tussaud’s’, or conversely, we might expect so much of theatre that
members of the audience at a production of Hamlet would feel implicated as bystanders to
murder, a disgusting experience never intended by Shakespeare.
Polanyi and Prosch (1975) took umbrage with the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s
(1772–1834) proposition that beholders of artworks employ imagination to suspend their
disbelief in the falsehoods that artworks affirm, and in so doing, may better appreciate the
artworks. Instead, Polanyi and Prosch said beholders use their imaginations to believe in what an
artwork means and grasp the facts of the imagination that it presents. These facts of the
imagination should not and do not represent factual reality. Rather, they represent artistic reality.
And according to them, artistic reality, unlike factual reality, is particularly suited to conveying
meaning. I would venture to say that the artistic reality presented by artworks is sometimes
powerful enough to change the world by moving those whom it engages, helping them to
understand what it is like to walk in others' shoes, or anticipate a stage of life as yet unlived. It
kindles the imagination.
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In my view, Polanyi and Prosch’s (1975) notion of artistic reality is the sense of reality to
which realist drawings should aspire. Drawings that possess a high degree of verisimilitude need
not preclude this possibility if an artist is sensitive enough. In fact, an artist’s ability to present a
lifelike world can support imaginative involvement with a drawing.
In Mimesis as Make-Believe, Walton (1990) philosophized that representations are
fictions that “possess the function of serving as a prop in games of make-believe” (p. 102). His
overall theory fails to account sufficiently for fictional characters and propositional content in
artworks, but there is merit in this analogy between props and representations, because it offers
an insightful way of thinking about the relationship between factual reality and artistic reality.
Within his paradigm of make-believe, Walton (1990) argued that a wide array of principles
governs the process of mapping features of the actual world onto fictional worlds, allowing
beholders to enter and play “the game.” One of the conventions he identified as being most
frequently operational in artworks is the Reality Principle. Artworks that leverage this principle
provide rich detail and present themselves to appreciators in a way that feels natural, preserving a
sense of coherence within the frame.
I contend that many realist drawings do this. It’s fair to say that the Reality Principle
facilitates imaginative participation, because works that employ it are typically easy to grasp.
Walton (1990) did not claim that the Reality Principle characterizes all or even most imaginative
encounters. Neither shall I suggest that it functions impeccably in every work of realist art, for I
can easily call to mind artworks that deploy convincing, and thus realistic, visual illusions (e.g.,
proportional figures, three-dimensional modeling, linear perspective) in the service of portraying
fantastical or paradoxical subject matter that is otherwise riddled (and oftentimes, delightfully
so) with logical inconsistencies that do not comport with reality.
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The Unbeholden Beholder
Polanyi and Prosch (1975) said that when we behold artworks, our imaginations are
guided by our intuition of what is probable or possible. This allows us to discriminate among a
rich array of alternative ideas and interpretations. Even fantasy worlds are more likely to be
entertained when they possess an internal coherence wherein the various elements imply and
seem capable of serving plausibly rational ends. The role of intuition should not belie the
imaginative effort entailed upon encountering or inventing an evocative image. We exert
imagination both in appreciating and creating artworks. Polanyi and Prosch believed the arts
present a uniquely rigorous opportunity to exercise our imaginations, for while it is true that both
artists and scientists take pains to produce imaginative work, only artists depend on beholders to
mentally re-create the fruits of their labor; otherwise, encounters with artworks would be for
naught. Scientists, on the other hand, need not satisfy such demands; no one must recreate
inventions, such as telephones, in order to use them. Yet, beholders of artworks must put forward
imaginative effort simply to appreciate, let alone understand, what they are seeing. For this
reason, Polanyi said it is uniquely the job of artists to impart, alongside their creations, a basis for
others to reconstruct them in their own imaginations. He suggested that an artist should, in some
sense, be like a teacher, providing the scaffolding necessary to actively re-imagine a given
aesthetic experience.
Adept artworks help the beholder “seem to see” (Ryle, 1949, p. 254), or more vividly
imagine, a given subject, by lending detail and clarity to the process of visualization. To clarify
this observation, Ryle asked his readers to consider an oil painting or cartoon that did not
replicate, but instead faithfully captured some essence of a faraway friend’s likeness, allowing
them to clearly picture that friend. He argued that a particularly expressive drawing may convey
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a more authentic representation of a sitter’s personality than a comparatively accurate snapshot.
An artist’s ability to depart from a literal interpretation of a scene can facilitate accentuation of
the most meaningful details. This requires imagination.
When the power of imagination is wielded perceptively, it allows the beholder access
beyond surface appearances. According to educational philosopher M. Greene (1995) it presents
us with alternative realities that make a claim on the world, telling a tale of possibilities, of
becoming. As writer and educator C. Heller so aptly observed, imagination, “ironically, [helps us
to] be more fully in the world” (personal communication, June 20, 2014). This may be because it
affords insight into alternative ways of seeing. Philosophers Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) were
interested in how imagination:
[enables] us to project ourselves into another situation and to see, or think about, the
world from another perspective. These situations and perspectives are not currently ours,
but ones we come to occupy, as we say, in imagination. The perspective taken might be
that of another actual person. It might be the perspective I would have on things if I
believed something I actually don’t believe. It might be a hypothetical perspective, that of
a fictional character of someone else’s devising or our own. (p. 1)
This account speaks to what inspires enthusiasm for the imaginative arts in so many of
us, and it echoes Greene’s (1995) contention that “participatory involvement with many forms of
art can enable us to see more in our experience, to hear more on normally unheard frequencies,
[and] to become conscious of what daily routines have obscured, what habit and convention have
suppressed” (p. 123). This liberation of mind, which imagination facilitates, underscores my
conviction that imagination plays no trivial role in the creation of drawings worth examining.
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Some Examples of Imaginative Practice Among Realist Artists in History
There is nothing new about reconciling exploration in the arts with a search for deeper
truths. In his scholarly monograph, Drawing Acts, art historian D. Rosand (2002) described how
earnestly the Italian Renaissance humanist, Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472), sought to
establish a theoretical foundation for visual art as a liberal art. This endeavor came to fruition in
Alberti’s three-volume treatise, Della pittura [On Painting], written in 1435. In this work,
Alberti discussed artmaking in terms of its intellectual principles, and in this context, he
identified a concept he called istoria, which referred to the composition of an artwork and the
story it depicted, whether historical or mythological. Alberti considered istoria to be of great
importance for artists. He recommended that they associate with knowledgeable mentors as a
means of informing their choice and portrayal of subject matter. Although it can be argued that
the topic of an artwork offers the most potential for imaginative play, Alberti did not focus on
imagination in this sense. He was more interested in the gestalt principles realized through
istoria; specifically, how each part related to the whole, both symbolically and visually, than he
was in talking about imaginative composition, per se.
Another writer, the Late Gothic Florentine painter, Cennino Cennini (1370–1440 [ca.
1437/2015]), spoke about imagination more directly. In the first chapter of his handbook for
craftsmen, he recommended an imaginative disposition toward painting that also could be
applied to drawing. He said of the painter’s profession, “imagination and manual dexterity are
needed in order to find invisible things hiding in the shadow of ones in nature and to capture
them with your hand, so that you can make manifest that which is not there.” Even as he
recommended learning to render form accurately, through rigorous transcription of master
drawings, Cennini made room for originality. In the same section of his handbook, he elaborated,
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saying, “The painter is given freedom to be able to compose a figure standing upright, sitting,
half-man, half-horse as he pleases, according to his imagination.” Artistic license, while
encouraged, need not have implied the abstraction of form, as many may assume today. Rather,
it welcomed invention and reconfiguration.
Based on a contextual analysis of imagination-related vocabulary used in 15th century
Latin and Italian manuscripts, including words like inventio/invenzione,
imaginativa/immaginazione, phantasia/fantasia, or ingenium/ingegno, art historian M. Kemp
(1977) concluded that imaginative invention in Western art during the quattrocento fit
comfortably into a rational framework that prized both discovery and making, tying together
inquiry and craft. Exemplifying this phenomenon, he pointed to the artistic practice of Leonardo
da Vinci (1452–1519), who approached painting as a vehicle for probing and revealing natural
truths. Among a collection of Leonardo’s notebooks, now known as the Treatise on Painting, or
Codex Urbinas Latinus 1270, Leonardo wrote about his aspirations for painting, crediting it as
the art form “which alone can portray faithfully all the visible works of nature” (1540/1956, Part
1, Number 6). Yet, in another manuscript transcribed as number 48 (and passim), he also advised
his fellow artists to construct their paintings as dictated in imagination, provided they had
already learned the skills necessary for convincingly imitating nature.
How can we understand this apparent contradiction, wherein artists were expected to
make faithful records while also making things up? M. Kemp (1977) threaded this needle by
explaining that Leonardo understood the concept of imitation in a very specific way, “which for
him was no servile procedure of superficial copying but an active ability to remake natural
effects in the work of art through a deep understanding of natural causes” (p. 381). In applying
Leonardo’s rationale, artists could freely call upon their imaginations to deepen their
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interpretations of a given scene, so long as their representations, through the use of linear
perspective and measured proportions, mimicked natural laws.
Art historian P. Parshall (2013) argued that Albrecht Dürer, Leonardo’s contemporary
from the north, had a fraught relationship with imagination. According to Parshall, Dürer resisted
imaginative invention in pursuit of epistemological certainty, fearing that ventures into the
unknown risked unleashing something demonic. This fear was driven by the Christian theology
predominant in Dürer's day, which held grotesque creations like centaurs and harpies suspect,
because they could not be verified through the senses. Unverifiable phenomena were to be
accounted for in the spiritual realm, not in the worldly domain occupied by artists.
However nervous Dürer may have been about transgressing epistemological boundaries,
it did not deter him entirely from experimentation, as attested by his insouciant sketches for a
prayer book and his depiction of the devil as a hybrid creature. Wrote Dürer of this enterprise,
“Everyone should be cautious not to make something impossible that nature would not allow,
unless it would be that one wanted to make a dream work … , in which case one may mix
together every kind of creature” (translated by Parshall, 2013, p. 395). Although he flirted with
the construction of “dream works,” he remained leery of the practice and did not indulge
wholeheartedly. A master of draftsmanship whose sensitive and detailed work inspired the field
of scientific illustration, Dürer struggled throughout his life to reconcile the potential of
imaginative experimentation with plausible depiction of the natural world.
Philosophies of Imagination Relevant to Realist Drawing
What is imagination, and how does it manifest in the arts and cognition? Philosophers
have puzzled over imagination since classical times. No definitive explanation has arisen; only
theories, many of which recognize its image-forming capacity. In the arts, imagination has been
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conceptualized in terms of genius or the occult, but it also has been compared with perception.
The following discussion does not resolve the debate. Rather, it contends that drawing may play
a mediating role in our understanding of the phenomenon of imagination in the arts.
Tiered Theories
Several theories of imagination offer a two-fold conceptualization. In De Anima [On the
Soul], the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1992), defined imagination as
“that in virtue of which an image arises for us … . [It appears to be] a single faculty or
disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate and are either in error or not”
(Book 3, Part 427b28–428a4). He saw imagination as a counterpart to judgment, and in
conjunction with it, a facet of thinking, distinct from perception.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, intellectuals of the Islamic Golden Age preserved
Greek texts, and a Persian polymath known as Avicenna (980–1037) wrote commentaries
building on Aristotle’s philosophy (D’Ancona, 2016). His may have been the first dual theory of
imagination. Imaginatio, the first type of imagination Avicenna identified, was envisioned to be
passive and representative in nature, concerned with preserving imagery gathered through
sensory perception. The second type, he named imaginativa. By contrast, it was thought to be
active and deliberative, focused on feeding recollected images and experiences into a
recombinatorial mental process to produce new, sometimes fanciful images, such as emerald
mountains or flying men (as cited in M. Kemp, 1977).
Centuries later, the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) broke with
Aristotle and Avicenna, hypothesizing that imagination was a species of perception. He
speculated that incoming and relatively robust sense impressions would result in fainter echoes
that manifested as mental pictures or ideas (as cited in Ryle, 1949). Around this same time,
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Immanuel Kant (1724–1804 [1781–1787/1998]) theorized imagination as the ground of all
cognition. He credited imagination with producing understanding through schemata, which he
defined as “a representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept
with its image” (A140/B179–180). A particular schema, according to Kant, identified and
defined an essence that all objects of a similar kind shared in common. For example, he
explained that we use a schema when we map a percept of a real dog we have encountered onto
the concept “dog” in our minds; in the background, our imagination is applying the schematic
rule that classifies certain kinds of four-footed animals as dogs.
Kant’s (1781–1787/1998) notion of schemata existed only in thought, like the idea of a
triangle, which he said could be created according to a specific rule among all the relevant rules
for imagining pure shapes in space. He argued that, without schemata, mental images would not
be possible, and he believed this schematism was “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul”
(A141/B180–181). Kant was likely the first scholar since ancient times to use the term “schema,”
which according to the Oxford English Dictionary (n.d.), originated from the Greek word
denoting form, figure, or shape. His conceptualization of schemata has persisted to this day,
albeit with some alteration, in scientific and educational literature.
Unlike Hume, Kant (1781–1787/1998) distinguished imagination from perceptual
experience per se, and in so doing, he applied a rationale that, in my view, harkens back to
Avicenna’s two species of imagination, one passive and the other active. According to this
rationale, perceptual experience, which Kant defined as “empirical” cognition (i.e., cognition
based on sensory data) involved the imaginative synthesis of incoming information, successive
in time, creating a sequence of appearances determined by cause and effect. More specifically,
he meant that the physical objects we experience are themselves determined by the empirical
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laws of the universe, and likewise, our sensibility of them is so determined, and thus, is beyond
our conscious will. This conceptualization of the passive role of imagination in perception was
defined by Kant as reproductive imagination. Reproductive imagination helps us make sense of
experience through classification and allows us to recall and reproduce images stored in memory,
albeit imperfectly.
Meanwhile, Kant (1781–1787/1998) believed that when these events are reversed, and
data arise from within rather than outside the self (through what he described as
“transcendental” or rational processes), then an active form of imagination must be at play.
Because this involves more than merely reproductive imagination in service of memory and
perception, he called it productive imagination. He suggested that imagining objects in this mode
allows us to determine, or will, how we experience them, instead of the other way around.
According to him, imagination spontaneously shapes our perception by filtering new sensory
information through our existing knowledge and understanding. This “subjective play of …
[imagination]” (A201/B247), as he described the process, may be implicated similarly, albeit
unconsciously, in dreams and delusions. When it comes to artworks, Kant (2000) believed that
those exhibiting productive imagination must be constructed as if by nature’s hand, raw and
uninterpreted, to engage beholders’ imaginations and stimulate reflection. His analysis of
imagination according to its productive or generative, versus reproductive or receptive forms,
mirrors Avicenna’s notions of imaginativa and imaginatio, respectively.
Coleridge (1847) built on Kant’s theory of imagination, grouping its functions into three,
rather than two, categories. He labeled them: (a) primary imagination, denoting creativity and
ingenuity, (b) secondary imagination, denoting inventive schematization, and (c) fancy, denoting
the reproductive aspects of imagination (Pettersson, 2016). The first and most celebrated of these
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concepts, Coleridge’s “primary imagination,” captured the minds of many of the philosophers of
his day even as it betrayed a sense of nostalgia for late Renaissance ideas about artistic genius.
Imaginative Genius
Recall M. Kemp’s (1977) investigation of quattrocento language surrounding the concept
of imagination. He was surprised to discover that the word ingenium, meaning “inspiration,” or
“divine insight,” was not widely applied to Renaissance painters, but frequently occurred in
discussions of poets and architects. As he noted, this concept of ingenium was passed down from
Plato through Cicero, Horace, and Seneca, and it implied that individuals who possessed it
exhibited “innate brilliance of mind [hand in hand with] acquired learning and executant skill”
(p. 390). Perhaps Coleridge’s (1847) ode to the primary imagination alluded, if only obliquely, to
the historical notion of ingenium:
That synthetic and magical power, to which I would exclusively appropriate the name of
Imagination. This power, first put in action by the will and understanding, … reveals
itself in the balance or reconcilement of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness,
with difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea with the image; the individual
with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects; a
more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order; judgment ever awake and
steady self-possession with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement … . The sense
of musical delight, with the power of producing it, is a gift of imagination; and this
together with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect, and modifying a series
of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling. (vol. 2, pp. 14, 17)
Coleridge’s idea of imagination, as expressed above, was distilled and defined by
educator and rhetorician I. A. Richards (1938) as “the power of ordering experience” (p. 228).
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As Richards saw it, poets and other artists have an extraordinary, wholehearted ability to absorb,
process, and respond to an extreme swath of human experience unfathomable to the average
person. This imaginative power, in his view, imbued artists with a heightened, uninhibited kind
of awareness: the ability to see, with fresh eyes, beyond routinized conceptions of the world and
consequently seize, combine, and align the most primitive and essential elements, seeking
harmony in opposition.
In my view, the most illuminating aspect of Richard’s (1938) theory of imagination was
his insight that this estimable yet elusive harmony was to be found, not in the structure of an
artwork itself, but in the emotional response it elicited. By way of example, he explained that
Aristotle, in his Poetics, advised that a good tragedy should stimulate clashing impulses: to
retreat, but at the same time, to approach. Specifically, Aristotle (ca. 335 B.C.E./1954, Poetics,
Part 1449b 28) identified the astute juxtaposition of feelings of terror and pity with pleasurable
rhythms or songs as being among the hallmarks of tragedy as a genre. A playwright able to
accomplish this delicate balance could evoke catharsis—the purging of pent up emotions. If you
have ever wept while watching a heartfelt drama, you may have experienced this phenomenon.
In Aristotle’s eyes, playwrights able to lead their audiences through this kind of emotional
odyssey would have succeeded mightily.
When we conceive of imagination in terms of Aristotle’s catharsis, Richards’ (1938)
power of ordering experience (p. 228), Coleridge’s (1847) primary imagination, or even
ingenium, it seems all at once beautiful and sublime, the stuff of magic—more akin to our
modern concept of talent than to a facility of cognition accessible to anyone. Talent can be
developed, but never earned. All a simple artist can do is strive, and take comfort in what Polanyi
and Prosch (1975) observed: Even though a meaningful artwork entails exceptional imaginative
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effort, it comes into being nearly as much through the beholder’s imagination as it does through
the artist’s.
The Imaginal–Perceptual Debate
As we begin the third decade of the 21 st century, the philosophy of imagination has
continued to flourish. This selective overview would be incomplete without examining more
recent theories that may be instructive in the context of drawing. The first such theory, presented
by independent philosopher of cognitive science, N. J. T. Thomas (2014), revived and modified
the seed planted by Hume (1739/1978), who postulated that imagination was a species of
perception. Thomas (2014) proposed the existence of a multidimensional cognitive spectrum,
common to both imagination and perception, that exhibits three dimensions, across which
cognition varies. The backbone of his argument was based on continuum theory—the belief that
a continuum operates between perceptual and imaginal experiences, and that there is no
meaningful qualitative difference between perceiving versus imagining something. An
illustration that springs to mind is the difference between seeing a real apple and envisioning an
imaginary one. Thomas (2014) suggested the distinction between such experiences is
quantitative in nature, rather than qualitative; according to him, they differ by degrees, not in
content. The philosophical underpinnings of continuum theory have been embraced by other
scholars besides Thomas (2014) and Hume (1739/1978)—most explicitly Jastrow (1899) and
Savage (1975)—but Thomas’s three proposed imaginal dimensions have elaborated on those
underpinnings.
His three imaginal dimensions include vividness, stimulus constrainedness, and
amenability to voluntary control. Vividness concerns how sharp, rich, or real an experience feels.
Thomas’s (2014) interest in vividness was derived from Hume (1739/1978), who had argued
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that, even though imagination is a species of perception, imaginal experiences almost always are
less vivid than perceptual ones. Although Thomas (2014) embraced Hume’s overall thesis, he
disagreed with him on this point. Meanwhile, stimulus constrainedness concerns the presence or
absence of an object relative to an individual who is perceiving versus imagining that object.
Amenability to voluntary control describes whether or not a particular act of perception or
imagination might be determined through an individual’s conscious will, as opposed to external
factors. Thomas discussed the latter two of these dimensions, stimulus constrainedness and
amenability to voluntary control, in response to several prominent philosophers (for example, see
Ichikawa, 2009; McGinn, 2004; Reid, 1764/1997; Sartre, 1948/1968; Wittgenstein, 1967/1981)
who argued that perceptual experiences are constrained by the physical presence of their objects,
and also are determined by forces outside an individual’s control, whereas imaginal experiences
are not limited in these ways.
Regarding vividness, although perceptual experiences generally are considered to be
more vivid than imaginal ones, phenomena like hallucinations or the occlusion of occurrent
objects in shadow disprove that commonplace. In other words, although hallucinations are
located on the imaginal end of the spectrum, they often are characterized by a high degree of
vividness. Similarly, although objects in one’s midst are on the perceptual end of the spectrum,
they may be hidden in shadow, and thus may appear to be less vivid (Thomas, 2014).
This being the case, Thomas (2014) suggested we could agree that imaginal experiences
might be just as vivid, and sometimes more vivid, than occurrent reality, as it is perceived.
Therefore, he said the tacit supposition that percepts are more vivid than internal images is a
faulty assumption on which to base any distinctions between perception and imagination.
Vividness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception, therefore, it cannot be a qualitative
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factor distinguishing perception from imagination. It must be a quantitative factor that is more or
less operative, by degrees, depending on the situation, whether that situation is perceptual or
imaginal in nature.
Applying the same kind of analysis, albeit with greater difficulty, Thomas (2014)
objected to classifying stimulus constrainedness and amenability to voluntary control as
qualitative factors capable of distinguishing perception from imagination. He argued that even if
all three factors were aligned in one or another direction, it would not matter qualitatively, only
quantitatively. He defended this conclusion using nuanced examples, such as when a physically
present stimulus might not be perceived due to attentional factors (thus nullifying the argument
that a qualitative difference exists based on stimulus constrainedness), or when a mental image
appears to the imagination, uninvited (similarly neutralizing any potential support for the idea
that there is a qualitative difference based on amenability to voluntary control). Most
interestingly, he presented hybrid scenarios, wherein imaginal and perceptual experiences may
overlap, such as “mistaking a bush for a bear in the darkness; seeing the shapes of animals or
angels in the clouds … seeing paint on canvas as a portrait of Napoleon; and so on and on” (p.
157). Such mixed perceptual and imaginal states are common in human consciousness. This
layering of imagination and perception suggested to Thomas that each may be a bird of the same
feather.
Whether or not continuum theory is correct, I do not think that Thomas’s (2014) list of
three dimensions, upon which perception and imagination vary, is exhaustive. For example, he
did not consider the ability of perceptual versus imaginal experiences to be shared beyond one
individual beholder, a fourth potential dimension that I would label amenability to shared
experience. For example, Ryle (1949) cut a clear line of distinction between seeing and
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picturing, and thus, between perceiving and imagining. According to him, the difference is that,
in the first case, when a person actually is seeing objects (i.e., when they are having and, more or
less accurately cognizing, sensations), others may also see those same objects. However, when a
person is visualizing something, as in the second case, nobody else can see what is pictured in
that person’s mind. He said the same situation applies when hearing sounds, contrasted with
imagining them, or likewise, tasting flavors, smelling scents, or touching textures versus
imagining those sensations.
Ryle (1949) also identified another difference between perception and imagination that I
would label, in Thomas’s “dimensional” terms, as degree of impact. Expressly, Ryle said that
imaginative experiences do not entail repercussions in the same way that perceptual experiences
do. For example, he noted that visualizing extremely bright lasers or clamorous noises will not
blind or deafen, but perceiving the same may cause actual harm. Indeed, if we revisit my
example of a real versus imaginary apple, it is possible to bite into, chew, swallow, and digest
the former, but not the latter. Clearly, Ryle’s contributions merit consideration in the debate
about the nature of imagination.
The Mediating Role of Art and Drawing
Recall Ryle’s (1949) thought experiment involving a friend’s painted portrait. He said the
arts help beholders “seem to see” (pp. 254–255), or in other words, more vividly imagine a given
subject, by lending detail and clarity to the process of visualization. This observation about the
imaginative impact of artworks bears on Schwartz’s (1985) philosophical analysis of the role of
art in fine-tuning perception. As Schwartz saw it, when an artist succeeds in capturing an
essential aspect of something that exists in the world, people who view the artwork will be more
likely thereafter to recognize in its subject the elements depicted, even if they never had noticed
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the selfsame traits before. To illustrate what he meant, Schwartz analyzed a portrait of American
writer Gertrude Stein (1874–1946) painted by Pablo Picasso (1881–1973 [1905]). In the
painting, Picasso depicted Stein’s posture, hair, neck, and eyes in a particular way, a way that
hinted at certain features of Stein’s personality—her spiritedness, her reflective nature, her innerstrength and patience amid suffering—that another artist may not have apprehended so well.
Schwartz argued that artistic portrayals, such as Picasso’s, play an important role in shaping
perception, for Stein’s portrait left an indelible mark on the public’s consciousness of her legacy.
Indeed, by exemplifying important features, artists can help us see what we may otherwise
overlook (Elgin, 1996).
It seems clear that artistic depiction may play a mediating role in the philosophical
conceptions of imagination just discussed; in fact, it interfaces with the dimensions we have
touched upon in interesting ways, particularly where drawing is concerned. Drawing helps to
bridge the gap between perception and imagination, regardless of whether that gap may be
qualitative or quantitative in nature. If we revisit the three dimensions that populated Thomas’s
(2014) spectrum of imagination, and include my suggested additions derived from Ryle (1949),
we have five dimensions to test. These include, (a) vividness, (b), stimulus constrainedness, (c)
amenability to voluntary control, (d) amenability to shared experience, and (e) degree of impact.
Taking vividness first, imagine yourself examining a picture that you have drawn. If the
drawing is superb, beholding it could be an even more vivid experience for you than the moment
you conceived of the original plan. If the drawing is dull, the reverse is more likely since you
failed to bring your idea to fruition. Either example demonstrates that artworks, such as
drawings, engage imagination and perception in ways that further problematize our
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understanding of the differences between the two. In other words, drawing offers insights into
how we can access and apprehend objects of the imagination via the dimension of vividness.
Drawing may also mediate the perceptual–imaginal spectrum via stimulus
constrainedness. According to this dimension, objects that are physically absent should be more
difficult to perceive, as per continuum theory (Thomas, 2014), or impossible to perceive, given a
qualitative understanding of the differences between imagination and perception. In fact, it does
tend to be easier to create a realistic drawing of an object that is present in one’s midst than it is
to create a convincing drawing of an absent object through the power of imagination. Prima
facie, objects that are present may be observed, while those that are not must be visualized
instead, a more effortful endeavor. Yet, drawing confounds this assumption, because as a
drawing emerges, perceptual traces become intertwined with imaginal ones. To illustrate, any
artists who strive for mimesis when drawing from observation (even those who are highly
skilled) cannot help but introduce one or more idiosyncrasies originating from their own mental
schemata that do not match reality. Meanwhile, artists in the midst of drawing a non-existent
entity will see that entity emerge from imagination, line by line, and may thereby perceive its
representation in physical form.
Turning to Thomas’s (2014) third dimension, amenability to voluntary control, drawing
may also play a mediating role. It seems obvious that skilled draftspersons should be able to
draw anything they imagine, depending on their will or inclination. This means that, under the
right circumstances, drawing from imagination should be amenable to voluntary control, a
conclusion that neither continuum theorists nor their qualitative counterparts would necessarily
dispute. But does it make sense to conclude that drawing from life also would be under a given
artist’s control, particularly regarding the subject matter? If the assignment is to represent what is
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observable in the immediate environment, it seems there may be less latitude for will, because an
artist may wish to draw something that is out of sight. Even though such objects cannot serve as
perceptual subject matter, a great deal of latitude is, in fact, available. Depicting reality entails
decision-making; it is simply impossible to represent every aspect of three-dimensional existence
on a two-dimensional plane. The draftsperson must determine lighting, decide on the
composition of objects, pick a perspective, and choose which aspects of a scene to emphasize
over others. Because the effectiveness of such depictive decisions depends on the expertise and
judgment of an artist, it seems that imaginative and perceptual drawing skills go hand in hand.
Once again, drawing unites seemingly opposed states of consciousness by opening dimensional
pathways, including amenability to voluntary control.
The fourth proposed dimension on the spectrum between imagination and perception is
amenability to shared experience. Ryle (1949) argued that imaginal content, because it occurs in
one’s mind, cannot be witnessed by others; by contrast, most perceptual content is available to
anyone in the surrounding environment, provided they have the use of their senses and are
paying attention. This argument seems obvious if we account for the possible occlusion of
objects or sounds based on the different vantage points of our witnesses.
Matters may be further complicated, however. While it is true that we cannot experience
what exists in the mind’s eye of another person exactly as they experience it, there is evidence
that imagination leaves discernable traces as it occurs. For example, despite the vegetative state
of a traumatic brain injury patient, neuroscientists Owen et al. (2006) were able to confirm the
patient’s conscious awareness by using fMRI to measure brain activity in response to spoken
requests for her to engage in mental imagery. Their instructions for the patient to imagine
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playing tennis or walk through her home resulted in neural responses identical to those of healthy
volunteers undergoing the same experiment.
While neuroscience allows experts to detect imaginative activity in others’ minds,
drawing likewise may mediate the dimension of amenability to shared experience via a more
experiential bridge. On the perceptual end of the spectrum, two individuals in one room drawing
a still life from the same arrangement will share a similar perceptual experience of their external
subject matter. However, they may share their inward experiences as well, by taking a break to
witness what each has captured on paper: the same scene filtered through the interpretive lens of
two different people.
In regard to amenability to shared experience, the greater challenge lies on the imaginal
end of the spectrum. As already acknowledged, we can to some extent measure, but we cannot
phenomenologically experience, what goes on in another person’s mind. We may ask others to
describe their experiences, but it is unlikely that listening alone will allow us to simulate those
experiences internally. The arts are unique in their ability to ignite the senses and allow us to
empathize with others. In the case of drawing, an artist may render an imagined form on paper,
bringing once-immaterial subject matter to life for others who view the artwork. The fluidity of
line, the depth of shading, the way light reflects; all contribute to simulating what it was like to
envision the entity. This process cannot turn fictions into realities, but it can reveal facts of the
imagination, and allow them to be shared.
The last dimension to consider is degree of impact. Can drawing play a mediating role
there as well? Whatever we perceive, from infrasound to deafening noise, from faint scribbles to
harsh scrawls, impacts our lives, whether only barely, subtly, noticeably, substantially, or even
unrecognizably. But what about the things we imagine? If it were the case that objects of the
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imagination could not impact the world, for good or ill, propagandists with pens would never
profit. And if it were true that mental imagery had no power, Olympians would put no store in
visualizing victory. The role of imagination in decision-making is now recognized (see Heyman
et al., 2004; Nanay, 2016; Votinov et al., 2010), and imaginative artworks have been credited
with inspiring votes or raising consciousness. Among a plethora of potential examples, consider
Shepard Fairey’s (2008) Hope portrait of Barack Obama, or Picasso’s (1937) Guernica.
Imagination in all its forms can be impactful. Whether a drawing emanates from imagination or
documents life via an accumulation of glances, it may indeed change the world.
The act of drawing can also be impactful. According to artist, critic, and novelist J.
Berger (2005), “drawing challenges disappearance” (p. 70). In an urgent effort to capture some
likeness of his deceased father before the elder’s imminent burial, a weeping Berger drew at the
bedside, tracing the outline of his father’s beloved profile, so long taken for granted. The
experience of documenting what physical features of his father remained in that moment held
meaning for a bereaved son:
As I drew his mouth, his brows, his eyelids, as their specific forms emerged with lines
from the whiteness of the paper, I felt the history and the experience which had made
them as they were. His life was now as finite as the rectangle of paper on which I was
drawing, but within it, in a way infinitely more mysterious than any drawing, his
character and destiny had emerged. I was making a record and his face was already only
a record of his life. Each drawing then was nothing but the site of a departure. (p. 68)
Over the years, as Berger (2005) gazed upon these images, he found that memories of his
father would resurface through the lines. For him, the drawings ultimately became “the site of an
arrival” (p. 68). He held onto something deep and intangible through them that otherwise would
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have vanished. Through imagination, and often through drawing, we invoke memory, and we
evoke change, as well.
The activity of drawing therefore passes each of our dimensional tests relative to
imagination, including degree of impact. When all is said and done, imagination and drawing
remain rich philosophical fodder. It is remarkable that drawing can play such an important role in
consciousness, regardless of whether one embraces continuum theory or believes that perceptual
experiences are qualitatively distinct from imaginal ones. If imagination and perception are
comparable as Thomas (2014) argued, or intertwined as Kant (1781–1787/1998) held, then either
way, drawing has the power to modulate or bridge these fascinating forms of consciousness.
The Psychology of Imagination in Drawing
Like their philosophical compatriots, cognitive psychologists have been doing their
utmost to understand the machinations of imagination. Rather than pursue an explanation by
means of rigorous thought experiments, however, they have turned to empirical experimentation.
Under this alternative epistemic framework, the curious relationship between imagination and
perception resurfaces to spur our inquiry. Synopses of selected literature follow.
Constructive Perception
A landmark study conducted by C.W. Perky (1910) revealed that real, but barely
perceptible images interfered with participants’ imaginative cognition. Asked to visualize
specific objects (e.g., a tomato, a book, a banana, an orange, a leaf, or a lemon) while staring at a
white wall, most people were unable to detect faint pictures emerging before them of the same
objects. Despite the sometimes surprising orientation of the items the researchers projected, such
as a sideways banana, subjects confused perceptual content with the internal images they were
asked to manufacture mentally. This finding, called the Perky effect, was credited with
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demonstrating such a close link between perception and imagination as to make each
indistinguishable from the other under certain circumstances.
Segal (1972) devised an experiment to test whether the Perky effect could occur in
situations where perceptual content differed from imaginal content. As in the original study,
participants were asked to visualize content; meanwhile, supraliminal images were projected on
a surface in front of them. Rather than replacing imaginal content, the undetected pictures
became superimposed in the participants’ internal imagery. For example, some participants who
were shown the faint projection of a tomato while visualizing New York City’s skyline
incorporated its round, reddish shape as a setting sun. They were not aware of having seen the
projected image. Rather, they believed they had imagined a sunset cityscape. Perceptual
experiences, even subtle ones, can impact the most mundane acts of imagination.
Perception plays a role in creative imagination, as well. Fascinated by the creative
process of designers, Suwa and Tversky (2003) devised an experiment to compare the ability of
professional designers, design students, professionals in unrelated careers, and students studying
cognitive science to generate written interpretations for four ambiguous drawings they were
shown. According to the researchers, success in this endeavor, denoted by a high number of
interpretations, would demonstrate a cognitive skill they called constructive perception.
Constructive perception is “the deliberate adoption of perceptual strategies in the service of
cognition” (p. 1140). It is a hallmark of expertise in a variety of domains. To better understand
how constructive perception works, consider the role that perception plays in learning, as
exhibited by the expanded perceptual power available to experts as compared to novices. To
illustrate this phenomenon, Gibson and Gibson (1955) contrasted the ability of wine
connoisseurs to discriminate among nuances of flavor in different varieties of wine with a
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layperson’s inability to distinguish either taste or type. Suwa and Tversky (2003) argued that
individuals exhibiting constructive perception in a given domain not only have this type of
perceptual expertise, but can deploy it creatively.
Each group’s performance on Suwa and Tversky’s (2003) interpretive generation task
was compared to its performance on tests of three separate abilities: perceptual reorganization,
spatial ability, and associative fluency. Perceptual reorganization occurs when an individual
regroups elements, alters a frame of reference, or changes perspective (as evoked by the wellknown duck-rabbit illusion, for example). The researchers tested participants’ perceptual
reorganization abilities using an embedded figures challenge that featured one or more discrete
graphic figures obfuscated by distracting details and presented inside of a larger figure. Spatial
ability is demonstrated when one accurately perceives the length, width, or depth of objects and
their arrangements in relation to one another within a given perceptual plane. The researchers
evaluated this using a mental rotation test. Associative fluency is “the ability to produce words in
a restricted area of meaning” (p. 1142). More broadly, it is a cognitive process wherein
perceptual stimuli trigger seemingly unrelated thoughts through a rapid stream of consciousness;
the greater the number of unique thoughts that arise, the higher the associative fluency. The test
of choice for this was Associations IV, which measures the rate of word production in response
to two random stimulus words; for example, generating the word “egg” after reading the words
“cake” and “frog” in juxtaposition.
Throughout their report, Suwa and Tversky (2003) used the term “conceptual generation”
interchangeably with “associative fluency,” yet they did not distinguish between ideational and
interpretive thought in their analysis of associative fluency; therefore their conclusions cannot be
analyzed in terms of the dual theory of imagination posited by some philosophers. Nevertheless,
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the concept of associative fluency is useful for measuring cognitive outputs in the broader,
aggregate sense of imagination.
Results indicated no significant differences among the four groups in the tests of
perceptual reorganization and spatial ability, but in the test of associative fluency, designers
significantly outperformed the other groups, and in the task of generating interpretations of the
four ambiguous drawings, designers and design students were nearly twice as productive as the
other participants. Because spatial ability was not a factor in the differences among groups and
also was not correlated with the main task of generating ideas and interpretations, Suwa and
Tversky (2003) ruled it out as a contributor to constructive perception. On the other hand,
perceptual reorganization and associative fluency each were correlated with the generation task,
and thus were determined to be constituents of constructive perception. High composite scores of
both perceptual reorganization and associative fluency within participants were even more
strongly correlated with constructive perception, underscoring the importance of each as a
contributing factor. These findings suggest that improving one’s perceptual prowess, in tandem
with exercising one’s imagination to form conceptual associations, may lead to constructive
perception, which characterizes expertise (Suwa & Tversky, 2003).
Sketching: Imagination in Visual Form
In the case of building expertise in drawing, sketching presents an ideal opportunity to
engage in constructive perception (Suwa & Tversky, 2003; Tversky & Suwa, 2009). In fact,
sketching has been described as “visual thinking” (Arnheim, 1969, passim). Art historian N.
Suthor (personal communication, December 9, 2019) argued that Renaissance and
Enlightenment artists’ imaginative sketches not only described images emanating from their
inner visions, but also were used to establish and hone those visions, thereby informing and re-
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informing imagination in successive interpretive acts. According to her, the famous art historian
Giorgio Vasari (1511–1574) recommended the practice of sketching to artists of his day, calling
it macchia, which is Italian for “blotch,” or “stain.” This was most likely in reference to the
pentimenti (i.e., “repentances”) approach of layering iterative and exploratory lines of ink in the
process of constructing compositions, a practice that artists like Leonardo had embraced without
apology.
Leonardo (ca. 1540/1956) used sketching as an interpretive tool—an aid to reproductive
imagination, as if anticipating Kant. He admonished artists who prematurely committed to their
inventive underdrawings, saying:
Do not separate the parts of your narrative paintings with sharp lines, or that will happen
to you which happens to many painters, who want every little stroke of charcoal to stand
… . Now, have you never considered how poets compose their verses? It does not annoy
them, just because they have written beautiful letters, to erase some of their verses, then
writing [sic] them out again better. Therefore, painter, compose the parts of your figures
arbitrarily, then attend first to the movements representative of the mental attitudes of the
creatures composing your narrative painting, rather than to the beauty and goodness of
the parts of their bodies. (Part 2, Number 261)
Leonardo prized sketching as a vehicle for feeling the motivations of imaginary characters and
conveying their stories meaningfully. This was an interpretive act. He left behind many rough
sketches that exemplify this approach (for example, see Figures 4 and 5).
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Figure 4
Leonardo da Vinci, Study of Battles on Horseback and on Foot, ca. 1503–1504. Gallerie
dell’Accademia, Venice.(1503)

Note. In the public domain.
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Figure 5
Leonardo da Vinci, Neptune, 1504, Royal Collection, Windsor Castle(1504)

Note. In the public domain.

Gombrich (1991) believed that Vasari prescribed sketching because it functions as a
feedback mechanism, bolstering the mind’s limited capacities. In Vasari’s words, “The mind can
neither perceive nor perfectly imagine such inventions within itself unless it opens up and shows
its conceptions to the corporeal eyes which aid it to arrive at good judgment” (ca. 1550, as cited
in Gombrich, 1982, p. 227). Sketching allows artists to transpose ideas from the mists of
imagination into solid, two-dimensional form. Therefore, sketching might be considered
essential both in an interpretive sense, as Leonardo recommended, and in a creative sense
reminiscent of Kant’s (1781–1787/1998) concept of productive imagination.
Scientists J. Fish and S. Scrivener (1990) claimed that sketches, which they described as
"incomplete visual structures" (1990, p. 124), facilitate imagination and problem solving. Their
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argument suggests three distinct mechanisms: (a) conservation of working memory, (b)
recollection of visual schemata, and (c) engagement of judgment and decision-making. Saving
the last of these for chapter 3, let us examine the first two, as they bear most heavily on the role
of imagination in drawing.
In regard to conservation of working memory, Fish and Scrivener (1990) noted that when
new ideas or inventions emerge in the mind, they are frequently vague and inchoate. Sketching a
rudimentary representation of an initial vision allows a draftsperson to capture a sense of it, in
percept form, before the image fades. The authors compared the first step in this process to the
way a home decorator, when examining a client's living quarters, mentally superimposes new
furnishings onto a room (a phenomenon cleverly dubbed make-perceive by Briscoe, 2018). As a
helpful next step, sketching captures imaginal arrangements in a fixed yet flexible medium. Once
an idea is documented on paper, the sketch serves as a starting point for elaboration and the
construction of a clearer depiction.
Throughout this cyclical process, the draftsperson perceives emergent markings and
immediately retains them as new mental imagery; in turn, those internal snapshots stimulate the
production of additional pencil markings. Even as the complexity of a drawing grows, the act of
sketching conserves working memory, for at any given moment, at least half of the thinking
involved is retained on the page. Fish and Scrivener (1990) believed that the facility of sketches
to bridge internal and external imagery may be due to the involvement of similar brain substrates
in the processing of mental images and percepts. Both share a neural medium and sketching
likely activates a feedback loop between them.
A second imaginal mechanism facilitated by sketches is the recognition of visual
schemata. According to Fish and Scrivener (1990), the indeterminate nature of accumulated
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sketch lines results in perceptual gaps, or lacunae. The authors hypothesized that these lacunae
stimulate a given artist’s or beholder’s mind to reconstruct fragmentary images unconsciously,
by means of preexisting mental schemata that are brought to bear on perceptual experience. An
ink drawing by Henri Matisse (1869–1954 [1901]) demonstrates this phenomenon (see Figure 6).
Although it is composed of loose, disconnected lines and scribbles, the sketch is easily
recognizable as a representation of a female figure reclining, because we automatically fill in its
discontinuous contours and gaps from our wellsprings of mental imagery. The drawing evokes a
percept-memory hybrid image that beholders experience holistically.
Sketches are particularly suited to this subtle dance, wherein pictures relayed through the
eyes are continually and inconspicuously overlaid with images generated from memory. The

Figure 6
Henri Matisse, Nude Resting on One Arm, 1901, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Note. In the public domain.
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"blank spaces … , multiple alternative contour lines (pentimenti), missing contour lines, wobbly
lines, mysterious dark shadows (sfumati), suggestive scribbles and smudges, energetic crosshatching, blots, accidental flow patterns of paint and even scratch marks" (Fish & Scrivener,
1990, p. 120) that sketches exhibit invite both artists and beholders to activate their pre-existing
visual knowledge.
Fish & Scrivener (1990) hypothesized that the human visual system evolved the
capability to reconstruct whole images from fragmentary parts to compensate in situations where
crucial visual stimuli are occluded by environmental obstacles. This comports with Kant’s
(1781–1787/1998) concept of reproductive imagination, wherein the imagination stores images
from experience and reproduces them the next time a similar situation is encountered, precluding
the need to investigate every aspect of the environment anew. For example, imagination stands in
when we view an opaque cube from one side. Even though some of its sides are out of view, we
realize it has six faces thanks to previous encounters with cubes (Perdue, 2003). Indeed, we
recognize subsequent cubes thanks to reproductive imagination. When we look at sketches and
contour drawings, this process is augmented, because outlines tend to emphasize features that are
most essential for object recognition; in this way, they function as highly processed visual
representations.
Fish & Scrivener’s (1990) most emphatic argument, that sketching is endemic to creative
depiction and problem solving, echoed the sentiments of Leonardo (ca. 1540/1956), Vasari (ca.
1568/1898), Gombrich (1982, 1991), Suthor (2015), and others. Indeed, "it seems plausible that
percepts arising from sketches can facilitate and amplify mental imagery" (Fish & Scrivener,
1990, p. 123). Thereby, sketching can power not only perception, but imagination. It may be the
most important key to constructive perception in drawing.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

60

Developing Imagination Through Skill Acquisition in Drawing
Cognitive psychologists A. Kozbelt and A. Kantrowitz (2019) argued that creativity in
the visual arts often is powered by knowledge and skill in drawing. In their words, "cognitive
processes related to creativity and imagination are built on a foundation of drawing skills,
whereby external depictive representations are put down in the service of idea development and
evaluation" (p. 327). The ability of an artist to accurately render, and thus communicate, what
they see, imagine, or feel, may provide a foundation for building new ideas. Therefore, these
researchers advocated for visual arts educators to equip their students with a repertoire of manual
and cognitive skills in preparation for unstructured artistic adventures and more sophisticated
conceptual challenges to come. The acquisition of such content knowledge may give novice
artists a better shot at producing artworks with imaginative flair.
Support for this approach has also emerged in the field of cognitive neuroscience. Over a
three-month period, Schlegel et al. (2015) investigated behavioral and neural impacts of drawing
instruction by comparing an experimental group of college-level art students who were receiving
introductory instruction in drawing or painting with a control group of non-art students who were
not. Concurrently, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan data allowed the researchers to
detect structural changes in participants’ brains each month. These results were correlated to
each groups’ performance on a gesture drawing task scored by independent, trained raters using
the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) Figural Form A test of conceptual creativity.
The same drawings were also assessed in terms of technical skill (e.g., line quality, degree of
resemblance to the observed stimulus, and gestural expressiveness).
The researchers discovered that the art students’ brains experienced a reorganization of
white matter that did not occur in the control group. This reorganization, defined as a reduction
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in fractional anisotrophy (FA), indicated that the degree of directional bias in the diffusion of
water decreased in this tissue. In other words, water diffusion pathways became more
directionally diversified in the brains of individuals who were studying observational drawing or
painting. The FA measurements were inversely correlated with robust ratings of the same
individuals’ drawings on the TTCT in regard to that groups’ ability to model systems or
processes creatively; for example, the experimental group outperformed the control group on
storytelling articulateness, emotional expressiveness, and skill at portraying movement or action.
Its members also demonstrated higher skill levels in divergent thinking and the depiction of
imagery, although those scores did not likewise correlate to MRI results (Schlegel et al., 2015).
No significant differences were found in verbal creativity or other factors as measured by the
TTCT (Schlegel et al., 2015).
The findings of Schlegel et al. (2015) indicate that, while drawing skill acquisition may
not augment perceptual abilities, learning the craft of drawing is positively associated with
creativity, and thus, with imagination. Sustained training and practice in drawing promises
improvements in creative expression, within the visual arts, over time. Imaginative drawing can
be learned and drawing itself powers this learning.
Drawing on Memory
Fernandes et al. (2018) ran several studies of the effect of drawing on the recollection of
academic definitions and concepts, in addition to mundane words. They concluded that the
benefits of drawing rival a battery of proven mnemonic techniques. For example, they found that
drawing is just as efficacious as the generation effect, discovered by Slamecka and Graf (1987),
which ascribes memory benefits to individuals when they independently produce words, over
when they try to recall words shown to them. Fernandes et al. (2018) also claimed that drawing
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can hold its own over the techniques of enactment, wherein non-verbal actions are used to
represent and recall verbal information (see Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1997), and production,
wherein words are read aloud rather than silently (see MacLeod et al., 2010).
To explain these findings, the researchers proposed an integrated-trace hypothesis that
identified drawing-specific memory traces capable of enhancing recollection. Elaboration is one
of these traces that is relevant to imaginative memory. The semantically rich nature of drawing
boosts elaborative activity by encouraging a draftsperson to represent more layers of meaning in
one discrete moment than is possible with words. However, if drawing is to facilitate elaborative
encoding, an artist must contribute some original visual detail. It is insufficient to copy or trace
lines from existing imagery. Therefore, drawing from imagination or in response to verbal
stimuli is more elaborative than drawing from observation, and is a more successful strategy for
strengthening memory (Fernandes et al., 2018).
Leonardo (ca. 1540/1956) prescribed specific exercises for the imagination and the
memory. First, he recommended spending time in the dark, before bed, “recalling the outlines of
forms you have already studied, or other noteworthy things comprehended by subtle reflection”
(Part 2, Number 65). According to Suthor (personal communication, December 9, 2019), he did
this with pen and paper in hand, making contour drawings from memory. During daylight hours,
he implemented additional exercises:
When you wish to remember well something you have studied, do this: When you have
drawn the same object so many times that you seem to have it in your memory, try to
execute it without the model. Trace your model on a thin, smooth glass, and place it upon
the drawing you have made without a model, and note well where the tracing does not
coincide with your drawing. Where you find that you have made errors, resolve not to
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repeat your mistakes. Return to the model and draw the wrong part again so many times
that you will have committed its image to the mind. (Leonardo da Vinci, 1540/1956, Part
2, Number 66)
Why might exercising memory and imagination play a role in learning to draw?
According to Schacter et al. (2007), a crucial function of memory is to imagine the future.
Memory and imagination, rather than serving mutually exclusive roles, are two sides of the same
coin. They are both important for human survival and are intimately intertwined in the mind. Just
as scrub jays cache food for later retrieval, we rely on past experiences and outcomes to inform
our own decision-making in the present.
One of the most impactful studies concerning memory and imagination was conducted by
Hassabis et al.(2007). They discovered that amnesiac patients who were asked to construct
imaginary, novel scenarios struggled to do so compared to controls. The researchers concluded
that forgetting the past impairs one's ability to engage in imaginative thought, and that creative
mental constructions originate in the storehouses of individual memory.
Buckner and Carroll (2007) postulated that a specific neural network is responsible for
facilitating memory and imagination in tandem. This core brain system is functionally correlated
with the hippocampal formation and encompasses the medial temporal lobe, the precuneus, the
retrosplenial cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, the lateral parietal cortex, and the lateral
temporal cortex. These brain regions are consistently active when either memory or imagination
is engaged.
The link between memory and imagination was supported in a study by Addis et al.
(2008) that explored the relationship of episodic memory abilities to episodic future thinking
prowess. Episodic memory is the kind of memory we use to travel back in time, mentally, and
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remember personal experiences from our lives. When it is robust, we can recall rich contextual
details alongside the basic narrative outline of past occurrences. Meanwhile, episodic future
thinking helps us project into the future. When it is functioning well, we can generate more
elaborate mental simulations. The researchers compared college students to healthy older adults
and documented declines in the older adults' episodic future thinking that corresponded to
normal, age-related declines in their episodic memory (Schacter et al., 2007).
When the two age groups were asked to relate a memory of a past event and a plan for a
future event, the narratives told by each population diverged in telling ways. Typical past event
responses from college students supplied rich episodic details threaded together chronologically,
such as descriptive information about the vegetation in a park visited, names of accompanying
friends, bits of recollected dialogue, movements from one activity to the next (e.g., from walking
to sitting down on the grass), and mention of specific foods consumed. Conversely, typical
responses from older adults supplied little if any episodic information. Instead, they tended to
dwell primarily on non-episodic details, particularly information about immediate events in their
lives that a past memory called to mind, such as disconnected anecdotes about their
grandchildren's preferences and social milieu (Addis et al., 2008).
Meanwhile, typical future event responses among college students provided a similar
amount of episodic detail as had been shared about their past memories; for example, plans to
bake a loaf of bread before the Yom Kippur holiday using an old recipe in a hot room lit by
candlelight, with the television tuned to the BBC. On the other hand, details about future
planning shared by the older adults lacked comparable episodic detail; to illustrate, one
participant communicated a desire to drive a Saab with abandon, throwing care to the wind, yet
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focused the lion’s share of the narrative on energy efficiency, road rage, and the growing climate
crisis, instead (Addis et al., 2008).
Schacter et al. (2007), identified the importance of relational memory to imaginative
thinking, noting that one's ability to flexibly recombine memories in order to construct novel
mental simulations is probably just as important as the ability to access episodic information
from past experience. To illustrate, a neuroscientific study conducted by Okuda, et al. (2003)
discovered that imagining the future, in addition to engaging the core brain system responsible
for mediating past and future thinking, activates frontopolar and medial temporal brain regions,
and appears to be more effortful than remembering the past. Schacter et al. (2007) speculated
that this extra activity represents relational memory at work. Therefore, imaginative, creative
planning for the future not only draws on recollections of past life experiences, but it also
requires the mental agility to see relationships among discrete past episodes.
Artists can integrate memories into material for future use and draw upon them to power
activities, like perspective taking and invention, that involve mental simulation. The American
illustrator Terryl Whitlatch is one of many who do this regularly. She builds fanciful creatures
for the silver screen by interleaving mental scraps of her days as a zoology student with patches
of pure inspiration (Banducci, 2013). Edgar Degas also relied on memory in artmaking as a
means to free artists from their dependence on the whims of nature and believed it could bring
forward an artist’s unique vision. “Draw what you only see in memory,” he advised. There is a
transformation during which the imagination works in conjunction with the memory. You only
put down what made an impression on you, that is to say the essential” (as cited in D. R. Rousar,
2013, p. 19).
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Like Whitlatch and Degas, Leonardo (ca. 1540/1956) stirred memory into his creative
process intentionally. Among his recipes for stimulating the imagination, he suggested that artists
should project their internal visual memories onto abstract scenes, thereupon mixing
recollections with reality in a playful manner. In his words:
Look at walls splashed with a number of stains or stones of various mixed colors. If you
have to invent some scene, you can see there resemblances to a number of landscapes,
adorned in various ways with mountains, rivers, rocks, trees, great plains, valleys and
hills. Moreover, you can see various battles, and rapid actions of figures, strange
expressions on faces, costumes, and an infinite number of things, which you can reduce
to good, integrated form. … Look into the stains of walls, or the ashes of a fire, or clouds,
or mud, or like things, in which, if you consider them well, you will find really marvelous
ideas. (Part 2, Number 76)
Many are the times I have found myself staring at a plate of residue after a meal or
watching the play of water in a public fountain—bursting, leaping, and falling like aquatic
acrobats. How often have I seen shapes in the clouds, discerned a humble grace in the
accumulated long hairs on my shower wall, or pondered a frost-bitten windowpane. As I have
intuited and Leonardo (ca. 1540/1956) recommended, such dawdling can find productive ends.
Chapter 2 Summary
This chapter grappled with the role that imagination plays in representational drawing
and the challenges it presents to novice figurative artists who hope to cultivate in themselves a
finely tuned and expansive imagination. It explored how historical ideas about imagination—
from the quattrocento concept of ingenium (M. Kemp, 1977) to Kant’s (1781–1787/1998)
philosophy of reproductive and productive imagination, to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s (1847)
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notion of primary imagination, and I.A. Richard’s definition of imagination as “the power of
ordering experience” (p. 228)—inform our conceptualizations today. From there, this chapter
turned toward psychological intersections between drawing practice and imagination, including
the theory of constructive perception (Suwa & Tversky, 2003), the role of sketching (Fish &
Scrivener, 1990; Gombrich, 1982), skill acquisition (Kozbelt & Kantrowitz, 2019; Schlegel et
al., 2015), and memory development (Fernandes et al., 2018; Rousar, 2013).
Realist art provides unique opportunities for drawing on imagination, yet it also presents
significant technical challenges that may be daunting to adult novice artists, eager to hone their
craft. A drawing that is deft, yet imaginative, boasts no easy recipe. The literature just reviewed
sheds light on what happens cognitively when an artist takes pen to paper, intent on creating
volumetric, representational drawings that not only are “realistic,” but also imaginative. Perhaps
we have demystified this alchemy just enough to reveal principles useful for guiding a selfdirected drawing curriculum of value to adult novice artists, such as myself, who wish to
improve both their representational abilities and imaginative capacities.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

68

CHAPTER 3
Judgment in Realist Drawing

Drawing relies upon and reveals the regularity of nature to the artist.
—realist artist Eric Johnson, personal communication, October 21, 2020

When I mention my interest in the role of judgment in drawing, I frequently receive looks
of surprise when I explain that my research does not center on the aesthetic merits of artworks or
how they are evaluated by beholders. Rather, I am fascinated by how artists think, in terms of
judgment and decision-making, while crafting realist1 drawings. Realist drawings and the
processes involved in creating them serve as windows on the inner workings of the human mind,
particularly regarding a cognitive faculty best described as artisanal judgment, which bears on
artists’ imaginative capacities and is sensitive to situative conditions affecting the body of the
artisan. In this chapter, I review literature in philosophy, psychology, art history, and education
that sheds light on what happens cognitively when an artist takes pen, pencil, or paintbrush to
paper, intent on creating a drawing. Herein readers will consider the history of artisanal judgment
in the West and survey the results of numerous empirical studies in light of philosophical
frameworks pertinent to judgment in drawing. This chapter should be read with an eye toward

1

See Janson (2007) for a more detailed, academic definition of Realism in Western art. In this chapter and
throughout the dissertation, I have not capitalized “realism,” because I am interested in a broader conceptualization
of the term than strict adherence to a specific art historical period or style allows. Embracing a less determinate
definition accommodates a greater degree of artistic license in creating drawings inspired by the Realist tradition
proper, as well as its antecedents and consequents in representational drawing. Therefore, the term “realist,” in
lowercase form, should be understood as a quasicolloquialism, and purposely so. In essence, I use it to describe
plausible, volumetric rendering in representational drawing.
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identifying pedagogical principles of value for developing artisanal judgment among adult
novice artists who are learning to draw and also drawing to learn.
Realist Drawing as a Window on Judgment
Drawing is a kind of making, and realist drawing is a kind of making that strives for
believability within the realm of artistic reality. The approximation of artistic reality within one’s
work involves judgment—the ability to compare one’s creation, as it unfolds, to a terrestrial
model for it or a design envisioned in the mind’s eye. What is to be made of the space between
how a drawing appears and an artist’s intentions in crafting it?
Making and Mimesis
In Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E. [340 B.C.E./1909])
identified technē as “a truth-attaining intellectual quality concerned with making” (Part 1140a
10). His meaning of the word technē encompassed our concepts of art, science, and craft;
Aristotle applied it to a wide range of skilled activities, such as weaving, house building, poetry
writing, medicine, and meteorology (Nussbaum, 2001). In reference to art and drawing, the word
artisanship is an appropriate translation, because it captures the creative sense of drawing as an
art, as well as the technical sense of drawing as a craft.2 Technē, or artisanship, held a seat within
Aristotle’s (340 B.C.E./1909) list of intellectual virtues, alongside practical wisdom, political
wisdom, scientific knowledge, philosophic wisdom, and inductive reason. He thought that the
first three, artisanship, practical wisdom, and political wisdom, stood apart from the other virtues
in an important way: By their nature, they must be exercised in projects or situations that are
characterized by variability. Therefore, these virtues entail risk, uncertainty, or contentiousness.

Technē is the etymological root of the word ars, which is Latin for art. I have chosen to use the word artisanship
instead of ars, because the term ars reflects the false dissociation of art from technē undertaken in Western art
discourse after the 17th Century, in pursuit of elevated intellectual status. This resulted in the devaluation of manual,
craft elements of artmaking in art theory and practice (Suthor, 2008).
2
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Artisanship ultimately differed from political and practical wisdom in Aristotle’s eyes,
despite its common medium of doubt, because of its concern with making; its goal has always
been the creation of products that do not exist as ends in themselves, but instead serve as means
to other ends. Meanwhile, practical wisdom gives some individuals the ability to live a fruitful,
moral life, and political wisdom enables some statespersons to foster human flourishing on a
grand scale. These latter virtues are concerned not with making, but with truth-seeking action.
Good deeds, when attained, succeed as ends in themselves, not as mere means to other ends.
“Doing,” said Aristotle, “is not making, and making is not doing” (Part 1140a 5–10). Artisanship
is procedural; it asks “how?,” whereas political and practical wisdom answer “why.” Aristotle
argued that wickedness blinds people to differences between means and ends; the distinction
mattered to him.
In section 48 of his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant (1790/2000) echoed this
identification of technē with making, specifically in reference to creative arts like painting,
sculpture, poetry and oratory. Unlike natural phenomena capable of inspiring aesthetic
experiences of beauty or awe without reference to preexisting concepts, he argued that beautiful
or sublime artworks are conceptually grounded. In other words, they are end products created
through the means of artisanal judgment and genius. By contrast, natural phenomena are ends in
themselves, because they are both cause and effect of themselves, just as a “tree generates
another tree in accordance with a known natural law. … and so it generates itself as far as the
species is concerned. … [and] also generates itself as an individual” (Kant, 1790/2000 §64).
Based on this, we may conclude that artworks, since they are not living beings, cannot act.
This conclusion need not imply, however, that artworks are inert, for even as products are
ends, they do not represent final ends in the way that natural phenomena or actions do. Aristotle
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(340 B.C.E./1909) stated this plainly: “Every man who produces a thing produces it with some
further end in view: The thing which is made is not an absolute end, but has reference to, and
belongs to, something else” (340 B.C.E./1909 Part 1139b 1–4). According to C.D.C. Reeve
(1995), Aristotle believed that individuals (e.g., artists) possessed of practical or political wisdom
would, by virtue of that wisdom, seek to employ the skills of their craft toward good works and
the project of human flourishing. Fellow philosopher M. Nussbaum (2001) held the same
interpretation, noting that Aristotle advised against relying on luck to achieve a desired outcome
when relevant technical expertise was to be had. Indeed, J. Dunne and A. Macintyre (1997)
called attention to Aristotle’s acknowledgment that many good deeds could never be
accomplished were it not for the skills necessary to perform them. In short, the products of
artisanship, via purposeful qualities that encourage, facilitate, discourage, or hinder specific
actions or dispositions, ultimately may serve as means to ethical or moral ends. Likewise, they
may contribute to unethical or immoral ends in the hands of practitioners who lack practical or
political wisdom.
The potentiality of power that artworks possess worried Plato (ca. 424–347 B.C.E.), the
student of Socrates who was Aristotle’s most famous teacher (469–399 B.C.E.), enough to
banish artists from his Utopian city. In Book X, of the Republic, Plato (380 B.C.E./2013)
portrayed a conversation between Socrates and Glaucon wherein both sages concluded that
artworks were corrupting because of their imitative, or mimetic, qualities. Through this dialogue,
Socrates won over Glaucon to the opinion that works of painters, poets, and playwrights were at
third remove from the truth, because these were mere appearances and not ideal forms or
tangible objects. In Socrates’ words,
God wanted to be the real creator of the bed which exists in reality, not a particular bed,
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nor a particular bed-maker, he created the one which in its nature is unique. … And the
carpenter: Shouldn’t we call him a craftsman who makes beds? … And the painter too,
isn’t he a craftsman and maker of such a thing? (Book X, Part 597e)
According to the logic of Plato’s argument through Socrates, true things exist as immaterial,
ideal forms, created by God. At second remove from the truth are the works of craftsmen, and
trailing behind are artworks, at third remove. It was a rhetorical question that Socrates asked
Glaucon: Whether the painter can be credited with creating a bed by depicting a bed. In response,
Glaucon replied, “In no way!”
Philosopher M. Burnyeat (1999), attributed to Plato a deep skepticism about the nature of
knowledge that uncritiqued cultural forms, like artworks, represent. The ancients believed that
culture plays a significant and often unrecognized role in the construction of identities, thoughts,
and behaviors among those whom it envelopes. In Plato’s eyes, mimetic artworks, because they
model the world so movingly and convincingly, could prove disastrous to a civilized society.
According to Burnyeat, “metaphors and images, as Plato knew better than anyone, are potent
weapons, especially in the wrong hands” (1999, p. 285). Plato believed the arts were too
dangerous for his Republic, because common citizens lacked the intellectual capacity to
overcome mimesis’s charms.
If we return to the arguments of Dunne & Macintyre (1997), Reeve (1995), and
Nussbaum (2001) regarding Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, we can surmise that the nature of a
product, whether artistic or utilitarian, may be informed by its maker’s or its owner’s virtue (or
lack thereof), particularly in regard to artisanship, practical wisdom, or both together. Following
this logic, should it stun historians that Leni Riefenstahl’s (1902–2003) technically innovative
films furthered the evil aims of Nazism? Something can be art, but also propaganda. Artworks
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can be weapons. But happily, and more often than not, they are nothing of the sort. As means to
any number of ends, including practically or politically wise acts, artworks can brighten a space,
bring joy, help unsettle stagnant stereotypes, and much more. Because of their innumerable,
often ineffable benefits, I beg to differ with Plato’s conclusion that artists should be banished
(380 B.C.E./2013); I believe a society cannot thrive without art.
Contemplating attributes of artworks in terms of practical or political wisdom is a fraught
business. Indeed, Aristotle (340 B.C.E./1909) reminded us that variability is a crucial medium
for the three intellectual virtues with which we presently are concerned: artisanship, political
wisdom, and practical wisdom. Variability ushers in doubt and uncertainty; risk, debate, or
deliberation ensue. In such an environment, judgment is required, but who gets to decide?
Censorship of works deemed immoral or otherwise bad usually causes more harm than good.
Meanwhile, artisanal judgment, unto itself, steers clear of such debates and still provides plenty
of fodder for analysis. While I certainly do not dispute the merits of investigating technē’s
interplay with political and practical wisdom in the arts,3 doing so would present manifold
philosophical contingencies that are unnecessary to my current project and therefore, beyond its
bounds. In this dissertation, I have confined my inquiry to the role of judgment in the technical
aspects of artmaking.
Drawing on Doubt
As we have discussed, technē requires artisanal judgment. Designer and craftsman D. Pye
(1978) emphasized the centrality of judgment to the endeavor of making. His concept of the
workmanship of risk, although it applies specifically to the production of utilitarian objects by

3

For those interested in the interplay of artistic and literary works with political and practical wisdom, see Edmonds
& Warburton (n.d.), Hakemulder (2000), Johnson (2007), Kidd & Castano (2013), Panero et al. (2017), Peterson
(2001), Rampley (2005), Uzel & Avasilichioaei (2019), Walker & Chaplin (1997), and Zettl (2017).
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hand, cleaves closely in meaning to the word artisanship as I am using it here. Pye described the
workmanship of risk as:
workmanship using any kind of technique or apparatus, in which the quality of the result
is not predetermined, but depends on the judgement, dexterity and care which the maker
exercises as he works. The essential idea is that the quality of the result is continually at
risk during the process of the making. (1978, p. 4)
Within Pye’s (1978) definition, which applies to workmanship and, via the technical
aspects of artmaking, to artisanship (and thereby drawing), the idea of risk regards variability in
the process of making. This variability introduces a diverse range of qualities, because artisans
cannot help but differ in the amount of time spent or afforded, the degree of labor or effort spent,
and the level of accuracy or skill brought to bear on a project. In the activity of making, artisans
approximate to standards, including standards of soundness (i.e., integrity of form) and
comeliness (i.e., conformity to an intended aesthetic design).
In the realm of realist drawing, the draftsperson’s work is approximated to rules of linear
perspective and naturalistic proportions, as well as spatial rhythms, melodies, and harmonies
based on geometric ratios (Aristides, 2016). This kind of approximation relies heavily on the
faculty of judgment; it requires a careful hand and an interpretive mind. Artisans must constantly
make inferences toward forms, whether apparent or in the mind’s eye. They strive to capture the
essence of whatever they choose to portray.
Aside from the spiritual beliefs expressed by Socrates in Plato’s (360 B.C.E./2017)
Phaedo, these efforts are in some ways analogous to the classical philosopher’s passion for truth.
In Plato’s conceptual universe, truth resided in forms, perfect and eternal structures that were
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ultimately beyond the grasp of embodied beings (Kraut, 2017). In a discussion with Simmias,
Socrates said,
Whoever of us prepares himself to apply his mind most rigorously and carefully to the
essence of each thing he’s investigating, he’s the one who will get closest to a knowledge
of each one. … by using his mind alone by itself and uncorrupted, he’d attempt to track
down the pure and actual form of each and everything that exists by itself. (Plato, 360
B.C.E./2017, Phaedo, Part 65d–66a)
Quattrocento art theorist Ludovico Dolce (1508–1568) defended the value of technē, or
artisanship, in the composition of artworks. In his words, it is not “enough for a painter to be a
good inventor if he is not equally good as a draftsman, for invention is represented by form, and
form is none other than [drawing]” (1557, as translated in Rosand, 2002). In asserting the
importance of disciplined drawing practice to the artistic enterprise, he was close on the heels of
Leonardo da Vinci. In his Treatise on Painting, Leonardo (1540/1956) criticized artists who
painted carelessly and without restraint. Instead, he instructed his fellow artists to engage with
theory and inform their practice by learning and applying established methods, like linear
perspective. “Those who fall in love with practice without science,” he said, “are like pilots who
board a ship without rudder or compass, who are never certain where they are going” (Part 2,
Number 70). Twelve years before Leonardo wrote those words, Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528)
expressed the same opinion in his Treatise on Human Proportion (as cited in Suthor, 2015).
Quattrocento artists and intellectuals agreed: Technical knowledge mitigates doubt. It facilitates
the exercise of artisanal judgment. and through it, the depiction of a believable world.
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Sharpening Judgment and Pencils: The Role of Drawing Instruction
It is not possible to represent reality as we experience it with complete accuracy, even
with conscientious effort, but the attempt remains worthwhile in the 21st century. Pye (1978) and
realist artist J. Aristides (2016) both argued that artisanship, whether in craft or drawing, could
be learned. According to Aristides, most groundbreaking artists of the 19th century received
academic training, including Renoir, Manet, Degas, Seurat, Millet, and Fantin-Latour. Their
education and dedication to observing nature provided a springboard for innovation, 4 and in the
case of the artists listed here, brought Impressionism into being. Aristides received similar
training in the last decades of the 20th century through the atelier education movement, which
“seeks to revive the discoveries of the past while giving students the skills to move forward with
their own vision” (2016, p. 8).
The atelier curriculum is rigorous from the beginning. During the first year, it emphasizes
intense observation of master works and diligent practice in the judicious application of tools and
techniques in drawing. As atelier students develop, they acquire abilities and dispositions that
empower some of them to express a unique vision. Their works are a gift to many beholders who
enjoy examining visual phenomena through the filter of a conscientious artist’s mind. The depth
of skill required signifies mastery, an achievement in workmanship that Pye (1978) equated with
expert judgment, alongside dexterity, technique, and care.
In her analysis of Aristotle’s concept of technē, Nussbaum (2001) identified
“teachability” among its four main features, along with “universality,” “precision,” and “concern
with explanation.” Technē is universal because its effects apply across a wide array of
applications. It is precise because practitioners employ it to a given standard of accuracy. They

4

Notably, Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) is among the many successful artists who received classical training in
anatomy and rendering. Some of his Bargue drawing exercises survive with his heirs (Rosand, 2002).
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are not satisfied with using it for production alone, for they are interested in explaining how they
have applied it to achieve specific effects; therefore, it is concerned with explanation. Finally, it
is teachable because its applications generally have predictable effects. Although technē
necessarily is practiced amid variability and doubt, and so implies risk, it is not ruled by chance.
It possesses a logical structure and procedures that may be communicated to learners.
Insofar as technē relies on judgment, Kant’s (1781–1787/1998) scholarship suggests we
should expect variability in students’ acquisition of artisanal skills. He argued that it is
impossible to increase an individual’s power of judgment through education, as this power is
directly tied to intelligence. However, he thought it was possible to “sharpen the power of
judgment” (A134/B173) already present in an individual, noting that such sharpening could be
achieved through examples that illustrate the application of a given judgment in action. In his
words, “examples are the leading-strings of the power of judgment, which he who lacks the
natural talent for judgment can never do without” (A134/B173). According to him, individuals
may learn any number of rules to guide their understanding, whether they possess great powers
of judgment or not. He believed it was possible to possess great knowledge, and yet fail to apply
it well, such that even very learned persons who lack judgment, whether physicians, judges,
politicians, or otherwise, must make do with the rules they have learned. When said individuals
encounter a particularly challenging case, those rules may not suffice, for rules are
merely formulas; they are not principles discernible through judgment. Given Kant’s
qualification on the teachability of judgment, he might agree that technical training cannot itself
produce artistic genius. Nevertheless, technē, particularly when accompanied by illustrative
examples, endows the draftsperson with pride of practice, and through it, artists may bring their
gifts to fruition.
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According to Pardo (2008), artist training in Leonardo’s day was designed to exercise and
inform an apprentice's judgment through close study of master works and manual training.
Students had the opportunity to observe how an experienced artist had solved three-dimensional
representational problems peculiar to the two-dimensional medium of drawing, as well as
scrutinize the artist’s maniera, or style. The practice of transcribing (i.e., imitating) master
drawings facilitated a re-embodiment of hand movements and pen strokes made by an expert.
More than mere mimicry, it allowed students to gain a glimpse into virtuoso decision-making. In
this way, master drawings functioned as examples that helped to guide the development of
artisanal judgment in novice artists.
Atelier instructors in the present day have revived this practice with the conviction that
doing so allows artistic vision to soar, strengthening students’ wings. Aristides (2016) advised
drawing enthusiasts that transcription involves interpretation, and is anything but rote. For
example, Eugène Delacroix (1798–1863) employed several different approaches in his own
transcription routine in order to achieve specific goals. These strategies ranged from creating a
complete facsimile to rendering a basic sketch and then focusing on particular aspects of the
work, such as its line quality, compositional elements, or value distribution. Aristides
recommended his example, noting that “the artist [who transcribes master drawings] learns to see
through another’s eyes. Emulation becomes the first step toward self-expression, and eventually
the artist will begin to see in life what he has been learning to see in art” (2016, p. 83).
Vasari prized drawing as the father of the three visual arts, above architecture and
sculpture, for its obligation of the intellect and hand in tandem. Through drawing, he said, the
draftsperson assesses ideas and measures the proportions of natural forms, whether plants,
animals, people, buildings, or sculptures. In his view, drawing afforded the discernment of visual
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relationships among objects in the world and one’s imagination: of parts to a whole, of wholes to
their parts, and of each part to its fellows (as cited in Rosand, 2002). Drawing remains an
important means for developing artists’ judgment. It is a timeless art.
Kant’s aesthetic theory made an indelible impact on the art world; yet, he is not
considered to be an authority on the arts, per se, because his writings focused mainly on aesthetic
experiences in nature (D. Sommer, personal communication, September 16, 2015). That said,
some of his remarks on artmaking were insightful for representational art, particularly regarding
the role of judgment. Kant deemed genius to be crucial in the artistic enterprise, but he believed
that judgment played an even greater role. In his view, judgment made art comprehensible. He
said that without it, genius “in its lawless freedom [produces] nothing but nonsense” (1790/2000,
§50, 5:319). For Kant, it was judgment that brought imagination into play with understanding
during one’s engagement with art.
Perhaps Kant borrowed the idea from Leonardo (1540/1956), whose instructions for the
student of painting applied equally to the novice draftsperson. In Leonardo’s words, “That
painter who doubts not, attains little. When the work surpasses the judgment of the painter, the
painter attains little, but when his judgment surpasses his work, the work never ceases to
improve” (Part 2, Number 82). This statement emphasizes the role of critical thinking in crafting
images and the responsibility of realist artists to compose their works intentionally. Drawing to
Leonardo’s standard requires knowledge and effort. It depends on an artist’s judgment.
Before moving on to the next section, it is important to temper the arguments related thus
far. As important as judgment is to the development of realist artists, it ought to be engaged in
balance with enthusiasm and self-compassion. In her book, The Creative Path, contemporary
artist C. Schlam (2018) urged artists to set aside moments dedicated to quelling their inner
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critics, lest they suffocate their will to create. Judgment directed at evaluating final products is
sometimes best left to art critics. On the other hand, judgment employed in the creation of a
drawing, activated with intention and embodied through discrete movements across the drawing
surface, is a topic worthy of study and appreciation for novice artisans. It is this latter sense of
judgment that concerns this chapter.
Philosophies of Judgment Relevant to Realist Drawing
Judgment is often invoked in debates centered on evaluating art according to the criteria
of established and avant-garde tastes, or in regard to the social value of artworks and artmaking.
There is less existing scholarship examining the role of judgment in creating works of art. In the
discussion that follows, I provide background for the concept of artisanal judgment through
philosophical theories of judgment, more generally.
Judgment and the Capacity to Judge
In the introduction to their translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, philosophers P.
Guyer and A.W. Wood (in Kant, 1781–1787/1998) noted the primacy of judgment in Kant’s
philosophy of mind. For Kant, judgment presented the main problem of philosophy; he saw it as
fundamental to human cognition, because it allows us to distinguish among different concepts
and make inferences, miniscule but momentous suppositions that drive thoughts and behaviors.
Judgment informs not only how individuals interact with the world, but also affords the
possibility of shared experience in society. In the First Introduction to his Critique of the Power
of Judgment, Kant (1790/2000, Section II) described judgment as a mental faculty that mediates
the connection between our understanding of natural laws (or general rules) and our ability to
reason logically. In other words, we exercise judgment in order to intervene purposively in our
own and others’ lives. When successful, our judgment leads us to decisions that enhance well-
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being, based on our ability to reason effectively and adapt our behaviors to circumstances that
otherwise are largely beyond our control. Judgment connects theoretical concepts and practical
ideas. It reconciles deterministic fate with the exercise of our will—whether in mind, action, or
both. In his words, “the power of judgment provides the mediating concept between the concept
of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition from the purely
theoretical to the purely practical” (Kant, 1790/2000, Published Introduction, Section IX, 5:196).
Philosopher W. Martin (2006) described judgment as a particular aspect of reasoning
with theoretical components that help us decide what to believe and practical aspects that help us
decide what to do. It involves responsibility, and how it is exercised by individuals and leaders
can tell one a great deal about the most and least esteemed values for a given individual or
society. Everyone exercises judgment in daily life, whether wise or foolish. These judgments
deal with an infinitude of questions, such as how much to salt one's food or not, whether to vote
and for whom, or where to distribute mail. According to him, judgment often involves seeking,
considering, weighing, and interpreting evidence and then rendering a conclusion; however,
judgments can also occur instantaneously, through intuition instead of deliberation.
Psychologist J.St.B.T. Evans (2007) said the rationality of any judgment may be assessed
based on how it measures up to a given standard. For example, personal judgment can be
measured by the degree to which it helps an individual reach personal goals; evolutionary
judgment by how well one’s behavior serves the designs of one’s genes; ecological judgment by
the amount of environmental adaptation achieved, and normative judgment by its conformity to a
normative system, such as formal logic, probability theory, expected utility, the Popperian
philosophy of science, or Baye’s theorem, among others. Following a similar line of reasoning,
Martin (2006) identified four “faces” of judgment, including psychological, political, logical, and
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phenomenological faces; the latter concerning the structure (not the content) of human
experience. In light of these perspectives on judgment, it is conceivable that a draftsperson may
exercise many faces of judgment in the course of creating a drawing, measuring each decision
against applicable standards, such as those pertaining to realist drawing.
The free exercise of responsible judgment requires agency. Kant (1781–1787/1998,
1790/2000) believed that, in the absence of a unified consciousness, or self, judgment would not
be possible, because judgments are about objects of consciousness. In other words, they concern
individuals’ interactions with the world. In accord with this view, Martin (2006) argued that the
goal of a given phenomenological judgment arises as a felt demand in a conscious agent, spurred
by a relevant state of affairs composing the object of that judgment. For example, such a demand
might be to determine the best way down a mountain pass, and the object from which it emanates
would be a situation of greater or lesser import to the judging agent. If the object seemed
sufficiently critical, the demand could be experienced as a sense of urgency. He provided the
following example of an object of phenomenological judgment:
Anxious to be on our way, we pick a likely route and start to pick our way down. At first
our choice looks promising, but before long it becomes clear that the would-be route
leads to an avalanche chute, or a sheer cliff, or a near-vertical debris flow. Initial
optimism turns to despair and we grudgingly recognize the route for what it is: a deathtrap rather than the way home. (p. 140)
The individuals described in this passage face a stark imperative to locate a successful pathway.
They must exercise keen judgment in doing so, for a multitude of options could lead to their
demise.
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Regarding circumstances like this, which require judgment, Martin (2006) advised
readers that, in order to be considered responsible for their conclusions, decisions, or actions,
judging agents must be afforded the capacity to judge. In his view, the capacity to judge is
dependent on multiple factors in combination: the tractability of a given state of affairs, the
availability of accurate evidence, and access to multiple perspectives, as well as the judging
agents’ representational capacity (i.e., their ability to go beyond surface appearances when
estimating a situation), and finally, free will to follow their convictions.
Kant (1781–1787/1998) argued that judgments originate from individuals’ subjective
consciousness, and whether the judgments are sound or not, are presented as if they apply
objectively for other individuals, in general. Judgments are more than mere observations that
given phenomena occur. For example, the observation that “if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of
weight” (B142) does not qualify as a judgment in his book. This statement merely recognizes
that two phenomena, that of carrying something and of feeling weight, are co-occurring; it says
nothing about the body that I am carrying beyond my subjective experience in relation to it. On
the other hand, an observation indicating that “the body is heavy” (B142) is in fact a judgment,
not only because it denotes a valid relationship between a body and a quality (weight) that may
characterize bodies in general, but because it makes a claim about that particular body in terms
of how one or more other individuals may experience it objectively: in this case, as heavy.
In order to analyze judgment in a systematic way, Kant (1781–1787/1998) proposed the
now renown Table of Judgments, which maps out categories of human cognition that make
reflective judgment possible, as well as logical functions that accompany and govern all acts of
determinative judgment. Notably, the categories and functions are forms of thought that are, in
and of themselves, content free. At the most granular level, Kant’s table identified four items, or
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“titles,” each of which operates both as a top level category and a top level function. These
include, 1) Quantity, 2) Quality, 3) Relation, and 4) Modality. Philosopher B. Longuenesse
(1998) understood these categories as an inborn cognitive architecture that allows the mind to
generate concepts from sensory stimuli. By means of the categories, we turn empirical data into
mental matter, which she described as “the given” (p. 148). With “the given” in hand (which,
because it is matter of a sort, is determinable), our minds engage the functions of judgment to
form, or determine it. In essence, the categories enable inductive reasoning by supplying a
precise5 range of universal slots that help us organize myriad particulars. Meanwhile, the
functions provide logical rules that facilitate deductive reasoning to subsume the same particulars
under those universal concepts we have already generated via the categories.
To illustrate how the table works, Kant (1781–1787/1998) supplied a few propositional
statements, which because they bear on finer-grained elements, I will not excerpt. Therefore, in
accord with the structure he outlined, let us consider our own statement, “This is great!”, for
purposes of demonstration. Pertaining to our statement, the category/function Quantity is
concerned with the subject, “this,” regarding its scope. We are interested in how much or how
many of “this” we are attending to, or what “this’s” magnitude is. By contrast, the
category/function Quality concerns constituent attributes of the predicate, “great.” This applies to
the nature of “great” and the features that compose it, and in this regard, whether or not “great” is
an appropriate label for the subject “this.” Turning to Relation, we focus on the linking verb,
“is.” The verb tells us how the subject “this” and predicate “great” affect one another. In other
words, it tells us how they are related, i.e., whether their relationship is causal, inherent,
oppositional, part-whole, conjunctive, disjunctive, hypothetical, or categorical. Finally, the

5

For an incisive analysis of the completeness and precision of the Table of Judgments, see Wolff (2017).
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statement’s Modality tells us how conceivable or plausible the situation referenced by “this is
great!” is deemed to be, based on phrasing and context. We use modality to determine whether a
proposition is possible, true, false, or necessary. 6
Thus, depending on a particular topic and context, we could judge the statement "this is
great" based on the factors of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. For example, if we
assume that the subject "this" refers to a homemade meal and the linking verb "is" indicates an
inherent relationship between "this" and the predicate "great," then judging "this" in terms of
Quantity entails consideration of portion sizes, the ratio of key ingredients to supporting ones,
and the number of courses, side dishes, and servings that the statement references. To inform the
judgment of "great" in terms of Quality, salient aspects include eye appeal, aroma, flavors,
temperature, and textures. In terms of Relation, “this is great” is a statement conveying relational
qualities of inherence and subsistence between the meal and its predicate, “great.” Rather than
implying a causal relationship between the meal and something else (such as feeling full) or a
relationship of community and reciprocity between the meal and its consumer (e.g., eat this meal
or starve; eat this meal and satiate your hunger), the statement “this is great,” applied to the meal,
categorically suggests that the meal satisfies the criteria of greatness in the eyes of the speaker.
In this sense, its relationship to greatness in inherent. Now, if the meal looks inviting, smells
divine, tastes delicious, is served at the ideal temperature, and was prepared with pure
ingredients at peak freshness, then the statement's modality is possible or true. However, if the
food looks unappetizing, smells foul, tastes bad, is served at the wrong temperature, or was
prepared with impure or spoiled ingredients, then "this is great" is likely a sarcastic statement
with a false modality.

Conditional (“what if”) and counterfactual (“imagine that”) modalities are of great interest to scholars of cognition
in the arts; interested readers may consult Stokes (2007).
6
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Where artworks are concerned, statements may be visual or psychomotor rather than
verbal. Instead of serving as the subject of a statement, “this” may refer to the subject matter of
an artwork or a technique used in creating it. Regardless, the categories and functions of
Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality would still apply.
Types of Judgment Relevant to Realist Drawing
According to Kant’s (1790/2000, First Introduction, Sections I–V) conceptualization, the
capacity for judgment allows us to specify general rules or categories that pertain to a particular
datum or to classify a particular datum or set of data under general categories or rules. In other
words, logical judgment employs reason, whether through deductive or inductive inference. Kant
made a distinction between deductive and inductive forms of judgment, labeling the former
determinative judgment, and the latter reflective judgment. According to him, determinative
judgment operates mechanically, through the schematizing engine of reproductive imagination.
As it specifies objects of experience, determinative judgment moves from the general to the
particular. Meanwhile, reflective judgment moves from the particular to the general as it
classifies objects of experience. Unlike its mechanical foil, Kant said reflective judgment is
exercised “artistically,” using a “technique of nature” (1790/2000, First Introduction, Sections I–
V, 20:214). In his view, the artistic character of reflective judgment is what enables us to discern
coherent patterns in the dizzying diversity of novel data we continuously encounter. Thereby,
human beings find order in chaos; we anticipate effects from causes, or put another way, we
encounter nature as a kind of art that functions according to laws, and simultaneously, is a
consequence of itself.
Reflective Judgment. Longueness’s (1998) analysis of Kant’s theory of judgment
clarifies the primacy of reflective judgment. According to her, The Critique of Pure Reason
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specified that determinative judgment is dependent on reflective judgment. This is because it is
first necessary to engage in reflective thought before one may determine, or subsume, particulars
under universal concepts. We begin with raw objects of consciousness, i.e., sensible
representations, that we perceive. The first step in cognition is to relate these data to an existing
mental schema or, in failing to classify them, to face a gap in our understanding. At this stage,
our judgments are merely judgments of perception; they are subjectively valid. Only after the
initial act of finding the universal for the particular has occurred, can we proceed to determining
said particulars under the universals we have identified. Therefore, said Longuenesse, “every
judgment on empirical objects as such is reflective” (1998, p. 164). The schematizing function of
reproductive imagination propels this search for universals. Ultimately, our schemata function as
gateways between figurative and discursive thought. This results in determinative judgments,
which are judgements of experience that are objectively valid. Recall that Aristotle (340
B.C.E./1909) listed inductive reason, not deductive reason, among the chief intellectual virtues;
the primacy of reflective judgment may explain that rationale.
Because reflective judgment is concerned with helping us find concepts and laws for the
particulars in our midst, it hinges on the principle of systematicity to guide our search (Kant,
1790/2000). According to this principle, we can rely on regularity in nature, and by virtue of this
regularity, we are able to understand the natural world. In other words, we can grasp an
understanding of science only because of the natural laws that govern our existence.
As stated previously, the supra-categories (i.e., titles) of human cognition that facilitate
reflection include Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. They are based on a principle Kant
(1781–1787/1998) derived from his understanding of space and time. 7 Without going into detail,

Kant’s belief that space and time, as we conceive of them, are objectively inaccessible beyond the bounds of the
human mind accords with some contemporary theories of space-time (see Rovelli, 2018).
7
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each of these titles contains three concepts according to Kant’s system. Through Quantity, we
may derive the concepts of plurality, totality, and unity; through Quality, the concepts of
limitation, negation, and reality; through Relation, we obtain causality and dependence,
community and reciprocity, and inherence and subsistence; and at last through Modality, the
concepts of possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, and necessity/contingency are
manifest. For each concept, derivative concepts, which Kant called predicables, follow. These he
did not enumerate; however, he supplied examples of what these might be, such as the
predicables of force, action, and passion under the concept of causality, or of generation,
alteration, and corruption under modality. He believed such concepts must be generated through
reflective judgment, according to the categories.
Some judgments, such as logical judgments made through inductive reasoning, are
reflective, but play a role in determinative judgment, which will be discussed in more detail later.
Because of this, they are not pure in terms of reflection. Meanwhile, other judgments are purely
reflective because they are incapable of leading to concepts. In other words, such merely
reflective judgments disallow determination. The category of purely reflective judgment includes
aesthetic judgments of beauty and sublimity, as well as teleological judgments, which we use to
categorize natural things in terms of their ends, or purposes (Kant, 1781–1787/1998;
Longuenesse, 1998).
Logical-Reflective Judgment. In the First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of
Judgment, Kant (1790/2000) identified a form of judgment that is reflective, but not aesthetic.
This, he termed logical-reflective judgment, and he tied it to an understanding of nature as
purposive. To illustrate, Kant suggested we imagine the taxonomist Carl Linnaeus (1707–1787)
collecting numerous rocks that, for all intents and purposes, seemed to him like granite, but were
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in fact different kinds of rocks. How could he ever identify a class of such rocks? Without the
principle of systematicity that undergirds reflective judgment, Linnaeus would have been at a
loss, and we would be at a similar loss in our daily endeavors, finding limitless diversity around
ourselves, ad infinitum. We would be unable to discern, let alone group together, related objects.
It is the purposiveness, or systematicity of nature that allows our minds to make sense of the
world. This systematicity is the domain of teleological judgment.
Teleological judgment allows us to form concepts from percepts in the environment.
Thereby, it licenses inductive reasoning, which we use to categorize particular observations
(Seide, 2013). In other words, logical-reflective judgment, which is epistemic and teleological in
nature, is central to the task of understanding. Its goal is hypothesis generation, based on
conceptual or empirical evidence, by means of non-deductive inference. Inductive reasoning,
alongside other non-deductive modes of inference (e.g., abduction, analogy), may be thought of
as teleological judgment in its a posteriori form (Rajiva, 2006). Unlike a priori teleological
judgment, non-deductive reasoning is not pure; however, it is comparatively more germane to
drawing. We employ logical-reflective judgment not only to compare the sensible objects around
us, but to generate concepts and ideas, both propositional and figurative.
Reflective judgment, including the logical variety, is set in motion when we encounter
objects that serve as novel cases —exemplars that challenge prior experience, shifting our mental
models of a given phenomenon. Because such judgments defy our existing schemata, they lack
objective validity; however, philosopher and political theorist H. Arendt (1906–1975, [1982])
thought we could evaluate them based on their exemplary validity, instead. By this, she meant
that whatever objects we deem to be exemplary should set the standards to which we may
compare subsequent encounters. In explanation, she said,
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How, for instance, is one able to judge, to evaluate, an act as courageous? … If one were
a Greek, one would have in ‘the depths of one’s mind’ the example of Achilles. … If we
say of somebody that he is good, we have in the back of our minds the example of Saint
Francis or Jesus of Nazareth. (p. 84)
I propose Sylvia Pankhurst (1882–1960), Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), Eleanor Roosevelt
(1884–1962), Patrice Lumumba (1925–1961), and Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968), as a few
other exemplars of goodness, whereas one thinks of Shakespeare, regarding drama, or Leonardo,
for art, among many others.
When choosing subject matter, realist artists are challenged to select exemplars that will
stimulate beholders’ contemplation in terms of logical-reflective judgment. Spencer’s
introduction to Alberti’s (1436/1966) Della pittura [On Painting], described how the
quattrocento theorist entreated artists to craft compositions with rich and varied details,
portraying dramatic scenes. Alberti invented the term istoria to describe this kind of painting,
which he considered to be intellectually meritorious. To achieve istoria, he recommended artists
draw inspiration from the literary works of antiquity—an unusual approach in that era, when
Christian themes and iconography dominated the art world. Specifically, Alberti said,
For their own enjoyment artists should associate with poets and orators who have many
embellishments in common with painters and who have a knowledge of many things.
These could be useful in beautifully composing the istoria … . Istoria gives greater
renown to the intellect than any colossus. … That which first gives pleasure in
the istoria comes from copiousness and variety of things. … in which in their places are
mixed old, young, maidens, women, youths, young boys, fowls, small dogs, birds, horses,
sheep, buildings, landscapes and all similar things. (Book 3, p. 90; Book 2, pp. 72, 75)
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Although he did not explicitly discuss its impact on judgment, Alberti recognized the intellectual
value of art. Artists who assemble a diverse array of imagery enlarge their schematic repertoires
by virtue of fashioning examplars that appeal to a viewer’s capacity for logical-reflective
judgment.
Aesthetic Judgment. Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment dealt tangentially with the arts
but pertained mainly to human beings’ perceptions of nature (D. Sommer, personal
communication, September 16, 2015). Nevertheless, his aesthetic theory has been embraced
widely among philosophers of art, mainly in regard to beholders’ perceptions of artworks
(Ginsborg, 2019). Regarding drawing, and for purposes of my present research, I am interested
in artists’ aesthetic responses to their subject matter and their own work as it progresses. I am
less interested in how a given audience may receive or react to an artist’s oeuvre, even though
most artists certainly do attend to such concerns downstream.
Kant (1790/2000) referred to aesthetic judgments as judgments of taste. While other types
of reflective judgment strive toward the generation of hypotheses or meaning, aesthetic
judgments must be assessed relative to the sensus communis. In other words, they are evaluated
against established societal norms. They inform and are informed by sociability. He explained it
this way:
For himself alone a human being abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either his
hut or himself, nor seek out or still less plant flowers in order to decorate himself; rather,
only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but also, in his own
way, a refined human being. (Kant, 1790/2000, §41, 5:297)
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The social nature of aesthetic judgments, despite their merely figurative character, sometimes
affords them greater consequence in human affairs than one might assume. This may be why
Kant dedicated more than half of his Critique of the Power of Judgment to analyzing them.
In Kant’s book (1790/2000), aesthetic judgments comprised judgments of beauty and
sublimity. In terms of the “categories of the understanding” he had outlined earlier in the
Critique of Pure Reason, he argued that when judgments of either the beautiful or the sublime
are generated, they follow a predictable pattern: In quantity, they are universally valid; in quality,
they obtain in the absence of personal interest; in relation, they are subjectively purposive; and in
modality, they are necessary.
Concerning universal validity, when individual beholders deem an object beautiful or
sublime, chances are high that others may perceive the object similarly. Aesthetic judgments
tend to hold across multitudes. 8 As each person’s judgment emerges alongside a growing
quantity of assessments, that judgment is validated against an emergent, universal criterion.
There is no guarantee, however, that a given object will be judged aesthetically, because one’s
personal interest may have a corrupting influence on the capacity to judge (Kant, 1790/2000).
Kant (1790/2000) believed that interest diminishes the quality of aesthetic judgment in
many ways. For example, individuals who prize modesty may not wish to concede that they find
an ornate and elaborate palace beautiful; they fail to recognize that practical preferences are
irrelevant to judgments of taste. Similarly, in order to estimate the beauty of a church, one should
not consult its worshippers, for their judgments about it cannot be free.

8

Although it is beyond the bounds of this chapter, readers interested in a comparatively recent discussion of taste in
the context of class and culture should consult P. Bourdieu’s (1986) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement
of Taste.
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Meanwhile, Kant (1790/2000) explained that aesthetic judgments are both subjective and
purposive for two reasons: First, beholders’ perceptions apply uniquely to them as individuals,
whether or not others ultimately agree with their impressions. Second, aesthetic judgments are
purposive in the sense that they are imbued with meaning for a given beholder; not in the sense
of the beautiful or sublime object’s usefulness, or final end.
Finally, Kant (1790/2000) deemed that aesthetic judgments are modally necessary
because a beholder who finds something beautiful or sublime imagines that it would please
everyone similarly. Even if it were the case that one or several others would not, in fact, be
similarly impressed, imagination (i.e., modal speculation) suffices. It may be true that a beholder
can understand, intellectually, that others disagree, yet the beholder cannot apprehend how it
actually feels to disagree.
Judgments of beauty and sublimity, according to Kant (1790/2000), are non-discursive.
In other words, they take figurative, rather than linguistic form in the mind, at least initially.
They are catalyzed by beholders’ unbidden feelings of satisfaction in response to encountering
aesthetic objects. Such feelings are ineffable—no existing concepts can encapsulate them.
Judgments of taste do not arise instantaneously, but only in the act of reflection, which occurs
only after one’s feelings have been stirred.
Thenceforward, beauty and sublimity diverge: That which is beautiful evokes surprise or
love, whereas the sublime conjures a sense of awe and fear; that which is beautiful delights,
whereas the sublime appeals to our sense of reason; that which is beautiful encourages
contemplation, whereas the sublime harmonizes oppositional feelings. In order to understand the
difference, contrast how one might perceive a beautiful palace and a sublime, but violent
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volcano. The palace pleases in the mere act of judging its beauty, but the volcano moves us
aesthetically only when we are located safely away from its danger zone (Kant, 1790/2000).
Sublime objects, in Kant’s words (1790/2000), “elevate the strength of our soul above its
usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance … , which gives
us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature” (§28,
5:261). Sublimity overwhelms. It both repels and pulls us toward its source. We experience its
objects as if they were great beyond comparison, for we feel them to be so, and we are moved.
The spontaneous, affective character of aesthetic judgment challenges the influence of
personal interest, which makes judgments of taste peculiarly useful to the task of freeing the
mind. Through encounters with beautiful or sublime objects, we may occasionally find our
routine thoughts and ideas have become dislodged, moving us to contemplate or reconsider
where we have stood, or reconcile dissonant feelings. This phenomenon was of keen interest to
the Russian Formalist critic Victor Shklovsky (1893–1984 [1917/1965]), who argued that art is a
technique that slows perception and shapes how we conceptualize the world.
According to Shklovsky’s (1917/1965) theory, this technique of art operates through the
process of defamiliarization. By means of defamiliarization, an artist may present a once-familiar
scene from an unusual perspective or may introduce apt but unanticipated comparisons that
function as coherent grounds to offset a newly estranged figure. A strategy emanating from
reflective judgment, the technique of defamiliarization depends on the principle of systematicity
to realize its effects. Patterns must exist before they can be broken. Once broken, life bursts
through the emergent lacunae. In this way, defamiliarization saves us from our otherwise dull,
forgettable lives. When we cannot experience the world aesthetically,
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Life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife,
and the fear of war. … And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists
to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the
sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. (p. 12)
In essence, art helps us take notice of things we might otherwise miss. It reveals subtle,
sometimes important, details that habit has obscured. Most importantly for artists,
defamiliarization provides a potential key for creating aesthetically pleasing works. According to
neuroscientist E. Kandel (2012), our visual experiences of the world would be very poor if they
were based on the two-dimensional information we receive through our eyes alone. Sighted
individuals enjoy robust imagery because, through an automatic process of unconscious
inference, their brains are constantly comparing incoming data to a warehouse of past visual
experiences. Artists who hope to captivate may interrupt this mechanical process by drawing
playfully, through the lens of defamiliarization. Doing so entails moving backward from our
sophisticated mental schemata in order to present drawings that approximate relatively raw,
unprocessed visual percepts. It allows a beholder to experience artworks aesthetically, as if they
were composed of unassimilated, novel stimuli—fresh sustenance for imagination to feast upon.
Determinative Judgment. Determinative judgment affords the capacity to classify
together similar elements of cognition under a comprehensive rule that encapsulates them all.
Likewise, it is the ability to reject from a particular class any object that does not cohere with the
rule pertaining to the class. We engage in determinative judgment to test hypotheses through
deductive reasoning, which involves making calculations and classifying information in terms of
concepts (Kant, 1781–1787/1998; Longuenesse, 1998). Through determinative judgment, we
draw on existing knowledge to gauge truth and accuracy. Like logical-reflective judgment,
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determinative judgment plays an epistemic role. It comprises both empirical judgment, which
applies to sensible objects in the environment, and rational judgment, which concerns mental
objects; for example, mathematical formulae or pure geometric representations (Kant, 1781–
1787/1998).
The logical functions governing all acts of determinative judgment are grouped into four
“titles”: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. Each title contains three moments according
to Kant’s (1781–1787/1998) theory. Regarding Quantity, we determine empirical concepts (i.e.,
apprehended sensory data, or “the given”) in terms of particular, singular, or universal moments.
Regarding Quality, we determine concepts in terms of infinite, negative, or affirmative moments.
Regarding Relation, we combine the given in terms of hypothetical, disjunctive, or categorical
moments. Finally, regarding Modality, we determine whether problematic (i.e., possible),
assertoric (i.e., asserted as being true), or apodictic (i.e., necessary) moments apply to concepts.
The intricacies of these moments are not of concern here; I list them merely to illustrate the
systematicity of Kant’s analysis.
One may not immediately anticipate how large a role determinative judgment plays in
drawing. It is of considerable importance, however, particularly for realist artists, who rely on
hard-won knowledge to guide numerous decisions, such as how to situate a line relative to others
on the page and create a sense of space that orients the viewer. Leonardo (1540/1956) outlined
many such principles for his students. In Part One of his Treatise on Painting, he described form,
perspective, shadow, and light as features that define the science of painting, and by extension,
drawing. “Practice,” he said, “ought always to be built on sound theory; perspective is the guide
and the path to this theory” (Number 70). He prized knowledge of anatomy nearly as much. In
his words:
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The painter who knows the sinews, muscles, and tendons, will know very well, when a
limb moves, how many and which sinews are the reason for it … . … in varying and
comprehensive ways he will display the diverse muscles through the various attitudes of
his figures, and not, as many do, show the same muscles prominent in the arm, backs,
breasts, and legs in different actions of their figures. (1540/1956, Part 2, Number 124)
Realist artists of today draw on the canon that Leonardo developed along with his predecessors
Cennino Cennini and Leon Battista Alberti, as well as a long line of successors. Applying this
knowledge requires, and also sharpens, determinative judgment.
Judgments of Coherence. Polanyi and Prosch (1975) recognized a class of judgment
invented by Polanyi, called judgments of coherence. Judgments of coherence may involve
recognition or insight. They operate through tacit inference. Tacit inference involves the
integration of proximal subsidiaries into distal focal targets. A proximal subsidiary is a nearby
object with which an individual may be engaged while attending to another, more distant object
of primary interest, much in the way a reader processes text in pursuit of the story it tells. The
story, in this example, is the distal focal target; it is the object that holds meaning for the reader.
We dwell in subsidiaries in pursuit of focal targets. When we shift our awareness toward a
subsidiary, it loses its transparency in that moment, and we cannot make meaning through it. It
has become a focal target, yet we can dwell only in subsidiaries. Thus, when readers shift
attention to the typographical characteristics of letters in a sentence, they lose the narrative
thread of the words those letters compose, at least for the moment.
Although we dwell in subsidiaries, we can focus our attention through them by means of
tacit inference. This kind of inference involves sometimes speculative, even slight, intuitions that
are guided by a deepening sense of coherence in the quest for meaning, which is finally realized
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in the focal target. Acts of tacit inference are “impelled by the imagination and controlled by
plausibility” (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 144). The amount of imaginative effort entailed in
integrating objects of subsidiary awareness, whether tacit or explicit, into a meaningful focal
target vary depending on the nature of the act of tacit inference. Some acts are merely
physiological, like combining retinal images with other environmental data to form percepts;
some are both physiological and mental, like performing a skill through the integration of
required movements; and others are highly conceptual, like creating a metaphor in order to
semantically bridge two previously disparate ideas. Integration to create or appreciate poetry,
drama, paintings, and other works of art requires yet more imaginative effort, and thus, tacit
inference at this level demands more sophisticated powers of imagination.
Judgments of coherence are integral to learning any craft. As learners progress from
elementary concepts to successively more advanced stages of facility in a domain, each
milestone occurs while dwelling in a different subsidiary. In the service of learning a skill such
as drawing, judgments of coherence map a nomadic journey across a series of physical and
conceptual bridges between subsidiary nodes. At each new resting place, the learner has been
changed ever so slightly. A student is unlikely to be conscious of these incremental changes, for
one cannot simultaneously attend to and dwell in a subsidiary of tacit inference. Thus, tacit
learning is characterized by indeterminacy. Tracking learning while it occurs is not feasible
through judgments of coherence (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). To the extent that one may identify
moments of tacit learning at all, strong powers of logical-reflective judgment must be called
upon. This reality poses a significant, but not insurmountable challenge to the use of
autoethnography to document and analyze my development as a draftsperson.
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Because judgments of coherence are epistemic (i.e., concerned with knowledge and
know-how), they are only as good as the inferences upon which they rely. In Polanyi and
Prosch’s (1975) view, the reliability of a tacit inference ultimately hinges not on imagination or
plausibility, but on the quality of the relevant object(s) of subsidiary awareness relative to a
given agent. According to this rationale, the same focal content, such as a story, may be more or
less scrutable depending on its subsidiary form (e.g., whether it is printed in a large, clear font in
one’s native tongue versus scrawled with sloppy cursive in an unfamiliar language).
Subsidiaries play an important role in the perception of artistic illusions. In twodimensional representations of three-dimensional space, the picture frame and the flat surface of
the picture plane function as subsidiaries through which beholders witness and make meaning of
whatever subject matter is depicted. Gombrich (1960) lauded the imaginative effort that realist
artworks entail in bridging the gap between everyday reality and artistic reality. In part XII of his
chapter titled Ambiguities of the Third Dimension, he quoted Quatremère de Quincy, a critic of
Neoclassical art, to illustrate that phenomenon:
When the painter packs a vast expanse into a narrow space, when he leads me across the
depths of the infinite on a flat surface, and makes the air circulate … , I love to abandon
myself to his illusions, but I want the frame to be there, I want to know that what I see is
actually nothing but a canvas or a simple plane. (1823, as cited in Gombrich, 1960, p.
279)
Illusionistic artworks facilitate tacit inferences, and through them, judgments of
coherence, by providing well-crafted subsidiaries in which beholders may safely dwell. These
subsidiaries allow access into artistic realities that exist on the other side of an attentional divide
between “from-awareness” and “to-awareness” (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). Without them, there
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can be no window to an imaginary world, for illusions would be experienced as if they were real;
they would delude rather than delight.
The Psychology of Judgment in Realist Drawing
While philosophers have tended to focus more on judgment per se, than its role in
drawing, psychologists have demonstrated a keen interest in the latter. Together, both disciplines
provide insights worth examining. A preponderance of the psychological research on drawing
has centered around perception. For example, several authors speculated that artists may perceive
the visual world more accurately than non-artists. However, numerous studies (Cohen & Jones,
2008; McManus et al., 2011; Mitchell et al., 2005; Ostrofsky et al., 2012, 2013; Ostrofsky,
Cohen, et al., 2014; Perdreau & Cavanagh, 2011; L. M. Taylor & Mitchell, 1997) have failed to
demonstrate that case; either effect sizes were negligible, or findings could not be replicated.
Only a few studies (Chamberlain et al., 2014, 2015; Ostrofsky et al., 2012; Ostrofsky, Cohen, et
al., 2014; Ostrofsky, Kozbelt, et al., 2014; Perdreau & Cavanagh, 2011) produced positive
evidence of a perceptual gap, and that evidence was weak or attributed to complicating factors,
such as artistic training or practice (Kozbelt, 2001). Because of this, it is worthwhile to look at
studies that shed some light on the nature of judgment in drawing.
The Cognitive Role of Reflective Judgment in Drawing
The domain of reflective judgment in drawing is characterized by high variability. There
are an infinite number of possible appearances and movements to represent, ideas to unleash, and
stimuli to navigate. Some findings in psychological research bear on artists’ logical-reflective
judgment, which allows them to gauge patterns that lead to the selection of optimal exemplars
and the generation of promising hypotheses. Other results shed light on aesthetic judgment—
how artists break through patterns and invigorate feelings that inspire personal meaning and
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inform social norms. Still more research illuminates theories on drawing in terms of judgments
of coherence, wherein artists toggle between tacit and explicit attentional modes in relationship
to subsidiaries and focal targets, on the way to grasping insights and creating meaningful works.
Let us take a look at that literature now.
Logical-Reflective Judgment. Recall that logical-reflective judgment, while reflective in
nature, is not aesthetic; it relies on the systematicity of nature for sensemaking (Kant,
1790/2000). When examining this kind of judgment through a psychological lens, the fallibility
of perception comes into focus. Drawing presents significant challenges to artists in negotiating
their own perceptual capabilities and playing upon those of beholders in terms of sensemaking.
Some Perceptual Challenges. There exists a pernicious perceptual challenge common to
observational drawing tasks; this is the inverse problem. Seeley (2020) defined it as follows:
"For any two-dimensional image that is projected onto the retina there is an infinite set of
possible three-dimensional shapes at varying distances and orientations that could have produced
it" (p. 123). In other words, although we exist in three-dimensional space and sighted individuals
see three-dimensional objects in their midst, it is only reflected light that reaches the eyes,
resulting in a flat retinal image that must be reconstructed by the brain. According to Hoffman
and Richards (1984), this one-to-many mapping involves interpretation. We depend on the
regularities in nature—Kant’s systematicity—to trust that our inferences will be inductively
strong enough to discern the causes of what we see. The inverse problem coheres with Kant’s
(1781–1787/1998) theory of reflective judgment wherein we infer causes from predicables (i.e.,
effects), such as force, action, or passion. Logical-reflective judgment entails an ability to
surmise relationships between what is seen and what is out of sight. Any draftsperson creating a
realist drawing from observation must not only deal with the inverse problem as a beholder but
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must also project the brain’s three-dimensional interpretation back onto a two-dimensional
surface to mimic a three-dimensional world.
In everyday life, the inverse problem generally is not a problem, even though it calls
attention to itself in the face of illusions. Optical in nature and the bread and butter of magicians,
illusions cause perceptual errors. For millennia, artists have used trompe l'oeil illusions to great
effect, successfully inverting the inverse problem for many a charmed beholder. As long as
illusions are understood for what they are (typically via the aid of correctional devices like
picture frames, television sets, or stages), they may inspire delight. Our ability to process local
details is more susceptible to illusions than is our ability to see the bigger picture, which we
accomplish at the level of global processing (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016).
Chamberlain and Wagemans (2016) discussed three human perceptual abilities that are
particularly susceptible to illusions. These include amodal completion, gestalt grouping, and
perceptual constancy. Amodal completion accounts for our ability to perceive objects in their
entirety even when those objects are partially occluded. One amodal completion illusion that
comes to mind is the classic magic trick, wherein an assistant lies inside a long box while a
magician seems to saw her in half. In reality, she is safe (thank goodness), with her knees folded
up while false feet peek out the end of a separate compartment. Without amodal completion, this
illusion would fail, but more frequently, we would fail to perceive real situations: Imagine how
scary the world would be if we misperceived fragmented views as fragmented objects, such that
full-bodied motorists driving neighboring vehicles on the highway would appear to us as floating
heads and hands.
Gestalt grouping, anther perceptual ability that can fall prey to illusions, is our tendency
to find patterns everywhere, even in chaotic systems. Gestalt grouping helps us make sense of
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the world by organizing a cacophony of visual data into meaningful structures, yet it also
accounts for many optical illusions. For example, faces represent a pattern we are primed to
identify; it is easy to spot a face that belongs to a being or that merely appears to be there, in
clouds or ceiling plaster (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016). A classic example that comes to
mind is the Rubin's Vase Illusion, a two-dimensional drawing depicting two faces in profile that
seem to be facing each other on either side of a vase; in actuality, the "faces" are simply negative
space around the vase—or are they?
Chamberlain and Wagemans (2016) cited perceptual constancy as another category of
perceptual efficiencies that is susceptible to visual illusions. Perceptual constancy is our ability to
recognize objects under different conditions. Because of perceptual constancy, we can perceive
an object's color under different lighting conditions, its shape despite its angle relative to us in
our visual field, or its size no matter how close or far away it may be. When we perceive the
same two-dimensional parallelogram as if it were a different size when drawn by itself versus
with legs attached, the difference is due to an illusion of perceptual constancy known as the
Shepard Illusion. The legs function as a cue telling our minds to visually process the
parallelogram as if it were the top of a three-dimensional table. Imagining the drawing in this
way mentally transforms a flat shape into a perspectival object with illusory depth, even though
it is actually identical to the original parallelogram we had viewed. Thus, the “table” version of
the parallelogram may appear as if it were larger than its legless twin.
Psychologists have studied the effects of amodal completion, gestalt grouping, and
perceptual constancy illusions in an effort to understand whether or not artists perceive the world
differently. However, results have revealed no significant differences in how these illusions are
processed among members of the human population, whether artists or laypeople. What is clear
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is that artists know how to exploit the efficiencies of the human perceptual system. They are
experts at triggering illusory visual experiences (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016), and they rely
on logical-reflective judgment to do so.
Visual Selection. Recall the inverse problem, wherein some information about an object's
volume is necessarily lost when it is represented in two dimensions. The solution to this problem
requires that graphic artists be selective about which information they include in their depictions.
Indeed, visual selection is an important component of drawing skill because it is impossible to
render all of the available information. Even if it were possible, doing so would not result in a
realistic-looking image. When confronted with a full range of options, artists take on a
representational dilemma: Which details are most essential, and which can be ignored? Some
judgments will prove more successful than others, but each artist must decide for themselves
(Kozbelt et al., 2010).
Kozbelt et al. (2010) tested a hypothesis that visual selection may play an important role
in the perceived accuracy of artists’ drawings over those of non-artists. In order to isolate visual
selection as the factor of interest, they supplied a production cohort with identical cropped
photographs of Samuel Beckett's (1906–1989) face to trace, so that proportions were accounted
for, and they provided an equal, but limited, number of segmented strips of tape to use as
drawing material. The tape served two purposes: First, it leveled the playing field among artists
and non-artists in terms of expertise with a drawing medium. Second (and most importantly), its
scarcity forced participants to make specific decisions about which lines to draw toward the goal
of creating a comparatively accurate tracing of the photograph (see Figure 7). The researchers
employed a panel of judges to assess the degree of realism achieved in the finished drawings.
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Figure 7
(left) Jane Brown, Samuel Beckett, 1976, National Portrait Gallery; (right) Six Drawings

Note. Drawings from "Visual Selection Contributes to Artists’ Advantages in Realistic
Drawing," by A. Kozbelt, A. ElBassiouny, Y. Mark, and D.R. Owen, 2010, Psychology of
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 4(2), p. 96. (https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017657). Copyright
2010 by the American Psychological Association.

This panel was composed, 50/50, of artists and non-artists, none of whom was in the production
cohort. Results revealed that drawings by artists were strongly favored over those of non-artists,
overall, and artist judges were more sensitive to differences in accuracy than were layperson
judges.
According to Kozbelt et al. (2010), internal features in the human face such as the eyes,
expressive wrinkles, the arch of the brows, and shadows of the nose and mouth, are more
essential for creating a likeness of a given individual than are more generic, external features like
the outline of the head, hair, and ears. In a post-hoc analysis of the data gathered in the tape
experiment, coders counted a consistently higher number of lines allocated by artists to key
internal facial features, while non-artists allocated most of their lines to incidental external
features. Therefore, the researchers concluded that artist participants made superior decisions,
compared to non-artists, about the most salient features to represent.
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According to Rousar (2013), Edgar Degas (1834–1917) employed memory in service of
logical reflective judgment, although he did not use the latter term. One of Degas’ most
cherished reasons for recommending memory drawing was to aid in the selection of essential
representational details. By relying on memory to draw objects previously observed, he thought
artists were likely to remember only those aspects that had resonated in their hearts and minds.
Conducting visual selection in this manner remains a recommended method for creating more
meaningful drawings.
Cermeño-Aínsa (2020) argued that our brains are, first and foremost, hypothesis
generators. When dealing with the inverse problem, people employ logical-reflective judgment
to generate hypotheses about what they are looking at. Artists do the same when deliberating
over aspects of a visual scene to depict. Drawing entails generating hypotheses about which
choices will converge to produce the most convincing portrayal. No one answer or means of
obtaining an answer is correct, but some decisions will prove to be more effective than others.
Bottom-Up Processing. The Victorian era artist and art critic John Ruskin (1819–1900
[1858]) advised artists to turn to their subject matter with an innocent eye. More specifically, he
said,
The whole technical power of painting depends on our recovery of what may be called
the innocence of the eye; that is to say, a sort of childish perception of
these flat stains of colour, merely as such, without consciousness of what they signify, as
a blind man would see them if suddenly gifted with sight. For instance; when grass is
lighted strongly by the sun in certain directions, it is turned from green into a peculiar and
somewhat dusty-looking yellow. (p. 22)
This data-driven approach that Ruskin advocated may rely on what today’s psychologists refer to
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as bottom-up processing (Kozbelt et al., 2010). Even though the psychological evidence to date
does not support the hypothesis that artists perceive visible reality more accurately than others
do, the innocent eye may be understood as a cognitive mechanism, rather than a perceptual one.
According to Chamberlain and Wagemans (2016), the innocent eye "functions not to
train the artists' eye to see more veridically, but to think more veridically" (p. 198) by helping the
individual focus attention on a stimulus without superimposing semantic preconceptions about
that stimulus's canonical structure (i.e., its prototypical visual representation) or categorical
structure (i.e., its membership within a particular class, or group of things). I wonder if this
“bottom-up” approach, which privileges perceptual over conceptual information, may serve as a
tool not only for more accurate rendering, but also as a strategy for sharpening a draftsperson’s
logical-reflective judgment.
If one were to witness an artist immersed in a purely logical-reflective mode of judgment,
the work may look somewhat like drawings produced by a certain robot. Artist/scientist P.
Tresset and co-author F. Fol Leymarie (2013) developed a robot, named Paul, capable of
drawing the human face from live observation. They built Paul to shed light on how human
biological systems, when brought to bear on the task of drawing, interact with the surrounding
environment. Paul was designed as a naive drawer, without any conceptual or semantic
knowledge of general facial structures, volumes, or proportions—in other words, without any
prior stored visual schemata. Built to mimic a human artist using the "naked eye" approach,
Paul's drawing method was modeled after Tresset's own signature style of loose line sketching.
Paul had a robotic arm and a camera positioned to observe its sitters. It drew them
according to a cyclical process that involved extracting pristine schematic information from live
visual data, running said imagery through computations, coordinating arm motions to accord
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with computationally-derived short-term memory, making marks on paper, and finally, running
feedback loops to compare executed lines with live camera snapshots. Although Paul's simple
drawing apparatus was nowhere near as intricate, or marvelous, as its human counterpart, Paul’s
drawings commanded a favorable reception among professional audiences of curators, collectors,
artists and critics who rated them as aesthetically comparable to human-created artworks (Tresset
& Fol Leymarie, 2013). Paul was able to produce captivating portraits (see Figure 8), and in so
doing, demonstrated the value of logical-reflective calibrations in the act of drawing. It remains
notable, however, that Tresset’s very human style served as an a priori template from which the
robot’s oeuvre ultimately derived. 9

Figure 8
Physical Drawing of Stella by Paul, 2011 (cropped view)

Note. From "Portrait Drawing by Paul the Robot," by P. Tresset and F. Fol Leymarie, 2013,
Computers & Graphics, 37(5), p. 350 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cag.2013.01.012). In the public
domain.
9

More recently, the artificial intelligence program, DALL-E 2, has demonstrated fairly astounding proficiency at
rendering visually compelling imagery based on language inputs.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

109

Translating Indeterminacy. As the most exploratory form of realist drawing, sketching
exhibits key features of logical-reflective judgment. In particular, the production of sketches that
illustrate verbal narratives involves making one-to-many translations of explicit, declarative
information into implicit, depictive content. For example, an obedient draftsperson told to draw a
“seated cat” would need to engage in selective decision-making just to translate this simple
description into a picture. The final drawing could represent any species, size, or color of cat out
of all the available options, whether scientific or fanciful. Likewise, this draftsperson would have
to translate what "sitting" looks like: Is the cat indoors on a tile floor, outside on the grass, in the
sky on a magic carpet, or someplace else? The act of translation enlists an artist’s logicalreflective judgment. Dealing with indeterminacy through sketching entails experimentation with
a multitude of representational options that were never prescribed, until one idea is finally
selected (Fish & Scrivener, 1990).
Leonardo (1500) was known to struggle with representational decisions on many
occasions. For example, in one of his numerous studies for the Madonna and Child with Saint
Anne and infant John the Baptist (see Figure 9), he made such a tangle of lines that he needed to
flip over the page to trace his chosen contours, because the subject matter was no longer
discernable, even to him. Leonardo began many works in this uncertain manner, but he finished
most of them very deliberately (Gombrich, 1991).
Recall that Degas engaged memory to inform and sharpen the artist’s logical reflective
judgment. By contrast, Leonardo employed logical reflective judgment to compensate for the
shortcomings of visual memory. Although he did not use the term, he relied most heavily upon
logical-reflective judgment when variability was highest, precluding other cognitive strategies.
For example, he recommended keeping a sketchbook to capture select views of bodies in motion,
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Figure 9
Leonardo da Vinci, Studies for Madonna and Child with St. Anne and Infant John the Baptist,
(Recto and Verso), ca. 1500–1510, British Museum

Note. In the public domain.

a task too taxing for memory to bear (see Figure 10). Pardo (2008) translated his advice to fellow
artists as follows:
When you will have learned perspective well, and have in memory all of the limbs and
bodies of things, be pleased often, as you go about your recreation, to observe and
consider the … actions of men as they speak, as they argue, or laugh or fight together—
their actions and those of the bystanders … and note them down with brief marks … in
a little book which you must always carry with you … . These things are not to be
rubbed out, but rather preserved with the greatest care, because the forms and actions of
things are so infinite that the memory is incapable of retaining them; wherefore you are to
keep these as your authorities and masters. (p. 69)
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Figure 10
Leonardo da Vinci, Recto: Studies of Men in Action, ca. 1506–1508, Royal Collection, Windsor
Castle

Note. In the public domain.
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Thoughtful visual selection, whether it occurs during preparation or the immediate act of
drawing, makes a world of difference. In my view, any draftsperson interested in honing
artisanal judgment would do well to follow such timeless advice.
Aesthetic Judgment. As we turn to a review of psychological literature relevant to
aesthetic judgment in drawing, it is worth restating that our focus is artists’ aesthetic responses to
their own subject matter and completed or in-process works, rather than objective analyses of
those works by art critics. Toward this vein, psychologists have begun to study dynamic
evaluation (Serafin et al., 2011). The term dynamic evaluation in the context of art describes the
process of assessing a given work’s aesthetic merits through different stages of its development.
Existing research in psychology, however, has not yet examined dynamic evaluation in reflexive
contexts. Rather, psychologists have studied participants’ assessments of others’ artworks, not
their own.
Generally speaking, artists’ perspectives on artmaking have not received sufficient
scholarly attention (Sullivan, 2005), although some important education literature bears on the
topic. Larsen’s (2010) autoethnographic study chronicling her artistic process and that of
undergraduates enrolled in her collage and assemblage course provided a rich account of
reflexive and transformative learning in the arts. Studies by Marchand (2010), Milner (1967),
O’Connor (2007), Painter (2018), and Sudnow (2001) detailed similarly insightful endeavors.
While these texts have informed my study’s methodology, here I turn to the literature in
psychology and visual culture studies to consider aesthetic attributes of artworks in terms of the
psychological mechanisms underlying artisanal judgment.
Putting Kant to the Test. Hekkert and Van Wieringen (1996) attempted to gauge whether
art experts and non-experts would evaluate the aesthetic merits of artworks similarly. To find
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out, they presented experimental participants with samples of emerging artists’ works, including
drawings, paintings, sculptures, and mixed media objects, All items were created by artists who
had recently applied for a scholarship at the same visual arts foundation. Half of them had
received a scholarship, while the other half had not. In the role of art experts, the researchers
recruited experienced practitioners, including museum curators, famous artists, and professional
art critics. In the role of non-experts, they selected art enthusiasts who hailed from a broad array
of sociocultural backgrounds, such as hobbyists and regular museum visitors.
Participants were asked to rate the overall aesthetic merit of each artists’ work, and make
more granular assessments in terms of 11 criteria on a 9-point bipolar scale: (1) simple—
complex, (2) static—dynamic, (3) incoherent—coherent, (4) absence of craftsmanship—
craftsmanship, (5) poor in concept—rich in concept, (6) lacking power of expression—power of
expression, (7) negative development—positive development, (8) not original—original, (9) little
affinity—much affinity, (10) uninteresting—interesting, and (11) poor quality—good quality.
Results revealed very low inter-rater reliability across all participants, but also indicated, when it
came to evaluations of the quality of artworks, inter-observer agreement among experts was
higher than among non-experts. Meanwhile, they found no relationship between expert and nonexpert ratings (Hekkert & Van Wieringen, 1996).
While both groups placed a high value on the contribution of craftsmanship to overall
aesthetic merit, non-experts held it in greater esteem than did experts. This dynamic was reversed
for the criterion of originality, with experts placing the most value on originality as a contributor
to aesthetic merit compared to all other criteria. Hekkert and Van Wieringen’s (1996) findings
suggest that a sensus communis, which Kant (1790/2000) theorized, may not exist within diverse
populations. Meanwhile, within the small cadre of art professionals who participated in the

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

114

study, some commonalities implied that the construct may be relevant within more homogenous
groups (Hekkert & Van Wieringen, 1996).
Like Kant (1790/2000) before them, today’s art experts have placed great store in novelty
as an aesthetic marker (Hekkert & Van Wieringen, 1996). Meanwhile, psychologists have
struggled to understand how the human mind can accommodate surprising information without
losing track of commonplace environmental details. This conundrum is known as the perceptual
prediction paradox. To solve it, scientists must learn how the brain reconciles the processing of
informative inputs alongside veridical inputs, or in other words, how attentional systems geared
toward novel stimuli can also accommodate expected inputs that comport with prior knowledge.
Conventional wisdom suggests that each task should conflict with its counterpart. Once the
mechanism is discovered, it will not only solve the perceptual prediction paradox, but it will shed
light on how aesthetic cognition works. Press et al. (2020) began the attempt, proposing “a twoprocess model in which probabilistic knowledge initially biases perception towards what is likely
and subsequently upweights events that are particularly surprising” (p. 13).
Visual Poetics. Due to its preoccupation with mental imagery, literature bears on the
aesthetic appreciation of visual art. Both genres are concerned with pictures, whether literary or
literal. Reading a narrative involves translating discursive percepts into figurative illustrations,
and viewing a drawing mirrors the same process. Psychologist of art, Arnheim (1976), argued
that the arts operate aesthetically on account of this dynamic. He said, “No psychologist could
handle perception without acknowledging that every image directly given to the eye is imbued in
the brain with the memory stores of a lifetime of visual processing” (p. 4). We perceive
discursive images in much the same way, with reference to experiences that came before them.
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Aesthetic philosopher N. Goodman (1976) looked to the poetic function of literary
devices, such as metaphor, to shed light on the cognitive mechanisms at play in our appreciation
of visual art. He argued that visual metaphors are economical symbols that can saturate even a
simple image with meaning. According to him, successful metaphors are apt; they are coherent
and meaningful. Less successful metaphors, on the other hand, may be farfetched, feeble, or
moribund; they are relatively incoherent and meaningless. Like works of art, when metaphors are
novel, their aesthetic impact is born of surprise. As the same metaphor is repeated, its effects
begin to wane, until it becomes clichéd. This occurs whether the metaphor is literary or visual.
Regarding this phenomenon, Arnheim (1981) exchanged views with the aesthetician
M.C. Beardsley, saying: “Meaning enters the perceptual process to the extent to which it
influences that process and to the extent to which the perceptual result conveys it. The basis of
these relations is the isomorphic analogy between perceptual dynamics and the dynamics of the
experiences that constitute the meaning” (p. 223). Pursuant to Goodman’s (1976) analysis,
Arnheim’s (1981) reply to Beardsley suggested that a compelling relationship between form and
content is critical to an artwork’s aesthetic reception, just as it is critical to a metaphor’s success.
Visual culture theorists Walker and Chaplin (1997) drew parallels between figures of
speech, or tropes, in literature and aesthetic forms in visual art, arguing that artists who learn to
identify and use these devices stand to gain greater command over their creative efforts and their
effects on viewers. The authors identified numerous examples of poetics at play in the visual
arts, including simile, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, personification, symbols,
allegory, alliteration, antithesis, assonance, chiasmus, quotation, allusion, rhyme, paraphrase,
puns, homophones, homonyms, and double entendres. Among the many illustrations they
provided, one was a visual rhyme achieved through repetition: a photo of a gas station with three
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pumps and three seated men aligned in front of them. Although Walker and Chaplin emphasized
the rhetorical potential of literary devices in the visual arts (a project in the realm of practical
wisdom), these effects depend on the skillful application of visual poetics (a project in the realm
of artisanal judgment and technē). Walker and Chaplin recommended that artists acquire a copy
of Richard Lanham’s (1968) A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms to guide their aesthetic judgment. A
more recent work, such as Dupriez’s (1991) A Dictionary of Literary Devices: Gradus A–Z, may
prove helpful, as well.
Natural Patterns. A form of reflective judgment, aesthetic judgement depends on the
regularities to be found in nature (Kant, 1790/2000). The ancient Greeks, and possibly the
ancient Egyptians before them, discovered the golden ratio. This ratio is a pattern, or
systematicity, in nature that exhibits remarkable mathematical characteristics of interest to
Gestalt psychologists who analyze part-to-whole relationships. Written as an equation, the
golden ratio is (1+√5)/2 to 1, or in decimal format, 1.618 to 1. That is the division by 2 of the
square root of 5 after it has been added to 1, compared to 1. The whole and part aspects of the
golden ratio relate to each other in the same way. In other words, the larger part is related to the
smaller part in the same way that the whole is related to the larger part (Aristides, 2016).
This relationship, when repeated through increasingly larger or increasingly smaller
iterations, is known as the Fibonacci sequence, after the mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci (ca.
1175–1250), who discovered it by projecting the monthly rate of rabbit reproduction that would
occur under ideal circumstances: 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, and so forth. The ancients
believed this ratio unified the universe. In nature, it can be found in snowflakes, cresting waves,
plant growth, human proportions, and the spirals of the Milky Way galaxy or a nautilus’ shell. In
artworks, its most basic unit is the golden rectangle. Because the golden ratio represents the
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epitome of beauty, many artists have embedded it in their drawings. Along with linear
perspective, it has inspired realist artists to study geometry (Aristides, 2016).
Other gestalt patterns relevant to visual art are human made, but no less natural. SchaeferSimmern (2003) identified and analyzed a set of aesthetically pleasing visual forms that have
recurred across a sweeping range of artworks created by individuals and peoples from numerous
and varied cultures (whether untutored children, layperson adults, or Indigenous Peoples),
spanning every era from prehistoric times to the present. Just as in the case of the golden ratio, he
found that artworks exhibiting these forms spanned all genres, and he cataloged them in his
magnum opus, Consciousness of Artistic Form, for use in studio art education.
Some of the most fascinating forms Schaefer-Simmern (2003) documented include
circles and concentric circles (as found in representations of flowers, faces, and bellies) and
hatched lines (as found in representations of pine trees, sunbeams, and human limbs and digits).
He also highlighted a set of clever representational conventions that artists have employed to
denote gestalt relationships, such as the use of patterns and overlapping elements to off-set figure
from ground (see Figure 11). Although some of the latter forms violate the rules of veridical
representation, they need not be off-limits to realist artists, for even in the realist domain, rules
can be broken in pursuit of aesthetic effects. Regarding realist drawings that have become
overwrought, I think Schaefer-Simmern’s artistic forms may offer artists a chance at dynamic
renewal.
The Cognitive Role of Determinative Judgment in Drawing
Compared to reflective judgment, the domain of determinative judgment in drawing is
much less variable, but it exists in a medium of doubt, even so. When engaging determinative
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Figure 11
Two Drawings Based on a Persian Painting; (left) original gestalt formation and (right) with
legs added to demonstrate a more veridical, but less aesthetic alternative

Note. From Consciousness of Artistic Form, by H. Schaefer-Simmern, 2003, Gertrude SchaeferSimmern Trust, p. 71.

judgment, a draftsperson must rely on potentially fallible knowledge and apply it logically. Not
only must judgments be made about physical objects, but mental objects impact the process too.
The following psychological research delves into the nature of determinative judgment in
drawing.
Top-Down Processing. How we decide to direct our attention, so crucial to judgments of
coherence, is informed by our preconceptions, which vary from person to person based on prior
experience. According to R. Solso (2003), when we take in data from the surrounding
environment, our brains can process only a fraction of it. Most often, it is wise to focus on things
that are relevant to what we have already learned, for those things have proven useful in the past,
and we have neural placeholders at the ready to accommodate related information. Our brains
classify percepts of the stimuli we deem relevant within taxonomic systems of mental schemata.
These schemata represent the structure of objects, scenes, or ideas and the relationships between
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associated concepts. In the transition from stimulus to schema, each percept is abstracted into a
proto-isomorphic structure that efficiently records what we have witnessed and how we
interpreted it. These new schematic abstractions are derived from, but not identical to, whatever
sensations captured our focal or subsidiary awareness. In turn, by supplying the machinery for
hypothesis testing, they help us determine what is likely to be most salient the next time around.
When our perception is motivated by knowledge in this way, we engage top-down processing.
The theory of top-down cognitive influences on perception, otherwise known as cognitive
penetrability of perception (CPP), has engendered vociferous debate among scholars. Although
numerous empirical studies have demonstrated support for CPP based on participants’
necessarily subjective reports (see Churchland, 1988; Siegel, 2017; Stokes & Bergeron, 2015,
among others), detractors have pointed to experimental limitations that provoke doubts (see
Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999; Raftopoulos, 2009). More recently,
Cermeño-Aínsa (2020) proposed a resolution, favoring CPP, that hinges not only on extant
empirical results, but also on consideration of an emerging psychological model of brain function
called predictive coding, as well as neuroscientific evidence, underpinning the model, which
posits that the visual system processes inputs and outputs cyclically and synchronously through
re-entrant neural pathways. According to the predictive coding theory, our brains are hypothesis
generators, continuously forming and updating a mental model of the environment that helps us
anticipate what may happen next. As we perceive sensory inputs, we compare them to the latest
predictions generated, according to Bayesian rules.
This understanding of the mind reconciles the distinction between knowledge and new
information by theorizing a connection that makes learning possible. In Cermeño-Aínsa’s (2020)
words, “prior beliefs, high-level beliefs, expectations, background knowledge and so on, are
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nothing else than cognitive states capable of exerting influence on perceptual states” (p. 17).
Cermeño-Aínsa argued that the line of demarcation determining whether a mental state is
perceptual or cognitive is dependent on myriad situational factors, suggesting that perception and
cognition exist on a continuum. This perceptual-cognitive continuum is partially compatible with
continuum theory as applied to the perceptual-imaginal debate discussed in chapter 2. Crucially,
I am not drawing an equivalence between perception and imagination. Rather, my interpretation
of the arguments presented in the literature suggests that a feedback loop exists between them.
Schema Theory. While formation of mental schemata entails abstraction, application of
a schema for making judgments involves concretizing new information in terms of that schema
(Gombrich, 1960). Some studies of the impact of language on visual memory have revealed
interfaces between symbolic (i.e., discursive) and pictorial schemata. Carmichael et al. (1932)
conducted an experiment to examine whether and to what extent naming objects affected
subsequent depictions of those objects from memory. Employing two experimental groups and a
control group, the researchers presented each participant with a series of ambiguous line
drawings. Before introducing each image to members of the experimental groups, they told
participants it resembled something tangible. Different verbal interpretations of the same image
were presented to each of the two groups, such as curtains in a window, or conversely, a
diamond inside of a rectangle. Meanwhile, members of the control group did not receive any
verbal information in tandem with the pictures.
At the end of each presentation, participants were asked to recall the shapes and draw
them accurately, in any order. Despite these instructions, results revealed that most experimental
participants’ drawings were syntactically distorted in alignment with the semantic information
that originally had preceded each image. Rather than hewing strictly to the ambiguous models
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provided, their drawings resembled one or the other named object, such as a bottle, or a stirrup
instead (see Figure 12). The authors concluded that naming forms immediately before displaying
them generally influences how spectators subsequently reproduce those forms; additionally, most
drawings converge on prototypical conceptualizations (Carmichael et al., 1932).
In a similar study, wherein student participants were asked to generate their own labels
for meaningless shapes before reproducing them from memory, Bartlett (1932) reported that
individuals who were able to fit his “nonsense figures” into a particularly apt schema rendered
them more accurately. For example, he presented students with the image illustrated in Figure 13
and asked them to give it a name. A student who called it a “pickax” drew it with pointier prongs

Figure 12
Model Images, Labels, and Reproductions

Note. Excerpt from "An Experimental Study of the Effect of Language on the Reproduction of
Visually Perceived Form," by L. Carmichael, H. P. Hogan, and A. A. Walter, 1932, Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 15(1), p. 80 (https://doi.org/10.1037/h0072671). Copyright 1932 by
the American Psychological Association.
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Figure 13
Nonsense Figure

Note. Excerpt from Remembering; A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, by F. C.
Bartlett, Cambridge University Press, 1932, p. 19. Copyright 1932 by Cambridge University
Press. Reprinted with permission.
than the original exhibited. A student who called it a “turf-cutter” accidentally rounded the
“blade,” and the six students who called it an “anchor” erroneously enlarged its upper ring. The
only student who accurately reproduced the lower portion of the image had referred to the figure
as a “prehistoric battle axe.” Gombrich (1960) speculated that the latter student may have
acquired the successful schema through exposure to a wide variety of prehistoric implements,
perhaps in a museum. He argued that artists who have acquired relevant schemata are able to
create more exacting representations of irregularly shaped objects. In his words,
The draftsman tries first to classify the blot and fit it into some sort of familiar schema—
he will say, for instance, that it is triangular or that it looks like a fish. Having selected
such a schema to fit the form approximately, he will proceed to adjust it, noticing for
instance that the triangle is rounded at the top, or that the fish ends in a pigtail. (pp. 73–
74)
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Artists through the ages have intuited this logic, building figures from a vocabulary of
idealized shapes, much like the Platonic forms. An illustration of the principle in action was
demonstrated by Aristides (2016) in her analytical drawings of gourds and rose hips (see Figure
14). Rather than rendering common surface features of the objects in front of her, Aristides
probed deeper to discover and isolate basic geometric components: a pentagram, a triangle, a
circle. This kind of exercise builds and fine-tunes artists’ mental schemata, helping them achieve
realistic depictions while also furnishing a visual repertoire they may redeploy imaginatively.
The efficacy of symbolic (i.e., discursive) and pictorial schemata is evident in these
examples, which demonstrate that human memories take shape through a process of

Figure 14
Juliette Aristides, Analytical Studies of Gourds and Rose Hips, 2005

Note. From Classical Drawing Atelier: A Complete Course in Traditional Studio Practice,
by J. Aristides, 2016, Watson-Guptil, p. 33.
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reconstruction, based on prior learning. Artists must rely, at least to some degree, on visual
memories in the process of representing subject matter, whether we are working from direct
observation or recollection. Because memories are often distorted, artists may achieve greater
accuracy by cultivating more precise representational schemata in regard to both imagery and
declarative knowledge. For example, when learning to draw portraits, it may be worthwhile not
only to practice drawing and visualizing faces, but also to measure and learn typical proportions
of the human head, or take verbal note of categorical features, such as traits exhibited by a
particular breed of dog (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016).
Through a study designed to test whether self-generated images would be remembered
better than copied, traced, or visually inspected ones, Peyni̇ rci̇ oğlu (1989) confirmed her
hypothesis that creating a drawing increases recollection of a stimulus more than other methods.
Among four experiments she conducted, the second is of interest for our present inquiry. In the
first stage of this experiment, participants in condition one created their own drawings based on
provided names or descriptions of familiar objects or scenes; these drawings were then queued
up to serve as models during the final stage. Participants in condition two made observational
drawings of prepared illustrations that depicted similar objects or scenes. Meanwhile,
participants in a third condition visually inspected and rated additional pictures distributed by
Peyni̇ rci̇ oğlu.
In the final stage, all participants were given pen and paper and asked to reproduce, from
memory, the same images they had just seen. Each condition resulted in some mnemonic benefit:
Mere visual study resulted in successful recollection of 24% of the images; observational
drawing garnered positive results for 32%, and translation from text to image through generative
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drawing netted an accuracy rate of 43%. Results were statistically significant (Peyni̇ rci̇ oğlu,
1989).
Although Peyni̇ rci̇ oğlu’s (1989) purpose was to test the efficacy of pictorial elaboration
for recollection, which she demonstrated in this experiment and another that revealed mnemonic
benefits of generating a nonsense figure by means of connecting numbered dots (37%) over
tracing (26%), it is telling that the verbal nature of some prompts represented a benefit at least
6% of the time (and could have been a factor in up to 43% of cases, even though Peyni̇ rci̇ oğlu
acknowledged that motor memory also may have contributed to the success of the drawing
conditions). Her findings corroborated prior research documenting a generation effect in verbal
contexts (see Ghatala, 1981; Graf, 1980; Slamecka & Katsaiti, 1987) and extended it to the
nonverbal domain. An unstated, yet still valuable contribution of this study is the revelation that
verbal inputs may have potential as semantic representations to benefit visual memory and
drawing accuracy; this likely occurs through the activation and translation of discursive
schemata.
Canonical Perspective and Geons. Research has borne out the intuition that human
beings favor a particular perspective on objects, especially when viewing a representation,
compared to the real thing. This privileged perspective, known as canonical perspective, is
typically a full frontal or three-quarters view, looking slightly downward. It tends to be most
revealing of an object's features and potential purpose, or relevance, to the viewer (Palmer et al.,
1981). The canonical structure of an object functions as a schematic protype for its categorical
structure, i.e., its membership within a particular class, or group of things (Chamberlain &
Wagemans, 2016).
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When compared to other viewpoints in Palmer et al.’s (1981) classic study, Canonical
Perspective and the Perception of Objects, the canonical perspective won the highest goodness
ratings compared to other views; it was the most frequent perspective represented in drawings by
participants who were asked to render objects from imagination; and it was the point of view that
participants most frequently used when asked to position objects to create the "best" possible
photographs. Without canonical perspective, recollection would be more challenging, because an
infinite number of two-dimensional images arising from different viewpoints of a given object
would compete for a schematic role in memory. Canonical perspective supplies us with a
prototypical exemplar of an object, which contains the greatest possible information about that
object and the category to which it belongs. It represents the object relative to our ability to use
or interact with it and allows us to remember it more efficiently and effectively. Thus, canonical
perspective affords the greatest possible speed of object recognition. Indeed, when researchers
presented objects in the canonical perspective, it took participants less time to recognize them
compared to objects presented in other perspectives. Naming latencies strictly decreased with
increasing canonicalness.
Just as alphabets systemize languages and thereby afford verbal documentation, learning,
and innovation, canonicalness may help us organize the visual world, providing a figurative
vocabulary upon which to draw objects from memory. Artist D. Hockney (2001) theorized that
many Western artists of the quattrocento, who could not rely on the proliferation of photographic
prints and pixels we enjoy today, painstakingly employed existing technologies, including lenses,
mirrors, and the camera lucida, to paint the world as it appeared optically. While Hockney made
a convincing albeit contested argument, a serious artist’s repertoire has never relied on devices
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alone. Knowledge and imagination are key. Canonical perspective is an aspect of visual
knowledge that artists have historically drawn upon.
Prototypes were a standard in Leonardo’s (1540/1956) cognitive toolbox. For example, he
referred to a variety of visual taxonomies he had collected, such as representations of noses (see
Figure 15). He thought noses could “differ in eight ways” (Part 3, Number 417), and documented
these differences in profile, the preferred canonical perspective for noses. Leonardo imitated
these models diligently, and he encouraged novice artists to apply themselves just as
methodically in their own practice. According to Pardo’s (2008) translation of a passage inside
folio 27r of the Codex Ashburnham II, Leonardo instructed art students to memorize a set of
prototypical images:
Winter evenings ought to be employed by the young in studying those things prepared
during the summer, that is, it will be appropriate for you to gather together all the nudes
you made over the summer, and elect the best limbs and bodies among them, and make

Figure 15
Leonardo da Vinci, Del Fare una Effiggie Humana in Profilo Solo col Sguardo d'una Sol
Volta [Of Making a Man's Portrait in Profile after Having Seen Him Only Once], 1540,
Vatican Library, Codex Urbinas Latinus 1270, folio 108v
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use of these and commit them to memory. (p. 67)
Long since Leonardo wrote his Treatise on Painting, and only 6 years after Palmer et
al.’s study on canonical perspective, Biederman (1987) proposed the recognition-by-components
(RBC) theory to explain how object identification is possible, particularly under less optimal
viewing conditions, such as low visibility or non-canonical viewing positions. As Kozbelt et al.
(2010) have noted, shape constancy is a property of the human visual system. Somehow, we can
perceive an object’s geometry even when the afforded view suggests a different shape, as in the
case of a rectangular door that would otherwise appear to be a rhombus or Isosceles trapezoid
when viewed obliquely.
Bierderman’s (1987) RBC theory may have solved the mystery of shape constancy and
object identification. It posits five “non-accidental” properties of three-dimensional objects as
viewed in the two-dimensional plane of vision. These properties, which include curvature,
collinearity, symmetry, parallelism, and cotermination, apply to edges. Because these properties
are readily discernable across a wide array of viewpoints, they cannot be attributed to accident,
and thus are critical to the interpretation of visual stimuli. Biederman produced a set of
approximately 50 generalized cylinders, called geons, that embody the five RBC properties (see
Figure 16).
Kozbelt and Seeley (2007) described these geons as “perceptual primitives” and
suggested they offer artists a coherent vocabulary of universal shapes to draw upon when
depicting objects. For example, a typical drinking mug comprises two geons: one that is parallel
with a curved cross section and straight axis, and another that is parallel with a curved cross
section and a curved axis. While object recognition is facilitated by the presence or absence of
particular geons, it is also supported by the relative configuration of geons. The points of
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Figure 16
Basic Geons, Permutations of which Produce Approximately 50 Geons

Note. From “Geons,” by S. J. Dickinson and I. Biederman, 2014, Computer vision: A
Reference Guide, Springer, p. 340. Copyright 2014 by Irving Biederman. Reprinted with
permission.

extreme negative curvature where geons meet, called vertices, therefore present equally
compelling diagnostic information for the identification of objects. This is evident in the images
of a stool used in one of Biederman’s vision experiments (see Figure 17). Of the two degraded
versions of the image, the one that is most easily recoverable exhibits more vertices.
Visual Memory. Determinative judgment in drawing depends on memory. Although
experiments have not discovered a causal link between strong visual memory and drawing
expertise, cognitive scientists agree that there is a correlation (Chamberlain, 2018). Rey (1941)
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Figure 17
Stimulus Object in an Experiment on the Perception of Degraded Objects

Note. Excerpt from “Recognition-by-Components: A Theory of Human Image Understanding,”
I. Biederman, 1987, Psychological Review, 94(2), p. 135. Copyright 1987 by the American
Psychological Association.

devised a measure of visual perception and memory, known today as the Rey-Osterrieth
Complex Figure Test (ROCF) (Rey & Osterrieth, 1945/1993) that is a valid measure of drawing
ability. Performance in any of the ROCF conditions, from “copy” to “immediate recall” to
“delayed recall,” was found to be an independent predictor of drawing ability as measured by a
panel of non-experts. Scores on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), by
contrast, were not correlated, either positively or negatively (Chamberlain et al., 2015). Unlike
the ROCF, which elicits physical evidence, the VVIQ (Marks, 1973) relies on participants’ selfreporting of the vividness of their own mental imagery in response to verbal descriptions of
visual scenes. See Figure 18 for Rey’s Complex Figure and two individuals’ approximations.
Artists have intuitively understood the relationship between memory and drawing and
have advocated for memory training. Degas, who was a superb draftsperson, famously
proclaimed,
If I were to run an art-school I should take a tall house, and I should put the model and
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Figure 18
Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure and Drawings

Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure

Good recall of Rey-Osterrieth

Poor recall of Rey-Osterrieth

Note. Excerpt from Drawing Conclusions: An Exploration of the Cognitive and
Neuroscientific Foundations of Representational Drawing, by R.S. Chamberlain, 2013,
doctoral dissertation, pp. 33, 347.
the beginners in the top-story; and as a student’s work improved I should send him down
a floor, until at last he would work upon the level of the street, and would have to run up
six flights of stairs every time he wanted to look at the model. (as cited in Lecoq de
Boisbaudran, 1914, p. xxxii)
Although Degas never formally taught, the history of drawing and painting instruction bears out
the wisdom of his advice. Adding memory drawing to one’s repertoire can facilitate more adroit
representation, whether a model is absent or immediately visible (D. R. Rousar, 2013). Doing so
is difficult. Artists who embrace the challenge of moving beyond passive recognition must
struggle through the murky depths of memory to claim its jewels.
The cognitive mechanisms underlying long term visual memory are complicated and
there is not yet a decisive neuroscience-based strategy for comprehensively grasping or
strengthening this faculty. Some vision scientists conducted experiments revealing that the brain
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stores exemplar information, such as an object’s color, separately from state information, such as
whether the object was originally viewed in an open or closed position (Brady et al., 2013).
Others conducted eye tracking studies that revealed significant, but low similarity ratings
between scanpaths during observation compared to mental imagery conditions; it was also
concluded that mental schemata seem to be fairly robust once formed (G. Underwood et al.,
2008). We know that separate brain systems allow us to identify what an object is compared to
where it is located in relationship to other objects (Livingstone, 2008), and we rely on parts,
edges, and global information rather than on surface features or local details to identify and
classify objects (Dickinson & Biederman, 2014). From these studies, we may provisionally
conclude that determinative judgment is most relevant for identifying and classifying objects
based on their parts and edges, and for recalling objects’ global features, as well as their physical
states.
When determinative judgment is brought to bear in drawing, we are dealing with the
cognitive end of the perceptual-cognitive continuum advocated by Cermeño-Aínsa (2020). As
discussed in the previous section on reflective judgment, trompe l'oeil illusions play the same
optical games with all normally sighted individuals, whether artistic or not. In cases where
illusions are accepted as true, however, they can lead to delusions: the failure to understand
perceptual information. Throughout the perceptual-cognitive continuum, visual attention and
perceptual representations mediate the degree of impact, whether illusional or delusional, that
faulty visual stimuli may induce. Illusions are most likely to affect local processing of specific
details, whereas delusions distort global processing of the bigger picture. Illusions alter percepts;
delusions impinge on internal representations, such as long term visual memories (Chamberlain
& Wagemans, 2016).
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Gregory (2003) illustrated the distinction between illusions to delusions by reference to
mirages and rainbows. As visual illusions, both play tricks on our eyes, and are harmless, even
delightful, when understood for the insubstantial semblances they are. However, when these
phenomena are mistaken for tangible objects, they become delusions that can lead beholders
astray, perhaps to walk for miles toward a desert oasis or a pot of gold that was never there.
Chamberlain & Wagemans (2016) speculated that people who demonstrate skill in
observational drawing may be less susceptible to visual delusions. If so, it may explain why
artists are better than others at rendering objects or scenes from real life. Good visual memory is
the likely keystone. In the absence of training, visual memories tend to become distorted, and
they are vulnerable to constructive recollection. Constructive recollection is a phenomenon
whereby false memories are generated from a variety of accurate yet unrelated originals through
subsequent layering of distinct but similar perceptual or semantic cues, such as associated images
or words. Constructive recollection has been found to emerge from such distorting cues whether
they are presented in fragments or gestalt wholes (Doss et al., 2016).
In a much-replicated experiment designed to test schema theory, Solso and McCarthy
(1981) observed a case of constructive recollection, which they dubbed “pseudo-memory.” The
researchers created a prototype face from features in a police kit, as well as a series of exemplar
faces. Twenty-five percent to 75% of each exemplar’s features were derived from the prototype
(see samples in Figure 19). Next, Solso and McCarthy showed all but the prototype face to
participants for a few seconds, in succession, and asked them to memorize each face. After a 5minute distractor task, participants took a test to gauge their recollection. The test included
exemplar faces, as well as others that participants had not yet seen, including the prototype face
and some new faces. Despite achieving correct scores for exemplar and new faces, most
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Figure 19
Pseudo-Mnemonic Prototype Formation of Faces

Note. From Prototype Formation of Faces: A Case of Pseudo‐Memory by R.L. Solso and J.E.
McCarthy, 1981, British Journal of Psychology, 72(4) p. 501 (https://doi.org/10.1111/j.20448295.1981.tb01779.x). Copyright 2011 by John Wiley and Sons. Reprinted with permission.

participants (35 out of 36) incorrectly identified the prototype face as one they had seen already.
This pseudo-memory phenomenon recurred for 23 out of 24 participants in a subsequent study,
wherein researchers delayed the recollection test for six weeks. Such results demonstrate that
short-term and long-term memory alike can be susceptible to constructive recollection.
Where working memory is concerned, Ballard et al. (1992, 1995) hypothesized that the
mind retains very little perceptual data in the midst of gazing back and forth between a target
stimulus and other objects. Instead, it favors tracking location pointers to salient junctures within
the visual scene. According to Cohen (2005), this deictic process is responsible for errors in
observational drawing, especially when gaze frequencies between the model and drawing are
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low, or when internal representations (i.e., mental images), which passively inform the
observational drawing process, are distorted.
Circumscription. Rosand (2002) retold Pliny the Elder’s (ca. 79 C.E.) account of
Parrhasios (ca. 500–401 B.C.E.), an ancient Greek artist legendary for his ability to capture
accurate likenesses with a self-assured line. Parrhasios was a master of contour drawing. With an
undulating stroke on the drawing plane, he implied depth. His lines wrapped illusory edges,
trailing off subtly to suggest surfaces beyond, barely out of sight. According to Alberti
(1436/1966), Parrhasio’s line served as a model of circumscription, a cornerstone of painting
technique.
If a realist drawing is to be considered successful, then its lines, whether constructed from
direct observation, reference, or imagination, should contribute to an illusion of space that
coheres with the embodied visual experience of sighted individuals. This kind of visual
experience offers a view of the world dependent on a given beholder’s physical position relative
to what is seen, and subject to the varied circumstances of lighting, occlusion, distance, and time
encountered in daily life. There is no pat explanation, however, for the phenomenon of
perspective. M. Kemp (1990) identified numerous and contrasting practices and manifestations
in the history of Western art; he also argued that some elements of perspective are universal.
Even so, a visit to the Seeing is Deceiving permanent exhibit at Boston’s Museum of Science
helps one understand that visual experience is, to some extent, culturally conditioned.
Additionally, Goodman’s (1976) critique of linear perspective’s fidelity (or lack thereof) remains
merited. All of this being said, the production of realist images illustrates just how close graphic
artists in the West have come to approximating a first-person perspective of visual phenomena,
one that is rooted in the laws of nature and can be shared and understood widely within a given
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culture.10 Such imagery incorporates concepts in figurative form, allowing works to be read and
interpreted by an audience, as visual texts. Successful encoding of such texts requires
determinative judgment on behalf of the artist.
Circumscription represents human visual cognition moreso than it represents reality, for
objects in our midst are not enclosed, cookie-cutter fashion, by lines (Livingstone, 2008).
Leonardo recognized this, advising his students that “the boundary is a thing invisible” (as
translated in Rosand, 2002, p. 4). Circumscription is central to depiction; a product of optical
hypothesis testing, it allows us to encapsulate a manifold of visual data in comprehensible,
depictive shapes. As we encounter objects in our field of view, we keep a running catalog of
them in memory, a cognitively costly process that demands efficiency. Sayim and Cavanagh
(2011) accounted for this efficiency by virtue of the brain’s sophisticated neural responses,
which evolved to allow lines to stand in for solid contours and edges. In their words, “if we were
to look at the visual cortex with voltage sensitive dyes, the pattern of activity for the oriented
units would resemble a sketch of the object” (p. 2). Our brains capture outlines because neurons
that select for visual objects fire along borders, not along uniform areas. When we look at a line
drawing, even though higher order cognition allows us to differentiate it from the original object
it depicts, our brains cannot make the distinction on a neural level. Is it any wonder that drawing
has been considered a staple of arts education for millennia?

10

Readers who wish to examine this argument through a more critical lens may be interested in the debate on the
ethics of linear perspective; in particular, writings by Brunner-Traut (1974), Elkins (1994), Edgerton (2006),
Mitchell (1987), Panofsky (1991), and Vollmer (2007). These represent a fascinating range of perspectives, both
literally and figuratively, on the topic. Because the debate is generally centered on issues of immediate relevance to
the topic of practical wisdom rather than technē per se, I have elided it here.
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The Cognitive Role of Judgments of Coherence in Drawing
Judgments of coherence occur through tacit inference (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975), but
those inferences can take any form, from reflective to determinative. What matters when it
comes to forming judgments of coherence in and through drawing is not the nature of the tacit
inferences drawn, but the structure of the processes of forming them. The literature discussed
below examines the psychological processes at play in judgments of coherence.
Drawing on Tacit Learning. According to philosopher of psychology H. Dreyfus
(2001), who was a disciple of Polanyi, the ratio of intuitive versus rational thought involved in
any task increases with expertise. At the novice level, context-free precepts provide an
orientation that serves as a basis for learning but is insufficient for practice. Meanwhile, the
advanced beginner learns methodically, by example and repetition, and competence is not
achieved until the learner can choose a perspective and use it to discriminate relevant from
irrelevant details. At the next stage, “the involved, experienced performer sees each situation
from an intuitive perspective, but hasn’t yet learned what to do. … The proficient performer
simply has not yet had enough experience” (2001, p. 34). Finally, the expert performer has
moved past the need for effortful decision-making; it is immediately clear what should be done.
Only at the level of mastery does this trend stop, with deliberative thinking once more taking
center stage to guide a seasoned hand with artisanal intention.
All aspects of this process involve tacit learning, which characterizes judgments of
coherence, particularly in dexterous tasks such as drawing. Polanyi and Prosch (1975)
distinguished the kinds of awareness in the triad of tacit knowing from conscious and
unconscious awareness. They thought focal awareness was always conscious, but that subsidiary,
or “from-awareness,” could be either. The latter is characterized by its from-to function relative
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to the knower and objects of awareness, not by its manifestation as conscious or subliminal.
Notably, Polanyi and Prosch insisted that acts of tacit integration of the objects of subsidiary
awareness into one’s focal attention are always conscious and intentional. According to them, the
act of tacit integration by the knower mediates the movement of awareness from subsidiaries to
focal targets. Thus, the triad of tacit knowing includes the knower, subsidiary particulars, and the
focal target.
Tacit learning, therefore, is understood as a process of accumulating or creating
knowledge through the integration of objects of subsidiary awareness (i.e., subsidiaries) into
focal awareness. Subsidiary awareness may engage with objects representing any form of
knowledge, whether intellectual (e.g., musical notes) or practical (e.g., piano keys), and without
regard to whether that knowledge is explicit, dormant (tacit but specifiable) or invisible (tacit and
unspecifiable). Tacit Integration concerns the bundling of objects of subsidiary awareness by
means of a series of tacit inferences (deductive, inductive, abductive, and/or analogical)
regarding the relationships among them. That reasoning process, when subsidiaries are of
sufficient quality, should lead to a deepening sense of coherence, which when achieved, results
in what Polanyi and Prosch (1975) call a judgment of coherence. This process is unconscious up
to the point when the bundle is finally brought into focal awareness as knowledge. In this way,
tacit inferences may be consciously acted upon.
Attentional Flexibility. Through the distal mode of visual perception, we gather
objective information about the environment that can be evaluated in terms of truth, accuracy, or
meaning; this mode is concerned with object identification and semantic information.
Meanwhile, the proximal mode concerns our subjective visual viewpoint relative to objects or
scenes, particularly regarding surface details and other kinds of syntactic information. When
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artists focus on optical, rather than conceptual features of a visual stimulus, the proximal mode
of visual perception is dominant (Lou, 2018); this is Ruskin’s (1858) “innocent eye” approach to
representation. It is characterized by a focus on local details abstracted away from the larger,
descriptive, global features in which they are embedded.
Lou (2018) argued that the concept of an innocent eye is a misnomer. According to him,
this approach to drawing is not innocent, because it occurs post-perceptually. In other words,
artists engage in proximal attentional modes after their brains have already identified objects and
scenes in the visual field. This means that the shift from distal to proximal awareness is made
voluntarily, by directing one’s attention selectively, just as Polanyi and Prosch theorized (1975).
Proximal features of objects, such as shadow contours, negative spaces between objects,
and embedded “phantom” shapes, are routinely easy to miss in the absence of concentrated
attention. The ability to shift intentionally and seamlessly between distal and proximal modes of
awareness demonstrates fluency in making judgments of coherence, and it characterizes the
skillful representational ability of artists to focus in on target features while keeping the bigger
picture in mind. This attentional tactic, which is arguably more cognitive than perceptual in
nature, enables artists to depict more accurate and captivating part-to-whole relationships in their
works. Attentional flexibility, the ability to shift attention purposively between proximal and
distal awareness, is associated with creativity. Because attention can be trained, it is a mental
skill that may be improved toward developing one’s creative capacity (Lou, 2018).
Skill in observational drawing may be linked to creativity. Drawing well entails a
flexibility of attention associated with the appreciation of visual ambiguities, as well as the
ability to form nuanced interpretations of artworks, two dispositions characteristic of a creative
mind. This implies a correlation between the cultivation of technical artistic skill with both arts
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appreciation and creative output (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016). The common denominator
underlying this relationship may be practice, which routinely hones artists’ capacities for
engaging in judgments of coherence.
Seeley (2020) argued that the most important feature of artworks is their impact on
attention. According to him, “artworks are attentional engines. They are artifacts that have been
intentionally designed to direct attention to critical stylistic features that reveal their point,
purpose, or meaning” (abstract). One artist adept at making judgments of coherence was M.C.
Escher (1898–1972). Sayim and Cavanagh (2011) speculated that the impossible objects
depicted in Escher’s artworks play to the imperfect design of the human visual system, which
accepts both local and global visual cues even when they conflict with one another (see Figure
20). This kind of error occurs because, at the local level, our eyes must pinpoint attention on

Figure 20
M.C. Escher, Relativity, 1953, Museum of Modern Art, New York

M.C. Escher's “Relativity” © 2022
The M.C. Escher Company-The Netherlands.
All rights reserved. www.mcescher.com

Note. Copyright 2022 by The M.C. Escher Company. Reprinted with permission.
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specific line junctions and features. If these make sense, they pass the test, even when their logic
does not extrapolate successfully on the global scale. In a deliciously maddening reverse logic,
Escher’s artworks challenge beholders to switch attentional modes while looking at them, much
as he had done when creating them.
Perdreau and Cavanagh (2013, 2014) compared novice participants to professional artists
and art students in their abilities to distinguish impossible objects among a selection of line
drawings of possible and impossible figures (see Figure 21). The researchers discovered that
participants with more accurate drawing abilities took less time and required a smaller portion of

Figure 21
Examples of Possible and Impossible Objects Used in the Experiments

Note. From "The Artist’s Advantage: Better Integration of Object Information across Eye
Movements," by F. Perdreau and P. Cavanagh, 2013, I-Perception, 4(6), p. 382
(https://doi.org/10.1068/i0574). CC BY 2013 by F. Perdreau and P. Cavanagh.
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the visual field to detect impossible objects. They were also better at deflecting local visual
clutter to home in on crucial details, even at smaller sizes. Among all participants, even the
artists, this kind of encoding skill has been found to be more difficult than either recognizing
objects as members of semantic categories (such as when we distinguish animals from
automobiles) or identifying them outright (such as when we tell a fork from a spoon). The
process of comparing object parts to wholes involves serial verifications of fit between two
attentional planes, which “undoubtedly require more extensive and higher level processing”
(Perdreau & Cavanagh, 2013, p. 115).
Chamberlain (2018) theorized that artistic expertise is largely attributed to an individual’s
capacity to direct, control, and flexibly switch between modes of visual attention. This flexibility
allows a draftsperson to shift focus from local to global features of a scene and back again. It
aids in depicting perceptual information, such as a deep shadow cast over a model’s eye, versus
conceptual information, such as the presence of an overcast pupil that is barely discernable.
Chamberlain also speculated that artists who can deploy attention skillfully may achieve
enhancements in other mental abilities that are associated with artistic expertise, such as visual
selection, representational decision-making, visuospatial working memory, and visuomotor
integration.
Discernment. Judgments of coherence are central to the experience of creating works of
art, including drawings. Serafin et al. (2011) discussed a psychological process whereby
individuals continually monitor the quality of artworks as they emerge. As mentioned earlier,
this process is called dynamic evaluation. It entails weighing the aesthetic merits of budding
works against one’s goals or a set standard, gauging progress toward completion, and assessing
the amount of time and effort warranted at each stage. In the field of adult learning, dynamic
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evaluation aligns with Boyd and Meyers’ (1988) conceptualization of “discernment,” an extrarational process in transformative learning that leads to contemplative insight after oncedisparate pieces are combined into a coherent whole. In this sense, each stage in the production
of an artwork is but one of many successive parts. As the work develops, a whole comes into
being. It is composed of many parts, now hidden within.
Chapter 3 Summary
This chapter focused on artisanal judgment and its role in drawing. The capacity for
judgment involves inductive reflection and deductive reasoning (Kant, 1781–1787/1998,
1790/2000; Longuenesse, 1998), both integral to visual decision-making. Reflective thinking in
drawing comprises visual selection (Kozbelt et al., 2010), bottom-up processing (Chamberlain &
Wagemans, 2016; Kozbelt et al., 2010), indeterminate ideation (Fish & Scrivener, 1990),
aesthetic choices (Arnheim & Beardsley, 1981; Goodman, 1976; Schaefer-Simmern, 2003),
attentional flexibility (Chamberlain, 2018; Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016; Lou, 2018), and
discernment (Boyd & Myers, 1988; Serafin et al., 2011). Meanwhile, top-down processing via
hypothesis testing and the development of schematic mental images (Bartlett, 1932; Carmichael
et al., 1932; Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016; Gombrich, 1960), alongside visual vocabulary
building (Kozbelt & Seeley, 2007), visual memory development (Chamberlain, 2018), and
resistance to visual delusions (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016), compose the more deductive,
determinative aspects of artisanal judgment entailed in drawing.
Creating imaginative drawings that are representational and volumetric depends on the
cultivation of visual and technical knowledge in conjunction with nuanced judgment and
inference making (deductive, inductive, abductive, analogical; whether tacit or explicit). The
more complicated our conceptual and pictorial taxonomies grow in modern society, the greater
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are the demands of artisanal judgment on artists. Drawing instruction for adult novice artists
should acknowledge this challenge and confront it explicitly. My dissertation, a cognitive
autoethnography exploring artisanal judgment from the perspective of an adult novice artist, is
designed to test the pedagogical strategies suggested in this chapter that are likely to support this
endeavor. Realist drawing may be the best vehicle for undertaking this work.
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CHAPTER 4
Embodiment in Realist Drawing
Drawing unifies the artist’s body and mind; it reminds us that we are a part of nature.
—realist artist Eric Johnson, personal communication, October 21, 2020
The body bears a complex and essential relationship to the project of realist 1 drawing,
one that is documented by historians of art and theorized by philosophers, psychologists, and
educators. In this chapter, I review the literature in these fields related to the embodied nature of
drawing. I introduce philosophies of embodiment and psychological findings in the domains of
situated cognition and tacit learning that are relevant to adult art education. Additionally, I
present literature that discusses aspects of embodied cognition and bears on artisanal judgment,
memory and imagination in drawing.
Reflections on the Body in Realist Drawing
Representational art is enamored of bodies—celestial, plant, animal, human, or synthetic.
Bodies matter in drawing and in life. Through the literature detailed below, let us take a walk
through the myriad ways the body has been depicted, moments when it has been demoted or
defended, as well as instances where its traces have been decoded for the benefit of learning in
the arts.

1

See Janson (2007) for a more detailed, academic definition of Realism in Western art. In this chapter and
throughout the dissertation, I have not capitalized “realism,” because I am interested in a broader conceptualization
of the term than strict adherence to a specific art historical period or style allows. Embracing a less determinate
definition accommodates a greater degree of artistic license in creating drawings inspired by the Realist tradition
proper, as well as its antecedents and consequents in representational drawing. Therefore, the term “realist,” in
lowercase form, should be understood as a quasicolloquialism, and purposely so. In essence, I use it to describe
plausible, volumetric rendering in representational drawing.
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The Body Depicted
When artworks depict bodies volumetrically, according to the principles of perspective,
one may describe the style, very generally, as naturalistic or realist. Realist artists cleave closely
to the body in their representations. In his quattrocento treatise, Della pittura [On Painting],
Alberti (1436/1966) emphasized the powerful role the human body plays in storytelling:
A painting in which there are bodies in many dissimilar poses is always especially
pleasing. There some stand erect, planted on one foot, and show all the face with the hand
high and the fingers joyous. In others the face is turned, the arms folded and the feet
joined. And thus to each one is given his own action and flection of members; some are
seated, others on one knee, others lying. … Movements of the soul are made known by
movements of the body. Care and thought weigh so heavily that a sad person stands with
his forces and feelings as if dulled … . In the angry, because anger incites the soul, the
eyes are swollen with ire … . In gay and happy men the movements are free and with
certain pleasing inflections. (Book 2, p. 76–77)
The realist tradition of representing bodies as three-dimensional forms does not preclude
recognizing the body as an outward manifestation of internal life forces; rather, it embraces this
notion as a matter of principle. This is why the use of convex rather than concave lines to
indicate bodily surfaces is a cherished tenet among atelier-trained realist artists in their drawing
practice. A consequence of this practice led to criticism of some artists for taking it too far; for
example, Michelangelo’s (1475–1564) figures have been compared to bulging sacks of potatoes
(C. Wheat, personal communication, October 6, 2019; E. Johnson, personal communication,
May 20, 2020).
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Leonardo (1540/1956) shared Alberti’s preoccupation with adept rendering of the human
form. Part three of his Treatise on Painting, which is titled, “Of the Various States and
Movements of the Human Body,” is dedicated to this endeavor. Therein, he instructed fellow
artisans in the skillful depiction of characters who would appear to beholders as if they had been
captured in the midst of motion, gesturing expressively. The approach he recommended entailed
careful measurement and attention to natural and ideal proportions, as well as the study of
anatomy and geometry. For example, in drawing a figure that is balanced on one foot, he
advised, “the shoulder on the side on which its weight rests will always be lower than the other,
and the hollow of the throat will be above the middle of the leg on which the weight rests”
(Number 336). In a related passage, he noted that “motion is created by the destruction of
balance … for nothing can move by itself which does not leave its state of balance, and that thing
moves most rapidly which is farthest from its balance” (Number 346). To illustrate, he described
how a figure moving against the wind loses its center of gravity. Echoing Alberti on the
embodied representation of emotions, he continued,
Make the motions of your figures appropriate to the mental conditions of those figures;
that is, if you conceive a man that is enraged, let his face not look the contrary, but depict
it so that nothing but rage can be discerned in it; and do the same with regard to joy,
melancholy, laughter, tears, and the like. (Part 3, Number 405)
A practitioner of realist drawing today may choose to idealize the body and exaggerate its
emotional valence, as Alberti and Leonardo recommended, or alternatively, may find inspiration
elsewhere in the downtrodden figures of medieval German mystics who belonged to the
Brotherhood of Common Life. Their naturalism anticipated the unprecedented realism of Jan
Van Eyck (1390–1441). Although the mystics did not employ linear perspective, their works
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may inform realist artists insofar as the world-weary figures therein represent “plausibly specific
individuals” (Smith, 2004, p. 13) whose humble limbs are tired and sore. Artists in the
Brotherhood of Common Life expressed a reverence for humanity that embraced the body’s
frailties and imperfections.
Appreciation for the body as an authentic subject of artistic expression takes many forms
in realist and other representational artworks across the ages. Even Hieronymus Bosch’s (ca.
1450–1516 [1490]) grotesque beings, languishing in the Garden of Earthly Delights, are
potential sources of revelation. Realist artists may, alternatively, draw on classical and medieval
works beyond the Western canon, such as tribhaṅga sculptures from the Ajanta caves or the
Khajuraho Group of Monuments. These works, alongside countless others across time and
cultures, exude an undeniable corporeal vibrance.
The Body Demoted
Even as so many artists have intuited the centrality of bodies to the representational
enterprise, the intellectual status of the body has suffered in the West. According to Bordo’s
(1987) psychocultural thesis, the demotion of the body as a locus of knowledge can be traced to
Plato, whose writings about the human body centered on overcoming its frailties rather than
listening to its signals. In Plato’s (360 B.C.E./2017) Phaedo, Socrates and his disciple Simias
regarded the body as an impediment to the search for truth, arguing that, even when one is alone,
one’s body may prohibit true solitude. Posing a rhetorical question to his friend, Socrates said,
“So in this case too, does the philosopher’s soul especially look down on the body, run away
from it and seek to be alone by itself?” (Part 65d). Plato considered the hunger, thirst, feelings,
discomforts, and desires presented by the body to be intellectual deficits that hindered
concentration, and so he recommended striving to surmount them. Nevertheless, he did not
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believe it was possible to achieve purity of thought, unimpeded by the body, in one’s lifetime.
According to him, the soul, as the seat of thought, was thoroughly enmeshed within the body. An
individual’s ability to focus on mind over matter was essential to engaging in cognitive pursuits
(Bordo, 1987).
Plato (380 B.C.E./2013) forswore poetry and other mimetic arts in his utopian citadel.
Regarding mimesis, Havelock (1963) speculated that it may have played an educational role in
Homeric Greece, rather than operating on a purely aesthetic level. The ancient Greeks, as
inhabitants of a predominantly oral culture, were accustomed to learning somatically, through all
five senses. Poetry catered to that preference. Listening to a poet, the audience “became his
servants and submitted to his spell. As they did this, they engaged also in a re-enactment of the
tradition with lips, larynx, and limbs, and with the whole apparatus of their unconscious nervous
system” (p. 160). Because listeners engaged their whole personhood, body and mind, poetry
made learning pleasurable, and it effectuated cultural continuity.
Imitation and memorization are wonderful tools for passing down patrimony, but Plato
had different pedagogical goals for his Republic. He was not as interested in perpetuating rituals
as he was in reshaping society (Havelock, 1963). Even so, I believe Plato was too hasty in
banishing the poets. The kind of embodied learning that mimetic art encourages, while different
from rational, discursive analysis, offers a complementary rather than oppositional approach.
When relied on exclusively, any mode of thought is prone toward indoctrination, whereas a
balanced engagement of the mind and body together may yield a greater likelihood of
enlightenment. This realization, the product of more than 2,000 years of hindsight and centuries
of written culture, probably would not have been self-evident to Plato. It is not even plain to
plenty of educators today.
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According to Bordo (1987), a more extreme version of the mindset that Plato initiated
can be found in the writings of the early modern philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650).
Descartes argued that body and soul, and thus, body and mind, were entirely separable. Many
scholars have alleged that Descartes’ philosophy, which gained traction in the 19 th century,
hailed the dawn of materialism, mechanical philosophy, and the hegemony of cerebral intellect
over corporeal intuition. This is a simplistic account of a rationalist philosopher whose work
likely was influenced by late Medieval women’s meditative writings on the subjective pursuit of
self-knowledge (Mercer, 2017). Nevertheless, philosophers who adopted Descartes’ mechanistic
worldview subscribed to the idea that bodies were akin to machines. In the case of non-human
animals, Descartes and his followers believed they were soulless automata, incapable of feeling
pain. As a result, researchers perpetrated cruel experiments on animals in the name of science.
Cartesians held that human beings, by contrast, could transcend the body entirely, even during
waking life (Berman, 1989), thanks to the human soul.
The reverence accorded to the soul by Europeans in this era apparently did not extend
across peoples, places, and times. Art historians have borne witness that body and soul alike
were desecrated in the creation of an astonishing number of artworks. A poignant example can
be found in the production of a pigment popular with painters in 18th and 19th century Europe
called caput mortuum. Caput mortuum, which means “dead head” in medieval Latin, was also
known as Egyptian brown, or mummy brown. It was, quite literally, made of the mummified
corpses of ancient Egyptians, ground up with white pitch and myrrh. This mixture effected an
earthy hue that artists like the Neoclassical painter Angelica Kauffman (1741–1847) and the PreRaphaelites enthusiastically procured, and used, to great fanfare. Art supply shops and
manufacturing firms, such as Paris’s À la Momie and London’s C. Roberson plied this macabre
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trade amid the backdrop of a mummy market that had been booming with Egyptian imports since
the 1500s. Even though the ancient Egyptians had mummified their dead with the expectation
that their bodies would be preserved for future visitations from the spirit world, it was only after
the mummy supply eventually diminished, in the early 1900s, that European businesses ceased
bottling body parts for the sake of art (Torres, 2013).
The Materialist paradigm, which alongside cultural ignorance and greed allowed the
mummy trade to flourish, persisted long past Descartes. Unlike in Descartes’ day, the
materialism of our current era rejects the concept of a soul. Materialism remains a driving force
in Western philosophy of mind and the sciences. Eliminative Materialism is today’s most
extreme manifestation of this post-Cartesian inheritance. According to its strictest tenets,
common sense ideas about the intellect, such as the existence of emotional states or even
consciousness itself, are unfounded in the absence of measurable, objective, material data
(Ramsey, 2020). Like Descartes’ animals, humans have become, in this view, no more
consequential than warm-blooded zombies. A body without a mind bears a problematic
relationship to knowledge. If educators were to follow this reasoning to its logical, unmitigated
conclusions, there would be no theoretically defensible point to learning anything. Big ideas
have big consequences; in the absence of contextual knowledge and interpretive nuance, such
consequences can be dire.
Berman (1989) rejected the Materialist worldview. Reflecting on the role of the body as
an extension of mind (or of mind as extension of body), he drew a parallel between the mimetic
ritual of Greek poetry recitations and the apprenticeship style of learning practiced in medieval
artisanal workshops. “A whole host,” he said, “of crafts and disciplines had an absorbing,
repetitive, trancelike aspect to them, and were highly mesmerizing and sensuous in nature” (p.
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112). The visceral quality of learning made accessible through craftsmanship exemplified the
merits of full-bodied, immersive, and immediate engagement in the acquisition of knowledge.
In the introduction to his translation of Della pittura [On Painting], art historian J.
Spencer (1436/1966), noted that Alberti’s Renaissance treatise ushered in “the ascendancy of
mind over hand” in the arts (p. 29). Regarding how this occurred, the tale is not straightforward.
As a Renaissance artist who inherited the traditions of the medieval guilds, Alberti understood
the intellectual merits of drawing and painting. He believed that drawing revealed the intellect
through the work of the hand, and he advocated for artisans to be accorded a status
commensurate with their epistemic achievements (Rosand, 2002).
Alberti’s advocacy was necessary because there had been a long precedent in the West of
omitting artistic practices from the scholarly domain. Aristotle, who had studied at Plato’s
academy, forged this legacy when he determined that artisans were unworthy of citizenship due
to the manual labor they performed, which he claimed deformed the body and mind alike (Smith,
2004). This deep-seated cultural prejudice may explain why Alberti’s pursuit of artisanal
recognition, however successful in his time, resulted in an ever-growing dissociation of the body
from the artmaking process in scholarly discourse. He was swimming upstream amid the
prejudices of his era.
Once integral to artisanship, the concept of technē, realized through manual dexterity and
discernment, was reconceptualized by the cultural cognoscenti as craft and separated from the
emergent, loftier concepts of art and design (Suthor, 2008). Thus, ironically, the full-bodied
aspirations of Alberti and his successors ultimately diminished the role of the body as a
recognized source of artisanal knowledge. Indeed, Vasari’s (1568/1898) biography of
Michelangelo (1475–1564) revealed that the virtuoso was so ashamed of his most painstaking
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efforts at draftsmanship that he destroyed most of his studies before he died. Although the body
of an artist is an instrument par excellence, documentation of its strivings, betrayed by the
uncertainty of a wobbly line, the frustration of a knot of scribbles, or the smudge of a cramping
hand, might cast the estimation of genius in doubt; at least, that is what Michelangelo probably
feared.
The Body Defended
According to Smith (2004) many Renaissance intellectuals, such as the artist Albrecht
Dürer (1471–1528) and the alchemist/physician Paracelsus (1493–1541), revered the visual arts
as a system for knowledge discovery based on artists’ rootedness in their bodies. They argued
that the artisanal body, embedded in the material world and equipped with sensory organs, was a
better probe of nature than the theoretical tools of pure science. The body, and through it, artists
and artworks, could uncover epistemological gems buried in creation. Thus, Dürer set to work
observing people to develop his system of human proportions, and Paracelsus drew on artisanal
techniques of visual analysis to read nature’s signs, which he believed could be mined from the
veins of a leaf, the cracks in a rock, the palm of a hand, facial expressions and features, and the
earthly elements. By the time of the Enlightenment, scientific practice diverged significantly
from the artisanal model for many good reasons, but close observation and empiricism, both
central tenets of artisanship, remained core features of the scientific method.
Crawford (2003) reported that artists and intellectuals who identified with the Arts and
Crafts Movement in the latter half of the 19th century expressed a sincere esteem for the manual
arts and sought to promote and elevate traditional craftsmanship. Leading the helm was John
Ruskin (1819–1900), a British artist, educator, and art critic who wrote and lectured prolifically.
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Ruskin understood the intellectual dimensions of artisanship, and as his career progressed, he
expressed a deepening appreciation for the role of the humble hand in creating art.
According to Levi & Tucker (2011), Ruskin delivered a public lecture at the Manchester
School of Art wherein he argued that the hand underpins crafts, manufacture, and fine arts in
common; what distinguishes each, he said, is whether or not the hand is in collaboration with
either the head or heart (or both), and the relative primacy of each organ relative to the others. In
his view, manufacture springs from the hand alone; it is mechanical in nature. Craft is produced
when the head leads the hand, guiding it intelligently. Art, then, is born of the heart. He
recommended that artists, inspired by emotion, should reflect rationally on their feelings in
bringing their works to fruition with the aid of their own dutiful, dexterous hands. In Ruskin’s
(1859) words,
FINE ART is that in which the hand, the head, and the heart of man go together.
Recollect this triple group; it will help you to solve many difficult problems. And
remember that though the hand must be at the bottom of everything, it must also go to the
top of everything; for Fine Art must be produced by the hand of man in a much greater
and clearer sense than manufacture is. Fine Art must always be produced by the subtlest
of all machines, which is the human hand. No machine yet contrived, or hereafter
contrivable, will ever equal the fine machinery of the human fingers. Thoroughly perfect
art is that which proceeds from the heart, which involves all the noble emotions;—
associates with these the head, yet as inferior to the heart; and the hand, yet as inferior to
the heart and head; and thus brings out the whole man. (pp. 31–32)
Underscoring this sentiment, Ruskin broke with aesthetic precedent and denoted as
“manual arts” manufacture, crafts, and fine arts alike, blurring the boundaries between these
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categories. While the artist’s hand played the most essential role in this construct, he emphasized
its subservience to heart and head. To Ruskin, a noble hand is a hand that listens, a hand that
follows. Lazy hands, hands that move aimlessly and without care or training, he deemed vulgar
by comparison (Levi & Tucker, 2011). Ruskin’s affirmative stance toward the artisanal body
influenced many of his contemporaries. For example, according to Harvard Art Museum fellows
S. Lynford and R. Awburn (personal communication, October 9, 2020), Alfred Joseph Moore
(1841–1893) employed a rigorous 17-step process in the creation of his paintings that implicitly
upheld Ruskin’s esteem for the value of labor, honest execution, and exacting finish in works of
art.
Other contemporaries took a body-positive stance that focused less on industriousness
and more on freedom, as evidenced in the relatively unrestrained style of Auguste Rodin (1840–
1917), who ushered in the 20th century with sculptures and sketches bearing palpable traces of
his experimental handiwork. Following him came Picasso and many other artists whose works
exhibited a “pure motor impulse” (Gombrich, 1991, p. 127) that left discernable impressions of
their creators’ metaphorical and sometimes literal fingerprints. Where the artisanal mind had
previously directed the body, the hand finally dominated the artist’s eye and intellect. This
transition is most visible in the scrawled, childlike drawings of Cy Twombly (1928–2011),
which are playful, but seemingly unguided by the artist’s will. Ruskin may have agreed with the
critic Barthes (1950–1980), who criticized Twombly for severing the connection between mind
and hand, thereby eroding the body’s virtue (van Alphen, 2008).
This historical summary of attitudes toward the role of artisans’ bodies in the West is
necessarily abridged, for my larger inquiry focuses not on art history, but on an artist’s learning
process. It bears mentioning though, that the transitions between the aforementioned positions
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relative to the body in art have not occurred in a linear sequence, as implied above. We have
skipped over many decades, artworks, and genres that would have revealed a more complicated
story if I had chosen to delve into them. Two cursory examples illustrate this convolution.
Firstly, in her analysis of 17th century European portraiture, N. Suthor (2008) identified different
approaches to handling the brush among the painters Nicolas Régnier (1591–1667) and Simon
Vouet (1590–1649), contemporaries whose works exhibited both delicately controlled dexterity,
or diligenza, and boldly flowing prestezza, wherein the hand, by contrast, was relatively free.
Secondly, returning to the classical era, Pliny the Elder drew a similar comparison between the
ancient Greek artists Parrhasios (ca. 500–401 B.C.E.) and Apelles (370–306 B.C.E.). Parhassios’
line, famed for its depictive exactitude, revealed nary a stroke astray from the artist’s intentions,
whereas Apelles dazzled beholders with graphical flair and virtuosity, referring as much to
himself in the act of drawing as to his subject matter (Rosand, 2002).
Despite the passage of time and centuries of technological change, artists’ haptic
experiences continue to capture the imagination. The word “haptic” refers to the sense of touch
an artisan encounters with materials in the act of drawing, painting, or otherwise making. The
role of touch in the creation of artworks has been debated among artists, art historians,
philosophers, educators, and scientists. Recently, phenomenological psychologists have linked
artists’ mental experiences of flow with haptic and motoric elements of making, such as fine and
gross motor control, body posture and stance, vitality, focus, enjoyment, the ability to hold one’s
hands steady, and a sense of one’s tools (e.g., pencils and paint brushes) as extensions of the
body (Banfield & Burgess, 2013). Even computer scientists have taken an interest in developing
software applications and equipment capable of simulating the visceral aspects of artisanship,
particularly in regard to drawing. For example, Sulaiman et al. (2010) found that artists
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appreciate tactile feedback in computer-based work environments just as much as they do in the
brick and mortar world. In order to meet this market demand, these researchers created
applications capable of delivering electronic feedback to users via vibrations, as well as
sensations of bumpiness, scratchiness, smoothness, or stickiness.
The Body Decoded
Gazing at a drawing engages the beholder in a visual reenactment of the process the artist
went through while creating it—the weight of the hand; the rhythm, pace, and direction of
strokes; the urgency and sensitivity of each line. In a sense, to view a drawing is to inhabit the
body of the artisan, if only fleetingly (Rosand, 2002; Tresset & Fol Leymarie, 2013). Citing this
phenomenon, which scientists believe is possible due to the human neural mirror system
(Freedberg & Gallese, 2007; Pignocchi, 2010), aesthetic philosopher R. Wollheim (2005)
praised drawing as a triumph of the embodied mind, lauding it not only as a visual art, but a
manual art. He credited the artist’s hand with imparting to an artwork both unity and personality;
intertwined, these two elements compose an artist’s style. In a drawing, Wollheim said, “the
material residues of which the eye takes stock have been deposited by the movements of the
hand” (p. 9). This embedded residue of matter and action has been described as the
"recoverability of the genesis of a drawing" (Tresset & Fol Leymarie, 2013, p. 360). Drawing is
raw and immediate; a drawing may reveal its creator’s actions, style, and emotional state,
possibly more so than any other two-dimensional visual medium.
As works of art, many drawings provoke an emotional response. Often, viewers are
affected empathetically, not only by the quality of line and rendering, but by the facial
expressions, bodily positions, and arrested movements of the characters depicted (Freedberg &
Gallese, 2007; Pignocchi, 2010). In effect, through careful observation of a drawing, observers

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

158

may get a taste of what it is like to see a scene through the eyes of an artist, and to some extent,
they also may be able to access a given artist’s mind, by means of the habits of workmanship
manifest, emotions present, and decisions made in the work. For this reason, novice artists
should consider undertaking close and careful study of master drawings as a means of receiving
indirect tutelage from predecessors who possessed a deep knowledge of their craft.
One such predecessor is Leonardo, who sought to inculcate in his followers a reverence
for the body exhibited through rigorous discipline of the artisan’s own body and keen study of
the bodies of others. His Treatise on Painting (Leonardo da Vinci, 1540/1956) is replete with
passages detailing recommendations on how to position oneself relative to objects and light
sources, where to hold one’s head relative to the eye level of a given subject, the proper ratio of
diligence to execution in elementary drawing exercises, the importance of anatomical study,
techniques for rendering movements and gestures, and methods for measuring the proportions of
human and animal figures. Leonardo’s timeless works exhibit these practices, which we can still
appreciate today; he was a draftsperson par excellence.
Philosophies of Embodiment Relevant to Realist Drawing
Just as artists engage with the body, philosophers have conceptualized embodied
epistemologies. The literature reviewed below discusses situated cognition, a theory in which the
body and its surrounding environment meaningfully shape cognitive experiences. Within this
framework, the theory of tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1961, 1967; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975) is
contextualized.
Situated Cognition
When performed by artisans and other sentient beings (as opposed to machines like Paul
the Robot), drawing is not only a cognitive act, but a conscious enterprise. As such, it is both
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embodied and situated. A draftsperson uses some part of the body, typically hands and fingers,
but sometimes mouth, toes, or eyes, to manipulate a graphic medium to create marks on a
surface. If the drawing is perceptual, the drawing implement is handled in accord with a chosen
array of environmental and mental data. This data may include a combination of low level visual
impressions, such as object corners and edges in the artist’s peripheral vision, intermediate level
views of a specimen from the artist’s specific perspective, or high level schematic imagery
projected from within the artist’s mind. 2
The above illustration reflects the two categories of sensorimotor processing recognized
among philosophers of mind: on-line and off-line. On-line processing connotes active sensory
and motor engagement of body, mind, and brain with the environment, whereas off-line
processing occurs through introspection, aside from external inputs or motor output (Robbins &
Aydede, 2001). Sketching a still life in one’s midst or matching the value of a cast shadow are
examples of on-line processing, whereas mentally reconstructing a scene from memory or
inventing a fanciful creature in one’s imagination are examples of off-line processing.
Recognition among several theorists that learning is the byproduct of an interaction
between knowledge and action, and that cognition is situated within the body and embedded in,
as well as structured by the world in terms of a given situation or context, has coalesced under
the rubric of situated cognition (Brown et al., 1989). Most situated cognition theorists
additionally acknowledge an “extended mind” component, wherein agents purposively arrange
objects in the surrounding environment, such as groceries on a conveyor belt that are bound for
bagging, to scaffold mental capacities like working memory (Robbins & Aydede, 2001). Anyone

2

For a more extensive analysis of the three levels of visual perception, see Marr (2010) and Prinz (2001).
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who uses apps on a cell phone to organize or sift through a plethora of digital tools and
information can probably identify with the extended mind hypothesis.
On the extreme poles of the situated cognition paradigm, some theorists posit a radically
extended model, arguing that internal representations of the world necessarily are content poor in
the absence of environmental stimuli; meanwhile, another camp focuses on enactive features of
cognition, putting forward the view that one cannot think or perceive without engaging in
sensorimotor activity, or that the body itself, aside from the brain, processes thoughts. Numerous
studies, however, contradict these positions (Goldinger et al., 2016; Prinz, 2001). The mind is
capable of vivid recall, imagination, dreaming, and hallucination; it is content rich. Meanwhile,
neuroscientists have discovered dedicated sensorimotor brain structures wired to muscles, taste
buds, fingertips, and fascia by way of neurons throughout the nervous system. By conducting
randomized controlled experiments, these scientists have repeatedly mapped phenomenal
experiences to neural correlates, showing that particular activities stimulate blood flow to the
same brain regions across participant groups. In other words, the brain appears to be the central
hub of intellection in all its forms, laying bare the shortcomings of the radical extension and
enactive hypotheses (Prinz, 2001).
This is not to say the body plays no role in cognition. The brain is an organ of the body,
after all. It depends on heart and lungs for the blood and oxygen needed to receive and deliver
signals throughout the living organism of which it is a part. It responds to sensory feedback. For
example, neuroscientists recently discovered that our digestive tracts are lined with neurons that
not only receive signals from the brain, but also transmit signals back, revealing how processes
like digestion are proceeding (B. U. Hoffman & Lumpkin, 2018; E. Underwood, 2018). This
“gut-brain neural circuit” (Soty et al., 2015, p. 106) is essential to metabolic health.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

161

According to Robbins and Aydede (2001), as well as Prinz (2001), a more moderate
position within situated cognition theory accounts for the brain’s central role in mental
processing, as well as the interdependent relationship between body and brain. Scholars who
have adopted the moderate stance agree that brain, body, and environment together participate in
a causally dependent relationship, each one affecting the others. They do not accept arguments,
however, that cognition is constituted, borne, or instantiated by the body or by the surrounding
environment. My own position aligns with that of the moderates.
If we accept the idea that the body, brain, and world are intimately connected, it begs the
question: What is this connection, and what is responsible for it? The connection may be the
mind itself, created by consciousness and serving as its primary locus. Prinz (2001) speculated
that consciousness is mediated through the body, because without our perceptions of existing
within our own physiognomies, incoming sensory streams would crash upon us unrelentingly, an
indecipherable ocean of meaningless data points, mattering to nary a soul. He suggested that
disparate sensory inputs, from eyes, skin, and nostrils, are unified by virtue of a sentient being’s
individual agency.
This line of reasoning harkens back to Kant (1781–1787/1998), who posited in his
Critique of Pure Reason an “all-embracing pure apperception” (A124) responsible for all
consciousness. He considered this apperception to be the necessary unity of selfhood in service
of which transcendental imagination bundles and synthesizes a manifold of sensations, or
“appearances,” rendering them comprehensible. In Kant’s analysis, transcendental apperception
preceded and grounded all experience. Albeit in different words, the transcendental apperception
sounds a lot like consciousness to me; at least, that is, consciousness as afforded through the
body-mind.
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Reflecting on the body-mind, it seems plausible to argue that cognition, generally
experienced at an intermediate, perspective-specific level of individual agency, is both embodied
and situated (in a moderate sense) and is dependent on consciousness. Meanwhile, the concept of
consciousness is much broader, and to a large extent, elusive. Dubbed “the hard problem,” by
Chalmers (1995, p. 201), scholars and theologians have pondered and debated since ancient
times what accounts for conscious, subjective experience. Although a review of the voluminous
literature on consciousness is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the perspective of a modernday Indian yogi named Sadhguru (2019) provides a taste of the extent and depth to which any
serious exploration of the phenomenon may delve. Sadhguru reported that, in the Hindu
tradition, consciousness is attributed not merely to the mind and brain, but to every cell in a
living body, for how else could individuals inherit physical traits once possessed by a long chain
of ancestors? The body remembers. Our bodies’ blueprints, even our immune systems, which
recognize pathogens previously encountered, may emerge from some form of consciousness.
Science has yet to shed definitive light on the matter, although many scientists are trying. 3
In addition to being situated, cognition is tied to aesthetic experience in the domain of the
arts. For artisans, focusing on experience involves tuning the body-mind to pay close attention to
one’s subject matter and one’s work, in tandem. Ideally, a balance is struck between the reality at
hand and an artistic reality in the midst of becoming. Working in this manner may help artists to
connect with beholders through their drawings, such that finished works may reflect the
synergies involved in creating them. Thus, drawings may serve as records of the creative
experience and simultaneously constitute an aesthetic experience for beholders.

For recent neuroscientific accounts of consciousness, the reader may be interested in Damasio’s (2021) Feeling
and Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, Hoffman’s (2019) The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth
from Our Eyes, and Koch’s (2019) The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness is Widespread but Can’t be
Computed.
3
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In Art as Experience, the educational philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952 [1934/2005])
diagnosed experience as the defining feature of art, insofar as experience possesses a specific
aesthetic quality. This quality is characterized by the unity of discrete, well-defined parts held
together through a kind of synergy or tension that emerges at the beginning of an aesthetic
experience and flows toward a point of culmination. In Dewey’s words,
A generalized illustration may be had if we imagine a stone, which is rolling down a hill,
to have an experience. … The stone starts from somewhere, and moves, as consistently as
conditions permit, toward a place and state where it will be at rest—toward an end. Let us
add, by imagination, to these external facts, the ideas that it looks forward with desire to
the final outcome; that it is interested in the things it meets on its way, conditions that
accelerate and retard its movement with respect to their bearing on the end; that it acts
and feels toward them according to the hindering or helping function it attributes to them;
and that the final coming to rest is related to all that went before as the culmination of a
continuous movement. Then the stone would have an experience, and one with esthetic
quality. (p. 41)
Key to Dewey’s concept of aesthetic experience is dynamism—the progressive unfolding of one
encounter over several varied movements, each of which contributes to a whole that is greater
than the parts. This mirrors the experience of creating a drawing while in a state of flow. Thus
situated, the artist’s mind and body are one, gliding with purpose and ease, as if lifted by a
breeze.
Tacit Knowing
Returning to cognition, which consciousness affords, we find that tacit knowing fits
snugly beside situated cognition under the rubric of embodiment. In a philosophical paper urging
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physicists to acknowledge the role of personal judgment in scientific discovery, Polanyi (1962)
explained that the structure and function of tacit knowledge are consequences of inhabiting a
physical body; our ability to learn is rooted in the unique perspective afforded by this mortal
apparatus. In most situations, we easily distinguish our own bodies from surrounding objects by
virtue of the fact that our fingers, limbs, noses, and eyes function as vehicles through which we
subjectively attend to stimuli outside of ourselves. A collection of connected parts, the body is
distinct from external objects and tools because of this unified relationship. “Every time we
make sense of the world,” he said, “we rely on our tacit knowledge of impacts that the world
makes on our body and of the responses of our body to these impacts” (p. 606). As such, the
body is an incomparable interface to the world and an exceptional cosmic substance.
Polanyi (1967) invented the term “indwelling” to describe how individuals are situated in
the learning process; either we dwell in our bodies very literally, or we extend our bodies and
neurons into concepts outside ourselves, or proximal tools, and dwell within those. Like a pencil
nestled in a draftsperson’s fingers, said tools function as subsidiaries through which we may
attend to various subjects of study, such as a drawing underway. As in the case of the pencil,
which will deliver a variety of marks based on grip, angle, pressure, and speed, Polanyi (1961)
advised that it takes time and effort to adapt to a subsidiary and properly assimilate it to our
habitus. Meanwhile, subjects of study, which are distally situated relative to the learner, serve as
objects of focal awareness. In the tacit learning process, we attend to said objects—pictures,
problem sets, or written texts—from our bodies outward. Indwelling is necessary to achieve
understanding and skilled performance. “All thought is incarnate,” mused Polanyi (1961, p. 468).
The body is central to any kind of learning, for indwelling is rooted therein.
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The beauty of tacit learning is its tacitness. Wordlessly, the body accounts for its acquired
knowledge without need of further explanation. When an individual learns to swim, there is no
need to remind oneself explicitly to inflate one’s lungs a bit extra when inhaling or to avoid
emptying them when exhaling. Buoyancy is retained automatically. Similarly, cyclists need not,
and indeed cannot, purposely and intentionally maneuver the curvature of their bicycles’ paths in
proportion to the ratio of their unbalance over the square of their speed. Yet, that convoluted
dissection explains the mechanics of how cyclists somehow manage to glide upright along their
respective paths (Polanyi, 1964).
A story related by Smith (2004) illustrates the role of tacit knowledge in embodied,
artisanal practice. In this tale originally authored by the Huguenot potter, Bernard Palissy (ca.
1510–1590), a character named “Theory” beseeches another named “Practice” to share her
secrets for glaze making by writing down the recipe for him. In response, Practice tells Theory
that he could not possibly grasp through written instructions alone what she had discovered
through trial and error, hard physical labor, repetition, and determination. Although Theory may
study the recipe, he nevertheless also must endure making a multitude of mistakes on the way to
realizing his desire. This kind of hard-won tacit knowledge ultimately resides in an artisan’s
body.
The Psychology of Embodiment in Realist Drawing
The literature presented below examines the psychological role of the body in adult
learning relative to drawing. In this context, it revisits the situated view of learning and the
process of tacit learning. The role of the body in developing artisanal judgment, memory, and
imagination is discussed.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

166

A Corporeal Context for Art Education in Adulthood
Vision is almost always central to the visual arts, and so is the body, for sight is sited
therein. Our eyes may be in our heads, but our heads are part of our bodies. Likewise, whether
outward or inward-looking, vision is processed in the brain, and the brain is also part of the body.
Each of us inhabits an organismic ecosystem warmed by the starshine of firing neurons.
Solso (2003) provided a diagram depicting a typical person’s cone of vision from above,
as well as an image capturing the extent of imagery that a healthy eye should encompass (see
Figure 22). The latter illustrates how objects in peripheral vision present as blurry compared to
those that are centered in one’s foveal range. Visually healthy humans take in light and visual
data with the aid of bodily movements, sometimes craning our necks; sometimes leaping forward
to glimpse a fleeting spectacle. Our visual apparatus undergoes smaller movements as well, via
the blink of an eye or darting saccades, the ocular flurries and fixations studied by vision
scientists to measure where a subject’s foveal vision is trained. Scholars have published tomes on
the topic of vision that are of interest to many artists;4 I will spare the reader a detailed outline of
its mechanics here. It suffices to say that visual experience is embodied.
Introspective vision, which many psychologists refer to as “mental imagery,” is also
embodied, according to recent findings by sports psychologists who have measured the
association between study participants’ mental creation of sensory experiences and subsequent
physiological changes within the same experimental populations (see Cumming & Williams,
2014; Hammoudi-Nassib et al., 2014; Jeannerod, 1994; McCormick et al., 2015; Slimani &
Chéour, 2016; Slimani et al., 2016). Findings showed tangible physical impacts of intentional,
repeated mental imagery practices, such that patients who merely imagined exercising achieved

4

M. Livingstone’s Vision and Art: The Biology of Seeing (2008) is such a publication, for example.
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Figure 22
Two Images Depicting Typical Vision; (left) cone of vision showing foveal, parafoveal, near
peripheral, and peripheral vision and (right) what the eye sees.

Note. From The Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the Conscious Brain, by R.L. Solso,
2003, MIT Press, p. 92–93. Copyright 2003 by MIT Press. Reprinted with permission.

maintenance of body strength compared to controls, despite being immobilized due to prior
injuries. These results suggest that cognition has full-bodied consequences; thoughts carry more
power than typically has been acknowledged. Simply directing one’s attention to a specific part
of the body, by way of the brain and nervous system, has stimulating effects on the
musculoskeletal system. Everything is connected.
What are the implications of embodied cognition for education? Learning through an
embodiment lens situates within the body first-hand experiences and ways of being. It recognizes
both being and doing as legitimate ways of knowing (Freiler, 2008; J. C. Matthews, 1998).
Brockman (2001) recommended that educators embrace the human body as a somatic foundation
for learning. In his view, having a body is a commonly understood phenomenon that undergirds
culture. This standpoint toward the body, as unifying and universal, is contested concerning the
acculturated body, onto which notions of identity related to the body’s shape, size, strength,
proportions, posture, prosthetification, dress, decoration, health, hygiene, fitness, age, looks,
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abilities, mannerisms, race, pigmentation, sex, or gendering have been embedded, such that “the
very expression ‘the body’ has become problematized” (Weiss & Haber, 1999, p. xiv).
Individual’s lived experiences are often impacted significantly by such factors, some more than
others. Nevertheless, the experience of having a body, regardless of its attributes, is universal
among living creatures.
While embodiment itself precedes culture, there is room within Brockman’s (2001)
pedagogy of somatic learning to grapple with the acculturated body. He argued that grounding
learning in a universal theory of embodiment allows educators to pass down received knowledge
and transmit traditions mindfully, while acknowledging and resisting harmful elements that
postmodern theorists astutely have identified as unjust contributors to human suffering and the
subjugation of individuals based on social and biological factors. Brockman’s approach
facilitates social justice without requiring educators to discard seminal knowledge in the process
of helping learners make sense of and improve the world, for teachers and learners may draw on
a multitude of traditions depending on their learning goals. In this way, Brockman’s somatic
epistemology eschews a hegemonic perspective. Tradition serves as a starting point rather than a
destination; both incremental change and transilience are acknowledged, documented, and
tracked within the learning space, allowing plenty of room for consideration and critique.
Employing a somatic epistemology in the art classroom embraces the transmission of
values and knowledge deemed worthwhile to learners, much as artisanal practices once were
disseminated through a system of apprenticeship. Brockman (2001) suggested that teachers who
employ somatic learning understand themselves as cultural mediators and role models who can
provide students with foundational knowledge and skills they may build upon anew. While the
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somatic learning model is not currently popular in the West, something very much like it was
emphasized in the Confucian Analects, according to Merriam et al. (2006).
Adult educator T. Amann (2003) identified four types of somatic learning: kinesthetic,
sensory, affective, and spiritual. According to her, each of these may occur independently or in
combination through an embodied learning experience. Although Amann listed kinesthetic
learning first, it has rarely been considered in the adult education scholarship. 5 Kinesthetic
learning is psychomotor in nature. It involves training in the development of fine and gross
motor skills (Brian & Goodway, 2018). In Amann’s (2003) view, it is also concerned with
meaning making through movement, particularly regarding adult learners. Adult learning
activities that comprise hands-on manipulation, physical activity, or role-playing encourage
kinesthetic learning. Second on her list, sensory learning entails meaning making through the
senses of touch, taste, smell, hearing, or vision. The ideal sensory curriculum should be
immersive and multi-modal. Third, affective learning engages learners’ feelings and emotions.
Students may experience affective learning by taking account of how they feel and reflecting on
those feelings as data to inform their actions and decision-making. Discussion and role-playing
are effective strategies to cultivate affective learning (I imagine journaling would be helpful, as
well). Fourth and finally, spiritual learning, which is characterized by self-awareness, engages

5

Some prominent exceptions should be noted. Simpson (1966) developed a taxonomy of psychomotor learning
objectives wherein kinesthetic learning was addressed (albeit as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end, as
in the case of drawing), and Gardner (1983) discussed bodily kinesthetic skill as a kind of human intelligence among
a set of multiple intelligences (MI). Although Gardner’s MI theory has gained some traction in K-12 classrooms, it
has not influenced adult education as significantly. According to educational theorists Kolb (2015) and Willingham
(2005), trait-based learning styles that focus on specific modalities such as vision or touch may accurately describe
learner preferences at any age, but there is no evidence to show that matching instruction to those preferences
influences learning. Other scholarship in adult education discusses concepts related to kinesthetic learning, but does
not address it directly; see for example: Merriam’s (2010) writings on adult learning wherein she described
embodiment theory, Immordino-Yang and Damasio’s (2007) investigations into the role of the body in learning
(they argued that it is intrinsically entwined with affective cognition), and Taylor’s (2006) examination of how
bodily experience informs the development of mind.
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adult learners in making meaning through their interconnectedness to other human beings and to
the cosmos. A spiritual somatic pedagogy should inculcate an understanding that as humans, we
carry meaning in our bodies that can be expressed through posture and gestures. In my view,
one’s spiritual expression of learning might also extend to acts of creation, such as drawing, that
are performed through the body.
Considering the role of emotions in sensory learning, artists would do well to pursue
drawing with wholehearted feeling. If they wish to represent the human form convincingly,
whether by copying a likeness or inventing fictional characters, empathy helps, likewise the
ability to recognize and render expressiveness in facial features. Leonardo exemplified this
virtue; the depiction of a wide range of distinctive emotional states was a hallmark of his
painting style. Multiple studies (for example, see Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Elfenbein & Ambady,
2002) have demonstrated that facial expressions and the muscle movements that produce them
are, to a large extent, hardwired in human beings. Specific expressions correlate with specific
emotions across cultures. Although there is an in-group advantage relative to outsiders for
reading facial expressions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995, 2001), psychologists have recently
discovered that artists tend to have a better ability than most to recognize and interpret them; this
is likely attributable to the tendency of artists to empathize more easily with others (Guariglia et
al., 2015). The naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–1882 [1897]) dedicated a treatise, On the
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, to cataloging facial expressions and analyzing
the physical and emotional mechanisms underlying them. His book may serve as a manual for
novice artists who wish to gain a more nuanced understanding of how emotional states manifest
in facial expressions.
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The rationale for centering the body as a primary point of departure within adult
educational theory and practice is substantiated by the cognitive science literature on grounded
cognition (see Ariely, 2008; Barsalou, 2008, 2010, 2020; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Freedberg &
Gallese, 2007; Kantrowitz, 2012; Lakoff, 1999; Tversky, 2001). According to researcher A.
Kantrowitz (2012), this literature coalesces around an understanding that human thought and
culture are rooted in embodied experience, as exemplified in everyday metaphors, from “the
journey of life” to “the scales of justice.” Metaphors receive their power through the association
of abstract ideas with palpable, embodied realities in the form of perceptual acts, proprioceptive
motion, and inwardly sensed bodily states and feelings. Grounded cognition is connoted by this
combination of perception, movement, and introspection at the individual level. Drawing is an
art form that showcases grounded cognition in action.
When we draw, we engage all three components of grounded cognition. We see, we
move our hand, as we feel our way across the paper. The partial, provisional nature of our
sense of reality, the “sketchiness” of much of human thought, visibly emerges beneath
our hand as we struggle to make form out of experience. Anyone who has ever tried to
draw from observation can attest to the difficulties of capturing a solid and convincing
sense of external reality. (Kantrowitz, 2012, p. 4)
To draw something is to study it, to wonder about it. The struggle to represent the world, to
understand it, is the process of learning itself, made conspicuous.
The Situated View of Learning
Rooted in somatic epistemology, the situated view of learning locates knowledge in
distributed networks across individuals, communities of practice, tools, time, artifacts,
publications, environments, and media. It defines learning as an interaction that occurs in
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situations and activities that immerse learners, body and mind, in these various knowledge
contexts. A situative learning environment is “an activity system, in which one or more
individuals participate along with material and informational resources” (Collins & Greeno,
2010, p. 335).
Rather than privileging abstracted knowledge in the learning process, situative
pedagogies preserve, present, or simulate the authentic, concrete scenarios from which a given
nugget of knowledge originally emerged. For example, students learning Shakespeare through a
situative approach might enact his plays rather than merely read them. Teachers of algebra might
introduce equations in the context of a surveying project, wherein students must establish the
measurements of large distances without needing to guess unknown lengths, areas, or volumes
(Collins & Greeno, 2010). Instructors might also incorporate algebraic equations to help students
construct proportionate drawings, which could motivate more artistic students to learn
mathematics.
Based on the school of thought they favor, learning theorists typically analyze different
components of knowledge systems. For example, cognitive theorists study learning structures
and processes, such as memory, perception, inference, and decision-making, that occur at the
level of individual agents. Meanwhile, situative theorists are interested in interactions that occur
among and between individuals, materials, and representations. A situative perspective may
complement a cognitivist view, rounding out the picture of what gets examined and what might
be improved in an educational setting. Regarding learning transfer, a situative lens may reveal
consistencies and inconsistencies in the application of knowledge across situations, allowing
theorists to recognize patterns and principles that operate as discrete features of learning domains
within communities of practice (Greeno, 1997). According to Collins & Greeno (2010), “transfer
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depends on constraints and/or affordances that are invariant under the transformations that
change the learning situation into the transfer situation” (p. 337), and these invariants should be
attended to in teaching. This acknowledgment affords additional mechanisms, beyond individual
performance, for correcting or enhancing students’ participation in interactive learning systems
(Greeno, 1997).
Students in a situative learning environment need not discover abstract principles out of
whole cloth as they might be asked to do under a naïve or trivial constructivist paradigm.6
Instead, they learn how to apply and appreciate proven principles as passed down through a
community of practitioners. This approach encourages learners to build on and modify
knowledge traditions while preserving epistemological genealogies from root to stem to leaf,
flower, and seed. When a system fails in some manner, it can be broken down for analysis and
critique, allowing members of impacted learning communities to revise problematic aspects
without discarding entire bodies of knowledge out of hand, much in the way functional medicine
puts the emphasis on reviving patients in terms of their overall health and wellbeing as opposed
to obliterating maladies outright. Thus, in the situative paradigm, knowledge becomes available
for adaptation in diverse and continually proliferating contexts.
An embodied, situative stance was evident in the teaching philosophy of master potter
and arts educator K. R. Beittel (1979), who argued that inherited traditions of artisanal
knowledge allowed practitioners to transcend the self in the conscious pursuit of ideas outside of
themselves. Expressing a deep appreciation for his craft, he said,
To pride oneself on doing away with tradition in pottery, then, would be to deprive

6

See critiques of constructivism wherein discovery learning is over-emphasized (B. Davis & Sumara, 2010;
Osborne, 2015), and Bowers’ (2005) ecological critique of the neoliberal assumptions embedded in constructivism,
particularly concerning the indiscriminate devaluation of intergenerational, traditional forms of knowledge.
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oneself of a deeply meaningful discipleship. The very repetitiveness of the acts, the
symmetry and centeredness, the timeless echoes of form and fire, all of these symbolize
that we get somewhere by going nowhere, by being truly and wholly here in this
humblest and most speechless art. (p. 19)
According to him, growth and change evolve from within the dwelling spaces of common
knowledge practices.
In addition to fostering the kind of pedagogical discipleship that Beittel (1979) cherished,
the situative view holds promise for developing judgment due to its focus on specific situations
and contexts for learning. When abstract concepts and knowledge are tested under the light of
concrete practice, the room for error in their application becomes apparent. Among a range of
situations, endemic levels of uncertainty are likely to vary, challenging learners to identify and
weigh variables that may be relevant under the same and different conditions. As a learning
theory, situated cognition aligns with Kant’s (1781–1787/1998) recommendation that, in addition
to teaching facts, rules, and formulas, educators should model judgment in context and action.
Greeno (1997) opined similarly in his critique of non-situative approaches to mathematics
education:
The problem with teaching mathematics as a set of rules is not just that some students
learn to do it incorrectly. The deeper problem is that students who learn the correct rules
may not learn to use mathematical expressions to represent mathematical concepts and
relations between quantities. They have learned a set of abstractions, but what they have
learned is not general. (p. 14)
This lament underscores how understanding and judgment are often lost when learning is
divorced from concrete, situative, and embodied contexts. Just as in the case of numeracy,
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artisanal education can benefit when students encounter knowledge embedded in authentic
contexts and simulations.
Teaching for Tacit Learning
Smith’s (2004) retelling of the dialogue introduced earlier between Theory and Practice
underscored the embodied, tacit nature of artisanal knowledge. It also acceded that some aspects
of tacit knowing can be made explicit, as evidenced in the glaze recipe, whereas other aspects
remain unspecifiable and may be accessed only through experience, by demonstration and doing.
Muñoz et al. (2015) developed a framework based on Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing that
separates truly non-specifiable tacit knowledge from ultimately specifiable forms of tacit
knowledge that have yet to be made explicit (see Figure 23). The most important stage featured
in this model is tacit integration, wherein subsidiaries, i.e., the “details of an act of
comprehension” (p. 291), are integrated meaningfully into focal awareness. This stage is always
tacit in nature, regardless of whether the subsidiaries are explicit, non-specified, or nonspecifiable. The authors recommended that learning might be accelerated by focusing on tacit
inferences wherein subsidiaries comprise tacit and explicit forms of knowledge in combination.
Academic drawing instruction that employs discursive explanations in conjunction with
modeling and practice may adhere to Muñoz et al.’s (2015) guidance. Such training, if it draws
on a repertoire of time-tested techniques, is more likely to foster creativity than stunt it. Although
the notion of providing a classical foundation may sound dated and stale, it is in fact timeless,
and affords flexibility. Any skills, once practiced and learned, will become tacit (whether
specifiably or non-specifiably so). Like swimmers, some of whom enjoy splashing in the waves
while friends compete for Olympic medals, or like cyclists headed for the Tour de France or
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Figure 23
Tacit Knowing Framework

Note. From "The Tacit Mystery: Reconciling Different Approaches to Tacit Knowledge," by
C.A. Muñoz, S. Mosey, and M. Binks, 2015, Knowledge Management Research & Practice,
13(3), p. 291 (https://doi.org/10.1057/kmrp.2013.50). Copyright 2013 by Springer Nature.
Reprinted with permission.

simply out for a breezy ride, artists can choose their own destinations. Once they have learned
the basics, they can focus beyond techniques by dwelling inside of them. By comparison, I
suspect that untrained artists may be more likely than trained artists to feel creatively frustrated
by a skills deficit; speaking for myself, this has been the case. Apart from happy accidents, the
struggle to achieve desired effects may overwhelm one’s grasp toward any number of focal
targets, whether observed or envisioned.
Drawing, the Body, and Cognition
Realist drawing engages the body and mind in a feedback cycle, wherein artisans are
challenged to exercise judgment, memory, and imagination in drawing. Meanwhile, they receive
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cognitive benefits from the act of drawing itself. The final sections of this chapter discuss some
examples of this phenomenon.
Judgment. The capabilities of an artisan’s body play an important role in artisanal
judgment. Realist artists seek to diminish doubt in workmanship through regulation of their
efforts. Such regulation informs crucial decisions and can be achieved through dexterity,
gradualness, and artisanal systems. Dexterity is attained through the purposeful, physical
repetition of tasks over weeks and years until intricate, skillful actions can be performed
automatically (Pye, 1978). Suthor (2008) associated the training that leads to dexterity with the
cultivation of an individual artist’s style: “The painter must bend … his hand for quick and
simple use of the brush. This ‘operation’ must be continually repeated to become second nature
to him, which is the routine that guarantees a facility in the act of painting” (p. 122). Because this
dexterous motion becomes automatic, it also becomes malleable by a given artist, such that a
signature modification will not result in the loss of regulation. To this extent, an artist’s new
twist on a traditional technique may be discerned and admired by others until it becomes a
recognized convention.
Regulation achieved through gradualness, as in the case of dexterity, demands patience.
Physical motions made by an artist in the development of a work, when gradualness is employed,
build successively upon one another. The posture of artisans when applying a gradual approach
should be intent and adroit, permitting them to focus with precision and care (Pye, 1978).
Leonardo (1540/1956) made gradualness into a rule for training young painters. Explaining this
principle in terms of metaphors, he said,
Vision is one of the swiftest actions there is, and in an instant sees infinite forms;
nevertheless, it understands only one thing at a time. Suppose that you, reader, glance at
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all this written page, and you will quickly judge that it is full of various letters, but in this
time you will not know what letters they are, nor what they would say. Hence you need to
proceed word by word, line by line, if you would have an understanding of these letters.
Just so, if you wish to mount to the top of an edifice it is advisable to go up step by step,
otherwise it would be impossible to reach the top. (Part 2, Number 60)
He then admonished students to “go slowly in your drawing” (Part 2, Number 63), taking care to
train both hands and judgment.
In addition to gradualness and dexterity, artisans may employ systems to help them
regulate their work. Such systems include jigs, forms, molds and gauges, among other tools (Pye,
1978). Some of the systems used by novice artists when learning to draw are plumb lines to
establish straight vertical lines, rulers and wooden skewers to measure relative lengths, and mahl
sticks to steady the hand. To illustrate the role of regulation in guiding one’s judgment through
the mitigation of doubt and risk, Pye (1978) described the following hypothetical examples:
There are different degrees of certainty in jigging. Thus, if you want to cut a piece of
notepaper straight, parallel and three inches wide, you can go to work in six different
ways. Either (1) mark the line on the paper, take a knife, hold your breath, and run the
knife along the line: in which case you are relying on dexterity; or (2) you can cut a little
outside the line and then trim back to it by paring off many little narrow slips of paper in
succession: in which case you are relying on gradualness. Or (3) you can cut along the
line with scissors, which … are partly self-jigging because in their case the newly cut
edge of the paper butts against the upper blade of the scissors and steadies the sheet while
they continue to cut … . Or (4) you can cut with a knife along a ruler; the ruler is an
effective jig and high regulation is still more certain than with the scissors. Or (5) you can
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use a guillotine, in which case it is really quite difficult to avoid high regulation, for the
operation is now completely jigged. Or (6) the guillotine could be fitted with a fence and
an automatic feed of some sort, in which case you would have the workmanship of full
certainty and you could produce thousands of identical strips of paper. (p. 18–19)
Based on their judgment in a variety of situations, artisans may choose among any of these
approaches to regulation, leaving less and less to chance as they proceed from options 1–6. The
method chosen will depend on an artist’s particular capabilities, in addition to the effects desired.
Thus, facility with tools and techniques can impact artisanal judgment and decision-making
substantially.
Memory. Drawing has been associated with improved memory, partly due to its
embodied nature. To understand the role of eye-hand coordination compared to symbolic (i.e.,
linguistic) processing in higher order cognition, Huette et al. (2013) studied drawing from
memory among non-experts. Researchers presented a selection of National Geographic nature
photographs to participants who were outfitted with eye tracking devices and asked them to
study each image for 30 seconds, after which it was replaced by a blank screen before moving on
to successive images. At the end of the presentation, participants were given 90 seconds to create
black and white line drawings of each photograph on a digital pad based on their recollections.
Within participants, the spatiotemporal trajectories of eye movements during study were then
compared to measured points inside the original images, as well as to the hand and pen
trajectories recorded while drawing.
Results indicated no clear sequences of movements over time; in other words, the order
in which participants drew scene elements did not correspond to the order in which they had
focused on similar elements within the original images during study. However, the researchers
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did discover significant, albeit coarse, degrees of spatial correspondence between and among
each unit of measurement. These correspondences were highest between concurrent eye and pen
movements made while drawing and lowest between eye movements made during study and pen
movements made while drawing. Because participants could not refer to the original images
during the drawing phase, it was anticipated that memory distortions would be introduced. This
did occur. However, there were still significant correspondences between eye movements during
study compared with eye movements during drawing, as well as between original image
coordinates and eye/pen movements made while drawing (Huette et al., 2013). Memory and
movement appear to be connected due to very basic perceptual-motor encodings that can be
extended to enable symbolic-level behaviors when scaled up.
Literature reviewed in chapter 2 included a study by Fernandes et al. (2018), which
proposed an integrated-trace hypothesis to explain how drawing stimulates the recollection of
verbal information. Drawing’s pictorial and elaborative elements composed the first two of three
mnemonic traces these researchers discovered. The third and final mnemonic element is motoric.
The authors argued that drawing supports better memorization of words than writing does,
because it entails a wider and more variable range of movement over a surface to produce visual
representations of verbal concepts as compared to the relatively routinized motions made when
forming words out of a series of letters.
Imagination. Echoing the three integrated traces—pictorial, elaborative, and motoric—
identified by Fernandes et al. to explain the mnemonic role of drawing (2018), Palmiero et al.
(2019) proposed an integrated embodied representation approach for mental imagery. According
to them, the ability to form mental images is underpinned by motor information involved in the
action of seeing, such as eye movements, in combination with individuals’ relative abilities to
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produce mental pictures and their preferred cognitive strategies in deploying visual imagination.
The researchers discerned two such cognitive strategies. The object strategy favors a focus on the
size, shape, color, or brightness of imagined objects in tandem with semantic information
involved in object naming and identification. Meanwhile, the spatial strategy emphasizes the
location and movements of objects in relationship to each other, marking out spatial data in
propositional terms, rather than pictorially; the spatial strategy is accompanied by additional
motoric representations, as well. The object and spatial strategies may be relied upon
independently or recruited in varying proportions relative to one another. Regardless of an
individual’s choice of strategy or aptitude for internal visualization, motor engagement remains
central to producing mental imagery.
Among high ability imagers capable of visualizing with a high degree of vividness, those
deploying the object strategy will be able to picture many object details; at the same time, areas
of the brain associated with physical movements necessary for object use will be stimulated, as
will language centers useful for processing sensory and conceptual information about objects.
Low ability imagers who likewise use an object strategy, although they may not be able to
picture many object details, will demonstrate the same kind of brain activity as their high ability
compatriots, and they will be more likely than that group to lean on semantic knowledge to
compensate for missing visual information. By contrast, high ability imagers who rely on the
spatial strategy will experience many spatial details while their brains show activity in areas
linked to spatial tasks, like finding, mapping, or moving objects, as well as language centers
focused on conceptual information about where things are located in space. Brain activity in low
ability imagers employing the same spatial strategy is similar to that of the previous group,
except their visualizations will be relatively sparse in terms of spatial details, and they will be
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more apt to rely on conceptual spatial knowledge to supplement mental imagery lacunae
(Palmiero et al., 2019).
In essence, although the vividness of imagination varies depending on one’s abilities, the
mental representations that support mental imagery always depend on the brain’s motor cortex,
and this is the case to a greater or lesser extent depending on the imagery strategy employed
(Palmiero et al., 2019). Novice artists who wish to improve their mental imagery abilities may
use these findings to their benefit. Those who tend toward the object strategy might pair
visualizing with verbal information about a given object to reap a dual coding benefit, while
those with a predisposition toward the spatial strategy might engage in physical movements to
bolster imaginal spatial relationships. For example, some studies have demonstrated that motor
expertise improves mental rotation abilities (see Kaltner et al., 2014; Voyer & Jansen, 2017).
Learners can thereby leverage embodied cognition to strengthen their imaginative capacity and
grow their creativity.
According to Suthor (2015), artists and art historians have long understood that painting
and drawing are embodied acts, carried out corporeally. It is also tacitly understood that
creativity can emanate from a series of physical acts, during which artists engage in communion
with their media and their emergent works. For the draftsperson or painter, hands and “fingers—
and their extension, the paintbrush—are understood to stimulate the development of pictorial
ideas” (p. 167). This truism was borne out in a recent study of design students’ haptic and digital
sketching habits. While students used digital platforms to present finished drawings, they
overwhelmingly preferred manual, haptic sketching with pencil and paper during the ideation
phase of a project (Page, 2019). The connection between mind and hand is immediate, allowing
ideas to flow. Gombrich (1991) eloquently expressed his observation of this phenomenon at play
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in the work of Raphael (1483–1520). He said, “Without this interaction between eye, hand, and
mind nobody can grow into a master” (p. 117). Excepting those visual artists who, due to
disabilities, have found workarounds to manual methods, I wholeheartedly agree.
Chapter 4 Summary
This chapter filtered conceptualizations of artisanal judgment and imagination in drawing
through the lens of embodiment. This perspective gave the body of the artisan its due in a
dissertation concerned with drawing as an activity—an activity engaged in by flesh-and-blood
mortals striving to be more human through its practice. After providing a corporeal context for
art education in adulthood (Amann, 2003; Brian & Goodway, 2018; Brockman, 2001;
Kantrowitz, 2012; Simpson, 1966; Solso, 2003), it provided an overview of situated cognition
(Brown et al., 1989; Collins & Greeno, 2010; Greeno, 1997; Prinz, 2001; Robbins & Aydede,
2001) and tacit knowing (Muñoz et al., 2015; Polanyi, 1962, 1964, 1967), theories that transcend
and complement the cognitivist perspectives on learning presented in chapters 2 and 3. More
specifically, chapter 4 has examined the role of the body in the cultivation of artisanal judgment
(Leonardo da Vinci, 1540/1956; Pye, 1978; Suthor, 2008), memory (Fernandes et al., 2018;
Huette et al., 2013), and imagination (Fernandes et al., 2018; E. H. Gombrich, 1991; Page, 2019;
Palmiero et al., 2019; Suthor, 2015).
During this brief tour through the storied realms of artisanal embodiment, our learning
path has been strewn with a lively undergrowth of pedagogical promise, artistic inspiration, and
ideas worth researching. It also has been littered with landmines, some long since exploded.
Others remain threatening; immoralities to be defused or avoided. My drawing research project
considers the art historical precedents, philosophical frameworks, psychological findings, and
educational practices here reviewed, particularly those pertaining to situated cognition and tacit
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learning. Thereby, the research study documents how embodied ways of knowing have affected
my capacity for judgment and imagination as an adult in the process of learning to draw.
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CHAPTER 5
Research Methodology
In this chapter, I detail the methodology and research paradigm pertaining to the design
of this study on learning to draw in adulthood. I adopted autoethnographic methods to investigate
the relationship between imaginative expression and the development of artisanal judgment
through the considered application of systematic drawing principles. Herein, the reader will find
information on my data gathering processes, the nature of data collected, and the data analysis
techniques I employed, as well as a discussion of the study’s limitations, validity, and ethical
considerations. The following questions guided my methodological choices:
1. How do cognitive factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the
development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment?
2. How do situative factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the
development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment?
3. What does the process of developing artisanal judgment through systematic drawing
practice mean to an adult learner in terms of her self-perceived capacity for imaginative
expression?
To answer them, I turned an analytic lens on the experiential residue of an often arduous,
but unforgettable learning journey that opened a gateway to my development as an artist.
Through the use of autoethnography, I documented my learning experiences while pursuing a
self-directed drawing curriculum that included exercises in imaginal illustration, gesture
drawing, visual memory, Bargue-style transcription of master drawings, observational sketching,
geometric pattern design, and linear perspective. The methods I employed, described in detail
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below, allowed me to triangulate cognitive and situative evidence gleaned through introspection,
retrospection, and observation.
Cognitive Autoethnography
I conducted a qualitative case study to capture and analyze data documenting an adult
learner’s experiences, both as an individual and socially, of learning to draw in a naturalistic
setting. This approach afforded in-depth examination of drawing instruction from the perspective
of one person: myself. Using my own experiences allowed me, in the dual role of research
participant and research instrument, to understand the learning process firsthand, over a 22month period, from October 2019 through July 2021, during which I invested 6–12 hours weekly
on lessons and exercises (most typically 8–10 hours).
The qualitative study of oneself, as a research participant, by oneself, as a researcher, is
called autoethnography. Arguably the most reflexive strand of qualitative inquiry,
autoethnography is “unique from a research perspective” (Hughes, 2017, p. 5) and is considered
to be a suitable methodology for both novice researchers and experienced scholars (Saldaña,
2011). Autoethnography is particularly appropriate for scholarly projects wherein data gathered
from a first-person perspective can shed more light on the research questions at hand than other
viewpoints might reveal. This was the case with my dissertation topic. The relatively unfettered
access I had to my own learning experiences and my own mind allowed me to recursively
investigate the meanings I ascribed to my learning discoveries, as well as associated cognitive
and situative factors, at a level of depth that would be difficult to achieve through other
participants, particularly during a pandemic. Therefore, I developed a research design that
utilized an autoethnographic case study methodology.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

188

Because my research focused on cognition in learning, I adopted some methods from
cognitive ethnography, an ecological form of inquiry used in psychology that is rooted in the
distributed cognition paradigm founded by cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins (Trasmundi,
2020). Although distributed cognition concerns cognitive tasks that occur across individuals
interacting within a system (Colman, 2015), the cognitive ethnography methodology associated
with it should be suitable for studying cognition generally, including cognition within individuals
as they interact with learning systems. Additionally, because distributed cognition falls under the
situated view of learning that guided the situative aspects of my research, its methodological
offspring seemed appropriate for studying situated cognition. The situated view of learning
locates knowledge in distributed networks across individuals, communities of practice, tools,
time, artifacts, publications, environments, and media (Collins & Greeno, 2010). My learning
experiences were similarly distributed. Therefore, the current project is properly characterized as
a cognitive autoethnography.
Research Participant and Setting
The study was situated amid my everyday life, that of an American, middle class, white
woman in midlife who was learning to draw while maintaining a full-time academic librarian
career, providing occasional care for my mother out of state, and conducting doctoral research
part-time—a juggling act among personal, family, and professional pursuits not unfamiliar to
American women generally, albeit distinct in terms of proportional time allocations (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2019). My research largely took place in the apartment that I share with my
husband, in a spare bedroom outfitted for drawing, except for one in-person conference that I
attended in October of 2019 and a couple of museum visits and lectures prior to the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic in March of 2020. My home setting was suitable for the research project
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because I could adapt the spaces around me—walls, doors, floors, and other flat surfaces—to my
learning needs, and I owned a networked personal computer with which to access online drawing
instruction.
An Analytic Approach
This arrangement allowed me to qualitatively examine my own cognition “in the wild”
(Hutchins, 1995, passim), meaning I could observe my learning in an authentic, everyday
environment without the artificiality endemic to laboratory settings. This kind of naturalism
lends itself not only to autoethnography, but also to analytic inquiry, which foregrounds the
processual features of phenomena under study (e.g., learning events as they unfold or are
reconstructed in memory) in terms of the social analytic context within which they are
embedded. Because an analytic approach is preferred when undertaking cognitive ethnography, I
designed my study, as much as possible, to capture thinking in action, reflection, and
retrospection. Throughout the project, I was inspired and humbled by L. Anderson’s (2006)
contention that “deeply personal and self-observant ethnography can rise above idiographic
particularity to address broader theoretical issues” (p. 379). This analytic aspiration served as my
North Star. It provided a means of validating my research, because it prompted me to compare
my personal observations along the way with findings documented in the literature.
Research Paradigm
My methodological strategy drew on a wide-ranging, but arguably coherent, lineage of
philosophical and psychological theory, beginning with Kant’s (1781–1787/1998, 1790/2000)
conceptualization of the human mind. According to this theory, the mind is a filter on reality that
allows humans to make sense of our surroundings through the application of ingrained schematic
rules (combinatory or figurative) bearing on quantities, qualities, relationships, and modalities
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among relevant sensory data. Through the exercise of determinative and reflective judgments (of
relative keenness), made possible on the basis of our mental architecture, individuals may
observe, track, and classify systemic patterns to inform decision-making; or, prompted by
anomalies discovered along the way, build new knowledge. Learning entails the exercise of
judgment as Kant envisioned, both in terms of knowledge acquisition (or problematization) and
knowledge discovery (or revision).
Polanyi’s (1962, 1966, 1967) theory of tacit learning extended Kant’s reasoning.
According to Polanyi, “Kant's categories by which experience of external objects is deemed
possible, reappear with me in the active knower participating in all live knowledge” (1966, p.
17). Both he and Kant posited that reality, while ultimately indeterminate, is worth our attempts
to grasp it. They theorized that the most elementary mechanisms learners engage in that effort
are baked in, largely unspecifiable features or processes of the human mind (see Zhenhua & The
Polanyi Society, 2004). This argument laid fertile ground for cognitive psychology and the study
of situated cognition by psychologists interested in probing essential aspects of the body-mind,
within or among individuals or groups.
Educators have much at stake in such findings, because the most useful
conceptualizations of learning ultimately rest on learners’ capacity for judgment, both rational
and imaginative. These conceptualizations need to accommodate variability among learners, yet
if they are to be effective, they also should derive from a common thread discerned through
careful study. Once adopted, theoretical frameworks matter; they impact everything about the
learning experience, from curricular content to learning modalities, materials, scaffolds, and
environments, as well as norms and practices within communities of learners. No system is
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perfect, and it is difficult to find the best approach. This is why educational research persists.
Those of us who engage in it are propelled by the best-reasoned conclusions of our predecessors.
Following this logic, I designed my study to comport with an embodied, situative view of
learning. Thus, I used methods capable of revealing cognitive moves pertaining to judgment and
imagination amid tacit and situative dimensions of learning. These dimensions should be
understood in terms of the tacit knowing framework proposed by Polanyi (1962, 1966, 1967) and
developed by Muñoz et al. (2015), who clarified that some aspects of tacit learning can be
explicit. They should also be viewed through the lens of legitimate peripheral participation, an
analytical innovation developed by Lave and Wenger (Lave & Wenger, 1991) to understand the
dynamics of learning in situational contexts. In addition to tacit and situative theories of learning,
I incorporated compatible research by cognitive psychologists on dual process thinking,
cognitive penetrability of perception, constructive perception, and drawing. Their findings
allowed me to ground the data I generated relative to broader observations documented in the
literature.
Data Collection
Cognitive ethnography was developed from ethnography by psychologists to capture
event-centered cognitive data and derive meaning about how knowledge is developed, shared,
and used in the context of everyday actions. Researchers who engage in cognitive ethnography
care about more than what people know and learn; they wish to understand the activities,
environments, systems, and interactions behind knowledge and learning. In this pursuit,
cognitive ethnographers draw on established ethnographic techniques and kinds of evidence, like
participant observation and video recordings (Hollan et al., 2000). My data sources and
collection methods exemplified this style of inquiry and facilitated the triangulation of cognitive
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and situative evidence gleaned through introspection, retrospection, and observation of my
learning in action. In essence, the processes and outcomes of my learning served as this study’s
data, which I elicited through self-directed study, the manual practice of drawing, and the
graphical products thereof.
Drawings, Photographs, Field Notes, Diaries, and Video Recordings
I used drawings, photographs, field notes, and diaries to track cognitive and situative
factors encountered in the process of learning to draw. Drawing lessons comprised four
interactive Bargue classes offered through the Academy of Realist Art Boston in summer 2020,
fall 2020, winter 2021, and summer 2021. Each course, spanning 8–10 weeks, was taught on
ZOOM one evening per week for three hours. In addition to these synchronous online courses, I
enrolled in web-based asynchronous classes through Atelier Rousar (Memory Drawing) and The
Society of Visual Storytelling (Basic Perspective). I supplemented these with ad hoc resources,
including books, YouTube videos, podcasts, and the occasional lecture, conference, or museum
visit, in-person or online.
The full drawing curriculum, detailed in a self-directed learning contract that I assembled
based on my literature review (See Appendix A), covered: (a) quick gesture drawing (not listed
explicitly in the learning contract), (b) imaginal illustration, (c) memory training, (d)
observational sketching (referred to as “canonical and non-canonical views” in the learning
contract), (e) perspective, (f) pattern, and (g) Bargue-style transcription (referred to as “copying
master drawings” in the learning contract). Due to time constraints, I did not cover anatomy, nor
visual poetics, as I had intended. As regards the section of my learning contract dedicated to
Euclidean plane geometry, I addressed it obliquely, by means of the pattern and perspective
projects.
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Approximately 80 distinct drawings that I produced in my classes and independently
served as visual records of my progress, struggles, and achievements as I learned new drawing
techniques. Photographs of these drawings and related materials helped me to document
cognitively crucial, but otherwise ephemeral, stages of mark making, as well as relevant
conceptual information about my artistic subject matter and learning environments. Throughout
the data collection period, I wrote field notes to document notable drawing techniques and best
practices that I learned in classes, from books, and through occasional attendance at conferences
and museum lectures. My learning diaries provided introspective and reflective data about my
drawing processes and my interactions with instructors, fellow students, and learning materials,
as well as self-evaluations of my learning progress. I used verbal evidence in tandem with visual
evidence to effectuate a dialogue among my written reflections and the graphic artifacts that I
created.
P. Leavy (2009) identified the generation of visual imagery in qualitative research as an
example of arts-based research, a mode of inquiry that is useful for accessing hidden dimensions
of social life. Likewise, arts educator S. McNiff (2013) defined arts-based research as “the use of
personal expression in various art forms as a primary mode of enquiry” (p. 5). According to these
definitions, my methodology could be described as arts-based, because most of my data emerged
through the process of drawing. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the exact criteria for
classifying scholarship under the rubric of arts-based research. For example, some definitions
reserve this classification for studies wherein the results are disseminated through artforms; for
example, interview data that has been translated by the researcher into poetry, drama, dance, or a
painting. For such purists, arts-based research is not the gathering of artistic data to be analyzed
psychologically; it is also not the result of interpreting artistic artifacts. At minimum, however,
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what matters is that the researcher should be deeply embedded and engaged in the artmaking
process (P. Cormier, personal communication, September 10, 2013). While the results of this
dissertation are delivered in the form of psychological analyses rather than art, I believe the
project merits categorization as arts-based research, not only because a large portion of the data
was gathered through artmaking, but because I was fully embedded and engaged throughout.
I also collected data in the form of video recordings for eight of my perspective drawing
exercises and part of the fourth Bargue exercise. Where tacit learning is a factor, whether in a
cognitive or situative sense, it is well documented that self-reports are unreliable, due to the
difficulty of accessing real-time introspective data and verbalizing perceptual-motor acts (R. R.
Hoffman & Militello, 2009; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Omerod & Ball,
2017; Wilson, 2002). Thus, post hoc self-observations of my drawing process, paired with
synchronous close-ups of the drawing surface, proved essential.
Making the video recordings involved downloading Panopto digital video recording
software onto a computer equipped with an internal camera and an attached microphone. This
allowed me to capture video of myself from a peripheral view (or in the case of the Bargue
activity, a view from behind), as well as my verbalizations as I narrated my experiences and
perceptions aloud. Next, I connected an iPad, outfitted with its own internal camera and the
Panopto app, to capture close-up video of the activity unfolding on my drawing surface. Except
in the case of the Bargue activity, for which I used only one feed, I was able to sync both video
streams to create one picture-in-picture (PiP) recording of each session. Whether a given drawing
activity took me half an hour or all day long, I restricted videotaping to one hour or less, treating
the captured recordings as samples. At the end of each session, I uploaded the video to my
Panopto account and ordered an automated transcript of the audio track, which I proofread
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carefully. Approximately 20% of the content of each transcript required revision. After making
corrections, I saved the revised transcripts and raw video recordings for subsequent analysis.
Authenticity and Visibility. Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009a) emphasized authenticity as
the gold standard for data collected via self-report. Because I served as my own research
participant, this criterion was relevant for data collected in my study. Authenticity is measured
by the amount of correspondence between verbal data collected and a participant’s direct
experiences—the higher the correspondence, the greater the level of authenticity. To meet my
target authenticity threshold, I maintained as high a degree of contact as possible between my
self-reports and my introspective experiences. For example, because abstract concepts are
distancing and best reserved for use during data analysis, I sought to use concrete language as
frequently as possible during data collection (see Hendricks, 2009; Hurlburt, 2009; Petitmengin,
2006).
In addition to authenticity, “visibility of the researcher’s self” (Anderson, 2006, p. 378) is
a hallmark of fidelity in autoethnography. The researcher should take pains to share experiences,
even personal ones, that are relevant to the research question. Such transparency in a study’s
narrative allows readers to see behind the scenes. Thus, throughout the data collection period, I
accumulated verbatim details of my learning experiences, not only for my own analysis, but to
share in the form of excerpts. In this way, I have tried to make my presence conspicuous.
Data Analysis
I adopted a processual, mixed methods approach to data analysis compatible with an
analytic research agenda. To begin, I designated three case classifications to keep track of the
main units of analysis in the study. These included: (a) Drawing Instruction, (b) Drawing
Exercise (Activity), and (c) Drawing Exercise (Artifact). The class of Drawing Instruction
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comprised data associated with receptive learning experiences, wherein I received knowledge
from arts educators and educational resources. The category of Drawing Exercise (Activity)
comprised data associated with active learning experiences, wherein I engaged in drawing to put
what I had learned into practice. The category of Drawing Exercise (Artifact) comprised data
associated with the products of my drawing, including drawings and photographs of drawings in
various stages of completion.
I identified ten cases within the Drawing Instruction category, representing enrolled
courses, podcasts and online tutorials, museum visits, conferences, and printed publications.
Within the Drawing Exercises (Activity) category, I identified 16 cases, including a variety of
exercise sessions that involved transcribing master drawings, producing value scales, sketching,
designing patterns, applying the principles of visual perspective, and creating observational
drawings, memory drawings, and gesture drawings. Finally, I identified 16 cases within the
Drawing Exercises (Artifact) category. These represented the physical products of the drawing
activities listed above, and included transcriptions of master drawings, value scales, sketches,
geometric patterns, perspective exercises, observational drawings, memory drawings, and
gesture drawings.
Cognitive Event Analysis
For the drawing activities that I captured on video, including eight perspective exercises
and one Bargue transcription, I conducted quasicognitive event analysis (CEA) (Steffensen,
2013). CEA centers action, typically through video documentation. Although it can be applied in
laboratory settings, it was developed to examine cognition and situative factors in everyday
interactions among people and their tools or materials in authentic environments. These
characteristics made it suitable for studying processual features of my learning experiences. For
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example, CEA lends itself to the observational analysis of tacit learning because it allows
researchers to access the dynamic bodily movements, gestures, and narrative prosody of research
participants at a microscopic level, and thereby trace cognitive trajectories that lead to attention
shifts and insights, which then may be earmarked for analysis as “cognitive events” (Omerod &
Ball, 2017). For purposes of this study, I identified cognitive events that exemplified important
instances of learning and offered relevant clues toward answering my central research questions.
Working recursively, I followed the five-step CEA process recommended by Steffensen
et al. (2016), which involved: (1) identifying cognitive events, (2) locating crucial moments
called “event pivots” that characterized each event, (3) annotating relevant observations, (4)
segmenting cognitive trajectories (i.e., uninterrupted cascades of embodied mental activity) into
phases that I demarcated with clear transition points, and (5) analyzing each cognitive trajectory
in terms of the enabling factors therein that led to the cognitive event.
To help me zero-in on cognitive events among the 15 hours of drawing footage I
collected, I began by reading through and coding my video transcripts. This allowed me to select
specific cognitive trajectories as candidates for further analysis through the viewing and reviewing of video recordings. My classification of sub-events into phases and transition points
depended on a range of potentially relevant features mentioned in the literature (see R. R.
Hoffman et al., 1998; Klein et al., 1989; Petitmengin, 2006; Simpson, 1966; Steffensen et al.,
2016), such as challenges and difficulties encountered, timing, influences and available cues,
sensory dimensions of experience, moments of deliberation and decision-making, hypotheticals,
and pertinent visual schemata. In marking out the event pivots, I discriminated among necessary
and merely incidental moments of transition relative to each cognitive event. Annotation of the
video sequences involved excerpting video stills synchronous with the cognitive events and
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event pivots, and then visually diagramming the cognitive events, phases, transition points, and
event pivots along a timeline. The resulting structure made the data amenable to deeper analysis
in terms of relevant learning skills and behaviors.
Reflexive Thematic Analysis
Due to the analytical orientation of my project, I employed reflexive thematic analysis to
analyze most of my data (nearly the full corpus, excluding the raw video recordings and
drawings, but including my video transcripts and the memos I had written about my drawings).
Reflexive thematic analysis is a flexible methodology compatible with most theoretical and
epistemological approaches to qualitative research (Braun & Clarke, 2006; J. C. Richards, 2022).
According to Braun & Clarke (2006), “thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing,
and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (p. 6). It is well suited to deriving categories of
meaning through iterative coding, memo writing, and the reflexive categorization and theming of
data. The reflexive aspect of thematic analysis emphasizes the interpretive role of the researcher
as the primary research instrument—one who must exercise judgment as the data is sifted,
mindful to acknowledge the role of researcher assumptions and biases in decision-making. It also
recognizes the researcher’s agency in constructing meaning throughout the project, from choices
made about what counts as data to the active construction of themes. Themes do not emerge of
their own accord. Rather, the researcher actively generates themes from the data (Braun &
Clarke, 2006; J. C. Richards, 2022).
Reflexive thematic analysis entails a series of distinct stages, including: (1) familiarizing
oneself with the data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) grouping and categorizing codes, (4)
reviewing and refining categories, (5) using categories to derive and define themes in
relationship to the wider project, and, (6) reporting out findings, including the researcher’s
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interpretation of what the findings represent and why it matters (Braun & Clarke, 2006; J. C.
Richards, 2022). I used NVivo qualitative data analysis software to facilitate this process. NVivo
accommodated the full array of file types and datasets in my study, as well as memo writing,
coding, and the generation of search queries to further probe my data.
In the first round of coding, I initially turned to process coding (see Saldaña, 2011),
which uses gerunds (e.g., “hoping,” “doubting,”) to highlight moments of action in the data.
However, because I needed to work across different types of data sets, from class notes and
diaries to video transcripts and memos, I adopted descriptive coding instead. Descriptive coding
uses nouns (e.g., “experience,” “encouragement”) to encapsulate the topical essence of a given
datum. I found it helpful for unifying codes across a disparate array of inputs. At this stage, I
worked inductively, identifying key terms in the data and classifying them within topical
domains without reference to existing theory (see Saldaña, 2011, 2013).
In the second round of coding, I realized many of my codes contained data that required
finer-grained analysis. I re-read the contents of the data classified therein and constructed more
granular codes to accommodate the most resonant concepts. Less frequently, I decided to delete a
code that did not stand up to scrutiny, or merged overly specific codes into broader categories. In
the process, I began to see connections to theoretical concepts documented in the literature.
By the third round, rather than re-reading the data underlying each code, I began working
deductively and arranged my codes hierarchically, to accord with the semantic categories I had
generated based on theory. Once the full hierarchy took shape, I revisited my research questions
and focused on the most relevant categories for each of them. Filtering categories in this manner
allowed me to move from an essentialist approach into a comparatively constructionist mode,
wherein I searched for latent connections of meaning among the categories and their contents.
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This required, once again, combing through and reading coded material, then writing reflective
memos, which I synthesized to create a collection of themes for inspection alongside images and
quotations extracted from the data.
I did not arrive at the final list of themes until I had written the first draft of my findings,
for writing is an essential analytical tool, by means of which latent discoveries emerge. The
excitement a researcher feels at this stage can resemble revelation—a sense that one is passively
receiving pearls of wisdom, as if by magic. In many ways, it felt that way to me. This is why I
needed to remind myself that I, as the research instrument, had generated the themes. The quality
of my researching findings is rooted in the care, rigor, and forthrightness that I brought to the
analysis detailed in the dissertation.
Delimitations and Limitations
As described above, the study was delimited in terms of participants, location, time, the
depth and breadth of curricular coverage, and learner progress. Regarding the latter, my status as
a novice learner necessarily limited the extent of possible discoveries related to drawing skill
acquisition, particularly in regard to the relationship between technical skills and higher order,
imaginative cognition hypothesized to draw upon such skills. The study also was limited in terms
of how the overall topic was treated. Topical matters are elaborated below, including
instructional experiences, the purpose and nature of drawings produced, the subject matter
content of drawings, and the level of experiential granularity provided in verbal data about
drawings and drawing activities. Additionally, the reader will find an explanation of the
limitations inherent in generalizing the study’s findings beyond my individual experiences as the
sole and primary research participant.
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Instructional Experiences
The impact of COVID-19 on society during the data gathering phase of my research
resulted in very few opportunities to participate in and document face-to-face learning
experiences. Additionally, due to my job and dissertation research, I lacked sufficient time to
commute to classrooms away from home. In consequence, I limited most of my instructional
engagements to content and interactions available online or in print.
Purpose and Nature of Drawings
All drawings constructed in the process of my research were construed primarily as
exercises, rather than works of art, per se. While the study was concerned with imaginative
expression, it did not bear on creativity in the “Big-C” sense of the term1. Thus, I did not attempt
to assess whether any of my drawings might be deemed creative, either by established arbiters of
taste or the general public. In other words, for purposes of the study, my interest in imagination
did not extend into the consensual realm, which Simonton (2013, 2018) reserved for works and
ideas that garner admiration from individuals beyond the originating author(s). Rather, I confined
my exploration of imaginative expression to a personal level of analysis that was purely
psychological in nature. Notably, I chose not to investigate “little-c” creativity either, because
creative works necessarily involve some combination of originality, utility, and surprise, whereas
I was interested in the graphical development and realization of visual ideas and mental imagery
regardless of those criteria.
Subject Matter Content of Drawings
The content of my observational drawings was inspired primarily by non-human objects
and environments. Of the small number of figure drawings included, most used, as models,

1

See Simonton (2013) for an analysis of “Big-C” versus “little-c” creativity.
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public domain photographs that were freely available for artmaking purposes on artist-serving
websites. No drawings created in the context of my study presented identifiable human
likenesses. Finally, the visual content of my imaginal drawings, although stimulated by
published poetry, emerged from my own mind, with occasional reference to photographs and
objects unrelated to any of the poems.
Granularity of Experiential Data
Proponents of first-person methodologies in the psychological study of lived experience
(see Depraz et al., 2003; Hurlburt, 2009; Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009a, 2009b; Vermersch, 2009)
have acknowledged that individuals require expert assistance from a third party in order to selfexplicitate pristine, pre-reflective lived experiences. The best that a first-person researcher like
myself could do was to reflectively and retrospectively self-elicitate my experiences, or record
myself in the midst of an experience for retrospective analysis. Although I employed strategies
recommended by Hendricks (2009), Hurlburt (2009), and Petitmengin (2006) to ensure that my
self-elicitations hewed as closely as possible to concrete experiences, my unaided reflections
could not produce the level of fine detail that otherwise might have been feasible with the aid of
a cognitive scientist trained in micro-phenomenology. That being said, as an analytic
autoethnography, the study did not need to attain phenomenological purity.
Generalizability of Findings
The study’s findings are restricted to my experiences as an adult novice artist who was
learning to draw, specifically regarding the role of artisanal judgment and imagination.
Therefore, no universal conclusions about artmaking can be drawn from them. While one of my
chief aims in conducting an analytic ethnography was to relate my first-person experiences to
generic social and cultural processes (i.e., extant theories), no ethnographic study, whether
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autoethnographic or not, purports to generalize from an “N of one” (Anderson, 2006, p. 386).
Thus, I took pains to make sense of my learning experiences in terms of relevant scholarship
without undue extrapolation. It is my hope that readers may draw helpful connections between
my findings and the empirical world in specific cases where they recognize patterns (Prus, 2003).
Crucially, any such recognition, when it occurs, must not be forced by means of a claim
registered in this dissertation. Rather, it may arise to the reader from a sense of coherence and
resonance with situations observed in the wider world.
Researcher Ethics, Assumptions, and Reflexivity
The methodology applied in this study was reviewed by members of the Institutional
Review Board at Lesley University who classified it as “exempt.” To guide my discussion of
results and overall storytelling, I applied S. Andrew’s (2017) ethical framework, which he “built
on a philosophical foundation and constructed with autoethnography in mind” (p. 52). In
particular, his Ethical Eyes, Exposure, and Ideas and Duties grids were useful for upholding
relational ethics concerning “peripheral players” (p. 12) whom I mentioned (by name or deidentified, as appropriate), but who were not participants in the study. In terms of my own
wellbeing as the research participant, my attention to ethical matters demonstrated self-care, selfrespect, and due diligence concerning how my drawing experiences related to and reflected on
the social world in which I was immersed.
In addition to proceeding ethically, it was incumbent upon me to exercise reflexivity.
According to C. Davies (1999), reflexive researchers express “awareness of their necessary
connection to the research situation and hence their effects upon it” (p. 7). As a “complete
member researcher” (Anderson, 2006, p. 378)—that is, a participant-researcher—my selfinterrogation increased the likelihood of transformational changes within my belief systems,
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behaviors, and self-concept, provided I understood the risk of self-delusion relative to my artistic
ability. If I were to block out data that I preferred not to acknowledge, it would nullify any
potential benefits of my research to me as research participant. Thus, I had a personal stake in
guarding against cherry-picking my data.
The questions I asked, investigated, and answered via the study incorporated my
understanding of myself as a researcher acculturated within a society and value system (Hughes,
2017) largely descended from the Western tradition. Because my esteem for systematic drawing
instruction was inculcated, in large part, through this heritage, it has been incumbent upon me to
grapple with how my artistic aspirations are challenged by my membership in a systemically
racist, sexist, ageist, ableist and classist society wherein discrimination based on sexual
orientation, gender role expression, ethnicity, and religion has persisted for so long. One cannot
be a fully engaged researcher, artist, learner, or educator without acknowledging and taking steps
to account for the legacies wrought by these injustices.
Consistency
Throughout the project, I strove for quality in terms of consistency, as recommended by
Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009a). To do so, I monitored and maintained agreement among my
chosen instruments, forms of data, measurements, results, and theoretically guided analyses
(Pickering, 1995). Such an approach is compatible with analytic autoethnography, which
requires a “commitment to theoretical analysis” (Anderson, 2006, p. 378). I hope it is evident in
these pages that such a commitment guided my research.
Chapter 5 Summary
In summary, this chapter detailed the methodology used in this study and the rationale
behind it. I employed cognitive autoethnography, a highly reflexive approach to qualitative
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inquiry that facilitates research in educational psychology via first-person case studies, to study
my own development of artisanal judgment and its relationship to my self-perceived capacity for
imaginative expression while learning to draw. Data collected described or embodied the
processes and outcomes of my learning journey, as evidenced in drawings, photographs,
fieldnotes, diaries and video recordings. My analysis focused on three basic types of data:
drawing instruction, drawing exercises, and drawing artifacts. For selected drawing exercises, I
used CEA, an analytical tool developed by cognitive ethnographers who study cognition “in the
wild” (Hutchins, 1995, passim), to identify pivotal moments in my learning process. In tandem, I
subjected nearly all of the data to reflexive thematic analysis, which allowed me to generate
themes and findings based on meaningful conceptual linkages otherwise obscured by the sheer
quantity of collected material.
Although the study was limited in terms of participants, location, time, curricular
coverage, and topical treatment, and the findings cannot be generalized beyond my individual
experiences as the sole and primary research participant, the dissertation holds up to inspection
in terms of validity. The engagement of oneself as a research instrument hinges on reflexivity,
which the project exhibited throughout, via my self-conscious and self-critical orientation. I
further validated my research by taking an analytic approach to autoethnography, contextualizing
my findings in broader research paradigms inherited through Kant’s (1781–1787/1998,
1790/2000) notion of judgment and Polanyi’s (1962, 1966, 1967) theory of tacit knowing,
alongside empirical studies documented in the educational psychology literature. Concerning
data collection, I strove for authenticity by documenting, to the extent possible, concrete
experiences. Likewise, I strove for visibility by allowing myself, as the research participant, to
show up without disguise, as the protagonist in a personal story of learning. Finally, I applied
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consistency in my research design from beginning to end, with an unwavering commitment to
research ethics.
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CHAPTER 6
Findings
The purpose of this study was to make meaning of an adult learner’s self-perceived
capacity for imaginative expression in representational drawing relative to the development of
her artisanal judgment via a self-directed program of classical study, online and in-person, over a
period of 22 months. That adult learner was me: the researcher and author of this study, a lapsed
artist in midlife. Before embarking on this research, I had never received systematic instruction
in drawing despite having attended art school in my college years. By tracking my progress with
skill-based learning, I was interested in probing connections between the development of my
artisanal judgment and my self-perceived ability to express myself imaginatively through
drawing. My hope was that, by understanding this relationship, I might gain crucial insights to
propel my ongoing artistic studies and eventually teach drawing to others more effectively. In
short, I hoped to liberate my imagination through the head, heart, and hands of drawing as a
cognitive practice.
Six major findings with accompanying data are presented below. In order to preserve
authenticity, data excerpts are provided intact, regardless of the use of colloquial language.
Findings relate to: (a) attentional demands on artisanal judgment amid uncertainty, (b) cognitive
learning supports for developing artisanal judgment, (c) the importance of social contexts for the
practice of drawing, (d) learner adaptations to situational features of drawing, (e) unhelpful
assumptions about imaginative expression in drawing, and (f) insights on supporting imaginative
expression in drawing.

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

208

The findings are sorted two apiece into three categories representing the study’s guiding
research questions. Those questions were: (1) How do cognitive factors encountered in the
process of learning to draw bear on the development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment? (2)
How do situative factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the development
of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment? (3) What does the process of developing artisanal
judgment through systematic drawing practice mean to an adult learner in terms of her selfperceived capacity for imaginative expression? In answer to these questions, the following
themes were identified and elaborated under the associated findings: visual choice overload,
working memory limits, attentional dynamics, knowledge, epistemically felicitous falsehoods,
communities of practice, artistic apparatus, peer learning, inhabiting a somatic activity system,
transfer of learning, assumptions about reproductive and productive imagination, and learning
supports helpful for developing reproductive and productive imagination. The reader will find an
interpretive analysis of these findings in chapter 7.
I. Cognitive Factors Bearing on the Development of Artisanal Judgment Through Drawing
I set out to understand how cognitive factors that I encountered in the process of learning
to draw bore on the development of my artisanal judgment. In terms of this inquiry, the data I
generated revealed two salient themes: (A) attentional demands on my judgment amid
uncertainty and (B) learning supports that I depended on to hone my artisanal judgment.
A. Attentional Demands on Judgment Amid Uncertainty
The results of my research pointed to complex attentional dynamics as the predominant
challenge I encountered. Complex attentional dynamics comprised visual choice overload,
working memory limits, and the task of negotiating gestalt relationships among parts and the
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greater whole in a given drawing. These dynamics created various levels of uncertainty that I
needed to negotiate by developing my artisanal judgment.
1. Visual Choice Overload. When faced with a blank sketchpad, it is comprehensible
that a draftsperson might experience the same feeling of paralysis that grips many a writer sitting
in front of a blank page. Yet, in my experience of perceptual drawing, the greatest intimidation—
and fascination—was not the paper, but my visual encounter with each of the stimuli I was
attempting to draw. My tendency since childhood was to home in on details, looking so closely, I
would sometimes lose my bearings. This experience of perceptual overwhelm, which Goethe
(1862/1988) likened to “trying to drink the sea dry,” (p. 24) is universally human. The world
contains multitudes more than a person can absorb, no matter the sensory modality. When I first
embarked on my learning journey, I did not have any clearly articulated strategies to help me
cope with the ever-crashing waves of visual data. How could I begin to assemble those disparate
streams into a representational whole? In the midst of daily life, while doing other things besides
drawing, many of us accomplish this feat: the “synthesis of the manifold of intuition” (Kant,
1781–1787/1998, p. A78/B103); we notice a myriad of things and make some sort of sense of
them. My attempts to arrange this manifold on the paper in front of me proved to be another
matter entirely.
A head-on encounter with this phenomenon, which is best described as visual choice
overload, occurred during a fall 2019 workshop I attended in person at SUNY New Paltz. The
session was about Goethe’s (1862/1988; see also Brook, 1998) tender empiricism and how it
could inform my drawing practice. It was facilitated by J. Korenblat (2019), who asked us to
engage in a detailed observation of a stimulus by focusing on each of its parts with a sense of
wonder, casting aside preconceptions. I appreciated his explicit acknowledgement that seeing,
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and representing what is seen, presents an enormous challenge if one is truly looking. After the
session, I recorded my recollections:
Korenblat handed each of us a small bundle of carnations and asked us to draw the
flowers using Goethe’s observational approach. With my carnation lying on the table in
front of me, I began to draw, doing my best to follow the suggested steps. Korenblat
called the first step Exact Sense Perception and asked us to observe every little
particularity of the plants. In doing so, we would be certain to encounter so many
unfamiliar details that we would be forced to go beyond our existing mental concepts of
“carnationness.” It was true. I felt bowled over by the riot of creamy ruffles before me,
each petal edged with fine pink stripes, radiating out like the ruff of the sun, into thin air.
The details were divine, but far too numerous to capture in one sitting (see Figure 24).
This stage of Goethe’s observational approach, gegenständliches sehen [objective vision] (see
Hinnebusch, 2018) was rooted in sensory communion between observer and observed.
Combined with successive stages, the overall method combined inner visualization with direct
Observation, toward comprehending the object. He believed that, to understand one’s subject,
one should assimilate into it and be transformed by it, thus erasing the duality between it and
oneself. The goal was to bring one’s a priori reasoning into dialogue with immediate sensory
experience—an approach that drew on Kant’s philosophy and emphasized the role of mediation
and relationship in intersubjective analysis. Based on this exercise, I jotted a note to myself:
“Observational drawing shows you how wobbly the space of your perception is. If you’re going
to do it well, you need to slow down the process of seeing.” After discussing my experience with
other conference attendees, I knew I was not alone; it was normal to feel humbled and
overwhelmed.
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Figure 24
Sketch of a Carnation, 2019, by the author

The next spring, I enrolled in a beginner’s Bargue-style drawing class online, through the
Academy of Realist Art Boston (ARA Boston [E. Johnson, 2020]). This class focused on the
late-19th century practice of copying, as accurately as possible, precise drawings printed by
lithographer and painter Charles Bargue (1826/27–1883). Assignments entailed transcribing
plates of drawings copied after models, master drawings, and casts of Ancient Greek and Roman
sculptures (see Bargue & Gérôme, 2003). Although I had produced many drawings in my life by
then—from life, photographs, books, and imagination—this was my first-ever induction into a
classical drawing curriculum. Across those many years before, I had relied on intuition to feel
my way through the process. Now, I was learning a method passed down through generations of
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practitioners—a method that drew its inspiration from antiquity. Again, I felt humbled. But more
importantly, I felt connected to a tradition wherein I could begin to find my bearings.
On May 24, 2020, while transcribing the lithograph of Cardinal Ximenes (Plate I, 32 in
Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), the familiar bewilderment that comes with visual choice overload
washed over me. I was having difficulty making out exactly where to draw the line dividing light
from shadow (see Figure 25):
The finer details can get finer and finer to an infinite scale. It’s too much for my brain to
process. One time I see one particular nuance, then another. That one fades away, and I
see a different one! I lost the former nuance somewhere in that shadow, and then I
wonder if I even had imagined it, or got it so wrong in relation to what’s around it. I feel
my brain fighting with itself.
I began to realize that getting lost in the details, no matter how engrossing, had become a pattern
for me, not only in drawing, but in everyday life: “It’s easier to focus on local details, but in so
doing, I lose sight of relationships between intricate areas and broader themes that encompass

Figure 25
My Second “First Marks” Bargue Transcription, 2020 (right), by the author
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them. They float, disconnected and meaningless. It’s the big picture that gives sense to it all.” I
wondered if my coursework would help me negotiate the space between the whole and its parts,
a crucial skill for creating art.
On a hiatus from classes the next winter, I took a break from Bargue drawing and
selected a three-dimensional object from my hutch: a teacup received as a wedding gift from my
mother-in-law. Although I was attempting this exercise without plaster cast training (a more
advanced phase of the ARA Boston curriculum that references three-dimensional objects), a
basic sketch seemed worth trying. I hoped to capture a canonical view and compare it with a
second drawing from a non-canonical perspective. Thus, I placed the teacup on a table, perched
my sketchpad on my drawing board, and proceeded to draw (see Figure 26).
My Bargue training reminded me that I should begin with straight lines and broad
strokes, but I caved to my yearning to follow the details. The fragile curves of the china captured
my imagination, and my pencil carved out a hair’s breadth on the blank page, my hand subtly
trembling. I recorded the experience in my diary, dated January 3, 2021:
I felt overwhelmed by the teacup. It wasn’t simple after all! It boasted delicate scalloped
edges and an intricate floral pattern, and it caught the light of the lamp but seemed to
escape that light at the same time. I needed my glasses to gain any visual command
whatsoever over this object, which seemed to be a phantasm, for my view of it kept
shifting. I tried to remind myself to close one eye and position myself carefully in relation
to it [as I had learned to do in Bargue class]. That sometimes helped, but my discipline
often flagged … I found myself substituting visual data for graphical moves that seemed
to jive on paper. This didn’t involve giving in to a motor impulse. Rather, having failed to
capture the visual scene with sufficient realism and accuracy, I noticed that certain visual
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Figure 26
(left) Teacup: Canonical View; (right) Non-Canonical View; 2021, drawings by the author

moves on the paper made the image “work” better visually. This is a very curious
occurrence.
There are many things I liked about the canonical drawing: its delicate quality, the
undulating arabesque of the calico pattern, and the sleepy drape of the background tassel. By
comparison, I appreciated the non-canonical version for its geometric austerity. If I had been
attempting realism (and to some extent, I was), there was also much to criticize. My shifting gaze
in the canonical drawing resulted in a noticeably skewed perspective (particularly evident in the
saucer), the impression that glazed-on flowers inside the teacup’s surface were suspended in air
above the tea, and an overall warped effect, as if viewing the teacup underwater.
The challenge of visual choice overload is perennial. My struggle with it continued
through my fourth Bargue drawing. A videorecording transcript from my independent drawing
session on May 4, 2021, noted: “I see a line of demarcation in one place and the next time I look
at it—the very next second—I see a different shape. Then I look again and it's different. There's
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so much variability. It's almost maddening!” However, by the time of that drawing session, I had
learned more helpful strategies to cope with the phenomenon.
2. Working Memory Limits. Drinking vessels were a drawing theme in the first few
days of 2021. On New Year’s Day, I began a web-based asynchronous class called Memory
Drawing, through Atelier Rousar (n.d.). The first exercise established my baseline skill level. I
had one minute to study a line drawing of two coffee mugs before they disappeared from sight,
followed by 10 minutes to draw them from memory (see Figure 27). While the stimulus was in
front of me, I focused on what I expected to be most difficult: the juncture of the two differently
placed cups—specifically, where the handle of the upright cup met the side of the overturned cup
behind it. When left to my own devices, without the stimulus image to guide me, I forgot that the
cups were curved! This outcome might have worried me regarding my mental fitness, but
Rousar’s (n.d.) instructions warned against judging outcomes too harshly. Mistakes were to be
anticipated.

Figure 27
Baseline Memory Sketch, 2021 (right), by the author
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Subsequent exercises were more abstract (for example, see Figure 28). They progressed
from straight lines to curved lines and then to simple shapes and value studies. As I moved
deeper into the course, I noticed a pattern, which I logged in my diary on February 13, 2021:
Where I go wrong almost always seems to be by emphasizing differences between lines
(short lines get shorter; curves get curvier). Or when lines are already close, then I
"unify" the shape and make it even skinnier. Likewise, when lines are further apart, I
"unify" that shape and make it even fatter. How might I overcome this, even though the
mental caricature seems to be helpful to keep track of notable details?” My instructor
reassured me that while this strategy led to inaccurate results overall, it seems to be a
legitimate strategy for recollecting small differences, and a normal mistake for beginners.

Figure 28
Curved & Straight Lines, Two Memory Drawing Exercises, 2021, by the author
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I was doing well when it came to recollecting small details, but I needed more work on
the overall shapes. Disciplined practice in the course bore some fruit over time, probably because
it demanded intense concentration. My experience made plain to me how reliant memory is on
attention. This is to be expected; the scientific consensus reveals a strong interdependence
between memory and attention (Brady et al., 2019; Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007; MacLeod,
1989). Vigilant attention is important, with its laser focus on detail, but so is another kind of
attention that I had not contemplated—an impressionistic, wide-angle kind of attention that I
hope to cultivate in myself to help me draw convincingly from the mind’s eye.
3. Part-Whole Relationships. In May 2021, I spent a month at my sister’s house in Ohio
to help care for our mother. Thanks to the yard there, I could draw outdoors in a private setting, a
rare opportunity for an apartment dweller like myself. It was a nice day outside. At the edge of
the woods, I gathered the most interesting little things I could find, including a couple of birch
leaves crumpled from the winter, two dandelions with their roots (one blossomed and one in
bud), some tree bark, and a couple of sticks. I set these together on the picnic table, in the
sunlight, so they were casting a nice shadow. My intention was to draw the arrangement from
different perspectives, spending approximately one hour on each drawing. Unfortunately, the
flowers began to wilt, and the leaves threatened to blow away in the breeze, so I had only enough
time to attempt one view (see Figure 29).
While drawing the bundle with my new set of Faber-Castell Pitt brush pens, I encountered some
difficulty maintaining my attention across disparate focal points. This event was documented in
my diary entry from May 11, 2021:
I started with the curvy stem of the closed dandelion, which was draped perpendicularly,
over both the bark and the stick. From there, I drew where the stick intersected with it,
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Figure 29
Woodland Debris I, 2021, drawing by the author

moving horizontally across the paper to get the full extent of the stick. I had also made a
notch for the top edge of the stick, just past the right side of the dandelion stem. So, when
I moved left of the stem, I realized that the horizontal line I was drawing, which met the
top of the right side, was in fact the bottom of the actual stick on the left side. How
frustrating!
My composition was fluid enough that I was able to disguise the disjuncture by drawing
over it, but that did not change the fact that the error had occurred. In and of itself, this error was
of no consequence; what matters is that it provoked my curiosity. The bevvy of details scattered

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

219

across the scene presented an attentional challenge best met with an agile ability to change focus
intermittently between parts and the whole—the skill of attentional flexibility touted in the
psychological literature on drawing (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2015; Lou, 2018). I met the
challenge with only partial success.
The next month, after I had returned home to Massachusetts, I ran into a similar jam, this
time while working on a linear perspective exercise. It was documented in my diary entry of
June 16, 2021:
When I moved on to drawing the grid, I noticed that I kept almost making a mechanical
error with my ruler. When drawing out spokes from a given vanishing point, I would
begin to confuse which side of the ruler I meant to draw down. My eyes would tell me,
above the horizon line, that I was matching the bottom edge of the ruler to the vanishing
point, but below the horizon line, I’d think I was drawing my line across the top edge of
the ruler. The top and bottom edges of the ruler are parallel; they don’t meet in the
middle. They’re not the same line at all! I often would have to stop and correct myself.
Thankfully, I always managed to catch the error before my pencil joined in on the action!
In the process of learning, I suspect my attentional capacities were more taxed than they would
have been if I were experienced in perspective drawing. In my view, the ability to flexibly shift
my attention from parts to the whole and back again is a skill worth cultivating. It appears to be a
notable feature of drawing expertise.
B. Cognitive Learning Supports for Developing Judgment
In the pursuit of sharper artisanal judgment, the success of my self-directed drawing
program hinged on the extent to which it helped me cope with uncertainties endemic to visual
choice overload, working memory limitations, and attentional dynamics. Learning supports
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featured as an important cognitive factor in that regard. A learning support serves toward
meeting many of the same aims that scaffolding (Wood et al., 1976) achieves: reduction of
degrees of freedom available to learners, emphasis of relevant task features, demonstration, and
so forth. However, the term learning support can be understood more broadly than the term
learning scaffold, due to the latter’s fairly strict definition, which entails aspects of teaching,
such as calibration and fading (E. A. Davis, 2015), that are less accessible in the context of selfdirected learning. While I did experience scaffolding along the way (most notably in my Bargue
classes), my overall curriculum was assembled piecemeal, which meant there were many times
when the interactivity and feedback characteristic of scaffolded learning environments was not
available to me. Generally speaking, learning supports that proved most essential for honing my
artisanal judgment included knowledge (empirical, axiomatic, and tacit) and “epistemically
felicitous falsehoods” (Elgin, 2017). Notably, some learning supports were highly productive,
while others were comparatively insufficient.
1. Knowledge. Much of what I learned about classical drawing while pursuing my selfdirected curriculum could be categorized as knowledge, broadly understood as “human-made …
. meaningful social symbols [that have] the function of a means of communication and of a
means of orientation” (Elias, 2017, p. 204). This knowledge was revealed through observations,
reasoning, and reflection. I received and acquired knowledge of drawing through firsthand
experience, other people, and various intellectual resources. Examples that illustrate the role
knowledge played in my learning follow. I have separated out experiences wherein empirical
knowledge predominated from those wherein axiomatic knowledge or tacit knowledge bore
more directly. It is important to acknowledge that the different kinds of knowledge often were
interdependent. Therefore, my classifications of distinct activities under each category reflected
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aspects of my learning experiences that were most salient relative to my perspective in a given
moment; the classifications do not necessarily reflect inherent properties of each learning
activity.
a. Empirical Knowledge. Knowledge is empirical when it can be justified through
observation and experimentation. Accessing and building empirical knowledge helped me in
many ways. It reduced the impact of visual choice overload by giving me tools to select and
segment visual data meaningfully. It also supported greater attentional flexibility by highlighting
relevant drawing concepts and principles at play in my projects and helping me take a more
mindful stance toward my use of artisanal systems.
One device for simplifying visual information entailed counting, at a course-grained
level, all of the distinct shapes that composed the form I was attempting to draw. Standing back
and squinting with one eye closed, helped to sift out finer-grained details. The strategy itself
served as procedural empirical knowledge, whereas the resultant grid (see Figure 30) functioned
as new knowledge that informed subsequent representational decisions. On June 3, 2020, I tried
this strategy in the early stages of my third Bargue transcription, for which Profile of a Foot
(Plate I, 5 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003) served as the model.
The act of counting visually discrete sections of the image helped me fine-tune my visual
perception, because it forced me to simplify the image and discern course perceptual qualities. In
essence, it lifted me out of the “trees” in which I was accustomed to losing myself and provided
a canopy-level view of the “forest.” I could find my bearings. With sufficient practice, this kind
of strategy may become ingrained as procedural tacit knowledge, obviating the need for explicit
counting.
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Figure 30
Counting Form Shapes Bargue Exercise, 2020, drawing by the author

Just as counting shapes within a form aided my ability to see and distinguish among
them, learning specialized terms in my first Bargue class helped me recognize and notice
recurrent visual elements present in my classical drawing repertoire and its subject matter. In
essence, vocabulary became a tool for gathering empirical visual knowledge. For example, those
shapes I had counted are called masses. I learned that brighter portions of a grayscale drawing
belong to the light family, while dark areas belong to the shadow family. I learned to tell the
difference between cast shadows and form shadows (when light on a form is blocked by a
neighboring body versus dissipated relative to the form’s distance from a light source). I also
learned that the haziest part of a cast shadow is called the penumbra, which is analogous to the
midtone, or transition shadow on a form. The darkest edge of the midtone is called the bedbug
line, or terminator shadow, demarcating where the form turns away from the light. The darkest
shadow of all is the occlusion shadow, the section of a cast shadow closest to its casting body.
My field notes of June 30, 2020, elaborated:
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The word “mass” is derived from “massive,” and there are areas of light mass and dark
mass. It's a section of the drawing. Think of someone walking in a maze inside of these
sections. When their path is truly finally blocked, that defines the boundary of the mass.
This way, you can count the number of shadow versus light masses in your piece.
Having words for these phenomena was like receiving a special pair of eyeglasses, enabling me
to see and interact with my drawing and its subject matter in a more sophisticated fashion. In
short, the acquisition of relevant vocabulary guided my attention.
According to findings supporting a weak form of the Whorf hypothesis, linguistic
categories appear to have influenced my thinking and decision-making (Ahearn, 2012;
Ottenheimer, 2009). The finished transcription of my third Bargue (Plate I, 5 in Bargue &
Gérôme, 2003) demonstrates that I was able, for the most part, to follow my teacher’s
instructions, which entailed blocking in the shadow masses while excluding form shadows
resident in the light family (see Figure 31). Without the language to describe them, I would have
found it much more difficult to notice and distinguish those differences.
I appreciated the value of augmenting empirical knowledge. In February and March,
2021, I created a classification table and heuristic to buttress what I was learning in Bargue class
(see Table 1). It served as a reference in conjunction with observational practice. There were
occasions when it was not handy but would have been appreciated, such as my en plain air
drawing session on May 14, 2021, when I sketched a couple of dead tree branches scavenged
from my sister’s back yard:
Once the shadow outlines were drawn in, I decided that the form shadows were the
darkest. Those got a black Pitt pen. I used indigo for the cast shadows. After a while, I

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

224

Figure 31
Profile of a Foot Bargue Transcription, 2020 (left), by the author

had a nagging feeling and wanted to check the light and shadow chart I had made in
Bargue class, but couldn’t find it saved in my phone. So I reminded myself to use my
eyes. As my instructor said, nature is the best teacher. My eyes were telling me that I was
right. I kept going with the black, coloring in the form shadows.
Although cast shadows are typically darker than form shadows, strong reflected light may
impact upon masses in the shadow family. I found it helpful, later on, to double-check the
classification table I had built. The passage therein, on reflected light, revealed why the cast
shadows in my drawing (see Figure 32) appeared to buck convention: Sunshine had reflected off
the tabletop and washed them out. Having this knowledge meant that my visual judgment was
validated. I did not have to depend on my eyes alone during perceptual drawing, for there was a
reliable systematicity to be found in nature. For the first time, it felt like I was in on a secret way
of seeing—not only optical, but logical. If I cultivated my newfound focus, I sensed the promise
of rewards for further experimentation.
Direct experimentation and practice allowed me to build on knowledge empirically and
ground my understanding, taking note of what I had learned, for further development. The case
that follows details a moment wherein I boosted empirical knowledge by earmarking my
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Table 1
Classification and Heuristics for Light and Shadow, 2021, by the author
Shadow Family

Light Family

Form shadows result from portions of the form facing
away (or being any number of degrees further away)
from the light source.

This is light on a form that is projected from a
luminous body.

Cast shadows are cast by an object that’s between
the form and the light source.
The bedbug line is the line between the shadow family
and the light family.
Also, in the shadow family is reflected light. This is
when a portion of something, whether a form shadow
or a cast shadow, is lit up (just a hint) because it is
receiving light that is bouncing off another form. Light
is only projected from a luminous body. But reflected
light bounces off a non-luminous, reflective body.

Position: Turned toward Light

There are the specular highlights. These are the
highlights where there is a 90-degree angle between
your eye and the light that is hitting the form. It is the
sparkle!
Halftones occur due to the distance of the object from
the luminous body, and the angles at which it is turned
in relationship to the luminous body. It is an
elaboration within the light family. It can be easy to
confuse a half tone with form shadows, but they are
different.

Distance: Closer to Light

Distance: Further from Light

Lightest

Judgment call:
Darker to lighter

Position: Turned Away from Light

Judgment call:

Darkest

Lighter to darker

understanding of a concept that was new to me. Caught on video, this moment qualified as a
cognitive event: a change, often initiated by the learner, in the learner’s body and attention,
project, tools, or learning environment. The event took place on June 14, 2021, while I was
completing a beginner’s linear perspective exercise that involved distinguishing line orientations
in one-point perspective. Putting this lesson into practice helped me notice specific
compositional features that served to orient viewers in relationship to depicted subject matter and
settings. The following transcript excerpt documents my in-the-moment narration of activities
that led up to a cognitive event that demonstrated one such discovery:

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

226

Figure 32
(left) Woodland Debris II, 2021, drawing by the author; (right) photograph of the model

Transcript: Earmarking Understanding as Empirical Knowledge
[00:06:57]

The horizontals are perpendicular to the verticals by 90 degrees.

[00:07:04]

All right, so in one-point perspective, that means … Okay, so,
uh, so we're doing the front face.

[00:07:15]

And because of that, I'm not going to follow this particular
line, which is curving [sic: slanted].

[00:07:21]

I only do that for the receding face of the cube.

[00:07:28]

So. Now I'm realizing it should be more like this, right?

[00:07:41]

Yeah, I mean that's too long; it wasn't really a cube.

[00:07:46]

All right. So now this edge is definitely receding. This is that.

[00:07:55]

And I think it's going to be … I don't know … about there, so I
will color it in.

[00:08:09]

Oh, boy. Okay, I'm going to color in …
concerned with, uh, receding.

this is the face we're

In the space of 85 seconds, punctuated by an act of coloring, I cemented my
understanding of a basic principle of one-point perspective: Front-facing cube faces are
physically square, while receding cube faces are physically distorted in agreement with
orthogonal lines. This is because the spectator’s view of a scene in one-point perspective is headon, looking straight into the picture plane; it is not a view from an oblique angle or from above or
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below. In concert with this orientation, I motioned with my hand to remind myself that the front
face of my cube should not follow the diagonal line of the orthogonals (see Figure 33, Pic A). By
doing so, I translated verbal knowledge acquired from the Society of Visual Storytelling’s
(SVSLearn’s [Terry, W., White, L., & Parker, J., 2021]) Basic Perspective class into an
embodied sensibility. After drawing the receding face of my initial cube, I affirmed my
understanding of the principle by tracing over the established area with colored pencil. That
tracing served as an anchor for iterative variation, grounding further experimentation within the
confines of the selected vantage point. Thus, the highlighted feature functioned as empirically
generated knowledge and a reference point to guide my attention through the remainder of the
exercise.
In other words, the cognitive event diagrammed in Figure 33 began in phase 1 with my
verbal articulation of knowledge conveyed in class. In phase 2, by using a hand gesture to help
me build a mental image (or schema), I was able, by phase 3, to represent the knowledge on
paper. Placing marks accurately required scrutiny; it depended on recognizing precise visual cues
evidenced in relationships among corners and orthogonal lines. By phase 4, the resultant shape
presented itself as an exemplar for the creation of additional cubes. The most pivotal moments
leading up to this cognitive event occurred at 00:07:21 and 00:07:34 on the timeline. Those
moments involved the use of hand gestures and cues, respectively. They served as cognitive
training for attentional flexibility through the artisanal system of linear perspective.
In regard to hand gestures, I captured a similar moment two days later, during an exercise
in two-point perspective. In that case, the translation of verbal knowledge to embodied
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Diagram: Earmarking Understanding as Empirical Knowledge, 2021

Note. The yellow layer indicates the author’s vocal utterances; the turquois layer indicates the
author’s thoughts and actions.
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understanding involved motioning with my hands to reinforce my schema of the upwardpointing orientation of corners above the horizon line (see Figure 34). This process enabled me
to continue productively onward through the drawing, just as I had done in the earlier exercise.
b. Axiomatic Knowledge. Unlike empirical knowledge, axiomatic knowledge bears on
the learning process prior to, rather than during, practice. In its purest form, it can be justified
rationally, without appeal to sense experience, and is contingent on causal relationships,
assumptions, and beliefs. Because it is inherently non-contradictory, this kind of axiomatic
knowledge is considered to be self-evident (e.g., 2+2=4). It reveals what is or might be possible
by ruling out what is not possible. Knowledge originally accumulated through trial and error and

Figure 34
(left) Hand Gesture; (right) Cubes in Two-Point Perspective, 2021, drawing by the author
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then passed down verbally and pictorially through one or more generations may also function
axiomatically, but not in the pure sense. Elias (2017) described this variety of axiomatic
knowledge as deductive knowledge. Both represent premises that underlie particular outcomes.
Given axiomatic priors pertaining to a drawing project, novice artists may experiment with an
extensive array of promising options without spending precious time pursuing dead ends.
Although I rarely experienced the benefit of axiomatic knowledge during my research, it
proved to be a surprisingly conspicuous factor in my learning. When it was present, I took note
with gratitude. It helped me navigate otherwise overwhelming visual details and set in motion
the progressive unfurling of geometric forms from my pencil tip. When it was absent, I felt the
lacunae sorely. In place of fruitful pathways, I found blind alleys. Instead of focusing on crucial
concepts, I wasted time trying to rebuild the proverbial wheel. Thus, data bearing on axiomatic
knowledge merits inclusion in this study’s findings.
The first classical drawing axiom I learned was the value of selecting and committing to a
specific standpoint as the basis for developing relative elements of a composition. In one case,
the axiom was shared with me explicitly, as a strategy for shading a wide array of values in a
drawing, but the instructor did not refer to the applicable law of optics as I would have preferred.
In another case, a key method for applying the same kind of axiom to linear perspective was not
shared with me, and I spent many hours over multiple days trying to discover it on my own.
Although my Bargue teacher did not use the word “axiom” when he introduced the
concept of keying my drawing, he was nevertheless transmitting a timeless principle that allows
artists to assert agency over their work amid uncertainty in the face of visual choice overload.
The principle of keying limits the range of all possible values down to a manageable, yet
effective, size. I recorded his advice in my field notes of March 14, 2021:

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

231

Going for the shadow shapes and shading them in helps you to simplify … The trick is to
shade in the shadow to the correct value, like on the value scale. Shade in the darkest
darks first, to key the drawing, so you can compare everything else against this darkest
value. This is helping me to see the big picture, instead of getting stuck from the outset in
all the nuanced details. There are just too many details to capture it all, and I could be
working on the drawing forever.
The instructor’s recommendation put into practice a foundational exercise I had completed (with
many imperfections) in my first Bargue class: the value scale, wherein students begin with a
small blank square on a large sheet of white paper and shade in eight successively darker squares
beside it, ending with a fully saturated, black square in the 9th slot (see Figure 35).
This spectrum of values from light to dark plays a comparable role in drawing to that of
scales in music. If a drawing were depicting a night scene, for example, the value scale would

Figure 35
My First Value Scale, 2020, drawing exercise by the author
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encompass more dark than light values, whereas a typical daytime scene would be wider ranging.
Just as the choice of a major versus minor scale changes the emotional tenor of a song, the
choice of a given value scale impacts a drawing’s mood. However, unlike notes on most
instruments, value increments are not predetermined. Rather, the artist must painstakingly build
them out of pencil strokes, relying on visual judgment to differentiate each square. The beauty of
completing a value scale is that one’s “notes” therein can serve as points of departure for further
decision-making. Even though I had accidentally drawn my whole value strip on the wrong
(rough) side of the paper, the overall experience exemplified the application of axiomatic
knowledge, for I was told what keying a drawing is and saw it demonstrated. I did not have to
discover the concept on my own.
There was an important axiom related to the value scale that was not communicated in
my class, however: Lambert’s cosine emission law, which explains how light reflects off a
typical surface relative to that surface’s orientation toward or away from a luminous body. Based
on this law, value scales should not be constructed as linear scales. In other words, completing a
value scale is not as simple as adding an extra layer of graphite to each progressive square, such
that the values would darken in equal increments. 1 Nor is the scale logarithmic, which would
entail factorial increases resulting in so many layers of graphite on the 9th square that it would
appear shiny rather than black. Instead, Lambert’s law dictates the following sequence in
percentages of brightness: “100, 99, 97, 94, 89, 82, 73, 62, 45, 0” (Briggs, n.d.; Iten, 2020).
Manual approximations of these proportions would result in a value strip that favors lighter
values across a larger number of squares than would be the case with a linear scale. My initial

1

It is important to acknowledge no such thing was implied. Rather than thinking about the string of progressively
darker values as a mathematical scale, students were guided to rely completely on our eyes. In my view, such optical
training is of great value. That said, I believe reasoning through the phenomenon may be a productive strategy to use
in tandem with eyeballing.
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value scale erroneously followed the linear pattern, and if I used it to key my drawings, those
drawings would end up looking muddy. Thanks to my own persistent searching online, which
surfaced Lambert’s law, I came to understand the underlying principle that would accelerate the
development of my technique.
Another case where potentially useful axiomatic knowledge was not shared occurred in
my Basic Perspective class. No axiomatic knowledge was provided to prepare me for the 6th and
final exercise, which entailed drawing a room in one- or two-point perspective based on a floor
plan and architectural elevation. The most relevant technique for this purpose, perspective
projection (also called the pull-down method) was never mentioned. The challenge presented
stumbling blocks beyond visual choice overload or demands on memory and attention, for I
altogether lacked the requisite tools for charting my course. My diary excerpt of June 29, 2021
illustrates how much at sea I found myself:
Uninformed about the technique of the vertical measuring line (VML), I started trying to
devise my own. But my guess, incorrectly, was to use a single vanishing point, as for
one-point perspective, and draw horizontal lines from a cube back toward that point in
increasingly smaller increments. These took a patience-busting amount of time to draw,
as they kept getting smaller and smaller, to infinity! (see Figure 36, left)
My intuition that it should be possible to embed vertical reference points in a perspective
drawing that corresponded to measurements on a floor plan was headed in the right direction, but
I need not have made logarithmic increments that obeyed perspective. Instead, I could have used
the same unit of measurement up and down the entire vertical line; I could have employed a
linear scale VML (see Figure 36, right, highlighted). Over the course of countless hours and
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Figure 36
(left) Attempted Vertical Scale; (right, highlighted) Proper VML; 2021, drawings by the author

numerous YouTube video fragments, I managed to piece together enough knowledge to
complete the assignment.
All told, the assignment took me nearly a month, from June 13th through July 8, 2021,
and led me down an embarrassing number of false leads, some of which persisted in memory,
clouding my comprehension of the proper method. Had my perspective class included a unit on
pull-down projection, I would have grasped much sooner the principle inherent in the VML: An
artist can anchor otherwise arbitrary pictorial elements by staking out a stable position from the
outset.
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The second classical drawing axiom I learned was the importance of leveraging
systematic relationships among key elements in one’s emerging perspective drawings in order to
build out the image. It is very similar to the standpoint axiom discussed above, but in this case,
the anchoring elements are not foundational to the drawing as a whole. Relevant relationships
may serve as attentional cues and should be leveraged. As in the case of the standpoint axiom,
instructors shared this wisdom sometimes but not always.
My lesson from SVSLearn (2021) on drawing ellipses, wherein I learned to determine the
location of a major axis based on a minor axis that I had already drawn, presented a positive
example. The following excerpt from a June 16, 2021 videorecording transcript documented my
progress on that homework assignment (see Figure 37): "We—we know where the Maj—er,
minor axis is, and it's right there. So let's draw that out … Hmm. So, I think, right. So I just
found the major axis based on the minor axis." Certain features of a drawing may be generative,
like the minor axis of an ellipse. Out of them, related elements emerge, as if plants from a seed.
Unfortunately, I struggled to transfer the relational principle to an exercise I developed
after completing the class in Basic Perspective: a two-point perspective projection based on my
own floor plan drawing of a staircase (see Figure 38). In order to grow the drawing
systematically, I needed to start with the bottom step, because it was anchored by two existing
reference points—the floor and the wall. It took several attempts before I recognized how much
these spatial relationships mattered. This was reflected in my diary entry of July 18, 2021:
I began with the top square. I didn’t realize that it’s always best to start from a position
on the vertical measuring line (VML) that references both the floor and the wall. Having
two reference points makes it a truly known location. Instead, I started at the top of the
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Figure 37
Ellipses, with Major and Minor Axes in Red; 2021, drawing by the author

staircase, thinking that the position on the wall was good enough. But this meant that I
ran into a discrepancy when I tried to join the bottom of my staircase and the top of my
staircase together at the staircase landing. Something was not measured correctly!! I
should have begun from the bottom stair on the floor, and worked up from there.
The relational axiom for linear perspective recommends a reliance on strong evidence in
the construction of drawings. Perspective drawings are built out of knowledge. In all fairness,
while I would have found it helpful to hear the axiom articulated more often, I probably still
would have needed to go through a great deal of trial and error to put it into practice. There
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Figure 38
(left) Staircase Floor Plan & Elevation; (right) Staircase Error; 2021, drawings by the author

simply were too many factors to attend to while learning perspective.
Beyond the standpoint and relational axioms discussed above, my third lesson was the
value of axiomatic knowledge in general for learning classical drawing. In the most obvious
sense, this entails the identification and explanation by instructors of first principles that define
what is necessary and what is impossible within a system. In another sense, it means asking
instructors to explain, intentionally and in detail, the foundational components of a drawing
system to circumvent misconceptions or dispel them before they take root. This requires
unsettling baked-in assumptions (at least temporarily)—even those that are correct. The next two
examples from my learning journey illustrate these two senses of the value of axiomatic
knowledge for classical drawing instruction.
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On the cusp of 2021, I engaged in a project to create tessellations, a component of my
drawing curriculum focused on geometric pattern design. A tessellation is constructed of
repeating geometric shapes used to tile a plane without overlaps or gaps. The artist M.C. Escher
is famous for his tessellations. Three basic shapes will tessellate in a regular fashion: squares,
triangles, and hexagons. I have always been amazed and intrigued by Escher’s interlocking
figures, such as his fish and flying birds. I learned that many of them are modified monohedral
tessellations (i.e., a repeating shape constructed out of an original polygon that has been
rearranged), and that Escher was inspired to create them based on his geometry research. His
series of tessellations included a Pegasus, a seahorse, crabs, and other creatures. With so many
designs accounted for, I realized that it would be tricky to come up with a figure he had not
already mastered.
With the help of video tutorials on YouTube, I reverse-engineered Escher’s lizard
tessellation as a basis for designing my own: a sea turtle derived from a hexagon (see Figure 39).
This worked fairly well, although my silhouette did not turn out as streamlined as Escher’s.
Further practice would have been necessary to achieve anything akin to his geometric
masterpieces. My December 28, 2020, diary entry highlighted my desire for a better command of
axiomatic knowledge in this area, to guide experimentation:
Next time, I’d like to see if I can identify the basic shapes from which a variety of Escher
(and other) tessellations were derived. For example, I know that his flying horse was built
from a square, but I know that because I read about it and saw it explained on the
internet. I’d like to be able to tell what was the original shape based on examining a
particular tessellated figure on my own.
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Development of a Turtle Tessellation, 2021, drawings by the author
a

b

c

d

Note.
a Reverse-engineering
b Building

a sea turtle tessellation from a hexagon.

c Tessellating
d

Escher’s lizard tessellation to a hexagon.

pattern of repeating turtles.

Tessellating turtle pattern with added detail and shading.
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The ability to identify which polygons are at the root of any tessellation would probably
require knowledge of relevant geometric first principles. As an academic librarian, I felt
confident that I could locate such principles, given enough time, or that eventually, I could find a
geometry professor to ask (or a theoretical physicist, like Roger Penrose). In lieu of pursuing
those options at that moment, I generated an initial list of principles to fill the gap (see Figures
40 and 41).
Perhaps the most meaningful tidbit of axiomatic knowledge I took away from the
tessellations project was that, in a work of art, every part matters to the whole, and likewise, the
whole matters to every part. As a developing artist, I realized I should strive to create a
meaningful, waste-free topology. I never expected that I would derive such succinct wisdom
from a simple geometrical exercise.
Despite discovering a number of valuable axioms on my own, the need to do so unaided
was a persistent and often frustrating challenge throughout my self-directed drawing curriculum.
In the absence of axiomatic knowledge, a learner must engage in repeated hypothesis testing to
eliminate actions that will break a given approach. As my diary entry of June 15, 2021, attested,
it is important to understand which aspects of a process are inviolable and which are flexible,
particularly when learning to use a system like linear perspective:
Had I only been told about two of the basic principles— (a) that the cone of vision should
encompass the picture plane, and (b) that the station point should be located outside of
the picture plane—I could have saved a great deal of time. These principles may be
obvious to others, but without this knowledge, a seed of doubt was permitted to grow.
After deriving the principles piecemeal, I finally realized that the boundaries of the
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Figure 40
Some Shapes That Tessellate: Regular; guidelines by the author

Translation: Swap crosswise sides by sliding (do not rotate).
Rotation: Use two crosswise corners as pivot points to swap adjacent sides by
rotation.
Reflection: Exchange crosswise sides by translating or rotating and then
flipping.

Translation: Triangles will not translate, because no sides are crosswise.
Rotation: Use one corner as a pivot points to swap one adjacent side by
rotation. Mark center of remaining side as pivot point and rotate/swap ½ edge
onto the other half.
Reflection: Same as rotation, but flip each piece that you are swapping in.

Translation: Swap crosswise sides by sliding (do not rotate).
Rotation: Use three alternating crosswise corners as pivot points to swap
adjacent sides by rotation.
Reflection: Exchange crosswise sides by translating or rotating and then
flipping.

Note. The junction of all angles must equal 360 degrees. Otherwise, these guidelines
have not been evaluated for accuracy.
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Figure 41
Some Shapes That Tessellate: Irregular; guidelines by the author

Translation: Swap crosswise sides by sliding (do not rotate).
Rotation: Rectangles will not rotate. However, you can mark pivot
points in the center of each face’s edge and rotate opposite halves of
those face edges around these points (the first cut must end in a
corner).
Reflection: Exchange crosswise sides by translating and then
flipping.

Translation: Swap crosswise sides by sliding (do not rotate).
Rotation: Parallelograms will not rotate. However, you can mark pivot
points in the center of each face’s edge and rotate opposite halves of
those face edges around these points (the first cut must end in a
corner).
Reflection: Exchange crosswise sides by translating and then
flipping.

Same rules as above for each shape, then tile.

Note. The junction of all angles must equal 360 degrees. Otherwise, these guidelines
have not been evaluated for accuracy.
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picture plane determined the placement of the station point (i.e., the conceptual feet or
sitz bones of any hypothetical beholder of the finished artwork), and not the other way
around.
Even though the concepts articulated above seem obvious to me now, it took me up to the
last second of the drawing phase of my research to grasp them. As a result, I unwittingly
introduced distortions into most of my perspective drawings and frequently spent time solving
logical puzzles when I could have been exploring creative variations on a theme. Axiomatic
knowledge is essentially the opposite side of the coin from empirical knowledge; they function in
tandem. In my experience, overreliance on one without the other slowed or impeded learning,
whereas their synergistic combination was helpful for managing visual choice overload and
focusing my attention purposively and flexibly.
c. Tacit Knowledge. Knowledge is tacit when a knower has discerned meaningful
coherence by integrating an array of data encountered while attending from one or more
proximal subsidiaries (such as names, clues, movements, bodily features, or tools) to a distal
focal target (such as a person or thing, a percept or theory, a skill, a physiognomy, or a purpose).
The integration may be perceptual or insightful in nature. When someone perceives a human face
by automatically recognizing a fit among the eyes, nose, and mouth, they have demonstrated
perceptual tacit knowledge, even though they cannot immediately articulate the exact
coordinates of each feature in relation to the others. Similarly, scientists demonstrate insightful
tacit knowledge when they discern (often suddenly, after a long period of study) previously
overlooked relationships among sensory or rational phenomena and build encompassing theories
to account for them (Muñoz et al., 2015; Polanyi, 1966).
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In the former (perceptual) case, the whole is grasped before the parts are considered,
whereas in the latter (insightful) case, the parts are considered before the whole is grasped.
Training to develop sophisticated perception, such as the analysis of X-rays, combines aspects of
perceptual and insightful tacit knowledge: The whole is accessible immediately, but the relevant
relationship among the parts may not be recognizable until each is examined in detail. Thus,
unlike perceptual tacit knowing, tacit learning is not automatic, and unlike insightful tacit
knowing, it is not original. Tacit learning is deliberative and derivative. Tacit learners must
toggle between gestalt principles: As in the case of perceptual tacit knowing, tacit learners may
have the whole in view before they notice its parts. However, as occurs with insightful tacit
knowing, most will need to study the parts before they can comprehend the whole.
Like an unbalanced tripod, tacit learners have one foot in each of two camps (perceptual
and insightful), with a phantom foot hopping back and forth between both. The parallels between
perception and insight were not lost on Polanyi (1966), who said, “The logic of perceptual
integration may serve … as a model for the logic of discovery” (p. 2). Because learning to draw
in the realist tradition involves tacit learning, and thus, exhibits features of perception and
discovery alike, it presents an optimal platform for examining the phenomenon of tacit
integration, which is integral to his theory of tacit knowledge. In the context of my drawing
curriculum, tacit learning challenged me to attend to a myriad of disparate but related elements
within and among each of my projects, building greater attentional flexibility along the way.
The most detailed example of this occurred on July 18, 2021, in the midst of a project I
devised to draw a staircase in two-point perspective from a bird’s-eye view using perspective
projection (i.e., the pull-down method). While drawing, I progressed through several stages of
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perceptual tacit integration until a consequential moment shifted the attentional dynamics toward
insightful tacit integration (see Figure 42). The following excerpt from this session, which I
captured on video, documents my concurrent narration leading up to the cognitive event.
Transcript: From Perceptual to Insightful Integration through Tacit Learning
[00:29:34]

That's right, top of eight? There. That came down.

[00:29:56]

That right there. Okay, now let's do top of seven, which is also—
actually—

[00:30:15]

yeah—that's really bottom—bottom of eight—I guess?

[00:30:29]

And this one is like right there. So. Bottom of eight.

[00:30:39]

It’s like right there. Hmmmmm [long pause, pressing pencil tip
into one spot on the paper; then, grabs cell phone to view a
photo of the original 3D model].

[00:31:22]

Yeah it’s true—true—the first few stairs, really, you can't
really see [sets phone back down].

[00:31:30]

So we'll call it the top of seven. Right, and that's right there.

[00:31:38]

So we've got that, and then right-top of seven and

[00:31:48]

So like that, and this drops down.

[00:31:56]

Pretty much the same as that. Okay.

[00:33:03]

So I got up to and—Did I do top of eight? Because I haven't
checked it off.

[00:33:22]

The. That's that one.

[00:33:27]

Yeah, okay. Hmm … All right. And reestablishing where that
line of the wall is on the left. Kind of need to see that. Okay,
it's from here. This pulls down …
Okay, so that's the line. Now I know I'm going to—[inaudible—
clicks tongue].

[00:36:47]
[00:37:27]

Is that right? Measuring—HERE.

[00:37:49]

Yeah, I did the wrong one. It is sooo easy to get

[00:37:59]

misdirected here. I am going to be deleting a lot, you know,
erasing a lot of that. But it is helpful to have a line there to
start.

[00:38:27]

Okay, that just tells me kind of visually where we are.
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[00:38:33]

Okay, good. Yeah.

[00:38:43]

So that's coming down here. It's,

[00:38:50]

I guess—It's coming down there.

[00:39:00]

Okay [sighs]. How do I find this line?

[00:39:48]

So see where that is … But. Well, I guess I have to determine
where that six—

[00:39:58]

top of six starts, and that will be the intersection. Meanwhile

[00:40:09]

these lines are kind of confusing things.

[00:40:27]

Okay. Top of the stairs.

[00:40:40]

This is the left-top of six. Huh, interesting. That same mark—

[00:41:01]

Yeah, pretty much right there. That's—

[00:43:04]

Okay, so the—the bottom of one of these is the same intersection
point as the top of the other, even though there is a drop down.

This cognitive event—a flash of insight into an underlying principle of spatial
representation in linear perspective drawing—developed over a period of 13 minutes and 30
seconds after a triggering incident. That incident was my puzzlement over the location(s)
represented on my drawing by a plot point on the floor plan above. Seventeen seconds later, at
00:30:29 on the timeline, an equally pivotal incident occurred when I decided to double-check
my observations by reviewing the photograph I had taken of my original three-dimensional
model for the floor plan design (see Figure 43, right, for floor plan). Based on that image,
snapped from the targeted vantage point, I could verify that my drawing was progressing in the
right direction. In the next minute, I began drawing without interruption, at a slow and halting
pace. The process entailed dividing my attention among the floor plan, my pencil, my drawing,
and two acrylic triangles that I used to calculate measurements and draw straight lines. It was a
clumsy state of affairs coordinating all of those activities.
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Figure 42
Diagram: From Perceptual to Insightful Integration through Tacit Learning, 2021

Note. The yellow indicates the author’s vocal utterances; the turquois layer indicates the author’s
thoughts and actions.
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Figure 43
(left) 3D Staircase Model With Cubes; (right) Floor Plan & Elevation; 2021, by the author

After eight minutes, I hesitated, momentarily uncertain where to place my next line. In
the space of 36 seconds, I decided to proceed deductively; I based its location on the floor plan
coordinates of the sixth step of my staircase. Three minutes and 2 seconds later, It hit home to
me that the projecting corner of one step had the same plot point as the inside-corner of the step
immediately below it. Thus, I realized that one point in one-dimensional space equals two points
in two-dimensional space—a literal “unflattening.” I finally understood that I was translating
dots into lines across dimensional boundaries, creating a conceptual pop-up book of sorts. At
last, I could articulate what explained the sense of coherence that had been developing implicitly
throughout the exercise. That moment of insight demarcated a shift away from perceptual tacit
integration, which I was experiencing in the first four phases of drawing, to insightful tacit
integration, which I enjoyed for a period of 14 seconds before moving on.
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To recap, the sequence began in phase 1 when I started to wonder if the same dot on my
floor plan might represent two different points on my drawing. Feeling some doubt at the
beginning of phase 2, I double-checked my work against the photograph I had taken of the
model. Satisfied with that, I moved forward to phase 3, a stage that challenged my attentional
flexibility and working memory capacity. My emerging drawing served, but did not continuously
function, as my focal target. In relationship to it, my floor plan served, but did not continuously
function, as my main subsidiary—a location of indwelling that would have been stable had I
already possessed expertise in perspective projection drawing. In order to make sense of the floor
plan as a learner, I needed to dwell outside of it so that I could attend to it focally. This meant I
was subsuming to the floor plan particulars (e.g., my pencil, the triangles) that would normally
be subsumed at a higher level—to the drawing. Thus, the floor plan and my drawing implements
by turns served as subsidiaries to the drawing and as focal targets from the drawing, and by turns,
my drawing served as a subsidiary to the floor plan and a focal target from it. Such shaky
indwelling is characteristic of tacit learning, but as knowledge becomes ingrained, the location of
indwelling stabilizes. After I had begun to fall into a rhythm, hopping rather than stumbling
between subsidiaries, I eventually missed a beat. This initiated stage 4, wherein I articulated for
myself that the location of lines could be methodically deduced.
Up to that point, I had been working perceptually and deliberately, but by stage 5, thanks
to my in-depth study of subsidiary particulars along the way, I finally was able to comprehend,
with clarity, the spatial relationship between the floor plan and my drawing. As Polanyi (1966)
explained, “We may say that a scientific discovery reduces our focal awareness of observations
into a subsidiary awareness of them, by shifting our attention from them to their theoretical
coherence” (p. 3). In essence, the nature of tacit integration I was experiencing at that stage
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shifted from perceptual to insightful, but because I was learning rather than making scientific
discoveries or inventing things unforetold, my insight was merely derivative. Nevertheless, it
was still exciting to me. My reward was a reasonably competent line drawing of my staircase,
which I shaded in the next day before setting to work on a different version of the staircase: a
worm’s-eye view, which I completed on July 26, 2021 (see Figure 44).
Two months earlier, I enjoyed a similar but comparatively effortless insight while
drawing my fifth rendition of weathered branches that I had gathered from my sister’s yard (see
Figure 45). This time, the insight was more aesthetic than logical in nature. However, its
structure, characterized by the reorganization of proximal subsidiaries into a distal focal target,

Figure 44
(left) Staircase Outline; (center) Aerial View; (right) Worm’s-Eye View; 2021, drawings by
the author
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Figure 45
Woodland Debris V, 2021, drawing by the author

was nearly identical. On my drawing pad, the arabesque of the branches and my impressions of
their subtleties played the role of proximal particulars to a distal gestalt that became apparent
when a passing cloud occluded the sunlight overhead and brought to light a surprising reality: I
was not drawing branches, after all. I recorded the discovery in my May 31, 2021, diary entry:
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I found myself waiting a few seconds for the sun to come back out between passing
clouds that faded the stark shadows cast by the branches in my arrangement. I wanted
those shadows to come back! Part of the subject matter would disappear and reemerge. I
could see that the shadows and the light were really what I was drawing, not actually the
objects on the table. I was drawing the absence of light, and I needed light to see that
absence.
While I had been focused on the branches’ discrete features, a temporary change in
lighting shifted my attention to a more profound reality that encompassed not only the branches,
but every aspect of my drawing endeavor: Only light itself is visible. Tacit integration, a
hallmark of tacit learning that precedes the accumulation of tacit knowledge by a given learner,
was a documented phenomenon in my drawing curriculum. I experienced it as a welcome and
sometimes wondrous gift in both its perceptual and insightful forms.
2. Epistemically Felicitous Falsehoods. Epistemically Felicitous falsehoods, a term
coined by philosopher C. Elgin (2017) refers to representations, usually models or idealizations,
that are valuable for couching and conveying understanding despite being untrue. Examples of
felicitous falsehoods abound across academic disciplines: the ideal gas law in physics, the
concept of oligarchy in studies of political economy, or triangular trade in history. Felicitous
falsehoods serve as lenses, and like schemata, they encapsulate and streamline a manifold of
evidence under one conceptualization that reveals patterns of meaning across time and space.
Although felicitous falsehoods are not true, they can be considered to be "true enough" (p. 277)
to merit acceptance. They function as exemplars of particular phenomena. Importantly, however,
they are exemplars that accentuate pertinent features of the given phenomena while
"marginalizing, downplaying, bracketing, or overshadowing others" (p. 185). In this way, they
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highlight the most essential aspects of the phenomena needed to elicit understanding. By
supporting understanding, felicitous falsehoods pave the way for learners to "draw inferences,
raise questions, frame potential fruitful inquiries, and so forth" (p. 3). They are deployed in the
arts as much as in any other field.
In drawing, felicitous falsehoods (understood loosely, with less of an emphasis on
idealization) can help mitigate visual choice overload and working memory limitations that
confront an artist. My first experience with felicitous falsehoods in the context of this research
project demonstrated how they could be deployed as an attentional strategy to cope with visual
choice overload. Figure 46 exhibits my early-stage transcription of the lithograph of The
Capitoline Ariadne (Plate I, 41 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), my first Bargue exercise. When
hashing out the initial lines to transcribe it, I noticed that my gaze was bouncing back and forth
from details in the model that squared with the facial forms to shadows that obfuscated or
occluded some of that same information. Very quickly, I began to feel overwhelmed. My diary
entry of May 17, 2020, described how I was aided by felicitous falsehoods:
I need to think of a shape for the shadow and approximate it closely. Suddenly, I’m not
paying attention to the facts of the face itself, but the fiction (or factual fiction) of the
shadow. When I get to the shadows, I focus on the abstract shapes rather than on the
architecture of the face.
Although my sketch exhibited some flaws characteristic for beginners, such as the use of
curves too early in the process, I was on the right track in terms of my strategy to invent
plausible shapes. In the figure above, I conceptualized the chin, combined with a portion of the
cheek, as the head of a horned bull in relief against the surrounding shadows—a fictional
comparison that came in handy. While the lines describing Ariadne’s mouth in my drawing
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Figure 46
My First “First Marks” Bargue Transcription, 2020 (right), by the author

looked nothing like a mouth (at least not at the stage pictured), they described the play of light
and shadow on her face fairly accurately. In that sense, my bovine schema functioned as an
epistemically felicitous falsehood, albeit one that was not universal, because it was peculiar to
me as an individual.
Inventing shapes turned out to be a well-worn strategy endorsed by my instructor, who
frequently suggested it to new students during critiques. The practice allowed me to block out
potentially distracting visual information so I could focus my attention productively in one area
of the drawing and make adjustments in accord with adjacent shapes. In subsequent Bargues, I
employed the strategy more intentionally. For example, in my third Bargue exercise, I journaled
about various “facts” and “fictions” I observed in the model to aid my drawing (see Table 2).
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Table 2
Fact and Fiction, 2020, by the author
Fact

Fiction

Mix of Fact and Fiction

It is a statue’s foot in profile, facing
left. The top of the ankle is cut off,
like a jagged cylinder. The foot sits
atop a flat slab, and it hangs a bit
over that slab, on the edges. There
are five toes, with the three middle
toes hanging lower than the big toe
and pinky toe. There is an intense
light coming from above and frontwise,
throwing
severe
form
shadows, and the shadow over the
slab is a cast shadow.

Toward the right-side bottom of the
foot, I see a white totem "bird" lying
dead, mouth open, with a fearful
expression. A puzzle piece over the
bird, folded exactly into it, is a
"shadow snake" hissing, its mouth
wide. For the shadow under the arch
of the foot, I am struggling to find a
schema/shape that I can keep in
mind to help me represent it
accurately. I guess if you look really
closely, it is kind of like a spiky
cathedral or Christmas ornament,
especially if you subtract the part of
the form shadow that falls within the
light family.

The top of the snake’s head is
parallel to its neck. The snake's
tongue is a little lighter, a little closer
to being in the light family, than is the
rest of the snake. There is a phantom
diagonal up from the left-side ball of
the foot (crease) up to the shadow
that is over the ankle. That phantom
diagonal seems parallel to the top of
the foot.

Note. Observations refer to Profile of a Foot (see Figure 31).

The facts were direct observations that I judged to be in comportment with non-accidental reality
as it appeared to my eye. The fictions were interpretive conceptualizations I used to help me
perceive metric properties, particularly those of shadows, more accurately.
My second experience with felicitous falsehoods, in the context of my drawing
curriculum, demonstrated their value in regard to working memory. This example occurred while
I was working on a phased memory drawing assignment that spanned from February 25 to
March 30, 2021 (see Figure 47). The exercise involved drawing three-sided polygons from
memory. These included different kinds of triangles, as well as polygons with curved edges.
Unlike previous assignments, wherein the models were simple arabesques, this time they were
silhouettes (i.e., shaded-in values with no perimeter outline). Even so, the assignment was to
draw the implied arabesque from memory after a short period of fixation. This alone was
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Figure 47
Polygon Arabesques After Silhouettes, 2021, memory drawing exercise by the author

challenging, but the fact that my practice had lapsed in the intervening weeks made it more
difficult. My diary entry of March 30, 2021, documented the endeavor:
For this particular project, I’m having the most luck when I imagine the shape as
something, such as part of a raindrop, to understand it better. By contrast, when I’m
noticing that a given angle is obtuse versus acute, I have to be very careful that I haven’t
recalled this fact for the wrong angle!
In the figure above, the shape I had imagined as a raindrop is pictured in the lower-left
corner. Clearly, it was not a raindrop, because two of its sides were straight. However, my
interpretation of the curved side made it easier to recollect the polygon. While any shape a given
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artist imagines will be particular to that individual, the strategy of inventing shapes may be
applied universally. Therefore, the raindrop schema and other shapes I named along the way
arguably functioned as epistemically felicitous falsehoods.
My third encounter with felicitous falsehoods was captured on video on May 4, 2021,
while I was transcribing my fourth Bargue, Hand of a Woman Holding a Stone (Plate I, 6 in
Bargue & Gérôme, 2003). This Bargue included a wider range of midtones than my first Bargue
assignments had, so it was more difficult. Although I had employed the shape-finding strategy to
copy the arabesque and denote the dark values within the “shadow family” regions, it did not
immediately occur to me that I could also use it to shade in different value masses in the “light
family” regions of my drawing. Thus, through much of the drawing session, I had been heading
down the wrong road, trying to denote a range of subtle value transitions across a large, illdefined area. This brought a feeling of visual overwhelm flooding back, because my attention
was spread too thinly across the paper. The transcript below and the diagram that follows (see
Figure 48) document moments from this drawing session that led up to a cognitive event,
wherein I realized that epistemically felicitous falsehoods, in the form of invented shapes, could
once again come to my aid.
Transcript: Identifying Masses for Use as Epistemically Felicitous Falsehoods
[00:27:39]

I think I see something.

[00:29:13]

Well, I really hope I'm not making an awful mess here. It looks
… okay? Heh-heh-heh [nervous laughter].

[00:29:27]

It has to go up a little bit more, like a little point. Mmmm.

[00:29:31]

I'm taking this—— it's a little eraser. Just ah—— take the edge
off that shadow, just slightly.

[00:32:07]

Hmm. No, I have to find the other shapes in here!

[00:32:21]

I. I see. It's like, kind of like a light bulb.
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Figure 48
Diagram: Identifying Masses for Use as Epistemically Felicitous Falsehoods, 2021

Note. The yellow indicates the author’s vocal utterances; the turquois layer indicates the author’s
thoughts and actions.
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The decision to change tactics in shading midtone values developed over a period of four
minutes and 21 seconds after I initially noticed a discrepant mass, which served as a hint that
partitioning my shading efforts within discrete masses would be a more fruitful strategy than my
attempt to cover a large area at once. This cue, which I noticed 27 minutes and 39 seconds into
my drawing session (building on several earlier sessions for that Bargue assignment), was one of
two pivotal moments leading up to the cognitive event. The second critical pivot, my
identification of the discrepant mass as “a little point,” occurred one minute and 44 seconds later,
at 00:29:27 on the timeline. Over the next 2 minutes and 34 seconds, I failed to act on these
insights, despite a growing sense of doubt; instead, I stubbornly kept working within a large, illdefined area. This caused my level of visual overwhelm to increase. In response, I shifted away
from graphite to eraser and back again, but neither proved successful. Finally, I took heed of the
earlier cues. By naming the “little point,” I had hit upon a way forward, via felicitous falsehoods.
This led to identifying other “fictional” masses, including what appeared to my eye as a “light
bulb.”
Taking another look, the sequence leading up to this cognitive event encompassed five
phases, two of which were pivotal, because they contained seeds of insight leading to a strategic
shift. Phase 1, which lasted one minute and 33 seconds, involved a pivotal cue that I noticed
upon stepping further away from the drawing. During phase 2, which lasted only 13 seconds, I
did not consciously register the implications of the previous cue. Instead, I continued my
gradual, but very general approach to shading, standing close to the drawing. Nevertheless, a
nagging intuition prompted me to laugh nervously and remark that I hoped I was not making a
mess. Productive doubt and deliberation had set in. Phase 3 followed; over the course of three
pivotal seconds, the felicitous falsehoods strategy began to kick in, and I found the words to
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describe the cue I had identified in phase 1: a “little point.” In phase 4, I spent the next two
minutes and two seconds resisting these clues. Rather than start over, I attended to a different
region of the drawing and used my eraser instead of the graphite. Continuing into phase 5, which
lasted only 30 seconds, I remained in denial a little bit longer, shifting back from the eraser to
graphite again. Only after I took a break from smoothing edges and evaluated my progress did I
accept that those efforts were futile. By phase 6, I realized that I needed to find and invent names
for value masses so that I could focus my attention more effectively. This was the cognitive
event, a moment defined by my realization that charting sub-forms (e.g., a “little point,” a “light
bulb”) could serve as a mighty wand to wield against visual choice overload, even when working
in lighter areas of a drawing.
The examples noted above fit some of the criteria of felicitous falsehoods. It is important
to acknowledge, however, that because my usage is subjective and does not apply to universal
idealizations, some philosophers might dispute my application of the term to these experiences.
That said, the concept captures some essence of the phenomenon better than other theoretical
frames that I had considered.
Summary of Cognitive Factors
Three cognitive challenges predominated during my endeavor to learn realist drawing:
visual choice overload, limits on working memory, and complex attentional dynamics. Each of
these demands on my developing artisanal judgment were predicted in the literature on drawing
and cognition (see chapter 3). To cope with them, I relied on learning supports in the form of
knowledge (empirical, axiomatic, and tacit) and epistemically felicitous falsehoods, each to
varying extents. My most pointed experiences of visual choice overload occurred when I tried to
take in more visual information than my mind could process; for example, while sketching a
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carnation, transcribing Bargues, and drawing a teacup with an eye to achieving Goethe’s
principle of gegenständliches sehen [objective vision]. When I met with working memory limits
in the midst of memory drawing exercises, it became apparent that I needed to broaden my
repertoire of attentional strategies beyond vigilant focus to embrace the complementary
disposition of wide-angled awareness. Regarding such attentional dynamics, I sometimes found
it challenging to track relationships among individual parts of a drawing while keeping the whole
picture in view. This difficulty was most apparent during the creation of my en plein air series of
drawings, Woodland Debris, and while creating a perspective grid.
Knowledge served as a helpful learning support to mitigate complex attentional dynamics
and the demands of visual choice overload. It expanded my attentional flexibility, helped me
meaningfully select and segment visual data, and set in motion the progressive development of
rule-based forms on paper. Empirical knowledge resulted when I generated personal discoveries
through trial and error; for example, by measuring and counting shapes in a Bargue, observing
visual phenomena in accord with specialized terminology (e.g., vocabulary related to light and
shadow), producing value scales aligned to relevant optical concepts, or creating and
distinguishing specific compositional features within perspective drawings.
Although essential to the development of my artisanal judgment, empirical knowledge
often was contingent on axiomatic knowledge that bore upon it. Unfortunately, the latter was not
always at hand. When guiding principles were within reach, such as when I learned how to key a
drawing or find the axes of ellipses in linear perspective, I not only understood the value of
establishing a standpoint on which other compositional elements depended, but also how to go
about choosing and creating said standpoint. When guiding principles, such as the foundations of
tessellations or the concept of a VML for perspective projection were not provided in the course
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of instruction, I struggled to secure a successful point of departure for my drawings, even though
the point of doing so could not have been plainer. Similarly, when it came to finetuning
gradations within my value scales, it took me over a year to turn up a clear explanation of the
underlying logic (see Briggs, n.d.; Iten, 2020), which would have been valuable to me as a selfdirected learner, for assessing my progress objectively.
Tacit knowledge developed over the course of several projects; most notably in the midst
of perceptual drawing outdoors and practicing perspective. I accumulated it through a process of
tacit learning. This involved attending to a myriad of disparate but related elements within and
among my projects and indwelling, perceptually and deliberately, among parts and the larger
whole, one at a time. In the moments when I achieved a sense of coherence—in other words,
tacit integration—I gained insights into spatial relationships to be found within my drawings at
both local and global levels.
Finally, an additional learning support came in the form of untrue representations that aided my
understanding: epistemically felicitous falsehoods. These served as a corollary to knowledge and
helped me cope with both visual choice overload and working memory limitations. Felicitous
falsehoods provided a semantic aid for the syntactic tasks of Bargue transcription and memory
drawing. They empowered me to invent familiar shapes to identify and demarcate borders
between distinct areas of relative lightness and darkness in a given Bargue and add meaning to
otherwise generic line drawings that I was attempting to memorize.
II. Situative Factors Bearing on the Development of Artisanal Judgment Through Drawing
I set out to understand how situative factors that I encountered in the process of learning
to draw bore on the development of my artisanal judgment. The data I generated coalesced
around two salient themes: (A) how the social context within which I was learning to draw
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impacted the development of my artisanal judgment, and (B) adaptations I made, as a selfdirected adult learner, to be successful in that context.
A. The Importance of Context: Drawing as a Social Practice
Situated cognition theorists are concerned with investigating how thinking derives from
the social practices in which it occurs. They are interested in people, considered within the
context of the world, and the world as a reflection of the people who inhabit it. Through a
situative lens, learning is conceptualized along large spans of time and space and across broad
cultural, historical, and political relations. It can take place in any setting: the workplace,
schools, or in the context of everyday life. Whether or not deliberate instruction is provided, the
focus of situated cognition is on learning, and not on instruction per se (Lave, 2019). The desire
to ground my drawing practice in a wider social context was evidenced, after a long hiatus,
through my exploration of potentially compatible communities of practice (Lave & Wenger,
1991), and within those, the existence of helpful artistic apparatus and peer learning
opportunities.
1. Exploring Potential Communities of Practice. Within the situative framework, a key
model of everyday learning is the community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991). A community
of practice (where “practice” is understood as a dynamic body of tasks and activities that
changes in response to improvisation among participants) is “a nexus of ongoing cultural
practice … . [that is] composed of its changing participants. … [and] is a condition of possibility
for learning” (Lave, 2019, p. 140). It is a social system wherein shared practices are endowed
with meaning based on the norms and expectations of a community. A community of practice
has three basic elements: (a) a community, (b) a domain, and (c) a practice. For example, a
community of practice wherein graduate students learn to do scientific research in geology
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would comprise: (a) a community of graduate students and faculty members, (b) the domain of
geology, and (c) shared practices related to scientific research that might include weekly
meetings, journal writing, a repertoire of scientific procedures, and fieldwork (Sadler, 2015).
What constitutes knowledge and learning in a community of practice is culturally
dependent (Sadler, 2015). Communities of practice set forth the “conditions of possibility for
learning” (Lave, 2019, p. 145) within themselves. These possibilities can be located in the
differences among individuals relative to their engagement within the nexus. Differences may
pertain to activities, physical movements, circumstances, resources, spatial dimensions, or
relationships, and should result in various forms of peripheral participation and learning
trajectories among groups and individuals. A range of perspectives are relevant to the study of
communities of practice, especially those of participants, who are well equipped to evaluate their
position and status within the community and the quality of learning conditions available to
them. A proper situative analysis of a community of practice concerns possibilities for learning
attributable to the community as a whole and to its components in relationship to one another
(Lave, 2019).
Lave and Wenger (1991) identified newcomers to any community of practice as engaging
in legitimate peripheral participation, a conceptualization of learning that is concerned not with
form or technique, but with an analytical viewpoint in terms of social processes and concrete
relations. All three components of the phrase—legitimate, peripheral, and participation—are
meant to be considered holistically; hackneyed reconstructions, e.g., “legitimate central
participation,” are meaningless in terms of the theory. For example, any learning within a
community of practice is considered to be peripheral by nature. By contrast, more seasoned
participants in a community of practice are understood to be engaging in “full participation,” not
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“central participation” (Lave, 2019, p. 37), because learning is not their primary focus. Likewise,
the community of practice framework is not designed for exclusionary purposes, such as the
determination of whose participation may or may not be considered legitimate.
a. Communities of Practice Relevant to Drawing. During my research, I discovered
several communities of practice, distinct and overlapping, composed of individuals, artists, and
academicians who loved to draw or teach drawing. These included communities centered on
drawing as a domain unto itself and others focused on domains related to or encompassing
drawing, as well as sub-domains of drawing. As a fairly shy, introverted librarian who had been
almost completely out of touch with the art world since college in the early 1990s, my
investigation began in books and library databases. Thanks to an afternoon searching
ULRICHSWEB™ Global Serials Directory for scholarly journals on my topic, I discovered
TRACEY: Drawing and Visualization Research and Drawing: Research, Theory, Practice. Both
publications are international in scope and delve into contemporary research focused on the
theory and practice of drawing. The websites associated with each of them led me to discover
additional fora in which to launch my exploration.
The communities of practice I encountered that were centrally focused on drawing
included organizations that sponsored publications, conferences, classes, or listservs. On the
TRACEY website, I became aware of the Drawing Research Network (DRN), established in 2001
as “an international network of individuals and institutions who are involved in some way with
improving our understanding of drawing, for example through professional practice, education or
general interest” (Loughborough University, 2021, n.p.). I joined their email discussion forum,
the DRAWING-RESEARCH list, which facilitates conversations among drawing educators and
enthusiasts and advertises a variety of events, such as meetings convened by the Drawing
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Research Group at Loughborough University and symposia like the annual Thinking through
Drawing (TtD) conference I attended in 2019, which was hosted by the International Drawing &
Cognition Research and Education (IDCR) association. Just as writers have retreats, The TtD
community of “drawers” as they call themselves, holds retreats too, by the sea in Wales, for
example. They also sponsor an online workshop called “Unlock Your Hidden Drawer,” the
naming of which I contributed to through a discussion on the DRN listserv.
On the same email discussion list, I learned about a recent publication by arts educator S.
Simmons III (2021), titled The Value of Drawing Instruction in the Visual Arts and Across
Curricula. In the introduction on page 22 of that book, the author listed several relevant learning
communities, including some I discovered through my own research and others that were new to
me. Browsing bookstores was also useful. In early 2019, a trip to a nearby Barnes & Noble
alerted me to Classical Drawing Atelier, a fascinating introductory text by J. Aristides (2016)
that revealed a previously hidden world of realist art academies.
Subsequent forays across the World Wide Web led me to instructors and institutes
dedicated to drawing instruction, such as Atelier Rousar (D. Rousar, n.d.), which offers the
memory drawing course in which I enrolled, as well as a class in sight-size cast drawing that I
did not have time to sample. Another promising resource was D. Iten’s (2021, n.p.) website,
which offered courses on shading techniques. I did not manage to fit Iten into my itinerary but
hope to enroll online at a later date.
In addition to the drawing-specific communities mentioned above, I discovered larger
communities of practice: organizations, publications, schools, and web-based platforms that
encompassed drawing among a broader set of pursuits in the visual arts. For example, my
Classical Drawing Atelier book (Aristides, 2016) cited the Art Renewal Center (ARC), an
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organization “devoted to promoting education in realistic art both in training techniques and in
the proliferation of historical art works” (Art Renewal Center, 1999, n.p.). The ARC website
listed the following among its principal values: skill-based training, visual literacy, realist art,
artistic iconoclasm, thematic meaning in the arts, dialogue among artists and educators, the
rediscovery of classical methods through research, and the preservation and sharing of
information resources, such as the Classical Realism Journal (formerly Classical Realism
Quarterly), relevant to realist art. The ARC represented a marginalized perspective that I found
refreshing, albeit polemical. Its rigid stance on art, which in my view was extreme, was offset by
its promotion of skills-based education and its position as a David relative to the Goliath of the
art establishment. By guiding students to approved ateliers, it appeared to be the only
organization paving the way for practitioners who wished to learn classical drawing and painting
techniques. I felt grateful to the ARC for its role in providing that opportunity and supporting
artists who practiced within the realist genre.
If I had not visited the ARC’s website, it may have taken me months longer to discover
ARA Boston (n.d.), the wonderful atelier where I engaged in exceptional classes at an
introductory level and intend to enroll for the long haul if I am able to do so on a part-time basis.
My instructor there was Eric Johnson (2020), whose classes I wholeheartedly recommend to
anyone who would appreciate learning from an artist who is patient, encouraging, effective,
generous, and highly skilled.
Another community I encountered dedicated to traditional artistic practices was the Guild
of St George, a charity for arts, crafts, and rural economy founded by Victorian polymath, artist,
and social critic John Ruskin, whose legacy I admired. Its motto, “There is no wealth but life”
(2019, n.p.), expressed Ruskin’s aspiration to build a sustainable society rejecting the destructive
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aspects of capitalism in favor of alternatives that might promote human flourishing more
successfully. The guild sponsors a museum, lectures, The John Ruskin Prize for contemporary
art, and The Big Draw, the world’s largest drawing festival and charity “dedicated to raising the
profile of drawing as a tool for wellbeing, thought, creativity, social and cultural engagement”
(2021, n.p.). While I did not participate in any of their events during the research and writing
phase of my project, I hope to incorporate their events into my lifelong learning journey.
I discovered other broad-based communities of practice relevant to me as a developing
artist among publishers of newspapers, podcasts, and web-based platforms in the visual arts. For
example, The Art Newspaper’s digital newsletter, a “daily digest of essential news, views and
analysis from the international art world” (1990, n.p.) introduced me, from the comfort of my
email inbox, to distant yet fascinating forces in the cultural realm, such as the advent of nonfungible tokens (NFTs), controversies surrounding cultural appropriation, the repatriation of
antiquities and Indigenous art, and new insights into old masterpieces revealed during their
restoration. I began following the paper’s podcast titled A Brush With (Luke, n.d.-a), which
features in-depth interviews with contemporary artists, and more recently became aware of their
other podcast The Week in Art (Luke, n.d.-b). Last in this category was Colossal, “an
international platform for contemporary art and visual expression that explores … . visual culture
through the latest in fine art, design, modern craft, street art, photography, illustration, science,
and animation” (2021, n.p.). Visiting Colossal via its gorgeously illustrated website and Twitter
feed never failed to fill me with a sense of awe, delight, and inspiration. It nourished within me a
deep admiration for the spirit of creative ingenuity and imagination kept alive through the work
of visual artists across the globe today.
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I encountered still larger communities of practice that supported the arts and humanities
more generally. There were too many of these to list, but the Center for the Humanities at the
Graduate Center, CUNY merits mentioning, as do a couple of podcasts. On April 9, 2021, the
Center for the Humanities hosted a free online conference on ZOOM titled Figuring Magic
Realism: International Interpretations of an Elusive Term. Unfortunately, I heard about the
conference late and had to work that day, but because I was working from home, I managed to
offset my schedule to fit in about 20 minutes—enough time to become aware of contemporary
artists like Julie Heffernan practicing in the magical realism genre. My interest was piqued.
The podcasts that I enjoyed, Spark & Fire from WaitWhat (founders of TED Talks) and
The Deep Place, by Joy Prouty and Joel Mckerrow, used narrative interviews to celebrate
imaginative people and their creative endeavors. Thanks to the asynchronous nature of podcasts,
I was able to listen to some episodes of each in the midst of my drawing projects. I appreciated
the wisdom shared.
Finally, I discovered communities of practice focused more narrowly, not on visual arts
or drawing writ large, but on niche sub-domains of drawing. These were essentially educational
organizations and online platforms supporting practitioners interested in mechanical drawing,
illustration, and figure drawing. I learned about some of them by searching YouTube, others
from art instructors, and still others via the Listen Notes podcast search engine. The most
surprising domains among this group were architecture and mechanical drawing, which I
stumbled upon in YouTube while struggling with exercises in linear perspective. I recalled
having heard about technical drawing as a field of study, but I had never imagined it would
interest me or provide useful techniques for creating art. The relevance of architecture to my
enterprise was less surprising, but unexpected, nevertheless. After finding succor in tutorials
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provided by technology and design institutes in the UK, United States, and Ethiopia, I came to
appreciate, on a personal level, arguments for better integration of the arts and science across
curricula.
Thanks to my podcast habit, I came across 3 Point Perspective (Terry et al., n.d.), a
podcast about illustration which led me to SVSLearn (2021), an online school offering
asynchronous classes on a range of topics central to illustration, including the Basic Perspective
class I completed, taught by illustrator David Hohn (n.d.). Since my dissertation research
concluded, they unveiled new classes in advanced and practical perspective taught by the same
instructor. I look forward to enrolling in those classes soon.
Lastly, a podcast called Love Life Drawing, created by an artist named Mayko and her
son Kenzo to help artists succeed at drawing the human form, alerted me to online communities
for life drawing enthusiasts. During a pandemic, when physical access to models was often
unavailable, specialized websites provided an important service to artists who drew people. The
first such website was Croquis.Cafe (Withers & Withers, 2022), which featured weekly drawing
videos with nude models in poses comparable to what one would find in a traditional drawing
class, as well as still photographs and 360 degree poses on a turntable. Some of the content was
free when I visited the site early in my research, but since then, the site began charging a
membership fee. Due to time constraints, my research did not encompass the anatomy project I
had planned, but if I had pursued the effort, I probably would have built visits to the
Croquis.Cafe into my repertoire. I may decide to do so in the future.
A similar website recommended at ARA Boston (n.d.) for the study of dynamic
movements in figure drawing was Scott Eaton’s Bodies in Motion (Eaton, 2022). Inspired by the
motion study photographs of Eadweard Muybridge (1830–1904), Eaton built the site to support
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the study of human anatomy by artists. Like Croquis.Cafe, a large portion of its content could not
be accessed without a paid subscription, but it did offer free images, some of which I consulted
as visual references for quick gesture sketches while warming up for extended drawing sessions.
Through Eaton’s site, I discovered that he offered a well-reviewed online course in anatomy for
artists. I did not find the time to enroll, but I am glad to know it may be an option for me down
the road.
As an adult learner, I found that my awareness of and ability to interface with the
aforementioned communities helped to reinvigorate my passion for art and drawing and begin
rebuilding a sense of myself as an artist. Participating in many of these communities costs time
and money. I will have to choose carefully among them, for neither time nor money is a limitless
resource. My first plan of action is to continue taking classes at ARA Boston part time. Due to
the pandemic, I may participate online, but I am glad that I live close enough to the school to
attend classes in person should this become feasible for me. Between terms, I hope to
supplement those lessons with content on the SVSLearn platform and maintain my connections
to the DRN and TtD communities.
b. Artistic Apparatus. A recurrent theme in the data I accumulated while learning to draw
concerned artistic apparatus. This term refers to the set of tools and equipment that underpin a
shared practice among members of an artistic community in the domain of drawing. As had
occurred in my art school days, I was expecting to be confronted with a list of drawing supplies
to purchase. This did occur. For example, the supplies for my Bargue classes included standard
items, like a drawing board, an easle, 2B graphite pencils, a kneaded eraser, a vinyl eraser,
Strathmore 18” x 24” white drawing paper, and masking tape. They also included items that
were new to me in the realm of artmaking, such as an Olfa brand utility knife with a snap-off
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blade, a sandpaper block with 150-grit sandpaper, Canson Mi-Teintes paper, a mahl stick,
wooden skewer sticks, a spool of thread, and a pendant-sized weight.
Tying the weight to a length of the thread produced a plumb line, a tool for positioning
elements vertically, which I had never used before. The wooden skewer stick, held in the hand
during the “first marks” phase of transcription, served as an aid to measurement and comparison
of proportions between the Bargue and my drawing. The mahl stick, a wooden baton with a
cushioned ball at one end, allowed me to rest my wrist without smudging my drawing. The
Canson Mi-Teintes paper functioned as “good paper,” onto which I learned to transfer my
preliminary drawings once they had progressed enough to begin adding shadow masses. Finally,
the utility knife was to be used in conjunction with the sanding block, to sharpen pencils
(specifically, Staedtler brand pencils). Learning about these tools was a revelation to me. They
made drawing much more satisfying than I realized it could be. Not only did they make the work
of drawing easier and more graceful, but they endowed me with greater control over my drawing
media than I had experienced before.
My Bargue instructor produced a short video demonstrating how to sharpen pencils
properly using the sanding block and utility knife. The first time I followed his instructions, I
worried I might break every lead or cut myself in the process, but it was not so bad. Even though
I broke plenty of leads along the way, pencil sharpening became therapeutic with repeated
practice. I particularly enjoyed watching the point take shape (see Figure 49). My diary entry of
March 14, 2021, described the pencil sharpening process:
I had to sharpen and sand all of my pencils twice, or about twice, for this shading stage.
The paper really eats up the pencil. When I was sharpening my pencil, I noticed how
beautifully the wood curls off from the lead, like a fleur de lis, or the vents in a violin.
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They spiral like a nautilus, moving according to Fibonacci’s law. It’s just beautiful, and a
“Zen” experience.
Keeping a jar full of sharpened pencils was helpful while drawing, so I could swap in a
sharp one immediately whenever a tip dulled, without interrupting the flow of my work. My
instructor encouraged this routine, particularly when he noticed in students’ drawings evidence
of a sluggish pencil tip. Sharpening several pencils at the same time proved to be a worthwhile
habit.

Figure 49
My Freshly Sharpened Pencil With Attached Wood Shaving
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As an alternative to a lightboard, a window was recommended equipment in my class at
ARA Boston for transferring drawings onto good paper (E. Johnson, 2020). My first experience
with transferring a drawing occurred at my sister’s house, where I stayed, worked, and studied
remotely throughout the summer of 2020 while helping to care for our mother after our father
passed away in an accident that May. Figure 50 shows my transfer in process for Profile of a
Foot. With the aid of sliding glass doors and the sun, I was able to trace my transcribed line
drawing through the Canson Mi-Teintes paper.
Travelling from Massachusetts to stay at my sister’s in Ohio meant that I could not carry
all of my supplies with me. I made do with a couple of modifications. To stand in for the easel, I
packed a flat drawing board that I could prop upright. Unfortunately, this meant sitting while
drawing, instead of standing, but it sufficed during those few months. Although I forgot to pack

Figure 50
Using a Window to Transfer My Bargue Transcription Onto Good Paper
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my mahl stick, the backyard woods offered a long thin branch, which I gratefully adopted in its
place (see Figure 51).
One of my most memorable experiences with artistic apparatus occurred during fine artist
C. Wheat’s (2019) session at the TtD conference. Cheri’s workshop took place at SUNY New
Paltz, where she taught her trade. In her afternoon workshop, I had the opportunity, alongside
several other participants, to try my hand at a sampling of drawing techniques and conventions
passed down through the Western canon, from Ancient Rome, to Giotto, to the Renaissance
masters. What struck me first was the classroom, which was outfitted with a kind of furniture I
had never used: rows of benches called drawing horses (see Figure 52).

Figure 51
(left) Easel and Mahl Stick at Home; (right) Drawing Board and Branch at My Sister’s, 2020
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Figure 52
Some Drawing Horses in a Classroom at SUNY New Paltz, 2019

Once a staple in art academies, drawing horses are wooden benches that feature one
raised end (the neck of the “horse”) to support a drawing board propped upright, whilst a student
sits astride the bench, able to see and mark upon the drawing surface and also peer over it, at the
instructor or any subject matter to be drawn. I took my seat on one of the horses and enjoyed
Wheat’s fascinating lesson. Afterward, I recorded my observations in my diary of October 5,
2019:
A sheet of newsprint was clipped to my drawing board, as well as a square of sandpaper,
and I was supplied with vine charcoal, which I rubbed against the sandpaper to produce a
beveled edge. By rotating my wrist with charcoal in hand, I could control when the
sharpest edge came into contact with the paper and when the blunter edge touched down,
instead. Combining this subtle move with undulating pressure, between light and heavy,
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took getting used to, but the more I practiced, the more beautiful the line, like a ringlet of
hair catching sunlight in its curves (see Figure 53).
Artistic apparatus played an important role in initiating me as a learner into classical
drawing practices shared among the cognoscenti in the domain of realist art. My encounters with
specialist tools and equipment felt like a rite of passage, as if I had crossed a threshold into a
previously obstructed sphere. This is what I had missed out on decades ago, in my art school
days. It is what my student loans, finally paid off in my forties, were originally intended to fund.

Figure 53
Charcoal Exercises at the Drawing Horse, 2019, by the author
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Now that I had tasted what I had been seeking in vain all those years, there would be no turning
back.
c. Peer Learning. Applying the communities of practice model, peer learning became
evident to me as a theme in my data. In the case of my atelier training at ARA Boston, my fellow
students and I were all novice members of a classical drawing community, whereas in other
learning contexts, such as conferences, it was more difficult to discern who was more versus less
seasoned among those involved. In either case, however, learning flowed in many directions;
most typically, from instructor or facilitator to students or participants, but there were undeniable
moments when I learned from peers, whether those peers were fellow students or other
conference attendees.
The first activity at Drawing Acts, the TtD conference I attended in 2019, was to partner
up and create a collaborative drawing with a fellow conference attendee (see Figure 54). I joined
forces with Lisa, a student at SUNY New Paltz. Seated beside one another at a table with a large
sheet of newsprint and a box of markers and crayons, Lisa and I dug in and started playing
together on paper, hashing out improvised marks. We began with tentative scribbles and wavy
lines in orange and yellow. These initially merged into squiggles, but with the swap of a marker
for a crayon, they became punctuated dots.
As we drew, I found myself listening, visually, to my partner. She would drop a
succession of dots and I would respond in concert, dashing out a rhythmic mosaic of spiral
forms. I would lay down a bundle of tightly coiled red ink, and she would hitch a wispy flow of
blue crayon fast behind its tail. During this process, my awareness vacillated between
nervousness and deep, focused relaxation. I could feel my breath move down through my arm
and out, into my drawing strokes.
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Figure 54
Collaborative Improvisational Sketch, 2019, by the author and her partner Lisa

Representational forms started to appear. My partner drew a large eye in the background
that I transformed into a sunrise peeking above the horizon, its eyelashes as radiating beams.
Next, I drew a cat in profile, and she added the lower half of a human face, its nose and mouth
also in profile view. Our hands moved over the paper as if dancing with our drawing
implements—first slow and steady, next fast and furious, then gently gliding, or gouging. When
the time was up, we had produced a colorful conglomeration of lines and shapes. Our final
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drawing looked like a naive cacophony of lines, but it was also engaging and playful, perhaps
because it possessed an invigorating resonance of the dynamism entailed in its creation.
In addition to the instance just described, which reminded me that working with kindred
spirits provides a boundless fount of creative energy, I also learned informally from my fellow
attendees. For example, during a break at the same conference, I sat down with the Boston-area
artist Martha Chason-Sokol while she paged through her sketchbook. It was filled with gorgeous
abstract line drawings that were much more than doodles. These images took my breath away.
She had drawn them with Faber-Castell Pitt brush pens in a wide array of colors. Her work
inspired me to try that medium in my own drawings (see my Woodland Debris series of
exercises: Figures 29, 32, 45, 61, 62).
Regarding learning from fellow students, the most notable moment occurred in the midst
of my third class at ARA Boston, while I was working on my fourth Bargue drawing, Hand of a
Woman Holding a Stone (Plate I, 6 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003). By examining a more-advanced
students’ drawing in progressive stages of development, I was able to focus on key differences
among those stages as the drawing developed. In essence, time slowed down enough for me to
catch up. I recorded the experience in my diary on March 3, 2021:
In class today, one of the other students was working on this same hand, although she
was quite a bit farther along. Based on her conversation with the instructor [which I was
able to hear on ZOOM], it sounded like she was a full time student at the atelier. Her
drawing was beautiful! The shading was exquisite. To me, it looked even more beautiful
than the original Bargue rendition. I felt a little envious, but also very inspired to try to
get a similar effect. Yet, I realize that mine will necessarily look different. I noticed that
she didn’t emphasize the exterior outlines. The instructor made a few suggestions to her
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about areas to finish, which did include darkening some of those outlines to match the
model. It reminded me that I really need to dig in and go for that shading!!
Because of the digital environment of that synchronous online class, I was able to stand at
my easel and attend to my own drawing while simultaneously listening to others’ critiques going
on in the background. If something caught my ear, I could break away from my drawing and
look at the screen. In a studio environment, chances are that I would have been too far away from
the instructor and my fellow classmates to overhear their conversations during individual
critiques. Happily, I did not lack for opportunities on ZOOM to learn from the experiences of my
peers.
The online format also helped me learn from peers across time. Because the class had
access to a Google drive where all the students uploaded our in-process drawings to a shared
folder, the instructor was able to refer to a series of those drawings to illustrate for me the
concept of big form modeling, which allows an artist to capture the tonal landscape of a drawing.
Even though he had already provided an expert live demo, I did not fully grasp the details of
what was involved until he exhibited the more advanced student’s in-process drawings to
illustrate what my drawing should look like across successive stages. The ability to save and
easily access digital surrogates of my own and other students’ work across progressive moments
of development provided a significant boost to my learning. By March 14, 2021, I had begun to
put the peer learning into practice (see Figure 55). In my diary entry of that date, I wrote:
I could see her decisions. I could see that she was really just going for the darkest darks
with her shadows. Staying away from the middle tones. So I followed that example,
squinting my eyes at my own drawing and the Bargue, and stepping back from it all
several times. Sometimes I agreed with where she drew her boundaries. Other times, I did
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not agree. I had already done a fair amount of detail work, which meant that my forms
still had more curves and fewer straight borders, but I think that’s okay. When I stepped
back from my drawing by the end of the weekend, I noticed that it looks fairly brutalized
compared to how I was drawing before. But this is actually good! I needed to take bold,
decisive steps to generalize and simplify forms, and denote the different value planes.
There were benefits and drawbacks to taking a drawing class through a remote,
synchronous digital learning platform. Because I did not take the class in person, I cannot make a
direct comparison. I can only speculate that there may have been more bonding and camaraderie
among students in a face-to-face classroom environment, due to the peripheral interactions that

Figure 55
Hand of a Woman Holding a Stone: Big Form Modeling (a), 2020 (left), drawing by the author
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typically occur in physical proximity to others (e.g., pre- and post-class conversation; watercooler interludes; the role of body language, pheromones, and shared space in human relations),
but the online classroom afforded alternative intimacies, such as being privy to one another's
critiques, that might not have occurred in person. In sum, interacting with fellow members of a
community of practice in the domain of drawing proved to be a valuable feature of my learning.
B. Learner Adaptations to Situational Features of Drawing
Another situative factor bearing on the development of my artisanal judgment through
drawing was the necessity of making adaptations to accommodate my learning as a self-directed
adult (Knowles et al., 2005). These included inhabiting a somatic “activity system” (Collins &
Greeno, 2010, p. 335) that influenced my perceptions, actions, and introspections, and leveraging
affordances and invariants of activity (Greeno et al., 1993) to effectuate the transfer of learning
between projects.
On the occasions that I drew in my sister’s back yard, two things became salient: My
time and space on this planet, like everyone’s, is limited. How quickly the earth turns under the
sun and the shadows shift! In one brief hour outdoors, the subject matter changes. Time waits for
no one, especially a person who is juggling learning with the everyday demands of life,
relationships, caregiving, dissertation writing, and a career. While drawing outdoors, I was
surrounded by nature. I heard robins, blue jays, chickadees, red-winged blackbirds, and cardinals
chattering at the bird feeder. Chipmunks darted out from the flower beds.
The ability to spread out one’s supplies under the sky and trees and to breathe clear air in
privacy is not available to everyone. For a range of economic and social reasons, just under 65%
of families in the United States own their own home. In my age group of people aged 50 and up,
the rate is higher, at 74% percent, but has been declining since 2004, and is expected to continue
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dropping relative to other age groups (Herbert, 2021). For those without a private yard, parks
help tremendously, but any stranger may observe an artist practicing there. It was a luxury to
know I would not be approached from behind. In my apartment back home, I drew indoors,
butting up against a finite number of walls and surfaces available to support mark making.
Happily, my husband tolerated newsprint strewn down the hallway and over doors.
It is probably self-evident that time and space limitations presented a continual challenge
throughout my project. What follows is a discussion of other situative factors I faced while
learning to draw, and how I navigated them despite occasional hand cramps, stiffness, sore feet,
and fatigue. These entailed activities, physical movements, circumstances, and resources—
aspects of my learning environment of interest to researchers who focus on situated cognition.
1. Inhabiting a Somatic Activity System. A situative learning environment is “an
activity system, in which one or more individuals participate along with material and
informational resources” (Collins & Greeno, 2010, p. 335). Where drawing is concerned, this
activity system is grounded in somatic, embodied experience. Because learning to draw
combines bodily movement and perception with introspective cognition, it can serve as a
laboratory for the study of grounded cognition (see Ariely, 2008; Barsalou, 2008; Borghi &
Cimatti, 2010; Freedberg & Gallese, 2007; Kantrowitz, 2012; Lakoff, 1999; Tversky, 2001)
within dynamic activity contexts. Through my research, I generated somatic learning data of a
sensory, kinesthetic, affective, and spiritual nature that exhibited all three features of grounded
cognition: perception (e.g., vision), action (e.g., movement), and introspection (e.g., internal
mental states and emotions).
a. Perception. My fierce pursuit of drawing principles opened new portals of perceptual
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experience. I monitored my physical feelings and learned specific ways that my senses could
function as instruments in drawing, not only to perceive a stimulus, but to gauge and motivate
my developing work. At ARA Boston, I began cultivating perceptual habits, such as squinting at
subject matter to home in on essential features, aligning my body carefully when making visual
measurements, taking breaks to examine my drawing from further away, and closing one eye to
facilitate mapping three-dimensional references onto the two-dimensional surface of my paper. I
documented one such example in my diary of Sunday, May 17, 2020:
I definitely succeeded this time in laying down lines BEFORE making measurements.
About three quarters of the way through, I started feeling fatigued, and I probably could
have done more correcting measurements. At this stage, I kept relying on my eyes.
Toward the very end, I was again better about adjusting lines according to measurements
with the bamboo stick. Next time, I’d like to try the sight-size approach, or whatever they
call it when you stand back and use the thread to do measurements and adjust (closing
one eye).
My instructor had advised students to exercise our perceptual muscles by estimating
where to draw our lines, after which we needed to test our accuracy with the wooden skewer
stick. The above reflection attests to importance of intentionality when learning to hone one’s
perceptual skills. It requires focused concentration and energy.
b. Action. My learning endeavors presented kinesthetic and sensory challenges.
According to Simpson (1966), the term kinesthetic refers to "the muscle sense; pertaining to
sensitivity from activation of receptors in muscles, tendons, and joints" (p. 20). It results from
the body’s effortful interaction with sensory stimuli, involving fine and gross motor acts. The
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following incidents were representative of the typical state of affairs concerning action within the
somatic activity system surrounding me as a learner.
In Wheat’s (2019) workshop, I was delighted to hear that one’s own body may stand in
for a plumb line if the latter is not at hand. Gravity, Cheri explained, could guide the artist. We
could use our bodies to pull down the line. She maintained that the purpose of gaining
knowledge and skills is not the end goal; it is what leads to the ability to work intuitively, so you
can draw a circle that traces the pattern of your breathing in and out as you round its edges
(personal communication, October 6, 2019).
While embarking on the shading of my third Bargue transcription, Profile of a Foot
(Plate I, 5 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), I struggled to create smooth lines. It was the first time I
had progressed to adding shadow masses. Without prior experience and practice, I lacked the
fine motor coordination and muscle memory needed to proceed with ease and grace. This was
documented in my diary entry of September 28, 2020:
Even with the mahl stick, my wrist feels sort of wobbly. I’m hoping I’ll gain better
control of my hand by repeating the strokes over and over again. I find that it helps to
keep sanding my pencil to a sharp point, so it grabs the tooth of the paper better. I have to
remind myself to breathe. I keep holding my breath. Need to breathe … Started off really
slowly, with wiggly lines. So now, I’m flicking the pencil faster, and the lines are coming
out finer and surer. That’s good!
With concerted effort, I began to train my hand. This involved double-checking my
pencil grip with the instructor and making the adjustments he recommended, such as holding my
pencil loosely at its top, between the tips of my thumb and my middle and index fingers. Two
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days later, on September 30, 2020, I made further improvements by repositioning objects in my
workspace:
Because I’m right-handed, I discovered that I had my Bargue model drawing on the
wrong side (left), and my drawing of it on the wrong side (right). I swapped them, which
allows me room to manipulate the mahl stick and use the sweeping stroke to draw. Thank
goodness! Now I’m able to achieve a much better quality of line for shading purposes.
Learning fine motor techniques was invaluable to manipulating my drawing media to
achieve classically realistic effects. That said, students and practicing artists are well advised to
balance fine motor development with gross motor exercises, taking a holistic approach. To do so,
I engaged in a series of gestural figure sketches as warm-ups for more painstaking projects (see
Figure 56). Although drawing from a live model is best for achieving a sense of vitality in figure
drawing, pandemic-related constraints prohibited that possibility. Thus, I consulted free images
on Scott Eaton’s Bodies in Motion website, which I used for visual reference. To each session, I
brought a stick of vine charcoal and a box of stubby charcoal, as well as latex gloves, because I
disliked the feeling of charcoal on my fingers. For my drawing surface, I taped a 6-foot sheet of
newsprint to the front door of my apartment. Then, with my computer propped on a pedestal,
displaying the model, I set a timer for a few short minutes of drawing abandon.
My first warm-up portrayed an aerial silk acrobat (see Figure 56a). When the sketch
came into being, I was not yet allowing myself to loosen up. Instead, I spent a half hour fleshing
out details and shadows; not a recommended approach for developing gross-motor coordination.
Even so, according to my diary of January 24, 2021, I did obtain some benefit: I was "drawing
with a full expanse of arm and body movement, which felt good. I felt in accord with the acrobat,
pushing off from her rope. She was hanging, floating, rocking, but also holding firm. And so was
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Figure 56
Warming Up: Large Gesture Figure Drawings, 2021, by the author
a

b

c

Note.
a Aerial
b Man

Silks Acrobat, 30-minute warm-up sketch, January 24, 2021.

Reaching Up Into the Sky, 1-minute warm-up sketch, February 13, 2021.

c Ballet

Dancer Commencing a Turn, 2-minute warm-up sketch, March 13, 2021.

I." Despite the doorknob getting in my way and the inaccurate result, I enjoyed the exercise and
the overall composition.
Another warm-up depicted a man stretching his arms upward (see Figure 56b). In
contrast to the first of my warm-ups, I spent far less time—only 1 minute compared to 30—
sketching him. This limitation allowed me to focus on the feeling of my own body instead of
obsessing over surface details. On February 13, 2021, I documented the experience in my diary:
Drawing the image felt almost like dancing, and my movements were fluid, to the point
where I could feel the lubrication within my own tissues—the fascia in my back, arms,
and shoulders as I swooped up to sketch his arms; then a good stretch in my back and
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hips as I dragged the charcoal down his leg. The image looks very loose and abstracted,
but it has a nice kind of energy and movement, especially revealing torsion in the model’s
back. It was pretty liberating!
The warm-ups proved worthwhile. By March 13, 2021, after completing a sketch of a
ballet dancer about to commence a turn (see Figure 56c), I wrote, “What I love about these
gesture drawings is working large—stretching and getting to plunge into the spirit of line
making. I feel a connection between my body and my drawing, and with the movement of the
model.” Large gesture warm-ups helped to condition my body for drawing while generating a
sense of connection with my subject matter. I suspect this occurred due to the activity’s
stimulation of mirror neurons, which, according to cognitive scientist Gigi Luk, are implicated in
social behaviors like empathy (personal communication, February 26, 2013). Gesture drawings
of this kind would be even better with newsprint covering the walls of an entire room, affording
a quick succession of many sketches together. If I hone my skills well enough, maybe one day I
will have an art studio where this would be feasible.
c. Introspection. The somatic nature of the activity system surrounding me as a learner
not only incorporated perceptual and motor features, but propelled introspection through them. In
terms of grounded cognition, a meditative form of introspection rounded out my experience of
drawing. By centering my gaze, striving to represent my observations, seeking systematicity, and
practicing movements repeatedly, I created space for consciousness to begin expanding beyond
the self. This was reflected in my diary entry of October 7, 2021:
I felt overwhelmed by the amount of filling in of shadows I needed to do on my foot
Bargue, especially since I had laid down the first layer of lines while holding the pencil
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the wrong way. But as I kept pushing my pencil, I started to feel mesmerized, and relaxed
into it.
On January 9, 2021, I observed how using an eraser to carve away at my third Bargue,
Hand of a Woman Holding a Stone (Plate I, 6 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), created “an
interesting fluctuation between meditative and striving.” The phenomenon grew stronger over
time, the harder I worked. On March 14, 2021, in the midst of the big form modelling stage of
the same Bargue transcription (see Figure 57), I noted:
It’s very meditative. I enjoy listening to music while I’m drawing. Today, I listened to
Renaissance radio on Pandora. Kind of fun to imagine myself as an apprentice in a
workshop! I also listened to a drawing scholar speaking on YouTube. It’s quite
something how I’m able to draw intentionally and make sense of a lecture at the same
time. It’s a different brain network, I guess. Very liberating for thinking!
Repetitive practice in drawing enhanced introspection on many levels. Sometimes, it
resulted in a sense of heightened receptivity, an experience that aligns with Amann’s (2003)
category of spirituality in her framework of somatic learning. This occurred after several days of
geometric study for my tessellations exercise, as described in my diary entry of January 2, 2021:
A very interesting side effect of this exercise was that I started dreaming of geometrical
patterns in my sleep, which was pretty cool. It felt enjoyable. One time in waking life,
when kissing my husband, my experience was amplified by an internal sense of being
inside of a kaleidoscope, with geometrical shapes falling into delightful fractal patterns.
That was a new twist on “seeing stars,” thanks to the tessellations. Of course, I give my
husband some of the credit, too! The phenomenon was fascinating, and also encouraging, in light
of an epiphany reported by Heffernan (2014/2020). Heffernan discovered her artistic vision after
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Hand of a Woman Holding a Stone: Big Form Modeling (b), 2020, drawing by the author
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spending hours upon hours in the studio, practicing her painting. The effort resulted in seeing
new images in her mind's eye, almost like movies that she was receiving, not from the immediate
environment, and not generated entirely from within herself either. Shortly thereafter, she began
focusing on achieving specific effects of light and shadow in the traditional still life genre. The
new mode of working became the ground from which the figures of her painterly imagination
ultimately emerged.
Other introspective contexts along the way were not always so joyful. Frustration loomed
large in the emotional sphere of my somatic experience. Before I discovered the class in basic
linear perspective from SVSLearn (2021), I attempted my own perspective exercise based on
some preliminary reading on the subject (see Norling, 1999). While Perspective Made Easy
provided an excellent treatment of one- and two-point perspective, it lacked a broad overview.
This meant that I did not learn about multiple-point perspective, even though it is the most
typical kind of perspective encountered in daily life. On reflection, the phenomenon of multiplepoint perspective makes intuitive sense, but as a newcomer to perspective as a representational
system, I became preoccupied with its most salient rules—the ones I had most frequently read or
heard about.
Norling’s (1999) book recommended practicing with bricks. For my first exercise (see
Figure 58), I selected as my subject matter the jewelry box passed down to me from my
grandmother. It was shaped like a brick except for its two mirrored doors; these added an
interesting twist. I intended to draw it in one-point perspective. This worked for the box itself,
but not for the doors, which I had left open, at different angles. I was puzzled and wrote about
the situation in my diary of February 13, 2021:
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So, maybe it was a multi-point [sic] perspective problem? But if so, how many vanishing
points? I felt overwhelmed and confused. What I did notice was that once I found a
vanishing point I could use, it made it very easy to just use a ruler to make the lines. I
didn’t have to eyeball anything. This made life easier, until I noticed that with three
separate vanishing points on the paper, my object disagreed with itself. Each door was
tilted slightly differently, and the main box was aligned to yet another point in the
middle.

Figure 58
Jewelry Box in Perspective: First Attempt, 2021, by the author
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This passage reveals that I was beginning to intuit the cause of my confoundment but did
not yet grasp the necessary knowledge about multiple-point perspective to move beyond the
cognitive bottleneck. My frustration was significant, not only due to the misapprehension, but
also because my drawing was very small, which precluded my ability to draw with precision.
Despite a vague sense of discouragement, I decided to try again. On an emotional level, I was
still motivated to learn.
On the second attempt, I made the drawing larger, but as a consequence, my vanishing
points fell outside of the drawing board. This made it impossible for me to use them as guides.
Frustration set in further. Although I knew I must be on the wrong track, I decided to set up a
much larger “drawing board” for myself on the hallway wall (see Figure 59). It seemed absurd,
but I reasoned that I would be able to accommodate all of the vanishing points if I used a
yardstick to reach them. That effort, as grand as it was, did not succeed either. I documented the
outcome in my diary entry of the same day:
Well, I was wrong! Making a sketch of that jewelry box, about life-size (about the size of
a shoe box), still found me reaching for vanishing points well outside of the paper that I
had stretched all down the hallway. Exasperating!! I felt drained and exhausted after this
effort. This frustrated me a lot because I didn’t have an instructor to ask questions of.
Despite the freedom afforded to me as a self-directed learner, autonomy came at a price.
It meant that I leaned more heavily than necessary on building my knowledge empirically, even
when axiomatic approaches might have served better. To quote a proverb (with a healthy dose of
self-compassion and humor): “Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other.”
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Figure 59
Setup for Jewelry Box in Perspective: Second Attempt, 2021, by the author

Having reached my wit’s end, I finally completed the drawing, but with only one vanishing
point, which served as a guide for the box alone. For the positioning of the open doors, I relied
on guesswork (see Figure 60). Although the result looked better than my flawed efforts to apply
the principles of linear perspective, I was not satisfied. I cared more about learning
Brunelleschi’s ingenious system than making a pretty drawing. I am thankful that I remained
emotionally resilient and subsequently had the opportunity to take a perspective class through
SVSLearn (2021).
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Figure 60
Jewelry Box in Perspective: Third Attempt, 2021, by the author

2. Toward Learning Transfer: Leveraging Affordances and Invariants of Activity. A
situative lens on learning may reveal consistencies and inconsistencies in the application of
knowledge across situations, allowing theorists to recognize patterns and principles that operate
as discrete features of learning domains within communities of practice (Greeno, 1997). This
phenomenon is called transfer, and it “depends on constraints and/or affordances that are
invariant under the transformations that change the learning situation into the transfer situation”
(Collins & Greeno, 2010, p. 337). Through participation in my self-directed drawing curriculum,
I experienced some transfer of my learning across situations. Some transferable concepts
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included the cone of vision, perspective guidelines detailing how objects appear larger and
darker the closer they are to the viewer, how cast shadows progressively darken as distance
decreases between a casting object and a relevant surface, and the role of a value scale in keying
a drawing.
Most transferred concepts were originally shared with me by instructors, in axiomatic
form, but empirical practice across different situations helped to solidify my learning. The main
indicator that transfer had occurred was when I applied a given method or axiom in a new
context unprompted, of my own accord. In most such cases, my axiomatic awareness already had
endured testing through trial and error. Thereby, my knowledge had expanded, increasing my
capacity for perceptual reorganization. In short, transfer allowed me to perceive and capitalize on
the relevance of particular drawing concepts and techniques beyond the situations in which I had
initially encountered them.
One of my nature sketches, pursued independently of classwork, illustrated my
experience with transfer. This was Woodland Debris III (see Figure 61). Recollecting my Bargue
instructor’s recommendation to begin a drawing with straight lines, I resisted my inclination to
denote curves from the outset. According to my diary of May 15, 2021,
I used the same pen set as yesterday, and the same general approach, although instead of
drawing a hard, curved, definite line, I began with a very sketchy, unsure, straight line all
around. As before, I sketched in the outline of the object, and afterward, the outline of the
shadows, and filled in from there.
Another example of my experiences with transfer was evident in my initial shading, on
May 31, 2021, for Woodland Debris V (see Figure 62). As I had learned to do in my Bargue
classes, I began blocking in the darkest shadow masses before adding lighter areas. It is unlikely
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Figure 61
(left) Woodland Debris III Underdrawing; (right) Finished Sketch; 2021, by the author

that I would have taken such a systematic approach before my embarkation on a classical
drawing curriculum.
Summary of Situative Factors
From the standpoint of situated cognition, my endeavor to learn realist drawing meant I
engaged in legitimate peripheral participation, to a greater or lesser extent, within communities
of practice that were new to me. Notable aspects of my participation entailed an orientation to
artistic apparatus, opportunities to learn from peers, inhabiting a somatic activity system, and
learning transfer between projects. I surveyed a fairly wide range of communities across the
scope of my research, including four basic types: (a) those focused on drawing (e.g., the DRN,
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Figure 62
Woodland Debris V In Process, 2021, drawing by the author

the Drawing Research Group at Loughborough University, TtD, the IDCR, Atelier Rousar), (b)
those that encompassed visual arts more broadly (e.g., the Art Renewal Center, ARA Boston, the
Guild of St George, arts-focused newspapers, podcasts, and web-based platforms), (c) those
centered around arts and humanities generally (e.g., academic centers, podcasts), and (d) those
dedicated to niche sub-domains of drawing (e.g., organizations and online platforms for
mechanical drawing, illustration, and figure drawing). As a self-directed learner, exploring these
communities of practice helped me to ground my drawing practice in a wider social context. In
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other words, my participation in such communities provided relevant yardsticks against which I
could begin to gauge the development of my artisanal judgment alongside the contributions of
others and the communities’ established and evolving norms.
Within these communities of practice, particularly ARA Boston and TtD, I most
appreciated becoming acquainted with artistic apparatus and learning from peers. In terms of
artistic apparatus, I was introduced to tools and equipment (and techniques for using them) that
afforded greater control over my drawing process. These included art supplies (e.g., plumb line,
wooden skewer stick, mahl stick), practices like extreme pencil sharpening or transferring a
drawing onto good paper, and equipment for drawing (e.g., easel, drawing horse). In many cases,
the introduction felt like a rite of passage that had been years in the making. In terms of peer
learning within communities of practice, I discovered that some of my most exciting insights
resulted from informal exchanges with fellow participants or originated within their work. These
moments occurred at the TtD conference, where I partnered on a collaborative drawing and
admired another attendee’s sketchbook, and during a Bargue class at ARA Boston, wherein the
instructor helpfully referenced the drawing process of a more advanced student who was
working on the same Bargue as I. Although I often enjoy working alone, these experiences
brought home to me the importance of nurturing connections to kindred spirits, both in person
and online, to propel inspiration and inform my own artisanal decision-making.
The activities within which I participated drew me into a somatic activity system (see
Collins & Greeno, 2010) that influenced my perceptions, actions and introspections and thereby
served as an exercise in grounded cognition (see Ariely, 2008; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010;
Freedberg & Gallese, 2007; Kantrowitz, 2012; Lakoff, 1999; Tversky, 2001). The perceptual and
emotional aspects of Bargue transcription, combined with drawing classes at the TtD conference
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and perspective exercises, involved consciously adjusting my body relative to the drawing
surface and my subject matter. I would squint or close one eye strategically, or use gravity to pull
vertical lines, sometimes bearing with mounting frustrations as I attempted to piece together
principles of perspective. My actions were both kinesthetic and sensory in nature. Bargue
exercises were particularly kinesthetic concerning the manner in which I held and manipulated
my pencil and how I learned to position my drawing surface to accommodate my dominant hand.
Warm-up drawings were more sensory in nature, due to the sheer physicality of working fast and
large. They helped me build a connection among my body, my breath, my drawings, my subject
matter, and my tools. Within the somatic activity system that enveloped me, Bargue drawing
encouraged introspection by centering my attention and creating space for my consciousness to
expand. Meanwhile, my tessellations project prompted me to become more receptive to internal
imagery.
Finally, I experienced transfer, a desired outcome of situative learning, by leveraging
affordances and invariants of activity (see Greeno et al., 1993) between my Bargues and my
perceptual drawings en plein air. Specifically, I borrowed the straight-line technique
characteristic of the “first marks” stage of Bargue transcription for use when sketching the initial
outlines of fallen tree branches and sticks that I observed outdoors. Additionally, I applied a
shading strategy learned in my Bargue class to the same endeavor, denoting the darkest darks
before laying down areas of successive lightness.
III. The Relationship Between Imaginative Expression and Artisanal Judgment in Drawing
A primary purpose in undertaking this research was to analyze the interplay of judgment
and imagination in my drawing practice. In other words, I wanted to understand what impact the
process of developing artisanal judgment through systematic drawing instruction and practice
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might have on my self-perceived capacity for imaginative expression. The data I generated
centered on two salient themes: (A) my initial, unhelpful assumptions about the nature of
imaginative expression in drawing, and (B), surprising insights into the role learning supports
could play in developing imaginative expression in my drawing practice.
A. Unhelpful Assumptions About Imaginative Expression in Drawing
Despite conducting a thorough review of pertinent literature to inform the design of my
self-directed drawing curriculum, I brought to the endeavor some assumptions about imaginative
expression that were ultimately unhelpful to my drawing enterprise. These pertained to the roles
played by reproductive imagination (i.e., “drawing out of one’s head”) and productive
imagination (i.e., “drawing from the mind’s eye”) in drawing. For purposes of this research,
reproductive and productive imagination, put simply, are to be understood as comparable to
visual memory (see Kant, 1781–1787/1998; D. R. Rousar, 2013) and “little-c” creativity (see
Coleridge, 1847; Kant, 1781–1787/1998; Simonton, 2013), respectively. In terms of reproductive
imagination, I falsely assumed that my pedestrian imaginal sketches were merely
disappointments and of little value to me. In terms of productive imagination, I mistakenly
believed that pictorial ideas should always emerge spontaneously, suis generis, from my head,
and that the ability to articulate my existing pictorial ideas through drawing was of greater
consequence to my work as an artist than generating new ideas through drawing.
1. Reproductive Imagination: Drawing Out of One’s Head. “Drawing out of one’s
head” is a colloquialism used to describe an artist’s ability, without observing a model, to
transcribe on paper visual schemata stored in memory, resulting in an image that appears
believable to beholders, regardless of whether the subject matter is realistic or fantastic. It can
also be used in a different sense, more strictly akin to productive than reproductive imagination:
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the unfettered, signature expression, via lines on a surface, of universal archetypes through the
blueprint of an artist’s inner being, without recourse to visual references. There are syntactic and
semantic implications of “drawing out of one’s head.” The first definition ostensibly belongs in
the syntactic category, whereas the latter aligns more closely with semantic concerns. It was not
always possible, however, to disentangle syntactic from semantic issues. Nevertheless, let us
begin with data I generated about drawing from imagination, which at face value, mattered in a
syntactic sense. This conceptualization of “drawing out of one’s head” aligns to reproductive
imagination (i.e., visual memory).
A personal goal when I embarked on my learning journey was to improve my ability to
draw from memory, to expand the range of visual subject matter available to me beyond
immediately accessible material objects, existing images, and physically present beings. I
casually hypothesized that I could do so by building a quality mental storehouse of visual
schemata via observational drawing practice and memorization. Had I been determined to test
that hypothesis rigorously; I would have produced a longitudinal study rather than a relatively
short-term autoethnography. This is because it would have taken me multiple years of sustained
practice to build the level of skill I desired. I knew that inflated expectations over the course of
this comparatively short study could prove discouraging, especially in a domain like art, where
genius is the presumed price of entry. Thus, instead of setting an unreachable goal, I maintained
a growth mindset (see Dweck, 2012) to keep myself motivated throughout the project.
Accepting my limitations prevented me from quitting, but as expected, moments of
frustration still occurred. In my first imaginal drawing (see Figure 63), a sketch inspired by M.
Oliver’s (2004) poem, “How Everything Adores Being Alive,” I struggled to convey, in
charcoal and graphite, how it might feel to be a winged beetle drinking nectar from a flower, as
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Figure 63
Beetle Drinking Nectar Near a Spider’s Web, 2021, imaginal drawing by the author

in the words of the poem: “What if you had wings / and flew / into the garden, / then fell / into
the up-tipped / face / of a white flower, … / oh happy prisoner— / sighing, humming, / roaming /
that deep cup?” (p. 20–21). After completing an illustration of the poem “out of my head” on
January 1, 2021, I wrote about the effort in my diary:
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I wanted the view to be as if the viewer were inside the flower with the beetle, but instead
we wound up hovering above the flower. I could not figure out the perspective. Although
no spiderweb appeared in the poem, I visualized one in my imagination, so I added that,
but realized I was having a lot of difficulty with it. Spider’s webs, as complex as they are,
are iconic. It’s not hard to recognize them, so why was I having such a difficult time
drawing one?
Before putting pencil and vine charcoal to paper, I had made the false assumption that a
spontaneous imaginal sketch was of little value if it did not conform to my standards of
believability or so-called realism. In fact, the emergence of the spiderweb, seemingly out of
nowhere, allowed me to bring forward subconscious associations between the poem and the
precarity of life. Spiders and their ilk wait in the shadows for every beetle, today or another day.
Because of mortality, life is all the more precious. Oliver’s poem is a celebration of life in every
possible form. My illustration, however clumsy, could not diminish its joyousness, and with
further development, might accentuate some readers’ appreciation of it.
I concluded that a beginner’s imaginal sketches, no matter how syntactically riddled with
memory gaps, may offer potentially valuable semantic insights. In other words, even though such
exercises revealed deficits in my reproductive imagination, they contributed to the development
of my productive imagination. Students who are attuned to the potential of silver linings, who
can see their flops as fortuitous, may benefit creatively while gaining the sustenance to persevere
in the training of visual memory. Even if my sketches looked nothing like Leonardo’s, it made
good sense to produce as many of them as I could, and perhaps journal about them, too. In short,
my pedestrian imaginal sketches proved to be semantically useful, and thereby motivated me to
keep practicing and working toward making syntactic improvements.
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2. Productive Imagination: Drawing From the Mind’s Eye. Productive imagination in
drawing can be understood in terms of the second definition mentioned above. To disambiguate
the two meanings, I will refer to this latter version as “drawing from the mind’s eye.” A creative
pursuit, “drawing from the mind’s eye” is chiefly semantic in nature but may also have syntactic
implications. Schaefer-Simmern (2003), whose research focused on recurrent patterns in the art
of ancient and Indigenous Peoples, children, and folk artists, argued that “an inherent
consciousness for artistic, gestalt form exists in the human mind and in art born of that
consciousness” (p. xx). He understood this consciousness as a source of limitless combinations
of shapes—most commonly circles, spirals, and formations of horizontal and vertical lines.
Through it, artists of any class, sex, race, nationality, age, or time period could improvise
endlessly vibrant variations on archetypal themes and natural subjects like trees, the human
figure, eyes, and faces.
I am skeptical of the methodology employed because I disagree with the implicit
assumption that folk art and art created by ancient and Indigenous Peoples is necessarily more
instinctively driven than culturally informed. One could just as easily locate pure geometric
shapes in Eastern and Western art over the centuries. However, I agree with Schaefer-Simmern
(2003) that art instructors should not impose, uninvited, conventions that may not have emerged
from the primal root he called consciousness of artistic form. Arts educator R. Emerson
(Jackman) Knight Braun, known as Jackie Braun (1988) referred to the same phenomenon as
visual concept, and promoted “drawing from the mind’s eye” in the workshops she taught. She
drew a clear distinction between drawing from a visual concept and drawing from memory. The
latter was to be avoided.
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The case made by Schaefer-Simmern (2003) and Braun (1988) is compelling in regard to
young children, for they are sensitive and impressionable, open to a panoply of creative
possibility that should not be unduly foreshortened. Among adolescents and adults, though, I see
no harm in introducing additional aesthetic genres to the drawing repertoire and helping students
develop their visual memory. So long as students continue to engage in a range of drawing
activities that attune them to universal elements and their own impulses, they need not be
discouraged from imitating inspirational artworks and recollected imagery to inform a broader
range of expression, both syntactically and semantically. Denying students such opportunities,
when they want to learn, is unfair, dispiriting, and limiting.
Based on an artist’s talk given at the Vermont Studio Center, it seems that Heffernan
(2014/2020) felt nearly as hindered in art school as I did by notions of pure visual concepts and
artistic genius. For years, she countenanced the expectation, inculcated during her art school
days, that ideas should emerge suis generis from her head. Yet, this disposition was not serving
her art. When she finally allowed herself to follow her instincts and engage in self-directed study
of historical works and methods, she made a discovery: Her most original images emerged via
conversations with existing works of art. When I heard Heffernan’s story, I felt vindicated.
Ironically, I also saw more clearly the merits of Schaefer-Simmern’s (2003) and Braun’s (1988)
pedagogical philosophies, as a complement to the more systematic approach that Heffernan
(2014/2020) ultimately embraced.
Despite its limitations, the framing brought by Schaefer-Simmern (2003) and Braun
(1988) to “drawing “from the mind’s eye” helped me appreciate, even more than I already had,
the dynamic nature of the two-person drawing I composed with Lisa at the TtD conference in
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2019. It also helped me to make sense of some practices I observed while studying tessellations.
About the latter, I wrote the following in my diary of January 2, 2021:
It is interesting to note that, during my YouTube wanderings, I found out that many
people create tessellations by making haphazard cuts into their polygons, rather than
imposing a predetermined shape from the beginning. After their tessellation has been
created, only then do they find a figure within it to represent, going with the flow of the
irregular stencil they’ve produced. In this case, the geometric aspects of the drawing are
effortless. Rather, the emphasis is placed on imagination, post hoc.
My engagement in research on learning to draw ultimately revealed a false assumption
that underpinned my original inquiry: Like Heffernan (2014/2020), I had expected that pictorial
ideas should emerge spontaneously, suis generis from my head, and that the ability to articulate
them as given was of greater consequence to my work as an artist than generating new ideas
through the process of drawing itself. I now think that both are of equal value and are mutually
beneficial. In other words, I think that generating new pictorial ideas through drawing is just as
valuable for my imaginative expression as the ability to articulate my existing ideas through
drawing. Not only does productive imagination play an important role in composing drawings
systematically and intentionally, but in a complementary sense, it is more accessible through
intuitive, improvisational drawing than I had initially envisioned.
B. Surprising Insights on Supporting Imaginative Expression in Drawing
Analysis of the data revealed surprising insights on learning supports to promote
imaginative expression in drawing. In terms of reproductive imagination (i.e., “drawing out of
one’s head”), I confirmed my suspicion that research and observational drawing can improve
imaginal drawing from memory and discovered that constructive drawing may circumvent visual
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memory limits. In terms of productive imagination (i.e., “drawing from the mind’s eye”), I came
to embrace within my repertoire a less glamorous but effective approach to imaginal expression
in drawing: a deliberative process known as problem finding (see Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi,
1976).
1. Supporting Reproductive Imagination. Through my research, I realized that no
matter how pedestrian syntactically, my imaginal sketches were useful because of their semantic
attributes. Reaping this benefit kept me motivated to keep practicing and honing my skills.
Toward that end, I discovered two useful ways to improve syntactical rendering: conducting
research and learning constructive drawing techniques.
Because my effort to bring a spiderweb into my fist imaginal illustration felt ham-handed,
I decided to learn more about what spiderwebs look like and how they are made. It was
wintertime, so I pursued this research on the internet, browsing scientific articles, Google
Images, and YouTube videos documenting the eight-legged weavers at work. Despite observing
great variability among spiders and spiderwebs, I saw enough examples to grasp a visual sense of
the prototypical spiderweb and drew some studies (for an example, see Figure 64). I recorded the
process in my diary of February 13, 2021:
[While drawing,] I followed the path of a spider as I had observed the movement on
several of the videos. The spider builds the secondary frame of her web first, followed by
the spokes, and then goes to the center, where she begins to spiral her web in a tight circle
around the center. Once this “eye” of the web is finished, the spider climbs across one of
the spokes, moving a little bit further toward the periphery, and begins another, more
widely spaced spiral. This spiral keeps crossing multiple spokes that stretch from the
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Spiderweb Study, 2021, schematic and observational drawings by the author
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Note.
a Starting
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the secondary (peripheral) frame.

c Constructing
d Finished

the spiral, with pentimenti.

sketch.
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center outward. The fresher the web, the tighter the lines of the spiral, but over time, or
from wind and rain, they start to sag between their buttresses, creating an umbrella effect.
Once I had studied a few spiderwebs, it was time to test my hypothesis that imitative
practice, based on close observation, could improve my visual memory of spiderwebs (and thus,
my ability to represent them in imaginal drawings). Figure 65 provides an illustration of that
experiment. I wrote about it in my diary entry of March 16, 2021:
At first, my little imaginal sketches of spiderwebs required plenty of preparatory gazing
at my original reference—the actual studies of real spiderwebs. They were pretty clunky.
It really did help to do those studies, to intentionally make note of features present in

Figure 65
Imaginal Spiderwebs: (left) Initial Sketches; (right) Subsequent Sketches; 2021, by the author

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

312

spider webs and see how they are made, part to whole. I think that next time I incorporate a
spider web into an imaginal drawing, it might look a little bit better, at least to my eye. I
definitely feel more empowered about drawing a spiderweb now.
In addition to the empirical approach to imaginal drawing described above, my pursuit of
an education in perspective revealed an axiomatic system for bolstering an artist’s visual
memory. This system is known as constructive drawing. In my asynchronous online class on
visualizing drawing in perspective, I learned how a draftsperson can use simple shapes to build
imaginal drawings of any given object from a myriad of angles, without recourse to visual
references. Unfortunately, I did not have time to complete the course exercises within the bounds
of my research timeline, but I noted my observations about the method in my diary of July 31,
2021:
I found out that is why imaginative drawing is sometimes called constructive drawing.
It’s because you are using perspective cube shapes as 3D spatial representations, from
which you can sculpt and carve into the virtual clay of your drawing. Chisel away to
create your people, places, objects, and animals, using the knowledge in your head, not
just what you see in front of you. This is liberating. It’s very, very exciting!
Learning constructive drawing techniques affords greater imaginative freedom in
drawing by reducing demands on working memory. Through it, I hope to become less dependent
on visual references when they are not available. It promises to power the invention of drawings
from “out of my head.”
2. Supporting Productive Imagination. My misconception that pictorial ideas ought to
emerge spontaneously, as if from the mind of an artistic genius, did not serve me. Under the
aegis of that ideal, the power of inspiration lay in the hands of a mysterious and fickle muse.
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Such luck or magic may occur often for some, or occasionally for others, but it puts one’s artistic
agency and autonomy at risk. I discovered this on my own, but with great effort and nearly
against my will. Had it not been for multiple grueling attempts to successfully render a two-point
perspective drawing of a bedroom based on the floor plan assigned in my Basic Perspective
class, I may have overlooked one of the most important lessons of my dissertation research:
Progress in imaginal drawing may emerge through slow and deliberative experimentation; it
need not arise suddenly, like a bolt of lightning.
The images in Figure 66 exhibit a selection of viewpoints I captured on camera of a
three-dimensional paper model that I had built from the floor plan in that assignment. Those
shots, among others, were candidates for the perspective view that I ultimately chose to render.
By snapping them, I was able to play with different eye levels and compare the visual impacts.
Each perspective angle told a slightly different story about the scene. More experienced or gifted
artists may have been able to visualize such distinctions without the use of a model; however,
such an expectation of myself, as a novice, would have been overly ambitious and could have
hindered the development of my imaginative drawing ability.
My decision to build and photograph a three-dimensional model did not initially have
anything to do with artistic agency. Rather, it emerged as a result of my struggle to comprehend
mechanical aspects of perspective drawing. For example, I had already selected the position of
the spectator relative to the scene. My chosen cone of vison centered on the corner between the
bed and the window, locating the spectator across the room from it. I had briefly considered
other angles for the drawing, relative to the floor plan, but settled on the corner view fairly
quickly. Ultimately, I had not given enough thought to alternatives, much less tested them out.
Through the process of experimenting with different eye levels (i.e., worm’s-eye and bird’s-eye
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Figure 66
Problem Finding for a Perspective Assignment (With a Consistent Cone of Vision), 2021, by the
author
a

b

c

Note.
a worm’s-eye

view (high)

b bird’s-eye

view (high)

c bird’s-eye

view (low)

views), however, I realized that I could have played with alternative placements for the cone of
vision, as well. Testing different options revealed outcomes I could not have foreseen through
visualization alone.
In future exercises, I plan to experiment with and evaluate a broader variety of
viewpoints before committing to one. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) described this kind of
deliberative approach to one’s compositional decision-making as problem finding, which they
defined as “the way problems are envisaged, posed, formulated, created” (p. 5). According to
them, problem finding is highly correlated with artistic originality. In my view, it also expands
the range of possibilities for imaginative expression. The next time I tried the problem-finding
approach, it was intentional (see Figure 67). I documented the experience in my diary entry of
July 18, 2021:
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I decided not to give up my idea of creating my own floor plan for perspective projection,
but I wanted to keep it very simple. I wanted to be sure to use my imagination! I
purchased a set of colorful cubes and positioned them in a three-dimensional shoebox
grid that I made for myself, lined with graph paper. I decided to make a simple staircase,
and wanted to have a good look at them, so I set them up in this little scene and then
snapped a bunch of photos with my iPhone from a lot of angles, straight-on, worm’s-eye,
and bird’s-eye view.
The imaginative potential of problem finding was an exciting discovery for me. It
promises to unveil stories that might otherwise elide artists and beholders of their works. An

Figure 67
Problem Finding for an Invented Staircase, 2021, by the author
a

b

Note.
a

bird’s-eye view (medium)

b worm’s-eye

view (low)
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artist who takes the time to experiment with problem finding need not appeal to the muse.
Although counter-intuitive, this deliberative process can open the mind’s eye in a way that
visualization alone cannot. Problem finding is available to artists prior to and during the creation
of drawings and may be engaged during any drawing project. Perhaps linear perspective is
particularly amenable to problem finding, because its purpose is to represent the world through
the eyes of another. According to the notes of June 10, 2021 that I took during my Basic
Perspective class,
The emotional valance of a story can be communicated through perspective. Bird's-eye
view empowers. A steep bird's-eye view implies a feeling of vertigo. Worm’s-eye view
may imply a feeling of overwhelm. Straight on may be mundane and not very dramatic,
but can also be done beautifully … Where you put your horizon line helps you to tell the
story that matters to you—it emphasizes different aspects of a scene.
Employing problem finding to craft scenes in linear perspective may help artists connect
with an audience, because it allows the beholder to take on a viewpoint that captures and
communicates not only a story, but the feelings behind it. The following series of images, which
I drew between July 19 and 25, 2021 (see Figure 68), traces the development of my imaginal
staircase from a worm’s-eye view. In Figure 68d, I began attempting to draw shadows in
perspective, but that is best left for another day, once I have mastered the basics.
Summary of Imaginative Expression and Artisanal Judgment
My inquiry into whether and how developing my artisanal judgment through the study of
classical drawing impacted my imaginative capabilities put me on a collision course with
unhelpful assumptions that I held about imagination (reproductive and productive alike) and
revealed surprising benefits of imaginal sketching, even in its most rudimentary form. It also
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Construction of a Staircase Scene in Worm’s-Eye View, 2021, by the author
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provided a golden opportunity for me to discover learning supports (e.g., disciplined practice,
problem finding) that promised to propel my imaginative expression through drawing. In other
words, disciplined practice and problem finding (see Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976)
provided support for artistic endeavors that called upon reproductive and productive imagination
(i.e., memory drawing “out of one’s head” and inventive drawing “from the mind’s eye”)
respectively.
Unhelpful assumptions about imagination caught me unaware. Regarding reproductive
imagination, I falsely assumed that my pedestrian imaginal sketches were merely
disappointments and of little value to me. In fact, they held semantic value that motivated
continued practice toward syntactic improvement. Regarding productive imagination, I falsely
believed that pictorial ideas should emerge suis generis rather than in conversation with other
works. I also assumed that my ability to articulate my existing pictorial ideas through drawing
was of greater consequence to my work as an artist than generating new ideas through drawing;
whereas in actuality, both were valuable.
Once those assumptions were challenged, it opened the door to an appreciation of my
attempts at imaginal sketching, even those attempts that looked clumsy to me. Where
reproductive imagination was concerned, imaginal sketches, such as my illustrations of
spiderwebs, provided insight into subconscious interpretations of my subject matter and
motivated me, out of curiosity and interest, to persist with my technical goals. The sketches
served as a semantic aid to a syntactic challenge. Where productive imagination was concerned,
the same drawings helped me realize that drawing “from the mind’s eye” is a dance between
one’s mental imagery and the void of an empty sheet of paper. Through some alchemy,
unforeseen content may appear, unheeded, out of one’s pencil tip. This is when imagination is
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ignited during the problem solution stage, as opposed to the problem formulation stage, of a
problem finding activity (see Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976). Additionally, thanks to
Heffernan (2014/2020), I learned that such moments of serendipity may occur more readily when
artists take the time to engage with famous artworks that inspire them.
When I examined my own imaginative expression through the lens of artisanal judgment,
I came to realize a few maxims that should inform my future efforts. Regarding reproductive
imagination (i.e., drawing “out of one’s head”), I learned the following: First, research and
observational drawing may improve imaginal drawing from memory. I based this conclusion on
the improvements I achieved after studying and memorizing spiderwebs to prepare for drawing
them. Second, constructive drawing may allow artists to circumvent their visual memory limits. I
learned about this visualization technique in a class via SVSLearn (2021) that I previewed
online. Regarding productive imagination (i.e., drawing “from the mind’s eye”), I reveled in a
new appreciation for problem finding. After building and photographing three-dimensional
models to help me select different perspective views to render, I came to understand that
progress in imaginal drawing may emerge through slow and deliberative experimentation, in
other words, through a process of problem formulation. It need not arise suddenly or effortlessly,
as if from the heavens. Therefore, it may be earned and not merely gifted.
Chapter 6 Summary
My investigation of cognitive factors at play while studying classical drawing revealed
three key challenges that I faced as an adult learner: visual choice overload, limits on working
memory, and complex attentional dynamics. My research also revealed two types of learning
supports necessary for developing the artisanal judgment I needed to cope with uncertainties
inherent in those challenges: knowledge (empirical, axiomatic, and tacit) and epistemically
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felicitous falsehoods. Empirical knowledge resulted when I generated personal discoveries
through trial and error; it was essential to my learning process. However, empirical knowledge
frequently hinged on axiomatic knowledge that was not always available to me as an
independent, self-directed learner. Such axiomatic knowledge, when it was at hand, spelled out
first principles and clarified the range of possibilities presented within a drawing task. As a
novice artist, I found axiomatic knowledge helpful for decision-making; its absence occasionally
slowed my progress. I accumulated tacit knowledge through a process of tacit learning that
involved attending, through effortful indwelling in proximal subsidiaries, to a myriad of
disparate but related elements within and among my projects. Such indwelling resulted in
moments of coherence, or tacit integration in pursuit of distal focal targets. These took root on a
perceptual level and sometimes blossomed into insights. Meanwhile, felicitous falsehoods, a
semantic aid to visual selection and otherwise meaningless memorization, served as a useful
corollary to knowledge and helped me overcome visual choice overload and working memory
limitations.
My investigation of situative factors affecting my learning revealed several potentially
compatible communities of practice for my developing artistic practice. Two of them, ARA
Boston and TtD, stood out; within them, I encountered two salient factors related to the
development of my artisanal judgment: artistic apparatus and peer learning. My introduction to
artistic apparatus, in the form of specialized drawing supplies, techniques, and equipment, felt
like a rite of passage; meanwhile, learning from peers inspired me and fueled my enthusiasm for
our common pursuit. My research also surfaced specific learning adaptations that I made to a
range of situative factors encountered in the course of my learning journey. Indicators of
grounded cognition, these adaptations entailed perceptual, physical, and introspective responses
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to the somatic activity systems that I inhabited, as well as the transfer of newly learned drawing
techniques between projects. In this way, situative factors helped me, as a self-directed learner,
gauge the development of my artisanal judgment and ground my drawing practice within a
relevant social context.
Finally, my research probed the relationship between my self-perceived capacity for
imaginative expression in representational drawing and my acquisition of a systematic drawing
repertoire. In other words, I wanted to find out whether the process of developing artisanal
judgment had any bearing on my imaginative growth and potential. Findings exposed three
hindering assumptions I held about imagination (both reproductive and productive) and revealed
countervailing insights for each. First, I falsely accepted that my pedestrian imaginal sketches
were merely disappointments, yet they held semantic value that motivated continued practice
toward syntactic improvement. Second, I falsely believed that pictorial ideas should emerge from
my mind as purely original creations; however, many such ideas are likelier to be born when an
artist engages with external resources, such as the works of other artists. Third, I falsely assumed
that my ability to articulate my existing pictorial ideas through drawing was of utmost
importance; but in fact, generating new ideas through drawing was just as valuable an
imaginative endeavor.
Aside from revealing those misapprehensions and their correctives, my research findings
also pointed to learning supports useful for promoting imaginative expression in drawing, both in
terms of reproductive and productive imagination: Visual research and observational drawing
practice may improve imaginal drawing from memory; the technique of constructive drawing
may allow artists to circumvent visual memory limitations; and inventive progress in imaginal
drawing may emerge through slow and deliberative experimentation—in other words, through a
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process of problem formulation. In sum, I identified a total of six methods for developing
imagination in drawing that could be earned, not merely gifted: (a) elaborative sketching, (b)
engagement with other artworks, (c) visual research, (d) perceptual and recollective drawing, (e)
constructive drawing, and (f) Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi’s (1976) problem finding strategy.
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CHAPTER 7
Discussion
I embarked on this autoethnographic study to investigate the relationship, in
representational drawing, between imaginative expression and the considered application of
systematic drafting techniques and principles through my own learning journey—that of an adult
novice artist. I anticipated the study would reveal situative and cognitive factors relevant for
adult learning in the visual arts and could help to prepare aspiring representational artists like
myself for a fruitful avocation in drawing and the teaching of drawing throughout the adult
lifespan. Qualitative research methods afforded my use of drawings, photographs, field notes,
diaries, and video recordings to track reflections on drawing instruction and exercises, cognitive
events, and drawing artifacts that I created, or that occurred in the process of learning to draw. I
coded and analyzed this data to produce findings that addressed the following research questions:
1. How do cognitive factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the
development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment?
2. How do situative factors encountered in the process of learning to draw bear on the
development of an adult learner’s artisanal judgment?
3. What does the process of developing artisanal judgment through systematic drawing
practice mean to an adult learner in terms of her self-perceived capacity for imaginative
expression?
In this chapter, I discuss my interpretations of the findings, in addition to my conclusions,
recommendations, and hypotheses based on those interpretations, drawing from available
literature to guide my thinking. First, I present interpretations related to cognitive factors that
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bore on my learning, including the predominant challenge presented by complex attentional
dynamics and the learning supports I relied on to accommodate them while drawing. These
included knowledge (empirical, axiomatic, tacit) and epistemically felicitous falsehoods. Second,
I discuss situative impacts on my learning within a grounded cognition framework: social and
physical drawing environments, embodied modalities amid drawing, and learning transfer
between drawing projects. Third, I share my interpretations bearing on the imaginal implications
of developing artisanal judgment through drawing study and practice. These related to themes
centered on reconceptualizing imaginative expression, building skills in perceptual
reorganization, and improving associative fluency through drawing. Conclusions and
recommendations are interleaved between sub-sections and followed by a summative hypothesis,
as well as recommendations for further research. The chapter concludes with a chapter summary.
Cognitive Challenges and Learning Supports Influencing My Artisanal Judgment
My first research question sought to understand the impact of cognitive factors, in the
form of learning challenges and supports, on the development of my artisanal judgment while I
was learning to draw. Tacitly, this question probed the extent to which my drawing curriculum
cultivated within me, by virtue of a broader palette of technical and decision-making skills, a
sense of artistic agency that I could put to imaginative use in the future. The results of my
research pointed to complex attentional dynamics as the predominant challenge I encountered;
and to help me cope, specific kinds of knowledge and felicitous falsehoods, which functioned
conjointly as learning supports.
Complex Attentional Dynamics
Complex attentional dynamics comprised visual choice overload, working memory
limits, and the task of negotiating gestalt relationships among parts and the greater whole in a
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given drawing or workflow. Visual choice overload occurred in my efforts to capture every
minute detail of the carnation at TtD, draw a teacup, and select the most important features of a
given Bargue at the first marks stage. I was barraged with visual data. My impressions of the
phenomenon were encapsulated by my observation that, “It’s too much for my brain to process.
One time I see one particular nuance, then another. That one fades away, and I see a different
one!”
The sheer volume of visual data that bombards an individual creates an experience of
perceptual overwhelm acknowledged by Kant (1781–1787/1998) and Goethe (1862/1988)
centuries ago. Here is one example: The amount of sensory data in the world is so voluminous
and inscrutable that it took scientists centuries of looking to ferret out the view that human
reproduction hinges on the division of cells carrying genetic messages (Osborne, 2015). The
multitude of stars in the galaxy compose the constellations, but not everyone can recognize
Pegasus or its comparable version in Hawaiian lore, Ka Lupe o Kawelo [The Kite of Kawelo]. If
artists are to marshal the visual data in their midst, then cultivating attentional dexterity,
flexibility, and range seems necessary. In regard to visual choice overload, representation
requires selecting essential features from the manifold, a task at which artists are known to excel
compared to non-artists (Chamberlain, 2018; Kozbelt et al., 2010; Ostrofsky et al., 2012).
Typically known as “visual selection,” this activity is called filtering in Rensink’s (2015)
function-centered taxonomy of visual attention. According to him, filtering, which entails
discarding superfluous information, likely occurs after an agent has already engaged in sampling
by scanning the visual environment and collecting a sufficient bundle of information from it.
Another word for filtering is gating. Filtering (i.e., gating) involves applying criteria to sift data
and reduce visual noise. Such criteria may pertain to spatial information and information about
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objects based on their properties, or features. Criteria may also regard how visual information is
gathered (such as viewing a scene with one eye closed), which Rensink termed ocular filtering. I
employed ocular filtering to help me isolate discrete form shapes in my Bargue drawing, Profile
of a Foot. This entailed squinting at the model with one eye closed to facilitate the diminishment
of extraneous details within the visual field. Another method of filtering suggested in the
literature was Degas’ reliance on memory as an aid to visual section, which helped him home in
on aspects of a drawing stimulus that left the strongest and most meaningful impression upon
him (D. R. Rousar, 2013).
Beyond perceptual experience, it seems feasible that filtering may also occur in the realm
of mental imagery and visualization, bearing on visual data retrieved from memory. Providing
support for their integrated embodied representation hypothesis, Palmiero et al. (2019) argued
that spatial and object criteria may guide visualization strategies based on imager preferences.
The spatial strategy, which is accompanied by additional motor representations, emphasizes the
location and movements of objects in relationship to each other, marking out spatial data in
propositional terms, rather than pictorially. Meanwhile, the object strategy favors a focus on the
size, shape, color, or brightness of imagined objects in tandem with semantic information
involved in object naming and identification. Lending credence to this hypothesis, some vision
scientists conducted experiments revealing that the brain stores state information, such as
whether an object was originally viewed in an open or closed position, separately from exemplar
information, such as an object’s color (Brady et al., 2013).
Back in the perceptual realm, my own working memory limits surfaced during memory
drawing exercises that revealed my tendency to favor an attentional posture of vigilant focus
over a more generalized posture of open awareness, such as when I lost sight of global features
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while discriminating local areas of complex detail. This resulted in tunnel vision, which led to
caricatured representations of distances between lines or unfolded on a grand scale, as in the case
of my misshapen coffee mugs. Although such mistakes were normal among beginners, they
exposed gaps and imbalances in my attentional repertoire worth remedying.
My habit of focusing on local details abstracted away from the global features in which
they were embedded aligned with Lou’s (2018) concept of the proximal mode of visual
perception, which prioritizes local features of objects, such as shadow contours, negative spaces
between objects, and embedded “phantom” shapes over more distant and encompassing distal
features. Importantly, the proximal approach occurs post-perceptually. In other words, artists
most likely engage in proximal attentional modes after their brains have already identified
objects and scenes in the visual field via the distal attentional mode. Based on this workflow, I
am curious whether my baseline memory sketch of coffee mugs may have turned out differently
had I spent less than 60 seconds fixating on the stimulus image (see Figure 27). Had I lacked the
necessary time to embed myself in a proximal perceptual mode, might I have recollected enough
global information to represent the base termination of each mug accurately, as rounded instead
of straight? It is hard to say. It may also be the case that, concerning imaging preferences, I was
inclined toward a spatial strategy rather than an object strategy (see Palmiero et al., 2019), as
evidenced in my successful capture of the mugs’ relative positions.
It seems notable that my default attentional posture when exercising visual memory was
weighted toward vigilant focus; I lacked a commensurate degree of open awareness. Rensink’s
(2015) taxonomy may shed light on the source of the imbalance. According to it, external
functions of visual attention coalesce around orienting and integrating goals that operate
interdependently. He hypothesized that all processes associated with visual attention begin with
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orienting functions, including sampling and filtering (described above), followed by integrating
functions, including binding, holding, and individuating (see Figure 69).
Binding and holding concern the construction of whole images out of visual fragments
(Rensink, 2015). Although susceptible to illusions (see Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2016), their
purpose is to represent the world accurately, maintaining the perceived integrity and continuity
of objects regardless of environmental occlusions, shifting vantage points, or movements.
Binding occurs within and across features via grouping or connecting, and through positioning.
Attentional holding, also called stabilizing, extends the logic of binding over time. It applies to
information gathered from a series of saccades across one or several gazes, such as when a
spectator watches a bird fly across the sky; it also determines both the perceptual and conceptual
continuity of the target. Finally, individuating (or indexing), is useful for purposes of focusing on
a specific object in relationship to surrounding structures and contexts. When accomplished

Figure 69
(left) Subdivisions of Visual Attention Functions; (right) Dependencies Among Processes

Note. Excerpts from “A Function-Centered Taxonomy of Visual Attention,” by R. A. Rensink,
2015, in P. Coates & S. Coleman (Eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and
Consciousness, p. 5, 14. Copyright © 2022 by Oxford Publishing Limited. Reproduced with
permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
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through representational means, it requires dedicated attention and demands a higher level of
processing than the other functions. Therefore, individuating processes are often accomplished
through subsequent tracking, a comparatively efficient mechanism used to monitor the position
of a figure relative to its ground or to other figures in its midst.
In light of Rensink’s (2015) taxonomy, my success in rendering local details and my
struggle to recollect the global aspects of objects that were featured in the memory drawing
exercises could have been due to an emphasis on the integrating functions of visual attention
over orienting functions. Despite my prior speculation that I may have preferred a spatial
visualization strategy over an object visualization strategy while retrieving mental images from
memory, it seems just as plausible that the spatial competency apparent in my drawings was
achieved through binding (since binding may occur through positioning) as well as individuation
(which involves spatial tracking). It may also be possible that an individual’s tendency to
privilege one or the other visualization strategy is either unrelated to, or consonant with one’s
relative strengths pertaining to particular functions of visual attention put forward in the
taxonomy.
Forestalling clarity on this issue, I may just as easily conclude that, due to the
comparatively deficient level of object-related competency exhibited in my memory drawings, I
failed to focus sufficiently on individuating the coffee mugs and lines that I observed. More
likely, however, I may have transitioned too quickly from the orienting functions of attention to
functions concerned with integration. The fact that I sometimes struggled to capture broad
features of the visual environment or select the most salient features of a drawing stimulus
suggests that I have more work ahead to bolster my visual sampling and filtering abilities.
Related to this hypothesis, I find it interesting to consider that my proclivity for engaging vigilant
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attention while individuating subject matter might preclude opportunities to engage with
unexpected phenomena of relevance to a given drawing task. A more receptive, orienting stance
may bring greater awareness, and with it, greater intuition, and imaginative possibility.
Exertions pertaining to gestalt relationships occurred while I was working on the
Woodland Debris series and when I drew a perspective grid. In the former case, the relationships
I was tracking were inherent to the composition, as described in my diary: “When I moved left of
the stem, I realized that the horizontal line I was drawing, which met the top of the right side,
was in fact the bottom of the actual stick on the left side.” In the latter case, the relevant
relationships were not inside the drawing; instead, they were located in my workspace, within the
dashboard of tools I was manipulating to create the drawing. As noted in my reflections on
building the grid, “When drawing out spokes from a given vanishing point, I would
[occasionally] begin to confuse which side of the ruler I meant to draw down.”
Rather than being derived from deficiencies in integrative functions of my visual
attention (at least predominantly), I surmise these difficulties arose due to attentional demands
related to tacit learning. Polanyi (1967) coined the term “indwelling” to describe how individuals
are situated while accumulating or creating knowledge through the integration of proximal
objects of subsidiary awareness (i.e., subsidiaries) into focal awareness, such as when a concert
pianist plays music. The musician is focally aware of the sound produced—it serves as the distal
focal target toward which attention is directed—but each measure begins in the sphere of the
pianist’s subsidiary awareness, from and through which attention is propelled. As Muñoz (2015)
explained, our subsidiary awareness may engage with objects representing any type or form of
knowledge, listed as follows (with my examples in parentheses): (a) knowledge types:
intellectual (e.g., musical notes) or practical (e.g., piano keys); (b) knowledge forms: explicit
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(e.g., sheet music), tacit but specifiable (e.g., habituated fingering), or tacit and unspecifiable
(e.g., the ability to play with feeling or pick out harmonies intuitively).
We dwell in subsidiaries while attending to focal targets; we cannot dwell in the latter.
Either we dwell in our bodies very literally, or we extend our bodies and neurons into tools or
concepts outside ourselves and dwell within those. When we shift our awareness from a
particular focal target toward a subsidiary, the subsidiary loses its transparency, at least in that
moment. It has become the focal target for the duration of our attending to it; therefore, we
cannot make meaning through it, but must make meaning of it instead (Polanyi, 1961, 1967;
Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). When we encounter a learning curve, we look upon the expert's many
subsidiaries from a standpoint of focal awareness; unlike the expert, we cannot make meaning
through them until we have carved out space to dwell within them by integrating them into our
store of tacit knowledge. On the journey toward that goal, learners must hop back and forth
among a multitude of subsidiaries to begin chipping away at each of them, little by little. This is
cognitively taxing, but I propose it fairly characterizes the conditions of learning.
In the case of my drawing exercises, I had begun by focusing on a particular distal target.
In the first instance (the Woodland Debris drawing), this was a notch I had drawn to denote the
location where the top edge of the stick should be placed; in the second instance (the perspective
grid), it was my ruler. Then I had moved my focus to a different element. In the former case, I
shifted my gaze to the intersection of a perpendicular stem and the imagined extension of the
stick’s top edge. In the latter case, I glanced at the horizon line. While attending to these different
targets, my places of indwelling necessarily changed. For a more expert draftsperson, the process
of tracking such shifts would have become more fluid; it would have been transformed into
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practical and largely unspecifiable tacit knowledge, precluding the need to uproot so frequently
among so many explicit subsidiaries embedded in the learning space.
On my way to acquiring that level of expertise, I will have to keep practicing, and tolerate
the discomfort necessitated by perceptual reorganization, wherein old cognitive structures are
continually displaced as new information is encountered. Perceptual reorganization entails acting
upon a configuration to reorganize it through regrouping, altering frames of reference, or
changing perspective. Often conceptualized as a mental occurrence, it also may be exhibited
physically by artists in the process of drawing. According to Suwa & Tversky (2003), “Expertise
is attained by coming to differentiate and reorganize parts, wholes, perspectives, and reference
frames. … [which] must then be coordinated with behavior” (p. 1145). In essence, a process of
perceptual reorganization appears to characterize indwelling in the context of tacit learning.
Thus, Polanyi’s (1961, 1966, 1967; 1975) theory of tacit knowing accords with Gestalt learning
theory, wherein learning is a holistic process that comprises, but cannot be sufficiently described
by “previous experience, new data and the reorganization of ideas” (Wallace, 2015, n.p.).
Because drawing involves negotiating gestalt relationships among parts and a greater whole, tacit
knowing appears to provide an ideal analytical framework in regard to it.
Knowledge and Epistemically Felicitous Falsehoods
Learning supports helped me contend with the attentional challenges just discussed.
These included empirical, axiomatic, and tacit knowledge, as well as felicitous falsehoods. I built
empirical knowledge by counting form shapes in my foot Bargue, deciphering and documenting
the visual vocabulary inherent in all of my Bargues, observing and tracking optical concepts
instantiated in the midst of drawing my Woodland Debris series, and by earmarking, for
subsequent reference, learning gains made during an exercise on one-point perspective. While
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each of these experiences was distinct, all held in common features that were amenable to
justification through observation and experimentation. This qualified them as empirical learning
supports. These were helpful toward managing visual choice overload and negotiating gestalt
relationships in a drawing. The essence of my experience with empirical learning is best summed
up in a diary entry regarding plein air drawing: “I decided that the form shadows were the
darkest … I reminded myself to use my eyes. As my instructor said, nature is the best teacher.
My eyes were telling me that I was right.” In moments like this, by engaging actively with
subject matter, I experienced learning as discovery, seemingly inventing principles anew.
This orientation accorded with the constructivist emphasis on bringing one’s prior
knowledge to the table and energetically constructing understanding upward from it. Had I been
left to such devices entirely, the approach may have satisfied the naïve or trivial view of
constructivism, wherein discovery is unguided. However, it would not have lived up to the
proper and more holistic conceptualization of constructivist theory, wherein teacher input and the
incorporation of learned principles are valued corollaries to hands-on learning; and where a
learner’s achievement of internal coherence between new and prior knowledge signals
comprehension (B. Davis & Sumara, 2010; Osborne, 2015). As Perkins (1999) noted, “Asking
learners to discover or rediscover principles can foster understanding, but learners sometimes
persist in discovering the wrong principles—for instance, an idiosyncratic scientific theory” (p.
8). Because much of my learning was self-directed, I did not always have the benefit of input
from a teacher. Therefore, I sometimes struggled with empirical learning, and appreciated other
learning supports, such as axiomatic knowledge, when I encountered them.
Where axiomatic knowledge was concerned, I used it when it was provided to me. When
it was lacking, I did my best to construct it for myself. Axiomatic learning supports were helpful
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toward managing visual choice overload and negotiating gestalt relationships in a drawing. The
axiomatic knowledge I gleaned from classes proved foundational. Principles received in this
manner included “keying” a drawing to a value scale and the procedure for finding an ellipse’s
major axis based on its minor axis. The axiomatic knowledge that was not given, in pursuit of
which I searched far and wide, included techniques for establishing standpoints within a
perspective drawing (e.g., the vertical measuring line, or VML), polygon roots and rules for
tessellations, salient optical laws (e.g., Lambert’s cosign emission law), and other first principles
related to drawing.
In every such case, I invested numerous hours and a good deal of frustration figuring out
the underlying logic of a given operation. Searching the internet and YouTube constituted a
scattered but essential approach to piecing such principles together as an independent learner.
The process of discovery enabled by my encounters with empirical knowledge supports served
me mightily; it was useful to generate some principles empirically. For example, one of the most
meaningful morsels of axiomatic knowledge I gleaned through trial and error during the
tessellations project was that, in a work of art, every part matters to the whole and the whole
matters to every part. However, one can have too much of a good thing. It took years, and in
some cases, decades (or longer) for humans to discover some of the drawing principles I was
trying to learn. Had I more frequently received this kind of knowledge directly, it could have
propelled my progress. The following comment from my diary supports this opinion:
Had I only been told about two of the basic principles—a) that the cone of vision should
encompass the picture plane, and b) that the station point should be located outside of the
picture plane—I could have saved a great deal of time.
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Life is too short to rebuild the wheel with every new venture. I would have benefited
from a curriculum that featured a well-curated and complementary balance of learning supports,
both empirical and axiomatic. Therefore, weaving in axiomatic knowledge strategically seems
essential for scaffolding the discovery process. I believe that a well-balanced combination of
axiomatic and empirical knowledge propels the formation of tacit knowledge. I discuss this view
further, below.
Alongside empirical and axiomatic knowledge, tacit knowledge was a key means of
negotiating gestalt relationships while I learned to draw. In fact, it was integral to every aspect of
my learning journey. Some moments exemplified the process of tacit integration more clearly
than others, particularly during activities wherein constructive perception could be developed.
Constructive perception is a facility that Suwa and Tversky (2003) described as “the skill for
coordinating perceptual reorganization and conceptual generation.” It may be the hidden link
between artisanal judgment and imaginative expression in drawing. Facilitating closer analysis of
said phenomenon, two cases stood out: (a) using perspective projection to draw a staircase in
two-point perspective from a bird’s-eye view, and (b) drawing an arrangement of weathered
branches in direct sunlight.
In these exercises, I hit paydirt after painstaking effort. This was reflected in my diary
entries. For example, during the perspective projection project, when I suddenly grasped the
spatial relationship between the floor plan and my drawing, I said to myself: “Okay, so the—the
[sic] bottom of one of these is the same intersection point as the top of the other, even though
there is a drop down.” I finally realized that one point in one-dimensional space equals two
points in two-dimensional space. Similarly, I enjoyed a eureka moment during the en plein air
exercise. My diary noted, “I could see that the shadows and the light were really what I was
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drawing, not actually the objects on the table. I was drawing the absence of light, and I needed
light to see that absence.” Both activities illustrated a transition from methodical, perceptual tacit
integration toward a sudden moment of insightful tacit integration.
Tacit Integration concerns the bundling of objects of subsidiary awareness (e.g., my floor
plan and vanishing points or my markers and the wooden branch) by means of a series of tacit
inferences (deductive, inductive, and/or abductive) about the relationships among those
subsidiaries. When subsidiaries are of sufficient quality, that reasoning process typically leads to
a deepening sense of coherence, which when achieved, results in what Polanyi and Prosch (1975)
called a judgment of coherence. This process is unconscious up to the point when the bundle is
finally brought into focal awareness as knowledge; in this way, tacit inferences may be
consciously acted upon. In Polanyi and Prosch’s words, we use “tacit inference to integrate, as a
coherent holistic entirety, the details or particulars and their meaning, as comprehensive
conceptions" (pp. 35–39).
Building on this, I suspect the nature of tacit integration that results—whether perceptual
or insightful—depends on the kinds of tacit inferences leading up to it. In the sphere of practical
knowledge (to which drawing in large part belongs), inferences that are predominantly deductive
in nature may effectuate perceptual tacit integration; whereas inferences that are predominantly
inductive or abductive in nature should eventually coalesce through insightful tacit integration. It
makes sense that perceptual tacit integration would come first, as the draftsperson handles and
manipulates proximal subsidiaries, such as a pencil and ruler, in accordance with rote learning
strategies, whole to part. With sufficient repetition, a measure of automaticity may be achieved,
transitioning an explicit subsidiary, such as one’s grip when positioning the ruler, into tacit form.
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In turn, this would free up cognitive space to attend to more advanced subsidiaries, and
regarding those, to make part-to-whole inferences (inductive or abductive) revealing
relationships between them and patterns among them; ultimately sparking insights, through
them, about the larger project. Of what might this liberated “cognitive space” consist? I believe it
may be a portion of focal awareness, now restored, which had originally been diverted away
from the focal target (e.g., my staircase drawing) to a subsidiary (e.g., my ruler, specific points
on my floor plan) in the process of learning.
Evans (2007) endorsed the hypothesis that two modes of thinking, intuitive and
deliberative, underpin processes of reasoning and judgment. The first, which Evans called the
heuristic system, is run by deep brain regions and is evolutionarily more primitive. Meanwhile,
the second, dubbed the analytic system, operates by means of the cerebral cortex, a more highly
evolved part of the brain. People typically have no trouble engaging both systems at the same
time. This means that individuals can think intuitively and deliberatively at once; for example,
people may drive their cars, pressing the gas pedal and turning the steering wheel via the
heuristic system while they simultaneously employ the analytic system to focus on street signs
indicating where to take the next turn ahead. The heuristic system functions without involving
working memory, relying instead on prior knowledge, beliefs, and muscle memory. By contrast,
the analytic system is volitional, controlled, slow, sequential, and capable of creative,
hypothetical thinking. Because it depends on working memory, this mode of thinking is
cognitively taxing. People rarely put in the effort at deliberative thinking unless the stakes are
high or the heuristic system is noticeably insufficient to the task at hand, such as when a driver in
training fumbles with the gear shift.
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If we analyze the process of learning to draw through Evans’ (2007) lens, we can infer
that tacit knowledge not only helps an artist negotiate gestalt relationships, but is also essential
for coping with the limits of working memory. In this way, developing determinative artisanal
judgment through careful adherence to preexisting principles (e.g., perspective projection) may
pave the way toward developing more imaginative, reflective judgment down the road. In other
words, the act of sublimating explicit subsidiaries into tacit form, an example of perceptual
reorganization, may be the first step toward cultivating constructive perception, since perceptual
reorganization is a major contributing factor to constructive perception (see Suwa & Tversky,
2003).
Notably, perceptual reorganization should lead to tacit integration whether the integration
is perceptual or insightful in nature; in the former case, through the subsumption of subsidiaries
under a given rule via deductive inference; in the latter case, through the reorganization of
subsidiaries in relationship to one another via inductive, analogical, or abductive inference. The
common denominator is inferences, which underpin judgments of coherence (see Polanyi &
Prosch, 1975) and are necessary for perceptual reorganization, and in turn tacit integration, to
occur. In essence, insightful tacit integration may depend, at an elementary level, on prior
perceptual tacit integrations. It should result from a reflective form of perceptual reorganization
that may be particularly well suited to serving as a constitutive factor in constructive perception
alongside associative fluency.
In the absence of knowledge while drawing, I sometimes felt an inclination to create
fictional proxies for it. I have adopted Elgin’s (2017) term, epistemically felicitous falsehoods, to
characterize this phenomenon. To recap the more detailed definition in chapter 6, epistemically
felicitous falsehoods are representations, usually models or idealizations, that are valuable for
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couching and conveying understanding despite being untrue. I offer the following caveat on this
application of the term: Because my experiences pertaining to the phenomenon were not
universal in nature, I believe they constituted a subjective species of epistemically felicitous
falsehood. I turned to epistemically felicitous falsehoods to help me identify and demarcate
borders between areas of relative lightness and darkness in my Bargues, and to make meaning of
abstract lines that I hoped to recollect during memory drawing exercises. To invoke such
felicitous falsehoods, I simply compared abstract shapes to known objects.
Epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) were helpful toward managing all
three of the complex attentional dynamics that challenged me: visual choice overload, working
memory limits, and the task of negotiating gestalt relationships in a drawing. In my diary, I made
note of specific experiences with epistemically felicitous falsehoods. The following excerpt
captures the gist: “"I need to think of a shape for the shadow and approximate it closely (e.g., the
head of a horned bull where light was hitting Ariadne’s chin [see Figure 46]). Suddenly, I’m not
paying attention to the facts of the face itself, but the fiction (or factual fiction) of the shadow."
After adopting the felicitous falsehood strategy of my own accord, I discovered that it was
recommended by my instructor at ARA Boston to improve the accuracy of Bargue transcriptions.
However, there was no particular term used to describe the approach.
Employing epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) to improve the accuracy
of my drawings called on imagination to sift through the perceptual information in front of me
and compare it to mental imagery stored in long term memory (see Bartlett, 1932; Carmichael et
al., 1932). Although my ends were mimetic, the means of achieving them were imaginative (in a
reproductive or productive sense), at least where felicitous falsehoods were concerned. In
addition to summoning helpful schemata to bridge gaps presented by abstract forms, I was
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encouraged to harness imagination for other representational ends. To better understand angles
and line directions in my Bargue, my instructor at ARA Boston suggested that I use my
imagination to animate the lines. For example, copying the precise angle of a line is notoriously
difficult for beginners. To succeed at doing so, I would imagine a marble rolling down a straight
diagonal line. The faster it fell, the steeper the angle should appear. This strategy could be
described as a form of epistemically felicitous falsehood akin to mental simulation (see Hegarty,
2004), but applied to fictional representations instead of mechanical systems.
Epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) of the subjective persuasion appear
to function as semantic supports for syntactic tasks. Apparently, the act of inventing familiar
shapes to make meaning of asymmetrical contours mobilizes associative visual memory as a
buttress for perception. What I have observed here provides support for the cognitive
penetrability of perception: the theory that cognition has an influence on perception (see
Cermeño-Aínsa, 2020; Lou, 2018). Envisioning a bull’s horns helped me see more clearly the
play of light and shadow across Ariadne’s jaw. Imaginatively imprinting a raindrop on top of an
otherwise insignificant polygon (see Figure 47) allowed me to recall the shape, even though it
provoked exaggeration (a minor trade-off for a beginner). Such experiences harkened back to
Palmiero et al.’s (2019) hypothesis for an object strategy in mental imagery and visualization,
wherein semantic information about imagined objects (e.g., name or purpose) gets bundled with
visually descriptive data (e.g., size, shape, color, or brightness).
Realist drawing relies on an artist’s abilities to finely tune perception and store and
retrieve visual memories. These are syntactic representational skills that depend, in some
measure, on semantic interpretation. In this sense, realist drawing rests on an artist’s associative
fluency, “the ability to produce words [and I would argue, images as well] in a restricted area of
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meaning” (Suwa & Tversky, 2003, p. 1142). The more objects an artist can name and recollect,
the larger the store of epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) to draw upon.
Because constructive perception comprises perceptual reorganization and associative fluency in
combination, epistemically felicitous falsehoods may contribute to its cultivation among students
of drawing. By priming the pump from syntactic mimesis toward associative fluency, I believe
epistemically felicitous falsehoods may serve as a bridge between artisanal judgment and
imaginative expression.
Epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017), functioning as a sort of “logical
fancy,” would therefore seem to complement knowledge in representational drawing, particularly
when they are invoked for purposes of imitation. Matthews (1993) offered a parallel view in the
domain of science education, arguing that, because theories are built upon idealized abstractions
(many of which, I believe, qualify as epistemically felicitous falsehoods), unguided observation
of scientific phenomena may present an obstacle to learning comprehension. In his words,
Most scientific advances have entailed commitment to propositions that literally defied
sense—Copernicus's rotating earth, Galileo's point masses and colorless bodies, Newton's
inertial systems that in principle cannot be experienced, Darwin's gradualist evolutionary
assumptions so at odds with the fossil record, Einstein's mass-energy equivalence, etc.
Indeed, the topic of pendulum motion, a common elementary physics topic, exhibits the
problems with using sense as a goal and arbiter in science education. (p. 368)
Epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) serve as models to help us
comprehend phenomena that we cannot grasp through sensory experience alone. This is the case
in visual art just as it is in the sciences. In regard to perceptual drawing, they provide a
theoretical lens, on a subjective level, for the interpretation of otherwise chaotic visual data. In
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sum, epistemically felicitous falsehoods were instrumental, at minimum, for navigating the
plethora of complex attentional dynamics I confronted in my drawing curriculum. It also seems
feasible that they contributed, in some measure, to expanding my imaginative capacity.
Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding Cognitive Challenges and Learning Supports
My findings related to the impact of cognitive factors on the development of my artisanal
judgment while learning to draw revealed key aspects of representational drawing practice that
may lead to constructive perception, as well as pedagogical risks posed by a trivial understanding
of constructivism. Many skill-driven exercises that promote imaginative expression in realist
drawing involve painstaking practice, which also helps to cultivate constructive perception, “the
deliberate adoption of perceptual strategies in the service of cognition” (Suwa & Tversky, 2003,
p. 1140). For me, the journey began with repetitive and cognitively taxing rote or mimetic
learning tasks that involved frequent attentional shifts among subsidiaries (e.g., drawing
implements, tacit knowledge, intermittently-subsidiarily-attended focal targets) and focal targets
(e.g., subject matter, semantic concepts, intermittently-focally-attended explicit knowledge
subsidiaries) located in my proximal workspace and the surrounding distal environment (see
Polanyi, 1961, 1967; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975).
Through perceptual tacit integration and the hard-won generation of tacit knowledge that
these practices encouraged, it appears that a novice artist like myself may build competency in
perceptual reorganization, one of two essential components of constructive perception (see Suwa
& Tversky, 2003). With sufficient practice, once the structures of the associated inferences have
shifted from determinative to reflective (e.g., from deductive to inductive, analogical, or
abductive), drawing exercises that develop perceptual reorganization skills should result in
insightful tacit integration (see Polanyi, 1961, 1967; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). This is because
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the process of empirically driven insightful tacit integration is likely dependent on prior theorydriven knowledge acquired through perceptual tacit integration and by means of scaffolding with
axiomatic learning supports.
Because perceptual reorganization depends on attentional resources, drawing exercises
that intentionally train attentional dexterity, flexibility, and range may spell the most efficient
route toward progress in that domain. Such exercises should be targeted to visual orienting
functions of visual attention, including sampling and filtering, as well as visual integrating
functions of visual attention, which comprise binding, holding, and individuating (see Rensink,
2015). Learners who achieve proficiency managing these functions will have at their disposal
sufficient resources to deal with the attentional challenges presented by visual choice overload,
working memory limits, and complex relationships among parts within a composition and its
greater whole. For those who are interested, as I am, in expanding the scope of perceptual data in
awareness, it may be worthwhile to emphasize visual sampling during practice.
Demands on attention while drawing are keen, and keener still while learning to draw,
due to the need to continually shift focus among subsidiaries and focal targets. The development
of visual attentional skills appears to be partially supported by semantic mechanisms, such as the
object strategy of visualization, which is language-dependent (see Palmiero et al., 2019), and
epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017), a subjective species of which, I argue,
involves the invention of familiar shapes to make meaning of asymmetrical contours observed in
a drawing stimulus. In tandem or separately, the object strategy approach to visualization and
epistemically felicitous falsehoods may help to bridge the gap between artisanal judgment and
imaginative expression by advancing mimesis via processes of associative fluency. This is
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noteworthy because associative fluency, alongside perceptual reorganization, makes constructive
perception possible (see Suwa & Tversky, 2003).
To further cultivate attentional dexterity, flexibility, and range, I recommend that drawing
instructors or self-directed learners develop targeted exercises informed by Kant’s (1781–
1787/1998) Table of Judgments and Rensink’s (2015) Function-Centered Taxonomy of Visual
Attention. For example, Kant's a priori categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality,
although they function automatically, can be intentionally exploited to focus attention and aid
visual selection.1 If we consider Quantity, we can purposely attend first to the most prevalent
patterns. If we consider Quality, we can distinguish among and prioritize certain types of
patterns. If we consider Relation, we can more quickly isolate distinct components of convoluted
patterns based on which aspects are integral to the most basic forms therein, versus other aspects
that are merely co-occurring or disjunctive. This comports with the practice of working part-towhole and whole-to-part, refocusing back and forth, for relationships between forms are key to
capturing shapes. Finally, if we consider Modality, we may remember to look from different
angles, adjust our eyes, and use measuring instruments to check our accuracy. Should we decide
to stretch the truth, we can manipulate the drawing’s modality intentionally, taking a
hypothetical, ironic, fantastic or sarcastic approach to the representation.
My findings suggest that a learner’s capacity for imaginative expression in
representational drawing also hinges on access to relevant axiomatic knowledge to support
empirical practice. Such knowledge offers potential to scaffold the discovery process and propel
the formation of tacit knowledge, the foundation upon which constructive perception rests. In
other words, axiomatic knowledge likely serves as an attentional filter during hands-on learning.

1

For an overview of the categories, see pp. 83–86 in chapter 3 of this dissertation, which is focused on judgment
and the capacity to judge (within the sub-section on philosophies of judgment relevant to realist drawing).
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In this way, it functions as a benchmark against which novice artists may gauge their decisionmaking and hone their inner visions. Unfortunately, as a self-directed adult learner, it was my
experience that learning scaffolds in the form of axiomatic knowledge often were unavailable or
difficult to discover unaided.
Compounding the challenges presented when insufficient axiomatic knowledge is
available to learners, naïve views of constructivism, wherein unguided discovery is uncritically
favored over direct instruction (see M. R. Matthews, 1993; Osborne, 2015; Perkins, 1999), could
present an obstacle to adult development in the domain of representational drawing. Under that
rubric, indiscriminate exercises in perceptual drawing, rather than promoting constructive
perception, could foreclose upon it by hindering opportunities to practice perceptual
reorganization and hone artisanal judgment. A laissez-faire approach to representation, such as
that adopted by many students who find themselves at sea under the aegis of trivial constructivist
curricula, casts the artist in the role of a one-way sponge, soaking up an ocean of images rather
than acting as a filter upon them.
Ironically, not only might such a passive disposition inhibit imaginative expression, it
also may stunt artistic agency. Representational artists who are actively discouraged from
imposing any schematic framework whatsoever upon the visual manifold may have difficulty
inventing or manifesting an original vision. Instead, they may find they need to channel the
universe to construct an image for them. While it is certainly legitimate to do so and may even be
considered creative (in a deterministic, intuitive, or perhaps collaborative sense), it probably is
not as volitional compared to a more schematic approach. In short, a predominantly empirical
approach to building images is arguably insufficient for expressing oneself imaginatively
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through realist and realist-inspired representational drawing, especially in the early stages of
learning, when there is less tacit knowledge to draw upon.
Therefore, I recommend that drawing instructors and self-directed learners embrace a
holistic conceptualization of constructivist pedagogy and learning, rather than a naïve or trivial
view. Within a holistic framework, learned principles, in the form of axiomatic knowledge
supports, are incorporated to guide hands-on learning. This should allow learners to reconcile
new knowledge with prior understandings, a hallmark of holistic constructivism (B. Davis &
Sumara, 2010; Osborne, 2015).
Before leaving this section, it merits noting that robust digital tools and programs (e.g.,
Wacom and reMarkable drawing tablets, Adobe Creative Cloud, SketchUp) have been available
for years, placing quick and polished drawing production within reach for everyday consumers
like me. I have no intention of shunning these technologies. However, as Simmons (2021)
recommended, it is best to learn basic drawing skills by hand before taking advantage of the
automated potentialities such vehicles offer. Once my artisanal judgment, cognitively speaking,
is keen enough, I hope to adopt some digital tools to streamline my process, especially in regard
to drawing in linear perspective.
Situative Conditions Influencing My Artisanal Judgment
My second research question sought to understand the impact of situative factors on the
development of my artisanal judgment while I was learning to draw. Such factors constituted
extending, embedding, embodying, and enacting domains of experience that grounded, or
provided the basis for, my cognition. These domains influenced my cognition in different ways
and to varying extents. For example, my social environment (e.g., other people, my interactions
with them, and the broader culture) extended my cognition. My physical environment (e.g.,
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drawing apparatus and settings for drawing) embedded my cognition. My body (e.g., limbs,
trunk, motor system) very literally embodied my cognition. Finally, external perceptual
modalities (e.g., vision, haptics) and internal perceptual modalities (e.g., affect, introspection)
allowed me to enact my cognition through drawing (see Barsalou, 2020) and transfer my
learning between projects.
According to the theory of grounded cognition, learning entails the interaction of these
“grounding” domains with cognitive processes like attention, memory, knowledge, language, and
thought (Barsalou, 2020). In light of the grounded cognition framework, my findings revealed
conditions for the possibility of learning born from my social and physical environment and
various embodied modalities. Regarding social and physical environments, I explored
communities of practice related to drawing wherein I gained access to artistic apparatus and peer
learning opportunities. Meanwhile, embodied modalities entailed learning experiences
characterized by perception, action, and introspection, as well as my adaptations to those
experiences.
Social and Physical Environments
Of the drawing-related communities of practice (see Lave & Wenger, 1991) I surveyed,
there were three to which I felt the most drawn: ARA Boston, SVSLearn, and TtD. Within these
communities, my status as a novice adult learner did not impinge upon my sense of belonging. It
seemed to me that a comfortable space had been carved out for all members regardless of
knowledge levels, experience, or demographic diversity. Because these groups were neither
apprenticeship guilds, wherein it would be customary to receive compensation for one’s creative
contributions (see Charland, 2005), nor informal associations among friends, legitimate
peripheral participation came with a fee attached. Luckily, the cost was less than I would have
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paid for tuition at a major university; it was manageable for me as an employed member of the
American middleclass.
At ARA Boston, I enrolled in online classes alongside novice students like myself who
were sampling the curriculum, as well as matriculated students who were progressing, at various
stages, through the atelier program. We were able to see one another on ZOOM and share our
work in folders on Google Drive. The diversity of students’ ages and levels of expertise, as well
as the depth and extent of intergenerational knowledge being shared with and among us was
inspiring to me. It signified that atelier training could be pursued adjacent to any type of career or
education and at any stage of adult life. It was also exciting to know that, down the road, I could
opt to attend classes in person, since I live nearby. Meanwhile, at SVSLearn, although I could
not see my fellow students on camera, the monthly subscription provided access to a large menu
of asynchronous class recordings and monthly community-wide lectures and critiques in real
time. Finally, at TtD, the annual conference hosted by IDCR, sessions examining the relationship
between drawing and cognition provided a scholarly context to my drawing practice that kept me
intellectually engaged and stimulated. Due to the pandemic, TtD was moved online after 2019. I
participated via ZOOM and Miro but enjoyed it more in person. The conference format, which
lent itself to short exercises rather than in-depth lessons, seemed too performative for my
comfort when our drawings were shared across a multitude of screens rather than across a table.
Within these communities of practice, my introduction to artistic apparatus felt like a rite
of passage. Imprinted in my heart is the moment I walked into a room full of easels and drawing
horses at TtD. No matter how basic, lessons from classically trained artists in sharpening pencils
and sanding vine charcoal struck an enduring chord. These were tools for gaining and creating
artisanal knowledge, and they were finally at my fingertips. In his midcentury study of
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Kentuckian craftspeople, or “chairmakers,” folklorist M. O. Jones (1989) described what I have
dubbed artistic apparatus as “tools, techniques of construction and choices of materials” (p.
240). For the uninitiated, the apparatus of artisanship is arcane. In Jones’ words, “The absence of
glue, screws, and nails … using a combination of green lumber, partially seasoned wood, and
fully dried pieces. … was the mystery or secret of chairmaking, known by those who learned the
craft directly from others" (p. 240). Such knowledge was precious because it had been honed
across generations. Like handmade chairmaking, classical drawing has its lesser-known
techniques.
The following diary excerpt on pencil sharpening sums up how I felt about artistic
apparatus in drawing: “I noticed how beautifully the wood curls off from the lead, like a fleurde-lis, or the vents in a violin. They spiral like a nautilus, moving according to Fibonacci’s law.
It’s … a ‘Zen’ experience.” With quality supplies in my toolbox and the know-how to handle
them properly, I experienced mundane tasks as meditative rituals. Initiation into artistic
apparatus, without the burden of being financially dependent on the fruits of the labor thereby
enabled, proved to be deeply satisfying. It gave me a taste of what the best aspects of
apprenticeship might have been like (in my idealized view), without the starkness that faced
some guild members so long ago, such as being forced under the tutelage of an unforgiving
master (Rorabaugh, 1986). Tools of the trade are wonderful in many respects; quality tools can
empower an artist. Respecting one’s tools—knowing how to maintain them, use them
responsibly, proficiently, and safely, and wield them wisely, matters. Nevertheless, it is
important to resist the temptation to romanticize or fetishize them.
As an introvert and a dreamer, participation in communities of practice kept me
grounded. Learning in the presence of others, many of whom knew more than I, allowed me to
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co-construct meaning and situate my experiences within authentic contexts. For example, many
of the people I encountered made their living as artists. For some, this meant losing sleep every
night to finish a commission under deadline. Passion for the work often did not equate to
pleasure; this was not a revelation to me, but it was a reality check, nonetheless. Like axiomatic
knowledge, social learning served as a metaphorical benchmark. It allowed me to gauge my
work ethic and hone my artisanal judgment. By participating in communities of practice, I
developed a modicum of social capital related to the enterprise of drawing (see P. C. Taylor,
2015).
Some of this social capital was transmitted via peer learning. My most striking encounter
with the latter occurred during a critique in my Bargue class at ARA Boston, when I was granted
a glimpse of a fellow student’s process during the big form modelling stage of transcription.
Progressive drawings, almost as if captured through stop-motion photography, had been stored in
her Google Drive folder. While the instructor talked to me about the stages exhibited in this
student’s drawings, I could see the student in the participant video panel, listening along with
apparent pride as she continued to work at her easel. After that class session, I reviewed the
images to guide my progress, and recorded the following observations in my diary:
I could see her decisions … she was really just [sic] going for the darkest darks with her
shadows. Staying away from the middle tones. So [sic] I followed that example …
Sometimes I agreed with where she drew her boundaries. Other times, I did not agree …
[but] I needed to take bold, decisive steps to generalize and simplify forms.
Sometimes watching a more advanced student is just as useful as hearing from a credentialed
expert. That is especially true when the expert in question vets and encourages peer learning, as
my instructor did at ARA Boston.
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Writing about apprenticeship in the arts, Charland (2005) described the value of social
learning. He said: “Apprentices are actively supported by, and in social interaction with, more
knowledgeable others, and gradually develop a greater understanding of, and take on greater
responsibility for, the tasks at hand” (p. 42). There is meaningful overlap here with my
experience at ARA Boston. Although my classes there in no way equated to an apprenticeship,
the people involved composed a community of practice, a conceptualization of learning modeled
after apprenticeship (see Collins et al., 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991). The atelier provided a
beneficial environment wherein I could experience situative, constructivist pedagogy in the best
sense of the term—not as trivial discovery, but as holistic discovery, paired with comprehension.
Not only did the instructor encourage peer learning, but he also disseminated expertly curated
knowledge to enrich hands-on, empirical learning, ensuring that the other students and I were
nurtured and could persist through whatever learning challenges we confronted.
Embodied Modalities
Completing drawing exercises and participating in related communities of practice
immersed me in a somatic activity system that grounded my learning in terms of perceptual,
action-oriented, and introspective modalities. Perceptual modalities concerned visual inputs and
the positioning of my body to influence them, such as how I aligned my stance and squinted my
eyes to capture imagery in my Bargues with greater accuracy. For example, after an evening
working on a transcription of Cardinal Ximenes (Plate I, 32 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), I
recorded the following reflection in my diary:
I kept relying on my eyes. Toward the very end, I was again better about adjusting lines
according to measurements with the bamboo stick. Next time, I’d like to try the sight-size
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approach, or whatever they call it when you stand back and use the thread to do
measurements and adjust (closing one eye).
The process of managing my perceptual experiences to improve my drawing ability
involved perceptual reorganization. As if turning myself into an instrument, I moved my hands,
body, and eyes to situate myself relative to my subject matter and scan its features. Whenever I
required updated visual data, I shifted my movements accordingly to gather it with as little
distortion as possible. Doing so likely implemented what Barsalou (2020) called a situated action
cycle that allowed me to coordinate my perception with cognition and behavior. In other words, I
aligned my drawing with my observations to the best of my ability, continually seeking cognitive
equilibrium through judgments of coherence (see Polanyi & Prosch, 1975).
External perceptual (action-oriented) modalities involved kinesthetic actions and bodily
sensations, such as how I gripped my pencil while shading a Bargue or stretched high and wide,
charcoal in hand, to capture the figure in a gesture drawing. The following diary excerpts, written
in regard to Bargue shading and to gesture exercises (respectively), provide a glimpse of my
experiences with such modalities:
Started off really slowly, with wiggly lines. So now, I’m flicking the pencil faster, and
the lines are coming out finer and surer … [I can now] use the sweeping stroke to draw.
Thank goodness! Now I’m able to achieve a much better quality of line … Drawing the
image felt almost like dancing, and my movements were fluid, to the point where I could
feel the lubrication within my own tissues—the fascia in my back, arms, and shoulders as
I swooped up to sketch his arms; then a good stretch in my back and hips as I dragged the
charcoal down his leg.
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These activities combined external perceptual modalities, such as vision and haptics, with
the internal perceptual modality of proprioception and the domain of embodiment, involving my
limbs, trunk, and motor system (see Barsalou, 2020). My memory of both events is visceral.
Literally, my recollections are rooted in the body, for my cognition was grounded in at least two
domains (perceptual modalities and the body), which likely left a strong trace.
Introspective modalities comprised feelings of centeredness and receptivity. In one diary
entry on shading a Bargue, I mused to myself, “As I kept pushing my pencil, I started to feel
mesmerized.” Meanwhile, my work on tessellations prompted new mental imagery: “I started
dreaming of geometrical patterns in my sleep … [I had] an internal sense of being inside of a
kaleidoscope, with geometrical shapes falling into delightful fractal patterns.” Introspective
modalities also rose to the fore when I struggled to teach myself perspective. That effort
prompted less pleasant emotions. Frustration was evident in the relevant diary excerpts: “How
many vanishing points? I felt overwhelmed and confused … Exasperating!! I felt drained and
exhausted after this effort.”
Drawing stirred my emotions and impacted my mental state. In turn, the feelings and
impressions I generated accumulated in memory and inhabited my subconscious. To some
extent, they became sublimated, or tacit. In this way, they served to ground my cognition in
drawing and thereby supported my continued learning and development over time. It is important
to note that, had my frustration turned to discouragement, the process could have been
detrimental instead of beneficial. It could have undermined my motivation and ability to learn. In
a sense, negative emotions might serve to unmoor, rather than ground learning. Likewise, faulty
grounding in other situative domains, including those discussed above, may hinder learning. This
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is probably why Polanyi and Prosch (1975) emphasized the importance of high quality
subsidiaries in the formation of tacit knowledge.
Learning Transfer
Over the course of my drawing curriculum, learning transfer occurred between my
Bargue lessons and my perceptual drawing exercises en plein air. Specifically, I transferred two
strategies from my Bargues: the use of straight lines to denote the initial outline of a curved
object and the progressive use of shading from dark to light when describing a form (see Figures
61 & 62). According to Greeno et al. (1993), learning transfer hinges on learners’ ability to
reason and draw inferences, their attunement to what actions are possible (i.e., affordances)
versus impossible (i.e., constraints) in the original learning situation, and which affordances and
constraints they imagine will remain constant in a transformed learning situation.
In the transfer cases just mentioned, I imported invariant concepts from my transcription
of a two-dimensional Bargue plate under artificial light to a sketch of a three-dimensional object
under natural light. Despite the transformations involved (level of detail applied, dimensionality
of subject matter, lighting), I inferred that it would be possible to apply similar principles across
both situations; nothing in the transfer situation would violate the principles I had already
learned, e.g., of beginning with straight lines and establishing the darkest darks to benchmark a
range of values across a form.
Greeno et al. (1993) conceptualized learning transfer in terms of how an agent’s activity
is structured in the initial learning situation compared to the structure of that learner’s activity in
a transfer situation. The research team characterized such activity as a series of interactions. This
theory complements Barsalou’s (2020) notion of the situated action cycle, which maps out the
phases and potential flow of interactions among an agent’s perceptual modalities, body,
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surrounding environment, and social milieu in the process of grounding, and thus shaping, the
agent’s cognition. As interactions are repeated and new concepts are acquired, a specific
choreography—or action-based schema (which Barsalou called a simulator), can be invoked
whenever the learner encounters relevant cues. Such simulators may be activated intentionally,
via recollection or imagination, or they may be triggered unconsciously.
Because simulators emerge from activated domains, whether extended, embedded,
embodied, or enactive, the potential exists for richly layered simulations that draw on social,
environmental, bodily, perceptual-motor, emotional, and introspective factors (Barsalou, 2020). I
suspect that the more layers a given simulator accumulates—likely via tacit integration (see
Polanyi, 1961, 1966, 1967; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975)—the more affordances and constraints will
be available for learners to superimpose in situations where the conditions of learning have
undergone a transformation, as in the case of transfer. Perhaps the knowledge I acquired during
my Bargue lessons transferred so easily due to the rich range of situative interactions I enjoyed in
my coursework at ARA Boston. These interactions comprised a supportive community of
practice, appropriate artistic apparatus, stimulating imagery, a comfortable workspace, adequate
lighting conditions, mental focus, and a determined, hopeful attitude.
Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding Situative Conditions
My findings regarding the impact of situative factors on the development of my artisanal
judgment while learning to draw comported with three complementary streams of research
across decades and disciplines: The theories of tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1961, 1964, 1966;
Polanyi & Prosch, 1975), constructive perception (Suwa & Tversky, 2003), and grounded
cognition (Barsalou, 2008, 2010, 2020). According to my research and this literature, it would
appear that grounded cognition, resulting from situative domains that extend, embed, embody,
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enact, and generally undergird cognition, forms the basis for learning to draw. Ruskin intuited
this when he invoked head, hand and heart in artisanship (see Crawford, 2003).
In this context, tacit integrations may arise whenever learners successfully coordinate
behavior with perception and cognition in the midst of a situated action cycle (see Barsalou,
2020). In the process, tacit knowledge may emerge, prompting the reorganization of ideas and
perceptual stimuli in accord with new understandings while enabling future simulations of the
learning experience. If my analysis is accurate, then grounded cognition and tacit knowing may
contribute meaningfully to constructive perception; recall that the latter depends on perceptual
reorganization, which flourishes when reasoning is sound and situative factors are propitious. It
would not surprise me if associative fluency, the key constituent of constructive perception
alongside perceptual reorganization, is likewise grounded in situative domains. Therefore,
situative factors likely play a crucial role in developing artisanal judgment in drawing, and
beyond that, imagination as well.
My research focused on developing a repertoire of classical drawing skills transmitted
intergenerationally among practitioners in the West, an endeavor that communities of practice
supported through artistic apparatus and peer learning. In my experience, the community of
practice model, especially at ARA Boston, held promise for supporting active, empirical learning
with axiomatic scaffolds and semantically driven visual attentional strategies. It also afforded the
continued transmission and adaptation of traditional drawing methods.
Whatever communities of practice one joins, I recommend incorporating drawing
activities that exercise both fine and gross motor skills, such as what I experienced during the
precise transcription of Bargues versus comparatively nimble gesture sketching in a large format.
I hope to form a weekly drawing club wherein the members will explore a different topic
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together trimonthly. During the exploration of each theme, we would spend the first month
reading and surveying relevant works of art; then, we would spend the second and third months
working on a related drawing assignment designed by myself or one of the other club members.
The recursive nature of Barsalou’s (2020) situated action cycle suggests that a system of
artistic training, if pursued persistently, may become ingrained. For me, that remains a desired
outcome. However, because such practice choreographs and retraces visual schemata, a classical
drawing curriculum also may have undesired effects downstream, due to the cognitive
penetrability of perception (see Cermeño-Aínsa, 2020). In essence, a given program of training
may influence how an artist sees the world; it can become limiting. To some extent, constraining
perception may be advantageous; for example, when confronted with visual choice overload.
Yet, it also may foreclose upon imaginative possibilities and opportunities to refresh a gaze that
has grown habituated or has come to adopt a colonizing perspective. Unfortunately, no matter
what an artist does, some tradeoffs are probably inevitable.
I recommend the following idea to instructors or artists who wish to cultivate more
cosmopolitan capabilities and mitigate some of the downsides of training: After establishing
proficiency in a primary drawing tradition, consider taking beginner’s classes, from time to time,
in different genres, traditions, and styles of drawing. This should build flexibility and renew
one’s perceptual capacities. At the same time, it is important to be mindful of issues related to
cultural appropriation. For practitioners seeking guidance in recognizing and grappling with
artistic biases and cultural appropriation, P. Rekdal’s (2021) Appropriate: A Provocation is an
astute and illuminating tour de force.
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Imaginal Implications of Developing My Artisanal Judgment
My third research question sought to understand, through firsthand drawing study and
practice, the relationship between skill acquisition and my capacity for imaginative expression,
both in terms of drawing from memory and inventively. Colloquially, these goals may be
respectively characterized as drawing “out of one’s head” and “from the mind’s eye.” By means
of classical drawing instruction, I was interested in developing both my reproductive and
productive imagination (see Kant, 1781–1787/1998). I hoped to understand whether an
association might exist, and if so, the nature of the association.
The results of my research suggested I should reconceptualize my notion of imaginative
expression and pointed to a potentially viable connection presented by the phenomenon of
constructive perception, “the deliberate adoption of perceptual strategies in the service of
cognition. … [Therefore], the skill for coordinating perceptual reorganization and conceptual
generation” (Suwa & Tversky, 2003, pp. 1140–1141). Constructive perception is correlated with
expertise. Individuals who are capable of constructive perception can interpret and manipulate
sensory information in coordination with their cognitive conceptualizations, and vice versa. This
ability is theorized to derive from activities that involve perceptual reorganization and
associative fluency in combination. Some of my drawing activities encouraged the development
of one or more of these components of constructive perception.
Reconceptualizing Imaginative Expression
My unhelpful assumptions about imaginative expression in drawing—that pictorial ideas
should emerge fully formed from my head and that generating ideas through drawing was
insufficiently imaginative—centered on my expectation that imagination should produce
something out of nothing. That is clearly not the case in regard to the reproductive function of
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imagination described by Kant (1781–1787/1998), wherein the mind classifies perceptual stimuli
and reconstructs in memory images gathered through sensory perception. It also is not the case
for productive imagination, the creative form of imagination espoused by Kant, which is akin to
Avicenna's notion of imaginativa. Rather than generating pictures out of thin air, imaginativa
was envisaged as a recombinatorial mental process that drew upon recollected images and
experiences for its raw material (see M. Kemp, 1977).
While the latter is certainly more active and deliberative than reproductive imagination, it
does not necessarily invent anything, at least not out of whole cloth. Rather, it reconstructs new
wholes out of a variety of different parts that have been reconfigured and rearranged. Life
experience, visual research, observation, and drawing practice may supply the necessary
fragments needed to fuel an artist's imagination. After that, artisanal judgment may set to work,
selecting among the materials available and deciding how to combine them. Under such
circumstances, even disappointing, pedestrian artworks, such as my poetry illustrations, may
offer imaginative value, for they sometimes reveal a snatch of insightful detail previously hidden
in the mind. Based on this more honest definition of imagination, I think it would be more
productive, going forward, if I conceptualized productive imagination not in terms of magical
invention, like the girl who tried to spin gold out of straw, but in terms of discovery and play,
like a child amid everyday treasures in the attic.
Perceptual Reorganization
When individuals act upon a configuration to reorganize it, they are demonstrating
perceptual reorganization. Typically, perceptual reorganization occurs mentally; for example, it
may be facilitated by illusions, such as the well-known image that appears to be either a duck or
a rabbit depending on how it is viewed. It entails regrouping elements, altering frames of
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reference, or changing perspective (Suwa & Tversky, 2003). Fertile ground for perceptual
reorganization depends on suitable environmental stimuli, whether ideal or merely adequate for a
given activity, as well as the relative ingenuity of the individual(s) involved in a task. In this
way, perceptual reorganization exemplifies grounded cognition in action.
Practitioners engaged in perceptual reorganization, such as expert chess players, are able
to recognize and distinguish component parts of a system from one another and the larger whole.
They may view a situation from multiple perspectives and through multiple frames of reference,
coordinating their insights with movements, decisions, and behaviors. The process is recursive;
old cognitive structures are continually displaced as new information is encountered (Suwa &
Tversky, 2003). In drawing, perceptual reorganization also may be exhibited physically, wherein
an artist acts upon a configuration of lines to produce a new organization that modifies the
stimulus; for example, the erasure of initial marks as a new shape takes form on paper.
Classes or exercises in recollective drawing, visual research, constructive drawing, and
perspective projection challenged me to strive toward perceptual reorganization, or at least
contemplate the steps I would need to climb on the way toward achieving it. These lessons
included geometric memory drawings, spiderweb studies, an introduction to constructive
drawing techniques, and problem finding in three-dimensional space to prepare for the creation
of floor plan projections in two-point perspective. One diary excerpt, regarding the staircase
projection I devised (see Figure 67), captured the recombinative nature of these projects:
I purchased a set of colorful cubes and positioned them in a three-dimensional shoebox
grid that I made for myself, lined with graph paper. I decided to make a simple staircase,
and wanted to have a good look at them, so I set them up in this little scene and then
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snapped a bunch of photos with my iPhone from a lot of angles, straight-on, worm’s-eye,
and bird’s-eye view.
This exercise, wherein I built a model to facilitate problem formulation (see Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976) before selecting a compelling viewpoint and investing time portraying
it, exhibited perceptual reorganization in several ways. It relied on suitable materials available in
the learning environment, including Snap Cubes, a shoebox, graph paper, and my camera. It
challenged me to relate distinct representations of the model (e.g., my floor plan and elevation
specs, snapshots from multiple vantage points) to the model itself and my envisioned drawing of
it. It tasked me with moving my body and gaze in relationship to the model, choosing among
depictive options, and calibrating mark making in accordance with measurements prescribed by
that decision. Throughout the process, I resorted to my eraser countless times, laying down one
correction upon another. This produced a finely grooved palimpsest and served as a reasonable
first effort at rendering a staircase in two-point perspective (see Figure 68).
Regarding the role of subsidiaries in the unfolding of perceptual reorganization through
exercises like this one, I experienced both setbacks and successes. For example, I initially lacked
knowledge of the vertical measuring line (VML), a conceptual device useful for determining the
heights of objects relative to the horizon line. Had I known about it, my slow and frustrating
progress could have been improved. However, the repetitive nature of perspective projection
allowed me to accumulate enough experience to sublimate or automatize some aspects of the
task as tacit knowledge (e.g., my handling of the ruler relative to my vanishing points) and
thereby achieve perceptual tacit integration, which freed up cognitive space to focus on more
complicated maneuvers and conceptualizations. Through further repetition, there were occasions
when I enjoyed a sudden insight, wherein the relationship of parts to the greater whole fell into
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place, such as when I realized that one point in the one-dimensional space of my floor plan was
equivalent to two points, stacked one-on-top-of-the-other, in the two-dimensional space of my
drawing. This kind of insightful tacit integration, made possible via the hard work underlying
perceptual tacit integration, exemplified perceptual reorganization.
By engaging in drawing activities that required perceptual reorganization, I came to
understand that progress in imaginal drawing, such as my drawing of an imaginary staircase,
may emerge through slow and deliberative effort and experimentation. Imaginative expression
need not begin with a bolt of inspiration. It may be earned, not merely gifted. Findings suggested
the following kinds of drawing activities exercised perceptual reorganization:
•

visual research and perceptual drawing: learning about a selected type of subject matter
and visually examining, then drawing, an array of stimuli belonging to that category. This
can be helpful for identifying prototypical features, as well as interesting variations on a
theme.

•

recollective drawing: drawing a stimulus from memory after a period of study. This can be
effective for training attention, selecting personally meaningful visual information, and
improving mimetic accuracy.

•

constructive drawing: using simple geometric shapes and principles of perspective to build
images and visual compositions. This precludes reliance on occurrent visual references when
creating imaginary worlds and liberates working memory to focus on playful manipulation
and responsive decision-making instead of mimetic matching.

•

problem finding: formulating an interesting challenge to propel problem solving, often in
the creation of a work of art (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976). Whether engaged
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intentionally or intuitively, this can be useful for revealing previously unimagined
perspectives and possibilities to be explored and developed.
Associative Fluency
Suwa and Tversky (2003) defined associative fluency as “the ability to produce words in
a restricted area of meaning” (p. 1142). For purposes of this analysis, let us expand that
definition to encompass the association of any number of object names with abstract shapes,
insofar as the names could plausibly be used to describe the shapes. For example, let us assume
that the associative task of producing words with a similar meaning to one or more presented
words is comparable to (a) producing names that imbue an otherwise ambiguous shape with
semantic meaning, securing it plausibly within one or more conceptual categories, (b) producing
multiple images that plausibly illustrate one or more given words, or (c) producing images of
objects that share a semantically meaningful relationship with other given objects. In this sense,
associative fluency can be understood as a conceptual ability that entails drawing plausible
semantic resemblances among syntactically different stimuli in a restricted area of meaning. In
the words of S. Boornazian, it functions, ostensibly, as a “visual thesaurus” for drawing (personal
communication, March 19, 2022).
Fertile ground for associative fluency as I have defined it depends on internal perceptual
modalities, particularly introspection (e.g., internal mental states and emotions), as well as
inductive and analogical reasoning ability. Such reasoning is grounded in the various domains
that support cognition (enactive, embodied, embedded, and extended). Within the genre of
artistic drawing, associative fluency is often prolifically manifested, whether symbolically or
literally. Therefore, engaging with existing works of art should encourage associative fluency.
That said, within the confines of my drawing curriculum, two kinds of exercises specifically
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challenged me to develop associative fluency: the production of subjective but epistemologically
felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) to improve the accuracy of Bargue transcriptions (e.g.,
naming shapes) and the formation of associations in response to verbal texts through elaborative
sketching (e.g., illustration of a poem).
My pursuit of associative fluency via epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin,
2017) is discussed earlier in this chapter. In terms of elaborative sketching, I engaged in
associative fluency in response to M. Oliver’s (2004) poem, “How Everything Adores Being
Alive” and in response to my own illustrations of her poem as they emerged on paper. In the first
case, I produced images that plausibly illustrated meaning conveyed by a series of words. In the
second case, I produced images of objects that were not mentioned in the poem, which shared a
semantically meaningful relationship with my existing depictions. In both cases, my illustrations
served as syntactically distinct yet plausible (albeit pedestrian) representations of semantically
related stimuli (see Figures 63–65). The following diary excerpt described my approach:
“Although no spiderweb appeared in the poem, I visualized one in my imagination, so I added
[it].” The emergence of the spiderweb, seemingly out of nowhere, allowed me to bring forward
my subconscious associations between the poem and the precarity of life.
Elaborative drawing effectuates the syntactical proliferation of imagery based on
semantic associations. Likewise, epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017) in drawing
facilitate syntactic mimesis through semantic means. As instigators of associative fluency, I
propose that elaborative drawing and felicitous falsehoods alike may propel constructive
perception, and thus serve as a bridge between artisanal judgment and imaginative expression in
drawing. In the same vein, Leonardo (1540/1956) recommended a process for stimulating
imagination that I did not have a chance to practice within the scope of this research project.
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Specifically, he recommended inventing scenes out of blotches on walls, much like one might
find shapes in the clouds. Akin to the technique of make-perceive (Briscoe, 2018), Leonardo’s
method involved projecting mental imagery onto real-world scenes to create imaginary ones,
much as a home decorator superimposes visual ideas onto a disheveled room. Make-perceive is
a useful tool not only for drawing and painting, but for everyday endeavors that involve
visualization.
Because make-perceive produces what Briscoe (2018) termed “perceptual-imaginative
amalgam[s]” (abstract), I surmise it engages perceptual reorganization and associative fluency in
combination. An imaginative strategy for developing the composition of a drawing, makeperceive shares much in common with the notion of an epistemically felicitous falsehood (see
Elgin, 2017) applied subjectively. Unlike the latter, however, its use encompasses an entire scene
(a whole), not merely separate parts of an image. Thus, Leonardo’s technique of imaginative
projection (i.e., make-perceive) either may amount to something more sophisticated than a
felicitous falsehood, or simply may be a compound version of such. Regardless, I hope to
attempt the strategy in my future drawing projects.
On the whole, findings suggested the following kinds of drawing activities exercised
associative fluency:
•

engaging with art: viewing, sketching, and learning about historical and contemporary
artworks. This is useful for generating a proliferation of visual ideas relative to a given
cultural context and milieu.

•

epistemically felicitous falsehoods: applying a subjective version of Elgin’s (2017) concept
to envisage within abstract shapes or imaginary visual settings recognizable objects or
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physical motions (e.g., naming shapes, mental simulation, Briscoe’s [2018] make-perceive).
This may increase mimetic accuracy or spur the development of compositional ideas.
•

elaborative sketching: freehand drawing in response to cues, typically verbal, but of any
sensorial origin (e.g., stories, poetry, music, images, movements, tastes, textures, scents).
This may surface unconscious semantic associations and mental imagery and propel the
spontaneous generation of visual ideas.

Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding Imaginal Implications
Findings concerning the relationship between skill acquisition and my capacity for
imaginative expression revealed promising and hindering approaches via constructive perception
and its constituent skills: perceptual reorganization and associative fluency. According to Suwa
and Tversky (2003) perceptual reorganization alone is insufficient for developing constructive
perception; it must be accompanied by “meaningful interpretations” (p. 1144). Likewise,
associative fluency must be paired with “new perceptual configurations or perspectives in
external representations” (p. 1144). In other words, perceptual reorganization and associative
fluency are necessary in combination.
Developing technical skills (i.e., practicing perceptual reorganization) benefitted my
imaginal progress; meanwhile imaginative experimentation (i.e., associative fluency) benefitted
my artisanal judgment and my representational abilities flowing from it. Due to the nature of the
relationship between these domains, which too often has been misconstrued as bifurcated rather
than complementary, it appears that drawing ability may be earned just as much as it is gifted. In
other words, talent is only one piece of the story of achievement in representational art. It is by
no means the totality.
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Imaginal sketching, exemplified in my poem illustration, may contribute to constructive
perception (see Suwa & Tversky, 2003), at least in terms of associative fluency. Because it
serves as a vector for meaning making, imaginal sketching is a form of imaginative expression. I
propose that imaginal sketching brings meaning to light through a process of insightful tacit
integration (see Polanyi, 1966). The semantic contributions of imaginal sketching also may
support the development of mimetic (i.e., syntactically accurate) drawing, because meaning is
the spark of motivation. It powers the kind of sustained effort, demonstrated in my spiderweb
studies (see Figures 64 & 65), that is needed to hone finely tuned representational drawing skills.
Indeed, practitioners of constructivism, in its holistic form, recommend meaningful framing of
repetitive content that is likely to become ritualized (Perkins, 1999).
In regard to perceptual reorganization (see Suwa & Tversky, 2003), problem finding
(Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976), which was exemplified in my perspective projection
exercise, may contribute to artisanal judgment (and thus, constructive perception) by introducing
opportunities for artists to rearrange materials and shift viewpoints during the problem
formulation stage of a project, ultimately selecting the most interesting options. Problem finding
also may be applied at the problem solution stage of a project; for example, after an artist has
sketched out many objects of importance to a composition, which then may be moved around
and playfully recombined at will to capture the essence of an intended meaning. This illustrates
one approach to combining perceptual reorganization and associative fluency. I recommend that
drawing instructors and self-directed learners intentionally incorporate problem finding into
drawing curricula. To aid this process, I designed a learning activity that incorporates problem
finding at the problem formulation stage of an assignment in linear perspective projection (see
Appendix B)
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Recall Evans’ (2007) explanation of the parallel nature of cognitive processing in
heuristic and analytical brain systems, wherein the heuristic system runs on automatic pilot in the
background while the analytical system metabolizes working memory to maintain focus. If we
analyze the process of learning to draw through this lens, we can infer that tacit knowledge, by
virtue of its tacitness, may be essential for coping with the limits of working memory. In other
words, the act of sublimating explicit subsidiaries into tacit form, an example of perceptual
reorganization, may be the first step toward cultivating constructive perception (see Suwa &
Tversky, 2003). The more subsidiaries can be dealt with via the heuristic system, the more
cognitive space may be dedicated to intended focal targets, such as an artist's imaginative ideas.
In short, practicing perceptual reorganization may pave the way for associative fluency; when
both are combined, constructive perception may result, and through it, a greater capacity for
imaginative expression in drawing.
This suggests there is value in creating tacit knowledge through meticulous and repetitive
drawing practice. In particular, students of representational drawing who wish to develop
imaginative ability should engage in visual research, perceptual drawing, recollective drawing,
constructive drawing, problem finding, and elaborative sketching. They should also employ
epistemically felicitous falsehoods when constructing drawings and engage with existing works
of art. Without an appropriate repertoire of skills, an artist’s analytical system may become
overtaxed by syntactic concerns when drawing, leaving less room for semantic and associative
exploration. Therefore, art instructors who expect original and inventive work from students
without providing training in foundational skills may have it backwards. In that world, the hare
always wins the race against the tortoise. Yet, we know there is wisdom in Aesop’s fable: Slow
and steady wins the race. In the words of contemporary artist and architect M. Abid (2022),
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“Perseverance is one quality that all artists must possess. The continued effort to do or achieve
something despite difficulties is what I feel guarantees creative fulfilment” (n.p.). I agree with
her sentiment.
A Hypothesis on Skill Acquisition and Imaginative Expression in Realist Drawing
Ideas tend to present themselves by surprise, through a sudden flash of insight. That part
is easy; but the expression of an idea—the creation of a coherent imaginary world—is
cognitively demanding (see Evans, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007). It is a sophisticated endeavor
that likely requires skill in constructive perception (see Suwa & Tversky, 2003). Such skills may
be strengthened through learning and practice; ideally, in a manner that harmonizes with how the
mind works.
Cognition, which entails mental activity encompassing attention, memory, thought,
language, and knowledge, is situatively grounded. This means it is embodied and dependent on
our physical health, abilities, and states; enacted by our particular external and internal
modalities like perception, emotions, proprioception, and introspection; embedded in settings or
tools available in the physical environment; and extended by our cultural contexts and social
interactions. The relationship between cognitive operations and these grounding domains is
coordinated through a network of feedback loops called the situated action cycle. Because
learning depends on cognition, learning is likewise contingent on such grounding factors and
deepens through the repetition of relevant situated action cycles (Barsalou, 2020).
With focused and repeated practice in a discipline or skill, learners may acquire tacit
knowledge (Polanyi, 1961, 1967; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). Tacit knowledge is knowledge that
has become so embedded in cognition (sometimes unconsciously so) that it has become part of
our perceptual apparatus, shaping how we see things. In other words, tacit knowledge
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exemplifies how perception can be influenced by cognition, i.e., the cognitive penetrability of
perception (see Cermeño-Aínsa, 2020). As learning progresses, earlier subjects of study (e.g.,
focal targets) transition to subsidiaries in which we dwell (Polanyi, 1961, 1967). The more tacit
knowledge individuals possess in a given area, the more they can focus on learning new
information or skills, and the more energy they can dedicate to imaginative thinking.
Perceptual tacit knowing occurs when attending to a whole without explicitly and
deliberately considering the contribution of each of its parts, such as when we recognize faces
without separately analyzing each facial feature. The whole is grasped before the parts are
considered. This occurs automatically. Insightful tacit knowing, by contrast, occurs after a
succession of parts each has been explicitly and deliberately attended, until the relationship
among said parts is apprehended suddenly, such as when a scientist builds a new theory based on
collected data. The parts are grasped before the whole is considered. Such tacit knowledge is
original (Polanyi, 1966). Effective learning among novices entails both perceptual and insightful
tacit knowing, via the balancing of whole-to-part and part-to-whole attention, but in a
comparatively rudimentary fashion (see Dreyfus, 2001; Wallace, 2015).
To encourage perceptual tacit learning, the whole should be presented to learners, even
though they likely cannot immediately recognize its meaning and implications. For novices,
perceptual tacit learning requires stepwise deliberation. Therefore, it may be supported with
learning scaffolds in the form of axiomatic knowledge. In my research, examples of such
scaffolds for drawing included the value scale I applied to “key” a drawing and the rule of linear
perspective I employed to find the axis of an ellipse. When presented as objective idealizations
of reliable phenomena, axiomatic learning scaffolds can serve as benchmarks for artisanal
judgment, much as the ideal gas law aids scientific judgment. Epistemically felicitous
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falsehoods, as Elgin (2017) described them, fit into this category of axiomatic knowledge
scaffolds, alongside background facts and first principles.
To encourage insightful tacit learning, learners also should be given an opportunity to
examine and experiment with parts. By doing so, the relationship(s) among those parts should
become evident. Notably, because discovery in the context of novice learning replicates what is
already known among experts, insightful tacit learning is derivative rather than original.
Insightful tacit learning may be supported through discovery learning (i.e., active learning),
wherein learners generate their own knowledge empirically.
In the context of my research, insightful tacit learning was encouraged when I counted
form shapes for Profile of a Foot (Plate I, 5 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), analyzed the play of
light and shadow on my Woodland Debris arrangements, and earmarked my understanding of a
principle of one-point perspective by coloring in the receding face of a cube. Additionally, the
assignment of concrete names for abstract shapes (a subjective species of epistemically felicitous
falsehood [see Elgin, 2017]) and elaborative sketching supported my acquisition of insightful
tacit knowledge. Specifically, those moments occurred when I envisioned a nonexistent bird and
snake in Profile of a Foot, a raindrop in my memory drawing prompt, and a lightbulb in Hand of
a Woman Holding a Stone (Plate I, 6 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), as well as when I included a
spiderweb, unprompted, in my imaginal illustration of “How Everything Adores Being Alive”
(Oliver, 2004).
Both epistemically felicitous falsehoods (see Elgin, 2017), applied subjectively, and
elaborative sketching demonstrate associative fluency in action via insightful tacit learning. In
the first case, the naming of otherwise abstract shapes allows a learner to draw plausible
semantic resemblances among syntactically different stimuli in a restricted area of meaning. In
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the second case, the intermingling of a learner’s mental imagery and the associated meanings
thereof, are expressed in syntactic form (e.g., as a drawing). According to Suwa and Tversky
(2003), associative fluency is one of two crucial ingredients underpinning constructive
perception. Therefore, insightful tacit learning likely contributes to constructive perception in
drawing.
Meanwhile, learning activities that cultivate both perceptual and insightful tacit
knowledge balance learners’ attention among whole-to-part and part-to-whole perspectives. The
kind of attentional flexibility this cultivates is a hallmark of perceptual reorganization, the ability
to rearrange a given configuration by regrouping parts or altering frames of reference. Alongside
associative fluency, perceptual reorganization is the second crucial ingredient underpinning
constructive perception (Suwa & Tversky, 2003). My use of problem finding (see Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976), exhibited when I created a three-dimensional model of my floor plan
for a two-point perspective drawing, demonstrated perceptual reorganization. Therefore, the
combination of insightful and perceptual tacit learning should contribute to the development of
constructive perception in drawing.
The examples just reviewed demonstrate cognitive processes and the embodied
modalities that ground them, such a vision and haptics. I would be remiss if I failed to
acknowledge the contributions of physical and social environments as well. In my experience as
a newcomer to classical drawing methods, participation in relevant communities of practice
further grounded my learning. Within the context of these communities, my introduction to
artistic apparatus (e.g., extreme pencil sharpening, the mahl stick, drawing horses) enriched my
physical environment for learning. My access to peer learning, which allowed me to observe the
decisions made by a more advanced student during her big form modelling of Hand of a Woman
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Holding a Stone (Plate I, 6 in Bargue & Gérôme, 2003), enriched my social environment for
learning.
The process of situative learning in drawing, as described above, affords the development
of tacit knowledge, a desirable outcome. There is a downside to everything, however. In the case
of drawing, ingrained knowledge risks dulling an artist’s sensibilities, which can only be
refreshed through exposure to other artworks and trying out unfamiliar styles, genres, and
methods. This is why Riley (2008) recommended engaging art students in the analysis of
drawings produced by a variety of cultures, as doing so cultivates an “awareness of ontological
possibilities other than their own. … [which] allows students to deconstruct their own, taken for
granted, beliefs about perceptual matters, and affords the possibility of elaborating more
sophisticated ontological constructs through drawings” (p. 160).
Caveats aside, the more tacit knowledge a learner acquires in a given area, the more a
learner may attend to new focal targets. In other words, tacit knowledge should free up mental
space for more sophisticated cognitive endeavors. Imagination, in the creative sense, requires
sophisticated thought. Ideas often may emerge spontaneously, but the building of a coherent
imaginary world requires constructive perception and the ability to engage in volitional decisionmaking. As well, representation in drawing requires perceptual filtering: the application of a
chosen set of criteria to select essential features from the visual manifold.
Pedagogies that embrace a naïve view of constructivism through an over-emphasis on
discovery learning risk depriving representational drawing students of opportunities to develop
constructive perception and agency in their drawing practice. This is because they provide
insufficient axiomatic knowledge to support perceptual tacit learning and discourage students
from imposing their own schematic frameworks on the visual manifold. Thus, I am calling for a
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holistic conceptualization of constructivist pedagogy in skill-based drawing instruction among
educators and self-directed learners. Such an approach should incorporate learned principles, in
the form of axiomatic knowledge supports, to guide hands-on learning. As a result, learners may
have more success in their efforts to reconcile new knowledge with prior understandings (a
hallmark of holistic constructivism [Davis & Sumara, 2010; Osborne, 2015]) and develop their
unique artistic visions in conversation with existing bodies of work.
Finally, artists like myself, who find themselves easily daunted, may benefit even more if
they conceptualize imagination in drawing not in terms of magical invention, like the girl who
tried to spin gold out of straw, but in terms of discovery and play, like a child amid everyday
treasures in the attic. Imaginative expression in drawing need not depend on the muse. Rather
than relying on giftedness, the ability to express oneself imaginatively through drawing may be
earned with exercises that involve elaborative sketching, engaging with art, visual research,
perceptual and recollective drawing, constructive drawing, and problem finding.
Future Studies
Several additional studies might be pursued to further this line of research. To bring to
light further learning supports for developing artisanal judgment, I suggest drawing instructors
consult Kant’s (1781–1787/1998) Table of Judgments and Rensink’s (2015) Function-Centered
Taxonomy of Visual Attention to classify and refine existing drawing exercises and expose
curricular gaps by identifying aspects of judgment and visual attention not yet addressed. This
would contribute a systematic approach to curriculum design and the creation of appropriate
learning scaffolds.
To better understand the conditions of learning at play in artistic communities of practice,
I recommend further ethnographic and cognitive studies among novice artists, comparing their
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experiences to my own or using the hypothesis I generated as a launchpad for further inquiry.
Cross-sectional studies might be conducted as well, interviewing members across a range of ages
and levels of experience or proficiency within the domain. Such studies might examine variables
related to grounded cognition in the transmission and adaptation of intergenerational knowledge.
Drawing is multimodal. It can be observed synchronously, and it leaves a visible
cognitive trace. Therefore, studying drawing may help scholars understand the mechanisms via
which extended, embedded, embodied, and enactive (e.g., social, environmental, physical,
perceptual) domains of experience become integrated with and thereby function to ground
cognitive processes like attention, memory, and judgment. Although a great deal of progress has
been made to understand how grounded cognition works, further research remains to be done
(see Barsalou, 2020). While I did not design this study to elucidate the matter, my findings may
point interested scholars in a fruitful direction of inquiry. For example, I am curious to know
whether or not my supposition is correct that learning transfers best when it is grounded in
multiple domains. If so, then drawing not only may empower artistic imagination, but due to its
natural multimodality, it also may augment learning across the disciplines.
As well, I propose that Polanyi’s (1961, 1966, 1967; 1975) theory of tacit knowing may
provide a helpful lens for grounded cognition researchers, particularly in regard to the process of
tacit integration. I recommend that researchers conduct more cognitive task analyses to
document tacit knowledge generation and better understand the relationship between perceptual
tacit integration and insightful tacit integration in drawing. Is perceptual tacit integration, as I
have hypothesized, more strongly associated with determinative judgment? Is insightful tacit
integration associated with reflective judgment? In the early stages of learning to draw, does
perceptual tacit integration set the stage for insightful tacit integration down the road?
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Finally, I suggest researchers investigate the interaction of semantic scaffolds on
syntactic learning outcomes in representational drawing, and vice-versa. I am interested in the
relationship between form and function, figure and ground. How do meanings shape form? How
does form shape interpretation? Such research may be pursued not only through cognitive
studies, but through the creation of visual art. Robust literatures in gestalt theory, art history, and
design thinking should form the basis of knowledge from which this line of inquiry may
continue.
Chapter 7 Summary
In this chapter, I detailed my interpretations of findings related to cognitive and situative
factors, and the imaginal implications thereof, encountered in the process of honing my artisanal
judgment through drawing study and practice. Based on my interpretations, I communicated my
conclusions and recommendations, offered a summative hypothesis, and suggested future
research. In terms of cognitive factors, I identified complex attentional dynamics as the
predominant challenge, which was addressed through the use of learning supports that
contributed to constructive perception through tacit learning. These came in the form of
empirical, axiomatic, and tacit knowledge, as well as a subjective species of Elgin’s (2017)
epistemologically felicitous falsehoods. The most effective learning activities allowed me to
accumulate tacit knowledge through systematic practice with axiomatic learning scaffolds,
employ semantic devices to inform mimesis, and develop a sense of artistic agency. I
recommended relevant theoretical frameworks for developing additional learning scaffolds, and
toward that end, encouraged educators to embrace a holistic conceptualization of constructivist
pedagogy in drawing, rather than a trivial, or naïve view.
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Regarding situative factors, I interpreted the development of my artisanal judgment
through drawing in light of domains, including embodied modalities and social and physical
environments, that grounded my cognition and enabled learning transfer. In place of cognitive
scaffolds (i.e., knowledge and epistemically felicitous falsehoods), I analyzed communities of
practice and the artistic apparatus and peer learning opportunities available to me through them.
Although the vehicles under scrutiny differed, the mechanisms of learning followed a similar
pattern: transmission of intergenerational knowledge, behaviors, and emotions (albeit embodied
within people, places, and tools rather than cognitive learning supports and scaffolds, per se).
This transmission was enacted through tacit learning, and it sometimes incorporated semantically
inspired mimetic techniques that propelled insight through tacit integration. Situative experiences
inspired me to approach drawing as just one component of a wider somatic activity system
wherein artists may immerse themselves holistically, training the fine and gross motor skills of
the body, making a point to view projects through the eyes of fellow students and spectators, and
deliberately expanding visual vocabulary as it is acquired.
Finally, my interpretation of the data revealed imaginal implications of developing my
artisanal judgment via the cognitive and situative channels described above. Themes centered
around reconceptualizing imaginative expression as discovery or play rather than invention, as
well as effortful practice in perceptual reorganization and associative fluency to effectuate
constructive perception in drawing and achieve imaginative flair. Through integrative processes
entailed in tacit learning, there appeared to be a reciprocal benefit between skill acquisition and
the capacity for imaginative expression in realist drawing. Exercises I recommended toward that
end entailed visual research, perceptual drawing, recollective drawing, constructive drawing,
problem finding, elaborative sketching, and engagement with existing works of art.
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Appendix A
Self-Guided Drawing Curriculum: A Learning Contract

Data Elicitation and Documentation
For every project1 included in this learning contract (as applicable), keep track of and
document the following kinds of information as they arise during and after execution, to the
extent possible (see Hoffman et al., 1998; Petitmengin, 2006; Steffensen et al., 2016):
•

What is challenging or difficult?

•

Situational walk-throughs. Focus on answering “how” and “when” questions, and
exploring various dimensions of the experience (e.g., sensory and temporal).

•

Timeline sequencing.

•

Decision points (i.e., times of uncertainty where alternative options are apparent).

•

Cues and knowledge that inform decisions or insights.

•

Hypotheticals.

•

Cognitive events and transition points between them.

Project A: Imaginal Illustration
Learning Competencies
•

Based on verbal texts, create constructive drawings that provide imaginative scaffolding
(lacunae to be filled in by beholders’ mental schemata) and that function as perceptmemory hybrid drawings.

•

1

Present images that can be interpreted in multiple ways.

All project exercises to be proceeded by warm-up drawing activities including gesture drawing and physical
movement, taking on a range of postures and positions to awaken and more fully inhabit the body. This is
recognized in the “Learning Strategies” section of each project here listed (see the last bullet points therein).
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Learning Objectives
•

Sketch in an exploratory fashion in order to develop multiple semantic interpretations,
and through them, “associative fluency,” a component of constructive perception, which
is a hallmark of expertise and creativity. (Imagination: Schematism/Perception;
Productive Imagination)

•

Loosely sketch different pictures to represent the same verbal data elaboratively, one-tomany. (Imagination: Productive Imagination)

•

Sketch as a way to conserve working memory when hashing out ideas visually. This way,
your imagination needs to produce smaller batches of information from memory at a
time, as the external image is built. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination)

Subject Matter
•

Poems by Mary Oliver

Learning Resources
•

foobearFollow. (2019, March 28). Drawing From Your Imagination—Dreaming on
Paper. Instructables. https://www.instructables.com/id/drawing-from-your-mind-somethoughts-and-ideas

•

Krieger, B. (2003). Draw on your imagination. Artists’ Magazine, 20(11), 32–33.

•

Scott, C. (2020, October 11). Drawing Our Inner World Seeing our Outer World [Video].
https://vimeo.com/467072257

•

Zagrobelna, M. (2019, March 28). Why Is It So Hard to Draw From Imagination? Here’s
How to Do It! Envato Tuts+: Design & Illustration.
https://design.tutsplus.com/articles/why-is-it-so-hard-to-draw-from-imagination-hereshow-to-do-it--cms-22967
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Learning Strategies
•

Visual Selection: Use memory as a tool to zero in on the most meaningful details.
(Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Recruit top-down determinative Judgment: Take note, verbally, of features and
proportions present in visualized subject matter. This improves accurate representation
because semantic information can bolster syntactic representation. Additionally, the act
of translation requires effort that bolsters memory. Give a concrete name to abstract
shapes to aid recollection of them. This is a use of semantics to support syntax.
(Imagination: Reproductive; Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Project your imagination onto abstract scenes to mix up your past visual memories into a
new combination. This exploits the gestalt grouping illusion, playing productive tricks on
yourself, and allowing you to produce more interesting compositions. (Imagination:
Schematism/Perception; Productive Imagination)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of exercises resulting in constructive (imagination-driven) sketches and
drawings

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should exhibit associative fluency, elaboration, and sometimes perceptual gaps.
The fact that the images are derived from specific written texts should be retrievable
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through some visible, representational link between words and pictures, even if only very
loosely. I will engage in dynamic and summative evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this
project; additionally, I will ask my committee members, who are artists and artisans, for
their assessments.
Project B: Memory Training
Learning Competencies
•

Conjure and represent an artistic reality from memory that largely (though not necessarily
entirely) seems probable or possible; this may sometimes include figures that feel
volumetric and full of life. These drawings should be based on observable data and
skillfully constructed so their contents seem to accord with natural causes.

•

Create drawings that accentuate the most meaningful details of recollected subject matter,
a form of exemplification.

Learning Objectives
•

Practice memory drawing through disciplined practice and rehearsal of visual
recollections, which you may test with models. Do immediate drawings from memory.
Here's the process: Mark a spot on the floor where you observe a scene. Go into a
different room and draw what you saw. Alternate like this: between viewing, and then
immediately drawing from memory. This not only helps train memory, but hones
selective judgment. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination; Embodiment: Situative;
Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

When you want to improve your internal visualization of objects' size, shape, color, or
brightness, as opposed to spatial features, focus on verbal information about the objects,

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

424

which will confer a dual coding benefit to your imaginative efforts. (Imagination:
Reproductive Imagination; Embodiment: Somatic)
•

When you want to improve your internal visualization of objects' spatial locations and
proportional relationships as opposed to their size, shape, color, or brightness, engage in
physical movements to bolster your imaginative efforts. (Palmiero et al., 2019). For
example, some studies have demonstrated that motor expertise improves mental rotation
abilities. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination; Embodiment: Somatic)

•

Do blind contour drawings. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination; Embodiment:
Situative)

Subject Matter
•

Rousar Exercises; objects arranged in a still life scene; Gustave Dore illustrations

Learning Resources
•

Rousar, D. R. (2013). Memory drawing: Perceptual training and recall. Velatura Press.

•

Rousar, D. (n.d.). Memory drawing: Helping you make the most of every glance in just 15
minutes a day. Atelier Rousar [Asynchronous Online Course].
https://memorydrawing.com

•

Schlam, C. (2018). The Creative Path: A View from the Studio on the Making of Art. New
York: Skyhorse Publishing Company, p. 44 “Building Your Visual Memory.”

•

Speed, H. (1917). The Practice and Science of Drawing. Seeley, Service and Co. Ltd.
(see chapter 18: The visual memory). http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14264

•

Yates, F. A. (1992). The art of memory. Pimlico.
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Learning Strategies
•

Recruit top-down determinative Judgment: Take note, verbally, of features and
proportions present in subject matter. This improves accurate representation because
semantic information can bolster syntactic representation. Additionally, the act of
translation requires effort that bolsters memory. Give a concrete name to abstract shapes
to aid recollection of them. This is a use of semantics to support syntax. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge; Imagination: Reproductive Imagination)

•

Visual Selection: Use memory as a tool to zero in on the most meaningful details and
squint your eyes to take in the most salient features of a scene. (Judgment: LogicalReflective)

•

Set aside adequate time for practice, and put diligent effort into your labors, striving for
accuracy toward soundness of form and conformity to the intended design, by means of
tacit inference. (Judgment: Judgments of Coherence; Embodiment: Tacit Inference)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of exercises resulting in drawings done from memory, wherein the model
and the drawing of the model may be compared.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should hew closely to their models, ideally. Over time, as more drawings are
completed, there should be discernible improvements. I will engage in dynamic and
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summative evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this project; additionally, I will ask my
committee members, who are artists and artisans, for their assessments.
Project C: Canonical and Non-Canonical Views
Learning Competencies
•

Create a library of drawings presenting selected objects in canonical perspective, as well
as various, unusual, and alternative perspectives.

•

Present an artistic reality that largely (though not necessarily entirely) seems probable or
possible; this includes figures that feel volumetric and full of life. These drawings should
be based on observable data and skillfully constructed so their contents seem to accord
with natural causes.

•

Present any human figures as plausibly specific individuals expressing universal
emotions through the body. For purposes of this dissertation, this excludes identifiable
likenesses of any living human being other than myself.

Learning Objectives
•

Look at things from different vantage points, and practice representing things from
different perspectives. This is called perceptual reorganization and it is a component of
constructive perception, which is a hallmark of expertise and creativity. (Imagination:
Schematism/Perception)

•

Recruit top-down determinative Judgment: Practice drawing a mnemonic alphabet of
canonical views of objects to strengthen mental schemata and train memory prototypes;
do the same with geons. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination; Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge)
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Loosely sketch different pictures to fill in visual memory gaps due to low resolution of
observed, recollected, or visualized imagery. An example of this strategy is the
sketchbooks Leonardo kept, documenting a wide variety of figures in motion for later
reference. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination; Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

Subject Matter
•

Everyday objects, both manmade and natural; animals; people from a distance (deidentified or otherwise unidentifiable)

Learning Resources
•

Aristides, J. (2016). Classical drawing atelier: A complete course in traditional studio
practice. Watson-Guptill.

•

Curtis, B. (2009). Drawing from Observation: An Introduction to Perceptual Drawing.
McGraw-Hill Education.

•

Dickinson, S. J., & Biederman, I. (2014). Geons. In K. Ikeuchi, Computer vision: A
reference guide (pp. 338–346). Springer.

•

Hohn, D. (n.d.). Basic perspective drawing [Asynchronous online course]. Society of
Visual Storytelling. https://courses.svslearn.com/courses/basic-perspective-drawing

•

Wood, J. N. (2009). Distinct visual working memory systems for view-dependent and
view-invariant representation. PLOS ONE, 4(8), e6601.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0006601

Learning Strategies
•

Study your subject matter with curiosity and rigor. Try to understand its essence beyond
what you see at first glance. (Imagination: Schematism/Perception)
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Measure and practice drawing to scale and proportion, observing how shadows are cast
differently based on lighting conditions. A good draftsperson must surmise relationships
between what is seen and what is out of sight, thus solving the inverse problem: "For any
two-dimensional image that is projected onto the retina there is an infinite set of possible
three-dimensional shapes at varying distances and orientations that could have produced
it" (Seeley, 2020, p. 123). This is because we infer causes from predicables (i.e., effects),
such as force, action, or passion. Ask and understand: What causes these appearances?
(Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

For the non-canonical views: “Unbake” your portrayals by stripping away the influence
of stereotypical schemata to present subject matter in a fresh, unprocessed way. Use
bottom-up processing, for example, the “innocent eye” approach. (Judgment:
Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Lead my hands with my head. (Embodiment: Tacit Integration)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of exercises resulting in series of perceptual (i.e., observational)
drawings that catalog objects and other kinds of subject matter using a wide range of
perspectives and lighting conditions.
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Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should exhibit evidence of close visual analysis and the incorporation of basic
shapes and geons where merited. I will engage in dynamic and summative evaluation,
reflexively, to evaluate this project; additionally, I will ask my committee members, who
are artists and artisans, for their assessments.

Project D: Perspective
Learning Competencies
•

Present an artistic reality that largely (though not necessarily entirely) seems probable or
possible; this includes presenting figures that feel volumetric and full of life.

•

Present skillfully constructed images that seem to accord with natural causes, or that
seem to be based on observable data.

•

Imply content beyond the frame that affects subject matter in view, for we infer causes
from predicables (i.e., effects), such as force, action, or passion. The beholder should
wonder, whether consciously or unconsciously: What causes these appearances?

Learning Objectives
•

Learn and apply rules of linear perspective, which provides a theoretical grounding for
realist art. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

Subject Matter
•

boxes, books, walkways, objects through window, buildings, imaginal people and places,
tables, windows, objects (e.g., bottles, utensils), interior spaces and shapes

Learning Resources
•

Bourke, P. (2020, July 8). Reverse Perspective. http://paulbourke.net/revpersp
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Goodman, N. (1976). Languages of art: An approach to a theory of symbols. Hackett.
(see chapter 3: Perspective, pp. 10-18)

•

Kemp, M. (1990). The science of art: Optical themes in Western art from Brunelleschi to
Seurat. Yale University Press, (Part 1: Lines of Sight, pp. 5-162; Appendix I, pp. 342–
343).

•

Norling, E. R. (1999). Perspective made easy. Dover Publications.

•

Sansom, P. (2019, January 25). Remember this … The reverse perspective? [Instructions
for making a reverse perspective drawing]
https://petersansom.wordpress.com/2019/01/25/remember-thisthe-reverse-perspective

Learning Strategies
•

Measure and practice drawing to scale and proportion, observing how shadows are cast
differently based on lighting conditions. A good draftsperson must surmise relationships
between what is seen and what is out of sight, thus solving the inverse problem: "For any
two-dimensional image that is projected onto the retina there is an infinite set of possible
three-dimensional shapes at varying distances and orientations that could have produced
it" (Seeley, 2020, p. 123). This is because we infer causes from predicables (i.e., effects),
such as force, action, or passion. Ask and understand: What causes these appearances?
(Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Employ gradualness, as well as artisanal systems, such as the mahl stick to steady the
hand, skewers and string to measure, pencil sharpening for control of pigmentation, and
plumb lines for accuracy. These afford regulation of your work and give you greater
control of your artisanal decision-making. (Embodiment: Situative and Tacit Integration)

•

Lead my hands with my head. (Embodiment: Tacit Integration)
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Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of perspective exercises of increasing complexity.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should exhibit accurate linear perspective. I will engage in dynamic and
summative evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this project; additionally, I will ask my
committee members, who are artists and artisans, for their assessments.

Project E: Euclidean Plane Geometry
Learning Competencies
•

When constructing a drawing, depict optical part-to-whole geometric relationships.

•

Harness geometry to present “unbaked” portrayals that feel fresh and unprocessed,
avoiding clichés and stereotypes, so the viewer can participate more easily in coconstructing the images.

•

Utilize geometric principles to create an artistic reality that largely (though not
necessarily entirely) seems probable or possible; this includes presenting figures that feel
volumetric and full of life.

Learning Objectives
•

Learn the names of different geometrical shapes and practice drawing them. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge)
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Learn and apply the rules of geometry that provide a theoretical grounding for realist art.
(Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Inductively seek out and draw the hidden geometrical forms within objects. Doing so
builds schemata, which can be drawn upon later in a more deductive fashion. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge; Logical-Reflective)

Subject Matter
•

2-D and 3-D objects that are explicitly or implicitly geometric in nature, some solid,
some transparent or translucent

Learning Resources
•

Aristides, J. (2016). Classical drawing atelier: A complete course in traditional studio
practice. Watson-Guptill.

•

Chabrier, R. (2020, October). The geometry of snails: A slow introduction to modern
geometry [Video]. https://vimeo.com/renaudchabrier/review/469215938/a6c4de7862

•

Gowers, T. (2002). Mathematics: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
(see chapter 6: Geometry, p. 86–111)

•

Hanstein, H. (1908). Constructive drawing. Chicago, New York [etc.], Keuffel & Esser
co. http://archive.org/details/constructivedraw01hans

•

Harvey, M. (2015). Geometry illuminated: An illustrated introduction to Euclidean and
hyperbolic plane geometry. Mathematical Association of America.

•

Heinz, A. (2021). Folding polyhedra: The art & geometry of paper folding. Schiffer.

•

Pacioli, L. (2021). De divina proportione [Divine proportion] (G. Tombs, Trans.).
Evidentia Classics. https://www.evidentia.net/book/pacioli-divine-proportion (Original
work published 1506)

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW
•

433

Penrose, R. (1986). Escher and the visual representation of mathematical ideas. In H. S.
M. Coxeter, M. Emmer, R. Penrose and M. L. Teuber (Eds.), M. C. Escher: Art and
science (pp. 143–147). North-Holland.

•

Solà-Soler, J. (2012). Sacred geometry. Sacred Geometry. http://www.sacredgeometry.es/?q=en

•

Studio Jocelyn. (2019, May 5). How to make a tessellation—The easy way.
https://youtu.be/Ca5J_moee7U

Learning Strategies
•

Study your subject matter with curiosity and rigor. Try to understand its essence beyond
what you see at first glance. Thereby seek its truth. (Imagination:
Schematism/Perception; Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Measure and practice drawing to scale and proportion, observing how shadows are cast
differently based on lighting conditions. A good draftsperson must surmise relationships
between what is seen and what is out of sight, thus solving the inverse problem: "For any
two-dimensional image that is projected onto the retina there is an infinite set of possible
three-dimensional shapes at varying distances and orientations that could have produced
it" (Seeley, 2020, p. 123). This is because we infer causes from predicables (i.e., effects),
such as force, action, or passion. Ask and understand: What causes these appearances?
(Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Employ gradualness, as well as artisanal systems, such as the mahl stick to steady the
hand, skewers and string to measure, pencil sharpening for control of pigmentation, and
plumb lines for accuracy. These afford regulation of your work and give you greater
control of your artisanal decision-making. (Embodiment: Situative and Tacit Integration)
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Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of a series of drawings depicting geometric figures, as well as analytical
drawings wherein geometrical figures are revealed within other objects or underpin the
overall scene/design/composition of a drawing.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should exhibit thoughtful attention to geometrical shapes and patterns. I will
engage in dynamic and summative evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this project;
additionally, I will ask my committee members, who are artists and artisans, for their
assessments.

Project F: Pattern
Learning Competencies
•

Present a sense of harmony by means of the golden ratio/Fibonacci sequence (part-whole
relationships).

•

Make the familiar strange through defamiliarization; for example, present unusual
perspectives. Offer an element of surprise.

•

Present meaningful part-to-whole relationships, both visually (optically) and
symbolically (by means of istoria).

•

Present universal artistic forms, such as circles, spirals, hatchings, and more.
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Learning Objectives
•

Learn the golden ratio/Fibonacci sequence. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Practice using the golden ratio/Fibonacci sequence when designing the composition of an
artwork and its subject matter. (Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Study universal artistic forms, such as circles, spirals, hatchings, and more. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge; Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Present a pattern, perhaps something derived from the regularity and systematicity of
nature, and then break it in an unexpected way. This exploits the perceptual prediction
paradox, which is a two-process perceptual model wherein probabilistic knowledge
initially biases perception toward what is likely and subsequently upweights events that
are surprising. (Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

Subject Matter
•

natural objects found outdoors (e.g., seashells, branches, pinecones); scenes (arrangement
and background of any subject matter)

Learning Resources
•

Aristides, J. (2016). Classical drawing atelier: A complete course in traditional studio
practice. Watson-Guptill.

•

Lima, M. (2017). The book of circles: Visualizing spheres of knowledge: (Illustrated
edition). Princeton Architectural Press.

•

Pacioli, L. (2021). De divina proportione [Divine proportion] (G. Tombs, Trans.).
Evidentia Classics. https://www.evidentia.net/book/pacioli-divine-proportion/ (Original
work published 1506)
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Schaefer-Simmern, H. (2003). Consciousness of artistic form: A comparison of the
visual, gestalt art formations of children, adolescents, and layman adults with historical
art, folk art, and aboriginal art. Gertrude Schaefer-Simmern Trust.

•

Solà-Soler, J. (2012). Sacred geometry. Sacred Geometry. http://www.sacredgeometry.es/?q=en

•

Three Initiates [pseudonym]. (2008) The kybalion: A study of the hermetic philosophy of
ancient Egypt and Greece. Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin. (Original work published 1912)

Learning Strategies
•

Study your subject matter with curiosity and rigor. Try to understand its essence beyond
what you see at first glance. (Imagination: Schematism/Perception)

•

Recruit top-down determinative Judgment: Take note, verbally, of features and
proportions present in subject matter. This improves accurate representation because
semantic information can bolster syntactic representation. Additionally, the act of
translation requires effort that bolsters memory. Give a concrete name to abstract shapes
to aid recollection of them. This is a use of semantics to support syntax. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge; Imagination: Reproductive Imagination)

•

Present a pattern, perhaps something derived from the regularity and systematicity of
nature, and then break it in an unexpected way. This exploits the perceptual prediction
paradox, which is a two-process perceptual model wherein probabilistic knowledge
initially biases perception toward what is likely and subsequently upweights events that
are surprising. (Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)
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Practice using the golden ratio/Fibonacci sequence when designing the composition of an
artwork and its subject matter. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge;
Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of a series of drawings depicting patterns, as well as analytical drawings
wherein patterns are revealed within other objects or underpin the overall
scene/design/composition of a drawing.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should exhibit thoughtful attention to patterns. I will engage in dynamic and
summative evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this project; additionally, I will ask my
committee members, who are artists and artisans, for their assessments.

Project G: Anatomy
Learning Competencies
•

Utilize anatomy to present an artistic reality that largely (though not necessarily entirely)
seems probable or possible; this includes presenting figures that feel volumetric and full
of life; Present skillfully constructed images that seem to accord with natural causes, or
that seem to be based on observable data (with wiggle room for fantastical subject
matter).

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW
•

438

Present meaningful part-to-whole relationships, both visually (optically) and
symbolically (by means of istoria).

•

Present a sense of harmony by balancing seemingly oppositional emotional experiences.

•

Present figures as plausibly specific individuals expressing universal emotions. For
purposes of this dissertation, this excludes identifiable likenesses of any living human
being other than myself.

Learning Objectives
•

Learn and apply rules of anatomy, which provides a theoretical grounding for realist art.
(Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Learn more about facial expressions in order to present figures as plausibly specific
individuals expressing universal emotions. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge;
Embodiment: Somatic)

•

Empathize with emotions by reading facial expressions among real people and people
depicted in artworks. This not only helps you be a better human being, but also helps you
to present your sketched figures as plausibly specific individuals who are expressing
universal emotions. (Embodiment: Somatic)

•

Do blind contour drawings. (Imagination: Reproductive Imagination; Embodiment:
Situative)

Subject Matter
•

art manikins and anatomical models; trees

Learning Resources
•

Armature Nine. (2016, January 9). A9 Lectures—Anatomical Landmarks.
https://youtu.be/BUMcqnlHooo
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Apesos, A., & Stevens, K. (2008). Anatomy for artists: A new approach to discovering,
learning and remembering the body. North Light Books.

•

Fairbanks, A. T. 1897-1987. (2005). Human proportions for artists. Fairbanks Art and
Books.

•

Körperwelten (n.d.). Body worlds - Take an eye-opening journey under the skin!
https://bodyworlds.com (This is different from BODIES...The Exhibition. These were
donated, whereas those were not.)

•

Lauricella, M. (2018). Morpho. Rocky Nook.

•

Cole, R. V. (1916). The artistic anatomy of trees, their structure & treatment in painting.
Seeley, Service & Co, limited.

•

Darwin, C. (1896). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. D. Appleton.

•

Dürer, A. (1958). Writings. Philosophical Library. (see Chapter 12, The four books of
human proportion, pp. 227–252)

•

Rifkin, B. A. (2006). Human anatomy: From the Renaissance to the digital age. Abrams.

•

Shoo Rayner Drawing. (2014, March 24). How to draw with wooden mannequin models.
https://youtu.be/rXWauwCy0Rc

Learning Strategies
•

Draw more than what you see outwardly (Cennini, 1437/2015) by layering perception
with imagination and recollected imagery. (Imagination: Productive)

•

Study your subject matter with curiosity and rigor. Try to understand its essence beyond
what you see at first glance. Thereby seek its truth. (Imagination:
Schematism/Perception; Judgment: Logical-Reflective).
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Learn time-tested principles and rules of draftsmanship, such as the precept to use convex
lines to denote the exterior surfaces of bodies and thereby show life force pushing
outward, giving your figures a sense of depth. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Recruit top-down determinative Judgment: Take note, verbally, of features and
proportions present in subject matter. This improves accurate representation because
semantic information can bolster syntactic representation. Additionally, the act of
translation requires effort that bolsters memory. Give a concrete name to abstract shapes
to aid recollection of them. This is a use of semantics to support syntax. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Visual Selection: Use memory as a tool to zero in on the most meaningful details and
squint your eyes to take in the most salient features of a scene. (Judgment: LogicalReflective)

•

When drawing faces realistically, emphasize the internal details over the outline to
achieve a more believable representation and in order to represent objects more
convincingly, portray local details, such as vertices, that aid object recognition.
(Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Develop discernment by working through hypotheses about which choices in drawing
will converge to produce the most convincing portrayals. (Judgment: Logical-Reflective;
Judgments of Coherence)

•

Purposively shift attention between local/proximal details and global/distal/gestalt
features of my subject matter and my drawing. Also shift attention between perceptual
and conceptual details, such as a shadow cast over the eye vs. the presence of a barely
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discernible pupil. This affords a serial verification of fit between two attentional planes
and develops creativity. (Judgment: Judgments of Coherence)
•

Allow my heart to lead my head. (Embodiment: Somatic)

•

Take situative factors into account: Because the location of lines is determined through
deictic location pointers in memory, I should situate my body in accordance with subject
matter and paper, and also close one eye to perceive a specific point/location more
accurately and increase gaze frequencies between my drawing and the stimulus. For these
reasons, there is also great value in doing blind contour drawings. (Embodiment:
Situative)

•

Practice combining and trying to harmonize seemingly oppositional subject matter and
markings (particularly in regard to chosen master drawing from HAM collection).
(Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The production of a series of exploratory anatomical sketches exploring proportions and
emotional expressiveness.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should exhibit thoughtful attention to anatomical proportions and
expressiveness. They need not feel finished. I will engage in dynamic and summative
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evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this project; additionally, I will ask my committee
members, who are artists and artisans, for their assessments.
Project H: Copying Master Drawings
Learning Competencies
•

When constructing a drawing, begin by accentuating the most meaningful details, a form
of exemplification.

•

When constructing a drawing, depict visual part-to-whole relationships.

•

Present an artistic reality that largely (though not necessarily entirely) seems probable or
possible; this includes presenting figures that feel volumetric and full of life.

•

Present skillfully constructed images that seem to accord with natural causes, or that
seem to be based on observable data.

Learning Objectives
•

Use the knowledge embedded in master drawings: Study these models/exemplars
(focusing on different aspects, like line quality, value distribution, composition) to
grapple with the decisions the artists made, which are documented therein. This
additionally will reveal some information about how the artists handled and manipulated
their tools and materials. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge; Logical-Reflective;
Embodiment: Situative)

•

Measure and practice drawing to scale and proportion. (Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Learn established drawing techniques to support imaginative ideation. (Imagination:
Productive Imagination)
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Subject Matter
•

Peter Paul Rubens. (1620). Saint Gregory of Nazianzus Subduing Heresy. [Drawing].
Harvard Art Museums/Fogg Museum, Cambridge, MA. https://hvrd.art/o/295713

Learning Resources
•

Academy of Realist Art, Boston: Online Bargue drawing classes in which I have enrolled

•

Digitized master drawings from Harvard Art Museums’ collections that I can easily
access for in-person examination in the Art Study Center after the pandemic, and which
are also published in the ARTstor database, allowing close-up zooming: Drawings from
the Age of Bruegel, Rubens, and Rembrandt
https://harvardartmuseums.org/exhibitions/5081/drawings-from-the-age-of-bruegelrubens-and-rembrandt

•

Rousar, D. R. (2013). Memory drawing: Perceptual training and recall. Velatura Press.
(see Appendix IV: Copying old master drawings, p. 125–128)

•

Studio Rousar. (2012, April 18). Copying old master drawings.
https://web.archive.org/web/20141022050222/http://www.studiorousar.com/2012/04/18/c
opying-old-master-drawings

Learning Strategies
•

Learn time-tested principles and rules of draftsmanship, such as the precept to use convex
lines to denote the exterior surfaces of bodies and thereby show life force pushing
outward, giving your figures a sense of depth. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge)

•

Recruit top-down determinative Judgment: Take note, verbally, of features and
proportions present in subject matter. This improves accurate representation because
semantic information can bolster syntactic representation. Additionally, the act of
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translation requires effort that bolsters memory. Give a concrete name to abstract shapes
to aid recollection of them. This is a use of semantics to support syntax. (Judgment:
Determinative/Knowledge)
•

Visual Selection: Use memory as a tool to zero in on the most meaningful details and
squint your eyes to take in the most salient features of a scene. (Judgment: LogicalReflective)

•

Purposively shift attention between local/proximal details and global/distal/gestalt
features of my subject matter and my drawing. Also shift attention between perceptual
and conceptual details, such as a shadow cast over the eye vs. the presence of a barely
discernible pupil. This affords a serial verification of fit between two attentional planes
and develops creativity. (Judgment: Judgments of Coherence)

•

Set aside adequate time for practice, and put diligent effort into your labors, striving for
accuracy toward soundness of form and conformity to the intended design, by means of
tacit inference. (Judgment: Judgments of Coherence; Embodiment: Situative; Tacit
Integration)

•

Employ gradualness, as well as artisanal systems, such as the mahl stick to steady the
hand, skewers and string to measure, pencil sharpening for control of pigmentation, and
plumb lines for accuracy. These afford regulation of your work and give you greater
control of your artisanal decision-making. (Embodiment: Situative; Tacit Integration)

•

Lead my hands with my head. (Embodiment: Tacit Integration)

•

Practice using drawing implements until they feel like extensions of my body. Develop
dexterity. (Embodiment: Tacit Integration)
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Maintain proper posture and stance. Learn to control appropriate fine and gross motor
movements. (Embodiment: Tacit Integration; Somatic)

•

Take situative factors into account: Because the location of lines is determined through
deictic location pointers in memory, I should situate my body in accordance with subject
matter and paper, and also close one eye to perceive a specific point/location more
accurately and increase gaze frequencies between my drawing and the stimulus. For these
reasons, there is also great value in doing blind contour drawings. (Embodiment:
Situative)

•

Practice combining and trying to harmonize seemingly oppositional subject matter and
markings (particularly in regard to chosen master drawing from HAM collection).
(Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while drawing, as well as sensations (e.g.,
five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements toward
skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect on how
these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment: Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The completion of Bargue exercises (copies of drawings) and a selected master drawing
from the collections at the Harvard Art Museum.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Drawings should hew closely to their models, ideally. Over time, as more drawings are
completed, there should be discernible improvements. I will engage in dynamic and
summative evaluation, reflexively, to evaluate this project; additionally, I will receive
feedback from my instructors in cases where I’m taking a class.
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Project I: Analysis of Visual Poetics
Learning Competencies
•

Detect and analyze “unbaked” portrayals that feel fresh and unprocessed, avoiding
clichés and stereotypes, so the viewer can participate in constructing the image.

•

Detect and analyze meaningful part-to-whole relationships, both visually (optically) and
symbolically (due to istoria).

•

Detect and analyze images that can be interpreted in multiple ways.

•

Detect and analyze harmony by resulting from the balance of seemingly oppositional
emotional experiences.

•

Detect and analyze forms that have a compelling relationship to the semantic content that
is depicted.

Learning Objectives
•

Become acquainted with literary devices and figures of speech (visual poetics) and how
these function in artworks. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge; Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Analyze forms in terms of content/function and look to literary devices and figures of
speech (visual poetics) for analysis. (Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

Subject Matter
•

2-D artworks found on the Google Arts & Culture website.

Learning Resources
•

Dupriez, B. M. (1991). A dictionary of literary devices: Gradus, A-Z. University of
Toronto Press.
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Forceville, C. (2008). Metaphor in pictures and multimodal representations. In R. W. Jr.
Gibbs (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (pp. 462–482).
Cambridge University Press.

•

Google Arts & Culture. (n.d.). https://artsandculture.google.com

•

Kennedy, J. M. (2008). Metaphor and art. In R. W. Jr. Gibbs (Ed.), The Cambridge
Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (pp. 447–461). Cambridge University Press.

•

Lanham, R. A. (1968). A handlist of rhetorical terms; a guide for students of English
literature. University of California Press.

•

Walker, J. A., & Chaplin, S. (1997). Visual culture: An introduction. St. Martin’s Press.

Learning Strategies
•

Notice forms that have a compelling relationship to the semantic content being depicted.
(Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Notice any sense of harmony achieved through the balance of seemingly oppositional
emotional experiences. (Judgment: Reflective/Aesthetic)

•

Draw upon knowledge from practitioners, both living and deceased, via artifacts and
media (e.g., artworks, inspirational models), publications (e.g., books and videos),
lectures, and classes (i.e., communities of practice]. (Embodiment: Situative)

•

Study your subject matter with curiosity and rigor. Try to understand its essence beyond
what you see at first glance. Thereby seek its truth. (Imagination:
Schematism/Perception; Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Note how the artist implied content beyond the frame that affects subject matter in view,
for we infer causes from predicables (i.e., effects), such as force, action, or passion. The

AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION OF LEARNING TO DRAW

448

beholder should wonder, whether consciously or unconsciously: What causes these
appearances? (Judgment: Logical-Reflective)
•

Analyze how the artist presented meaningful part-to-whole relationships, both visually
(optically) and symbolically (by means of istoria). (Judgment: Logical-Reflective)

•

Use the knowledge embedded in master drawings: Study these models/exemplars
(focusing on different aspects, like line quality, value distribution, composition) to
grapple with the decisions the artists made, which are documented therein. This
additionally will reveal some information about how the artists handled and manipulated
their tools and materials. (Judgment: Determinative/Knowledge; Logical-Reflective;
Embodiment: Situative)

•

Recognize emotions (i.e., affects) that arise while viewing artworks, as well as sensations
(e.g., five senses), kinesthetic feelings/experiences (e.g., textures/frictions/movements
toward skill development), and spiritual experiences (e.g., transcendence of self). Reflect
on how these experiences guide my decision-making in the work. (Embodiment:
Somatic)

Evidence of Accomplishment of Objectives
•

The writing of a series of short journal entries analyzing the visual poetics of various
artworks.

Criteria and Means for Validating Evidence
•

Each short analysis should reference literary devices and figures of speech and provide a
convincing argument.
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Appendix B
Problem Finding Activity for Perspective Projection

Purpose
To give students intentional experience with problem finding in art as it relates to the
artist’s role as a storyteller through images. The activity should encourage exploration, trial and
error, and the consideration of alternative ideas through the eyes of fellow students.
Procedure
To begin, present a selection of widely acclaimed representational paintings, illustrations,
or drawings to one or more small groups of students. These images should be ones that
exemplify various applications of naturalistic, or plausible, linear perspective. Perfection is not a
criterion, however!
Homework
Ask each student to select one of the works to represent spatially, in three-dimensional
(3D) form, using a shoebox-sized 3D grid, 3D geometric shapes, and wire, tape, or string as
needed. Discourage students from investing time rendering details and ornamentation; this
should be a very generalized sketch. Then, students should use a camera (a phone camera will
do) to snap several shots of their own finished scenes from a range of perspectives, distances,
and lighting situations without straying from the effort toward accurate spatial representation
(i.e., they should not make their dioramas too abstract—that can be for a different activity).
Students should each select one of the photos they snapped as their favorite and be ready to
explain why they selected it. Then, students should submit their chosen photos with their names
on them, being careful not to refer to the name of the painting that had inspired the photo.
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During the Next Class Meeting
Students should bring their selected photos and their 3D models to class. The 3D models
should neither include the title of the painting that inspired them nor the students’ names).
Class Activity. Students should experiment with lighting and perspective on two of their
fellow classmates’ dioramas (such that each diorama is workshopped by at least two peers),
snapping a range of photos and selecting the best among those for each of the objects.
Additionally, they should guess which painting was represented by their peers’ dioramas (but
keep that info to themselves initially).
Break.
After the Break. The class will do a round robin. To start: One by one, students will
each present their selected photo of their own diorama, not initially referring to the painting that
inspired it. Then, the diorama will be introduced and discussed. People will guess what painting
inspired it. Conversations/critiques should emphasize the storytelling effects of compositional
choices. Next, the peers who engaged with a given students’ diorama will present their photos
and the rationale behind their selection of favorites. Finally, the group will discuss those choices.
Move on to the next student, and so forth.
Follow-up Assignment
Students will develop a perspective drawing derived from and inspired by (but not
copying) their selected painting, being sure to make intentional choices related to the story each
hopes their drawing will tell. This may entail readjusting their dioramas and snapping new
photos from which one will be selected as a guiding model for the drawing.
Evaluation
The class will reflect on the assignment during individual and group critiques.
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